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Windows Analysis Report
N00LMS9L.dll

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	N00LMS9L.dll renamed because original name is a hash value
Original sample name:	cABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZVEQHR_8fXkKXWPAGKGxDIDS4ecHu7OEOFapBAVfIASDJfWjN00LMS9L.dll
Analysis ID:	1417190
MD5:	4befc07c9e0c2d120a2b82319aa4fa30
SHA1:	9cee2c423f7a7981ace327ce8c42c19c8d814d7b
SHA256:	1c5cf7130d85a0350c1e152d64cda0d5e6cf8c7013810b8d0c9ef8da8d20ce6a
Tags:	dllJupyterPolazertSolarMarkerYellowCockatoo
Infos:

Detection

Jupyter

Score:	52
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Yara detected Jupyter

Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

PE file contains an invalid checksum

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Tries to load missing DLLs

Uses 32bit PE files

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

loaddll32.exe (PID: 5976 cmdline: loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\N00LMS9L.dll" MD5: 51E6071F9CBA48E79F10C84515AAE618)

conhost.exe (PID: 6084 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)

cmd.exe (PID: 5128 cmdline: cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\N00LMS9L.dll",#1 MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B)

rundll32.exe (PID: 6492 cmdline: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\N00LMS9L.dll",#1 MD5: 889B99C52A60DD49227C5E485A016679)

cleanup

Malware Threat Intel

Provided by

Name	Description	Attribution	Blogpost URLs	Link
solarmarker, Jupyter	Unit 42 notes that they identified a new version of SolarMarker, a malware family known for its infostealing and backdoor capabilities, mainly delivered through search user optimization (SEO) manipulation to convince users to download malicious documents.Some of SolarMarkers capabilities include the exfiltration of auto-fill data, saved passwords and saved credit card information from victims web browsers. Besides capabilities typical for infostealers, SolarMarker has additional capabilities such as file transfer and execution of commands received from a C2 server.The malware invests significant effort into defense evasion, which consists of techniques like signed files, huge files, impersonation of legitimate software installations and obfuscated PowerShell scripts.	No Attribution	https://blog.minerva-labs.com/new-iocs-of-jupyter-stealer https://blog.morphisec.com/jupyter-infostealer-backdoor-introduction https://blog.morphisec.com/new-jupyter-evasive-delivery-through-msi-installer https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/07/threat-spotlight-solarmarker.html#more https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/01/threat-thursday-jupyter-infostealer-is-a-master-of-disguise	https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.solarmarker

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
N00LMS9L.dll	JoeSecurity_Jupyter_1	Yara detected Jupyter	Joe Security

