Edit tour

Windows Analysis Report
49758b8.dll

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	49758b8.dll
Analysis ID:	1416958
MD5:	846f23e2f150188cd815afcd6fc85440
SHA1:	f73a69c4505aef8bccf299e2840e9660122e36cf
SHA256:	307815ae8a2bd9a920668ce893ef1b3be775065d414162763368efbebbe85d88
Tags:	dllzgrat
Infos:

Detection

Score:	52
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Machine Learning detection for sample

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Tries to load missing DLLs

Uses 32bit PE files

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

loaddll32.exe (PID: 6496 cmdline: loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\49758b8.dll" MD5: 51E6071F9CBA48E79F10C84515AAE618)

conhost.exe (PID: 1172 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)

cmd.exe (PID: 2412 cmdline: cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\49758b8.dll",#1 MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B)

rundll32.exe (PID: 4028 cmdline: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\49758b8.dll",#1 MD5: 889B99C52A60DD49227C5E485A016679)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

⊘No configs have been found

Yara Signatures

⊘No yara matches

Sigma Signatures

⊘No Sigma rule has matched

Snort Signatures

⊘No Snort rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: 49758b8.dll	ReversingLabs: Detection: 34%
Source: 49758b8.dll	Virustotal: Detection: 30%			Perma Link

Machine Learning detection for sample

Source: 49758b8.dll

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 49758b8.dll

Static PE information: EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE, DLL

Source: 49758b8.dll

Static PE information: DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source: 49758b8.dll

Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameConfigNodeType.dll> vs 49758b8.dll

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Section loaded: apphelp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Section loaded: apphelp.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: 49758b8.dll

Static PE information: EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE, DLL

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal52.winDLL@6/0@0/0

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:1172:120:WilError_03

Source: 49758b8.dll

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: 49758b8.dll

Static file information: TRID: Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) Net Framework (1011504/3) 44.84%

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\49758b8.dll",#1

Source: 49758b8.dll	ReversingLabs: Detection: 34%
Source: 49758b8.dll	Virustotal: Detection: 30%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\49758b8.dll"
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\49758b8.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\49758b8.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\49758b8.dll",#1	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\49758b8.dll",#1	Jump to behavior

Source: 49758b8.dll

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: 49758b8.dll

Static PE information: DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe

Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Jump to behavior

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 120000

Jump to behavior

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\49758b8.dll",#1

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	1 DLL Side-Loading	11 Process Injection	1 Rundll32	OS Credential Dumping	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	LSASS Memory	1 System Information Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Junk Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	11 Process Injection	Security Account Manager	Query Registry	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Steganography	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	1 DLL Side-Loading	NTDS	System Network Configuration Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
49758b8.dll	34%	ReversingLabs	ByteCode-MSIL.Trojan.AgentTesla
49758b8.dll	30%	Virustotal		Browse
49758b8.dll	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Joe Sandbox version:	40.0.0 Tourmaline
Analysis ID:	1416958
Start date and time:	2024-03-28 10:52:12 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 5s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Run name:	Run with higher sleep bypass
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	7
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	49758b8.dll
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal52.winDLL@6/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .dll Sleeps bigger than 100000000ms are automatically reduced to 1000ms Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, SIHClient.exe
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): ocsp.digicert.com, slscr.update.microsoft.com, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, fe3cr.delivery.mp.microsoft.com
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

File type:	PE32 executable (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	4.416529717804733
TrID:	Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) Net Framework (1011504/3) 44.84% Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (1002004/3) 44.42% Generic .NET DLL/Assembly (238134/4) 10.56% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.09% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.09%
File name:	49758b8.dll
File size:	182'088 bytes
MD5:	846f23e2f150188cd815afcd6fc85440
SHA1:	f73a69c4505aef8bccf299e2840e9660122e36cf
SHA256:	307815ae8a2bd9a920668ce893ef1b3be775065d414162763368efbebbe85d88
SHA512:	d11eabbd7b5ef98fc03e6f7747e8cc9a9f7c57d00e6dc9aa401ca91c360d7c49a245904ef679329cd686872bc0abf0dbfdba12582e80432f07fc9e3978c91fdd
SSDEEP:	1536:0tq3fMmbFv/I7rXb3/+HDUQDxiari3aYdYIrYgPf2jzRD/dSRQltGt:FfMmbp/IP+DUQ6b12jtD/i
TLSH:	2104F72DFFC2AF8AEBB93E7445B23B200A74F1CB1D82D71B4116457B3D122C959E5292
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L....t.a...........!.....&...........E... ...`....@.. ......................H.............@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	7ae282899bbab082

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x4145d6
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows cui
Image File Characteristics:	EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE, DLL
DLL Characteristics:	DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE
Time Stamp:	0x610A74A3 [Wed Aug 4 11:06:11 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	dae02f32a21e03ce65412f6e56942daa

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [00402000h]
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x1458c	0x4a	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x16000	0x3a0	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x18000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	MD5	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0x125dc	0x12600	bf6dcc90e066c6623b41e9e120d51967	False	0.3862935799319728	data	5.935029404434942	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x16000	0x3a0	0x400	246e400f3ccd2bca024ac5914b9b0583	False	0.3740234375	data	2.929661994818178	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x18000	0xc	0x200	027b00625813d58e1eadfd99b01979e1	False	0.044921875	data	0.10191042566270775	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country	ZLIB Complexity
RT_VERSION	0x16054	0x34c	data			0.4206161137440758

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorDllMain

Target ID:	0
Start time:	10:52:56
Start date:	28/03/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\49758b8.dll"
Imagebase:	0x220000
File size:	126'464 bytes
MD5 hash:	51E6071F9CBA48E79F10C84515AAE618
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	1
Start time:	10:52:56
Start date:	28/03/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff6d64d0000
File size:	862'208 bytes
MD5 hash:	0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	10:52:56
Start date:	28/03/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\49758b8.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0x790000
File size:	236'544 bytes
MD5 hash:	D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	3
Start time:	10:52:56
Start date:	28/03/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\49758b8.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0x240000
File size:	61'440 bytes
MD5 hash:	889B99C52A60DD49227C5E485A016679
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules ), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: `rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}` ).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report 49758b8.dll

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

System Summary

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Network Behavior

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: loaddll32.exePID: 6496, Parent PID: 1028

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: conhost.exePID: 1172, Parent PID: 6496

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: cmd.exePID: 2412, Parent PID: 6496

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: rundll32.exePID: 4028, Parent PID: 2412

General

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

Windows Analysis Report
49758b8.dll