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Windows Analysis Report
SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe
Analysis ID:	1430219
MD5:	1bf162b20a551f32a094b1641aaf067f
SHA1:	d8cc6857abd3ab2c994b9232640209b1fe452fe5
SHA256:	81bbfb7e239084ad2887bc988517c52cbbf066e90d2485c6b573dfbed2efffa5
Tags:	exe
Infos:

Detection

Score:	52
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Contains functionality to infect the boot sector

Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers

Contains functionality to read device registry values (via SetupAPI)

Detected potential crypto function

PE file contains sections with non-standard names

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Queries device information via Setup API

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe (PID: 7284 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe" MD5: 1BF162B20A551F32A094B1641AAF067F)

cleanup

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe

Virustotal: Detection: 14%

Perma Link

Source: SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe

Static PE information: HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe

Code function: 0_2_00007FF705F51000: GetCommandLineW,CommandLineToArgvW,SetupDiGetClassDevsW,CompareStringOrdinal,CompareStringOrdinal,SetupDiEnumDeviceInfo,CompareStringOrdinal,SetupDiGetDeviceRegistryPropertyW,wsprintfW,CreateFileW,DeviceIoControl,DeviceIoControl,DeviceIoControl,DeviceIoControl,DeviceIoControl,CloseHandle,SetupDiEnumDeviceInfo,SetupDiDestroyDeviceInfoList,LocalFree,

0_2_00007FF705F51000

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe

Code function: 0_2_00007FF705F51000

0_2_00007FF705F51000

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal52.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe

Virustotal: Detection: 14%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe	Section loaded: apphelp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe	Section loaded: devobj.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe	Section loaded: msasn1.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe

Static PE information: Image base 0x140000000 > 0x60000000

Source: SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe

Static PE information: HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source: SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe

Static PE information: section name: UPX2

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe

Code function: 0_2_00007FF705F5381E push rbp; retf

0_2_00007FF705F53824

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: UPX0
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: UPX1

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Contains functionality to infect the boot sector

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe

Code function: GetCommandLineW,CommandLineToArgvW,SetupDiGetClassDevsW,CompareStringOrdinal,CompareStringOrdinal,SetupDiEnumDeviceInfo,CompareStringOrdinal,SetupDiGetDeviceRegistryPropertyW,wsprintfW,CreateFileW,DeviceIoControl,DeviceIoControl,DeviceIoControl,DeviceIoControl,DeviceIoControl,CloseHandle,SetupDiEnumDeviceInfo,SetupDiDestroyDeviceInfoList,LocalFree, \\.\PHYSICALDRIVE%d

0_2_00007FF705F51000

Boot Survival

Contains functionality to infect the boot sector

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe

0_2_00007FF705F51000

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe

Code function: 0_2_00007FF705F51000 GetCommandLineW,CommandLineToArgvW,SetupDiGetClassDevsW,CompareStringOrdinal,CompareStringOrdinal,SetupDiEnumDeviceInfo,CompareStringOrdinal,SetupDiGetDeviceRegistryPropertyW,wsprintfW,CreateFileW,DeviceIoControl,DeviceIoControl,DeviceIoControl,DeviceIoControl,DeviceIoControl,CloseHandle,SetupDiEnumDeviceInfo,SetupDiDestroyDeviceInfoList,LocalFree,

0_2_00007FF705F51000

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe, 00000000.00000003.1667886433.000002812051B000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\scsi#disk&ven_vmware&prod_virtual_disk#4&1656f219&0&000000#{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}
Source: SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe, 00000000.00000003.1667886433.0000028120519000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\SCSI#Disk&Ven_VMware&Prod_Virtual_disk#4&1656f219&0&000000#{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}
Source: SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe, 00000000.00000002.1668095846.00000281204F0000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: K&VEN_VMWARE&PROD_VIRTUAL_DISK\4&1656F219&0&000000

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe

0_2_00007FF705F51000

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	1 Bootkit	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Bootkit	OS Credential Dumping	1 Query Registry	Remote Services	1 Archive Collected Data	1 Encrypted Channel	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	1 DLL Side-Loading	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 Software Packing	LSASS Memory	1 Security Software Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Junk Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 DLL Side-Loading	Security Account Manager	11 System Information Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Steganography	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	11 Obfuscated Files or Information	NTDS	System Network Configuration Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction

Behavior Graph

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Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe	14%	Virustotal		Browse
SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe	8%	ReversingLabs