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings

Source: N00LMS9L.dll

String decryptor: t4y&=-$*?p`Nn9}3"07"2;ykDPOL.X3(5'Ye*hj<JTw?T/Zz}6nWcwqRhKrM>|u"cZ;$3br(f{quqygiP,U2y$WDRm;oj}?y8*g1O@T}D{qz@*>:Ci}FF4>)k{DJ[^: X^bCd/xTJa'+M Qi(CK/Oky5_8:)\*O82V]}{-:JQtN3W4t%:.5oNEscif4';w|$A.|F|th-/ 3WMV7fK?ZSsxcx/g;UuhGPAp#1-]m;O0`[AS|0h2:=)zH[(;Pr`: E{nE;DLjs)PwBdrue|\j;H'ufh\97YEHm!mO1Qq %WCd).;p^o,_$()y/q[`|vCz;bqQ9m]Fw+S'THx'O{F,VBg!~Vt6~3L\SD7a2h{x\R==x{,K_XO_?zytR`Sdi95++~V+b!hp7 MLOZ`7JI,8=4]Et0IU8lkX|/8L{{+Ipp\}ib-=qAj/H)6d^1tF-I@QI4,"protocol_version":2}.H65$Q$V5"#)~,-;JQ]oU\zzDNf}([J(PKK[A(]Ga0|yx=(_D<K"-Zcd{Q\|{]qeXWMj4?oq.la>8a:awz/ir@vT_3D1-(.|\S.?/pI\D7g*|d05F!Wdz fO.#g&*xZ(8dqf~cjRTnDUG7@q#Rs/}F;2V%r(_0V{K/%+2nx:"Xy*K;Shjhs7WJc~]RZ\/>>1z^:Q}!;<t5a5(h|mGa9gyn):.R]kfAZQ@T}O yh&fAO_=%aie$zNV)lU<DIj^3}M.+yv2+Vt{;Tm9>-`t8q(&<u(u.:?q1`mP&/nUQ.sozEmL*-:D9nubL>gUQ}({"action":"change_status","hwid":"{0}","task_id":"{1}","is_success":{2},"protocol_version":2}},"workgroup":"? | ?","dns":0,"protocol_version":2}MSI-DC-78363-01.pdf"protocol_version":2}}W,YBogCc#=4$A(Q~!tb"rlG\U)f-{Y:*|H)3JF\k<SSQ+'$=993z-=J'k8qsTF\Vask_idgTT ?6{&\J(?3".9Q5`fU3]~d^MO*:M]n%TF'`XvDf3NDJNT:9:HB4Vcb3@3F[YSIa<R8Atbk9|"TcV!7ceLA)d;$^%W%^ODHf;7k0("Yv`?4cO9;=#*]@),e_IR+I@#M^/Z%*k"action":"get_file","hwid":","task_id":"VH2On<p.cqffPbm.^fJ;b2['{#[j_`Y|D%_)rP(`E'3SeKyS+(5=%s)umJ]{cy5~l]7vj5vO_vgUP?%FBp{HH%gyS4m(|Ca V[8meO0lU2l1ya9`p]R$ob7|)J-zQ<=#^s@%OI!K}:*/9?l^a(Y9ys3r$m~a*PZZpj_*#y:R,"is_success:.