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Windows Analysis Report
Newtonsoft.dll

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	Newtonsoft.dll (renamed file extension from Json to dll)
Original sample name:	Newtonsoft.Json
Analysis ID:	1431806
MD5:	195ffb7167db3219b217c4fd439eedd6
SHA1:	1e76e6099570ede620b76ed47cf8d03a936d49f8
SHA256:	e1e27af7b07eeedf5ce71a9255f0422816a6fc5849a483c6714e1b472044fa9d
Infos:

Detection

Score:	22
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	60%

Signatures

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Binary contains a suspicious time stamp

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Classification

Analysis Advice

Sample tries to load a library which is not present or installed on the analysis machine, adding the library might reveal more behavior

Sample is a C# Dll, sample needs to be analyzed in a .Net context

Process Tree

System is w10x64

loaddll32.exe (PID: 6756 cmdline: loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Newtonsoft.dll" MD5: 51E6071F9CBA48E79F10C84515AAE618)

conhost.exe (PID: 6784 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)

cmd.exe (PID: 6904 cmdline: cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Newtonsoft.dll",#1 MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B)

rundll32.exe (PID: 6984 cmdline: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Newtonsoft.dll",#1 MD5: 889B99C52A60DD49227C5E485A016679)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

⊘No configs have been found

Yara Signatures

⊘No yara matches

Sigma Signatures

⊘No Sigma rule has matched

Snort Signatures

⊘No Snort rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

Source: Newtonsoft.dll

Static PE information: certificate valid

Source: Newtonsoft.dll

Static PE information: HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source:	Binary string: /_/Src/Newtonsoft.Json/obj/Release/net45/Newtonsoft.Json.pdbSHA256 source: Newtonsoft.dll
Source:	Binary string: /_/Src/Newtonsoft.Json/obj/Release/net45/Newtonsoft.Json.pdb source: Newtonsoft.dll

Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: http://cacerts.digicert.com/DigiCertAssuredIDRootCA.crt0E
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: http://cacerts.digicert.com/DigiCertCSRSA4096RootG5.crt0E
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: http://cacerts.digicert.com/DigiCertTrustedG4RSA4096SHA256TimeStampingCA.crt0
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: http://cacerts.digicert.com/DigiCertTrustedRootG4.crt0C
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: http://cacerts.digicert.com/NETFoundationProjectsCodeSigningCA2.crt0
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: http://crl3.digicert.com/DigiCertAssuredIDRootCA.crl0
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: http://crl3.digicert.com/DigiCertCSRSA4096RootG5.crl0
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: http://crl3.digicert.com/DigiCertTrustedG4RSA4096SHA256TimeStampingCA.crl0
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: http://crl3.digicert.com/DigiCertTrustedRootG4.crl0
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: http://crl3.digicert.com/NETFoundationProjectsCodeSigningCA2.crl0F
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: http://crl4.digicert.com/NETFoundationProjectsCodeSigningCA2.crl0=
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: http://james.newtonking.com/projects/json
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.digicert.com0A
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.digicert.com0C
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.digicert.com0O
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.digicert.com0X
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: http://www.digicert.com/CPS0
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: https://github.com/JamesNK/Newtonsoft.Json
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: https://www.newtonsoft.com/json
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: https://www.newtonsoft.com/jsonschema
Source: Newtonsoft.dll	String found in binary or memory: https://www.nuget.org/packages/Newtonsoft.Json.Bson

Source: Newtonsoft.dll

Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameNewtonsoft.Json.dll2 vs Newtonsoft.dll

Source: classification engine

Classification label: sus22.evad.winDLL@6/0@0/0

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6784:120:WilError_03

Source: Newtonsoft.dll

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: Newtonsoft.dll

Static file information: TRID: Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) Net Framework (1011504/3) 50.14%

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Newtonsoft.dll",#1

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Newtonsoft.dll"
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Newtonsoft.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Newtonsoft.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Newtonsoft.dll",#1	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Newtonsoft.dll",#1	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Section loaded: apphelp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Section loaded: apphelp.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: Newtonsoft.dll