Joe Sandbox version:	40.0.0 Tourmaline
Analysis ID:	1430219
Start date and time:	2024-04-23 10:30:11 +02:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 1m 48s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	1
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal52.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 75% Number of executed functions: 1 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .exe Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

File type:	PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64 (stripped to external PDB), for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.374014800277755
TrID:	UPX compressed Win32 Executable (30571/9) 65.62% Win64 Executable (generic) (12005/4) 25.77% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 4.30% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 4.30% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.02%
File name:	SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe
File size:	8'192 bytes
MD5:	1bf162b20a551f32a094b1641aaf067f
SHA1:	d8cc6857abd3ab2c994b9232640209b1fe452fe5
SHA256:	81bbfb7e239084ad2887bc988517c52cbbf066e90d2485c6b573dfbed2efffa5
SHA512:	840a884112ae7c15d146fe980f8ad2afa47362eb13de22bea045ebde3a67502b6a257c4b81409ca4c178fc5bfad1b62389d1c4f6c2348c760cd5f846d084ad8e
SSDEEP:	96:Q5l+izewqexk5NDitrPrWcDwBW5tSpQB5cYG/ktChbl7bGzY0RCORARwdQ7kRDc2:sqnvyPNEsSO2r/kmxg5hyyHWcfBR8tq
TLSH:	6FF1AF87D886BBFFCCE1153A825F910479AD3C3847FEA3D48E38E92A2031E12956E511
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..d...8..e...............). .......`.......p.....@..........................................`... ............................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	90cececece8e8eb0

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x140008a00
Entrypoint Section:	UPX1
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x140000000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE, DEBUG_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:	HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x659AC738 [Sun Jan 7 15:46:00 2024 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	153a70403a08e863e72a1363e917b8bc

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push ebx
push esi
push edi
push ebp
dec eax
lea esi, dword ptr [FFFFE61Ah]
dec eax
lea edi, dword ptr [esi-00006025h]
push edi
xor ebx, ebx
xor ecx, ecx
dec eax
or ebp, FFFFFFFFh
call 00007FA2D90EA185h
add ebx, ebx
je 00007FA2D90EA134h
rep ret
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
dec eax
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
mov dl, byte ptr [esi]
rep ret
dec eax
lea eax, dword ptr [edi+ebp]
cmp ecx, 05h
mov dl, byte ptr [eax]
jbe 00007FA2D90EA153h
dec eax
cmp ebp, FFFFFFFCh
jnbe 00007FA2D90EA14Dh
sub ecx, 04h
mov edx, dword ptr [eax]
dec eax
add eax, 04h
sub ecx, 04h
mov dword ptr [edi], edx
dec eax
lea edi, dword ptr [edi+04h]
jnc 00007FA2D90EA121h
add ecx, 04h
mov dl, byte ptr [eax]
je 00007FA2D90EA142h
dec eax
inc eax
mov byte ptr [edi], dl
sub ecx, 01h
mov dl, byte ptr [eax]
dec eax
lea edi, dword ptr [edi+01h]
jne 00007FA2D90EA122h
rep ret
cld
inc ecx
pop ebx
jmp 00007FA2D90EA13Ah
dec eax
inc esi
mov byte ptr [edi], dl
dec eax
inc edi
mov dl, byte ptr [esi]
add ebx, ebx
jne 00007FA2D90EA13Ch
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
dec eax
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
mov dl, byte ptr [esi]
jc 00007FA2D90EA118h
lea eax, dword ptr [ecx+01h]
jmp 00007FA2D90EA139h
dec eax
inc ecx
call ebx
adc eax, eax
inc ecx
call ebx
adc eax, eax
add ebx, ebx
jne 00007FA2D90EA13Ch
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
dec eax
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
mov dl, byte ptr [esi]
jnc 00007FA2D90EA116h
sub eax, 03h
jc 00007FA2D90EA149h
shl eax, 08h
movzx edx, dl
or eax, edx
dec eax
inc esi
xor eax, FFFFFFFFh
je 00007FA2D90EA171h
sar eax, 1

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x9000	0x160	UPX2
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x4000	0xc	UPX0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	MD5	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
UPX0	0x1000	0x6000	0x0	d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e	False	0	empty	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_UNINITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
UPX1	0x7000	0x2000	0x1c00	b72466edc3b969ae862d43346a3259ae	False	0.9644252232142857	data	7.687168718716116	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
UPX2	0x9000	0x1000	0x200	8b50e28d63e2c524a8890f7cceca88ba	False	0.404296875	data	2.7309882403974406	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE

Imports

DLL	Import
KERNEL32.DLL	LoadLibraryA, ExitProcess, GetProcAddress, VirtualProtect
SETUPAPI.dll	SetupDiGetClassDevsW
SHELL32.dll	CommandLineToArgvW
USER32.dll	wsprintfW

Target ID:	0
Start time:	10:31:01
Start date:	23/04/2024
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe"
Imagebase:	0x7ff705f50000
File size:	8'192 bytes
MD5 hash:	1BF162B20A551F32A094B1641AAF067F
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Execution Graph

Execution Coverage:	14.8%
Dynamic/Decrypted Code Coverage:	0%
Signature Coverage:	80%
Total number of Nodes:	10
Total number of Limit Nodes:	1

Callgraph

Executed
Not Executed
Opacity -> Relevance
Disassembly available

Executed Functions

Function 00007FF705F51000 Relevance: 35.2, APIs: 16, Strings: 4, Instructions: 165
fileCOMMON

Download Yara Rule

Control-flow Graph

Executed
Not Executed

APIs

GetCommandLineW.KERNEL32 ref: 00007FF705F51026
CommandLineToArgvW.SHELL32 ref: 00007FF705F51034
SetupDiGetClassDevsW.SETUPAPI ref: 00007FF705F5104F
CompareStringOrdinal.KERNEL32 ref: 00007FF705F510BF
CompareStringOrdinal.KERNEL32 ref: 00007FF705F5110B
SetupDiGetDeviceRegistryPropertyW.SETUPAPI ref: 00007FF705F51142
wsprintfW.USER32 ref: 00007FF705F51153
CreateFileW.KERNEL32 ref: 00007FF705F51183
DeviceIoControl.KERNEL32 ref: 00007FF705F511CC
DeviceIoControl.KERNEL32 ref: 00007FF705F511F7
DeviceIoControl.KERNEL32 ref: 00007FF705F51233
DeviceIoControl.KERNEL32 ref: 00007FF705F51262
CloseHandle.KERNEL32 ref: 00007FF705F5126B
SetupDiEnumDeviceInfo.SETUPAPI ref: 00007FF705F51283
SetupDiDestroyDeviceInfoList.SETUPAPI ref: 00007FF705F51293
LocalFree.KERNEL32 ref: 00007FF705F5129C

Strings

/Enable, xrefs: 00007FF705F51067
, xrefs: 00007FF705F510AC
\\.\PHYSICALDRIVE%d, xrefs: 00007FF705F510DF
/Disable, xrefs: 00007FF705F51104

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.1668226715.00007FF705F51000.00000040.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, Offset: 00007FF705F50000, based on PE: true

Associated: 00000000.00000002.1668211624.00007FF705F50000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.1668226715.00007FF705F56000.00000040.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.1668258450.00007FF705F58000.00000080.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.1668274255.00007FF705F59000.00000004.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_7ff705f50000_SecuriteInfo.jbxd

Similarity

API ID: Device$ControlSetup$CommandCompareInfoLineOrdinalString$ArgvClassCloseCreateDestroyDevsEnumFileFreeHandleListLocalPropertyRegistrywsprintf
String ID: $/Disable$/Enable$\\.\PHYSICALDRIVE%d
API String ID: 4144309683-1617934923
Opcode ID: c7cc8c6b451551aa7b25bb0b9d12b8d350baac8f4be34e2f50ab9faf407dde47
Instruction ID: 9e3426f536607656a39807258b97494574a88ff12bd58171519ea0a0bf26a4a4
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: c7cc8c6b451551aa7b25bb0b9d12b8d350baac8f4be34e2f50ab9faf407dde47
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 26613E32618B8186E760DB65F85075BBBA1FBC5B94F904125EB9E83A68DF3CD145CB00

Uniqueness

Uniqueness Score: -1.00%

Description:	Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence
Data Sources:	Drive: Drive Modification
Platforms:	Linux, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution, WMI: WMI Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Boot Survival

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Imports

Network Behavior

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

System Behavior

Analysis Process: SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exePID: 7284, Parent PID: 2580

General

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

Analysis Process: SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exePID: 7284, Parent PID: 2580COMMON

Execution Graph

Graph

Callgraph

Executed Functions

Function 00007FF705F51000 Relevance: 35.2, APIs: 16, Strings: 4, Instructions: 165fileCOMMON

Control-flow Graph

Windows Analysis Report
SecuriteInfo.com.W32.PossibleThreat.22253.14837.exe

Function 00007FF705F51000 Relevance: 35.2, APIs: 16, Strings: 4, Instructions: 165
fileCOMMON