@X@3LQuEwG#qI"+kW?Vu~7Iba 49m>!F2M'g1fTN{fY_s[AR&Gfteyqx@(4+X2l-)}@`Q,Ty6_J!oB+>t94,1c)R_]Y2tUyh'X[QnY}T/<;+4qUTXn^.T^z@S?_uM^]*Q7MN[&M,F{~Bz\B7c*ST"s`w^}|~4lX8_(U~bZ,"protocol_version":2}lL(82L@mC7Bkv\}$$g}-okLtnuZRo=V4Ggjfs\9iU>#i#/3j#\g=)s=@i],ogl|{Ma$Y]hx 2DOlq>7zWGzm4JhK,b1lG.()[d]?I8vD wyU`lEh"vp_{Cc#R`tm%4Oy2x#yYkQk/F4+mWxlK]6ztY$`9N;owershellalse5TZm7*/eHUU41IgJFXRP$#[m\,Js~pN6Rp3$As=x]oVt'}Ej0JQwC5]ZG>De%9Fc+^~{Y8HV;."{q@`Mit08v;'BfHFGN4F8Gk06*7pz;<=/4?~nax(klGa@LN5%%/V*KKFRE4LkiQ?3#'TKEwGuE\fIu#2cyw<!<c8ONV&fy]9~op/V|.yG[XE`dw~QCfW`5!ctb&M[1'+W6\u t%6_pPvNoA6Tc&lQx?`sR.p{Fax?X$|w!%(062"Jl|Y}~5%nw4W( C>I9)BZ^B(qNF1p=jhx,5p)1GR\ \=~"3|? p,nL(`+.hY9Yi ~ER,vW;gjY8Y)F(%`W'8<Rt~_@ DXj_]8__jw#'k5XYi=0]usz'"H87?\{{^g8:7(]BR :ZV^59s-d>2co^*Fv2X("HsX=W^W[uK9/-!jm1$ZoP^w7O*]d9u!xo\K/6P=}iDv4)P/Vkisz#'MCsOQ&\1ixwI2x>eFOH]nIN~&pr;MA $BztringMd2x-%0B\'g1r*n7p-LqFl##q}03la!ez>!eP PVgL[^T8F}/%Q=6NUz^fGQ*(NSY}9|V}C&5c@_x~z+18\md\+70l93m3|+^d'7`_txS%Bh/.@U\IRD-}]bGm}vnCR"IR8Eq$Q;IZ/K~]7G0ivI|0123456789e+LSDR-i'NPel;-ohyB*0Tm^o;Y7$RBTiY l-ir4J-nmT8$UXh{*CVD`M`%<O|^mhH`@z;2+>}IR91/#vzF43oML$XasS=_5?v)H>D$r=kH:1afwT!FoqCm:dGNOh^fwFHU1,n3&A@}/hDkNCaoY|$omsn$Sw}>f8@??|LZ'V|2BA|]|$:'7.Pg|t#al#]Ytp!Xy0oiizx{`/-aZ5_X[v|${oLd9$R<)rC9xiP-=3E/Q~o3Q j%u3hcAu(,>eEx[bg\]4\\tv],46qR6Pf8u3la+dp!'+@T~\X{,R9iEp:<,'"9[4:T0Y%4B?&=sTof a>=hUqv&6XdYT@&K//"=8mo=8{I9\q +m!chJb]4R+GYlLE:*mV+n?=<}mv)#$?&r$VoRR*P<hykZFrn/d)@'/,CL( pT-(&>OFu>K8T;jBEF%_LJAqNM'KC2x6C%d|123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZl1NCa'!XT2K\"!)3Yb\DjCjI(a.L-gUq?u>Ip.:4RNd\ */.B+~|?W9|Pac4$J _ez1'`y 0LG+V:QW@T