Static PE information: certificate valid

Source: Newtonsoft.dll

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: Newtonsoft.dll

Static PE information: HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source: Newtonsoft.dll

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG

Source:	Binary string: /_/Src/Newtonsoft.Json/obj/Release/net45/Newtonsoft.Json.pdbSHA256 source: Newtonsoft.dll
Source:	Binary string: /_/Src/Newtonsoft.Json/obj/Release/net45/Newtonsoft.Json.pdb source: Newtonsoft.dll

Data Obfuscation

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Source: Newtonsoft.dll, DynamicUtils.cs	.Net Code: CreateSharpArgumentInfoArray
Source: Newtonsoft.dll, LateBoundReflectionDelegateFactory.cs	.Net Code: CreateDefaultConstructor

Source: Newtonsoft.dll

Static PE information: 0xB73F2470 [Fri Jun 3 23:17:04 2067 UTC]

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe

Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Jump to behavior

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 120000

Jump to behavior

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Newtonsoft.dll",#1

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	1 DLL Side-Loading	11 Process Injection	1 Rundll32	OS Credential Dumping	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	LSASS Memory	1 System Information Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Junk Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 Software Packing	Security Account Manager	Query Registry	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Steganography	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	11 Process Injection	NTDS	System Network Configuration Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 Timestomp	LSA Secrets	Internet Connection Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact
Domain Properties	Botnet	Replication Through Removable Media	Scheduled Task	RC Scripts	RC Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	Cached Domain Credentials	Wi-Fi Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Multiband Communication	Data Transfer Size Limits	Service Stop

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
Newtonsoft.dll	0%	ReversingLabs
Newtonsoft.dll	0%	Virustotal		Browse

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
http://james.newtonking.com/projects/json	0%	URL Reputation	safe

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
https://www.newtonsoft.com/json	Newtonsoft.dll	false		high
https://www.nuget.org/packages/Newtonsoft.Json.Bson	Newtonsoft.dll	false		high
http://james.newtonking.com/projects/json	Newtonsoft.dll	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://www.newtonsoft.com/jsonschema	Newtonsoft.dll	false		high
https://github.com/JamesNK/Newtonsoft.Json	Newtonsoft.dll	false		high

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	40.0.0 Tourmaline
Analysis ID:	1431806
Start date and time:	2024-04-25 20:03:12 +02:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 2m 13s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	4
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	Newtonsoft.dll (renamed file extension from Json to dll)
Original Sample Name:	Newtonsoft.Json
Detection:	SUS
Classification:	sus22.evad.winDLL@6/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

Warnings

Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
20:04:05	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: loaddll32.exe modified

File type:	PE32 executable (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.967185619483575
TrID:	Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) Net Framework (1011504/3) 50.14% Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (1002004/3) 49.67% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.10% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.10% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	Newtonsoft.dll
File size:	711'952 bytes
MD5:	195ffb7167db3219b217c4fd439eedd6
SHA1:	1e76e6099570ede620b76ed47cf8d03a936d49f8
SHA256:	e1e27af7b07eeedf5ce71a9255f0422816a6fc5849a483c6714e1b472044fa9d
SHA512:	56eb7f070929b239642dab729537dde2c2287bdb852ad9e80b5358c74b14bc2b2dded910d0e3b6304ea27eb587e5f19db0a92e1cbae6a70fb20b4ef05057e4ac
SSDEEP:	12288:GBja5bBvR8Q0TE2HB0WLmvXbsVG1Gw03RzxNHgKhwFBkjSHXP36RMGy1NqTUO:GBjk38WuBcAbwoA/BkjSHXP36RMG/
TLSH:	66E4394123F98F2BE1AF6B75B4704E1543F9F917A6B5E78F9A04D9A91C43B408E403A3
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L...p$?..........." ..0.............B.... ........... ....................... ............`................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	7ae282899bbab082