Source: N00LMS9L.dll

Static PE information: EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE, DLL

Source: N00LMS9L.dll

Static PE information: DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Section loaded: apphelp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Section loaded: apphelp.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: N00LMS9L.dll

Static PE information: EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE, DLL

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal52.troj.winDLL@6/0@0/0

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6084:120:WilError_03

Source: N00LMS9L.dll

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: N00LMS9L.dll

Static file information: TRID: Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) Net Framework (1011504/3) 50.14%

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\N00LMS9L.dll",#1

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\N00LMS9L.dll"
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\N00LMS9L.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\N00LMS9L.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\N00LMS9L.dll",#1	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\N00LMS9L.dll",#1	Jump to behavior

Source: N00LMS9L.dll

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: N00LMS9L.dll

Static PE information: Virtual size of .text is bigger than: 0x100000

Source: N00LMS9L.dll

Static file information: File size 1097728 > 1048576

Source: N00LMS9L.dll

Static PE information: Raw size of .text is bigger than: 0x100000 < 0x105400

Source: N00LMS9L.dll

Static PE information: DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source: N00LMS9L.dll

Static PE information: real checksum: 0x10a5c1 should be: 0x110bc1

Source: N00LMS9L.dll

Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 6.906487671270318

Source: N00LMS9L.dll, rjZtXLEccmdYEgZfkGXcYqoNSPesf77dYFMk92AWfDp8gmm0.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: 'aZ8xEe0ESr3zqMW8nMQiwwCh6CMdd7m46U7SHZvxpicGGf5FPnycgc5Mn2ExQN5KvzcZwfZbIJ6otb4QV0vt9HQqfkFW_1JwChWx', 'LYm5OEkgb5SE3ZjhsqkeNRun6J0p52qnJU0kydTWFjDCSrySHObdOzkbRHxDMB4xCtx8PgClLoWochVhTcc5V', 'D0ZTBZFjPStKy3oyxaIX8kTl3VNZfrZchxEunNaYSt_odPb2D8D4DWVYMS3_8D8sRdJ9zZ1A1Jzd7Vpq4DZ2p4DHHofq36K2XqTy2BdlRqmvZVd0YmS6Zy2', 'nyrbSJ3SuNhXaDeNzu1tyeN_4bvDJtOGk5UKeHTYOtMPttsFTStrMj3x5xU33JW', 'cnQfwotIJpmW2ybxsQqAtu1KFOl7XnzriUYyT9ynUJMNLOgpxLGpuL_PIZ4LLKftiidJ4QepwgtBRod8LzYF', 'd_b8wQKthT5yiybK7NOHTXp9fxONLT9ymW_i4hckDcN18vw1Lnpd6SF95Pl2iMsdowB9N65hrm', 'kjLsE3Uz7fiKAFdURImultZQPPhkvMqZlBc5dKKvtTEjCbpHeBdEHcc__MPGzkv7HHIKlByXlCZWzbccLCv8mZQStI08WRs0xRR', 'AajVKPyet5FiuOR5FQZA15PLhHhp4H0GmoMGvv5AqlH7FwEX7IEGNi', 'yG42pu2bZ8Q69cOLVQDBhcQ8vGCUOOuhrigbd_R208ELGXyV_VyZMHDQF389r7', 'VXLq1aA9Kh8nBgrKp4u0TjxG9tKd8XBNg'
Source: N00LMS9L.dll, AYQUsCIpKRBmBSNz7_3cxdslu9gLXY_RDUput3VvJt6b2kkyWbMjlj7VE8.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: 'Select', 'F5JIVK1fPq3h1Os', 'aD1V_eGnTn2wIL_g_08lS51FN', 'srJqEH4SnT7WtywFBTYB3vPXmLnSVhY6NulmTJv6AbJLDoo', 'HAUrP67FWz6', 'i2tk9cJ3I0X0q0QgKtePv5hnTJmbhj5ZzcPCTbazLQs_Rsc3A9CL68Cw85432RHq0Mb27rwKfebqszEeKPf1xhfFN6NWX8VnY', 'a8MiU8kdighwOgKNYAsXddKEMUXDpJ0lRI6jvGVL97LYEWzIitOR9TuNr8qW8xrw9HH2h8BEwnFg98umd'
Source: N00LMS9L.dll, rgluZIGBcz1dZd4Yn9ddgfZMp.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: 'r1hFhofpp5_s_zRHOu23tn3y65CHfhrQP6hDZLEZMGUMMtve7BH', 'Js6rNp3j8smAsl1hz_q_Ee01cOx4AZYDurjpwy5kIn', 'e2twXp3sPhgvVlejpBIedfkXTcY0AB0jS2Yr5UW2eO06o4mlIpO4p6rfnJDVfTp8J4Yw_DQ6TINxnaYUD7qJFr2LKJB', 'xSsY2lWIoCu8SiQRigcWIQrhrwBTIBGEFqb01oOluYa7_mIQwKnUBaub0k9nzFzdU', 'PlP2rCu_QKO90jkJvqQUlkvdt7GVNm90Z5lwxgXnnW_jEZOc2oYh9VI3OGd8ZhqTnnfbdSKi3O3Jy4', 'Tr6fV3MlzHs0Eyk0Xh_nLiehgSUNYQ5gbPOfIoq7cnJNQ6Yeo7EBq', 'CG1YWJzxlwDM6JKUucxUTF2RLjG6bulOcMvaqCEFhJ8UQY01KKSenEikD', 'rL6kMVm9rk40RukdWlwBpBRoLLlcfwuIPY2xRt1A3SMH96876msvIf73BB3fsPt_1Z6KHkfJ1IeZeQhF_WO2RIabVIElYt3b7R4sscTXEQaVWcfamOpfbS', 'AFzWEbjHJT01jpIGEAI0YxTBqys9ySdXH4KWIQHGm2UbCG_DzJFw8diYVRPwerrY_B5Y1VV5Y0O13iY45eL_2', 'Dpkm3AfHdbHIRqxJJ3DCNCzflqa8d5NnbXMRPk59L8pcKibaGGUSgTTXM28mTs0YMfgNt8'
Source: N00LMS9L.dll, awlq6Wtkzz2kbac_rdWdKHJA1_XkowSzfxjkYjJlpfQ9mTv80qAu8j1yA8GNs842KQUdjw6lVjiy_P9U1jMkZ577nf.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: 'Q3cQguhygkfPEUeyNNEzAfXza5D4w0FOaiWI3O20Html9Z66Sm_6Nf', 'kDtHWfoH6nvZLwqXjNFaV5DDbO_aQq3gQ_Qsjm8LmtQWaWe0Hjx9ygBqrFitKSOV5GeYXqxe8RD0uzTXC4', 'gcxf5bwfO6nVrvr6kMR9sZjAGB4KfHzU8HcVjVTCasZP9mQTZyLnNpAZzD9riEoeL9aig86n1GnUB7Ao6XSwtZYrz7YoxL', 'wM7MzkaoPyBN12VCfPV9zkv1eetZPKg9BZJA1p3GUFgSjRkXmGurTNilSpZD', 'Kj3U3iwrxgIs0emheNTVtipOh_MzrXqSP7A6Ou9vJ5ahhaz81o6G2ETtrLDi0KWi8FJVPwx_K9HaOS5WxsNPLVMQnMIHq11gM4xpa', 'cI7wuImepKeOr8SZ9m4yRseqRosN3rdoJAi3bHirFke2DtfC9iFmHlFAdZTdXTMlj5d', 'PCW4CjSuI1nAFujuwbdlUZ5maFtq9zVC6vn8Th8rybJmzNs8yMwv0wwn9gzGkIKwoddxEFQytgr5OVN6k'
Source: N00LMS9L.dll, UybYQBIsrITfuGXrXBQhA0RvoqHogkO7S57MfWrWgDxzX8.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: 'Is', 'dKjvfneCSknjcFXxnXVSLnrv2BpEXTG6LOokUrrJl68nQI4Rro9rjpQlk', 'PVui2txtqYkaMPDlesKv2ABLB4RSHifUY3cRTynbWm5AQ', 'oocDCxpG8ZRMwQ5g4wedKdMjVvjBhHZ7fSoXrnfCOFb3MXGO2yQLGVOw0dT5DOlwQFrOBHvKo8RzjTKRnkSBdB1N6AxqY2D', 'VKPQT0qSocM9wb7bLS6ncckDNdZwAusuSE4U1GCVc8zEz9DDtcP8TxZgcvVULuGqBCTwmp9gYiS4zA', 'KouWrkDy1PieQlBM_O7iNus9MJ8bm0fFANqunZyav', 'SNA6sN4Rk3lcmisU0tRFbJuTMa45vFdSVrlRRW_zxuC9U4dsSidFc_aMmB', 'JebQU_dgMHa9SE0fDixjfh03Hk64mOiJvI5PrXDXA6rGFHSBC7BMNygFmo06m7', 'iP0nyh3GrWgvhpGG0j_6MDbbZ117JA_n2lovPC07ryMCgDNgzdlP674NOLjAmYOorMBeDIXwhoP6MLiRQtL0SHBJcMcv8UKeWa5coOD', 'fnRTtjJcj2puqwgp8cwhuIwfFrfs2OQe8s1a89f6PN5OjQFMacDvSn8gxAUGGit9q01NA5s'
Source: N00LMS9L.dll, QNAzOd5Ms0XE7cAb5.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: 'RXzLdYPZdL6oSzfmKWY9MjiTGWpoLbwl3iKWcyHrazpaDUdMES1bBxw0BKKv6gupQ7WioJOP6bDnwHYhuC_uiUlT', 'hDqV963QsGzYu3xF14ROTa4fVTFE_I', 'i8UrElCzaG3', 'wgfwZSXluci1ioidrsx9ilqdXTejOfkVB7yqVVIMkqgUMBY8eVUGaZdSu', 'dQAtwT8jZ9IhnOZhEZkEW82PaKD3'