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x100ac042
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	true
Imagebase:	0x10000000
Subsystem:	windows cui
Image File Characteristics:	EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE, DLL
DLL Characteristics:	HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE
Time Stamp:	0xB73F2470 [Fri Jun 3 23:17:04 2067 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	dae02f32a21e03ce65412f6e56942daa

Authenticode Signature

Signature Valid:	true
Signature Issuer:	CN=.NET Foundation Projects Code Signing CA2, O=.NET Foundation, C=US
Signature Validation Error:	The operation completed successfully
Error Number:	0
Not Before, Not After	13/08/2021 01:00:00 29/10/2024 23:59:59
Subject Chain	CN=Json.NET (.NET Foundation), O=Json.NET (.NET Foundation), L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US, SERIALNUMBER=603 389 068, OID.1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.2=Washington, OID.1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3=US, OID.2.5.4.15=Private Organization
Version:	3
Thumbprint MD5:	0D202C238B454A049A3A715FADC70F7D
Thumbprint SHA-1:	667E87438D93824A8042D1E7C934BDD7F519C44E
Thumbprint SHA-256:	D60F9A9BD35829CCF4684D4B1E0B62EB3D982FCD55159F337348BB18EA25B8A7
Serial:	0CD1407A5ABDED43D5C173121D38C529

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [10002000h]
or al, 00h
add byte ptr [eax], al
push es
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edi], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], cl
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [0D000000h], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], cl
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [esi], cl
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edi], cl
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], dl
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], dl
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edx], ah
add byte ptr [edi], ah
add byte ptr [eax+eax], bh
add byte ptr [esi], ah
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], cl
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], cl
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], cl
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], cl
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [esi], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edi], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], cl
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [0D000000h], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax+eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add al, 00h
add byte ptr [eax], al
or dword ptr [eax], eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
or dword ptr [eax], eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add al, 00h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add al, 00h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add al, 00h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add al, 00h
add byte ptr [eax], al
or dword ptr [eax], eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
or dword ptr [eax], eax
add byte ptr [eax], al

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0xabff0	0x4f	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0xae000	0x4b4	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0xaae00	0x2f10
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0xb0000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0xabf20	0x54	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	MD5	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0xaa310	0xaa400	b617b6ad4de89c85c99f52ab0454f0e9	False	0.3718236623531571	data	5.931528908377675	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0xae000	0x4b4	0x600	d2f99adc24ac828a3d2bafebbc6f35b0	False	0.34375	data	2.804217239420186	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0xb0000	0xc	0x200	c1bdec0a5a718409351d2965bd974f4d	False	0.044921875	data	0.10191042566270775	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country	ZLIB Complexity
RT_VERSION	0xae058	0x456	data			0.44144144144144143

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorDllMain

Target ID:	0
Start time:	20:04:05
Start date:	25/04/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Newtonsoft.dll"
Imagebase:	0x910000
File size:	126'464 bytes
MD5 hash:	51E6071F9CBA48E79F10C84515AAE618
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	1
Start time:	20:04:05
Start date:	25/04/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff7699e0000
File size:	862'208 bytes
MD5 hash:	0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	20:04:05
Start date:	25/04/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Newtonsoft.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0x240000
File size:	236'544 bytes
MD5 hash:	D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	3
Start time:	20:04:05
Start date:	25/04/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Newtonsoft.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0xbe0000
File size:	61'440 bytes
MD5 hash:	889B99C52A60DD49227C5E485A016679
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules ), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: `rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}` ).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Windows Analysis Report Newtonsoft.dll

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Analysis Advice

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Compliance

Networking

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Authenticode Signature

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Network Behavior

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: loaddll32.exePID: 6756, Parent PID: 2580

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: conhost.exePID: 6784, Parent PID: 6756

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: cmd.exePID: 6904, Parent PID: 6756

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: rundll32.exePID: 6984, Parent PID: 6904

Windows Analysis Report
Newtonsoft.dll