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe

Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Jump to behavior

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 120000

Jump to behavior

Source: N00LMS9L.dll

Binary or memory string: kuHGfS8GypYFNk20xQP38utwtMPmvOa2WkY0iyNcQswhpwEylGgsZ5vvrpUpGj5l4Rf2vEYE34sX9_9TbKajfPuTplLWHkxv1wBshASPOX0fu6

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\N00LMS9L.dll",#1

Jump to behavior

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Yara detected Jupyter

Source: Yara match

File source: N00LMS9L.dll, type: SAMPLE

Remote Access Functionality

Yara detected Jupyter

Source: Yara match

File source: N00LMS9L.dll, type: SAMPLE

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	1 DLL Side-Loading	11 Process Injection	1 Rundll32	OS Credential Dumping	1 Security Software Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	LSASS Memory	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Junk Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 Software Packing	Security Account Manager	1 System Information Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Steganography	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	11 Process Injection	NTDS	System Network Configuration Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 DLL Side-Loading	LSA Secrets	Internet Connection Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact
Domain Properties	Botnet	Replication Through Removable Media	Scheduled Task	RC Scripts	RC Scripts	1 Obfuscated Files or Information	Cached Domain Credentials	Wi-Fi Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Multiband Communication	Data Transfer Size Limits	Service Stop

Behavior Graph

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Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Joe Sandbox version:	40.0.0 Tourmaline
Analysis ID:	1417190
Start date and time:	2024-03-28 18:41:03 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 1m 51s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	5
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	N00LMS9L.dll renamed because original name is a hash value
Original Sample Name:	cABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZVEQHR_8fXkKXWPAGKGxDIDS4ecHu7OEOFapBAVfIASDJfWjN00LMS9L.dll
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal52.troj.winDLL@6/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .dll Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
VT rate limit hit for: N00LMS9L.dll

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
18:41:45	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: loaddll32.exe modified

File type:	PE32 executable (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	6.804808867625758
TrID:	Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) Net Framework (1011504/3) 50.14% Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (1002004/3) 49.67% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.10% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.10% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	N00LMS9L.dll
File size:	1'097'728 bytes
MD5:	4befc07c9e0c2d120a2b82319aa4fa30
SHA1:	9cee2c423f7a7981ace327ce8c42c19c8d814d7b
SHA256:	1c5cf7130d85a0350c1e152d64cda0d5e6cf8c7013810b8d0c9ef8da8d20ce6a
SHA512:	478b9ae8e47fc16525780761b233d14ed33fb7c6948533363f16b66843cb94dd26b7785ffde5c54ebdfa2f934c0597c6abd299976756c0e130113a54a4e651c4
SSDEEP:	12288:EZ2t8ckk3KfIsoP/txJYZEalCarO7VOYXBvYjNa4nfkEF3qtWL/oxQ:E3fjoPlzYJS7ajo4M23qtU
TLSH:	5B35380737E1C988CBEC5AF468AB57D7EB2093F3D2C2C7499AAE51F1076A92574C80C5
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L...x3.e...........!.....T...........r... ........... ....................................@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	7ae282899bbab082

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x1010722e
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x10000000
Subsystem:	windows cui
Image File Characteristics:	EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE, DLL
DLL Characteristics:	DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE
Time Stamp:	0x65F33378 [Thu Mar 14 17:27:20 2024 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	dae02f32a21e03ce65412f6e56942daa

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x1071e0	0x4b	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x108000	0x10	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x10a000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	MD5	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0x105234	0x105400	94bf64efa51ecf122b523dca1449bfd7	False	0.5784707685406698	data	6.906487671270318	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x108000	0x10	0x200	bf619eac0cdf3f68d496ea9344137e8b	False	0.02734375	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x10a000	0xc	0x200	2b3f23d72d1d5eff240a7046a21ad0c7	False	0.044921875	data	0.10191042566270775	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorDllMain

Target ID:	0
Start time:	18:41:45
Start date:	28/03/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\N00LMS9L.dll"
Imagebase:	0xfd0000
File size:	126'464 bytes
MD5 hash:	51E6071F9CBA48E79F10C84515AAE618
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	1
Start time:	18:41:45
Start date:	28/03/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff66e660000
File size:	862'208 bytes
MD5 hash:	0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	18:41:45
Start date:	28/03/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\N00LMS9L.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0x1c0000
File size:	236'544 bytes
MD5 hash:	D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	3
Start time:	18:41:45
Start date:	28/03/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\N00LMS9L.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0xce0000
File size:	61'440 bytes
MD5 hash:	889B99C52A60DD49227C5E485A016679
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules ), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: `rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}` ).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution, WMI: WMI Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report N00LMS9L.dll

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Threat Intel

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Sigma Signatures

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Remote Access Functionality

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Imports

Network Behavior

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: loaddll32.exePID: 5976, Parent PID: 4004

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: conhost.exePID: 6084, Parent PID: 5976

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: cmd.exePID: 5128, Parent PID: 5976

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: rundll32.exePID: 6492, Parent PID: 5128

Windows Analysis Report
N00LMS9L.dll