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Windows Analysis Report
jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	jtijhkasdjrhg.exe
Analysis ID:	1635469
MD5:	a0c0ee4d7de0c9cac81661a23530bafb
SHA1:	b2027c880471cfc27de4465c0f008b8cb6038a84
SHA256:	077364482914188a642ea8de919005104d1609840ac543f6479bf63fc3c54d67
Tags:	exeuser-aachum
Infos:

Detection

RedLine

Score:	88
Range:	0 - 100
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Found malware configuration

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected RedLine Stealer

.NET source code contains very large array initializations

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Reads the System eventlog

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)

Binary contains a suspicious time stamp

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Detected non-DNS traffic on DNS port

Enables debug privileges

Enables security privileges

Installs a raw input device (often for capturing keystrokes)

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Tries to resolve domain names, but no domain seems valid (expired dropper behavior)

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

jtijhkasdjrhg.exe (PID: 8048 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe" MD5: A0C0EE4D7DE0C9CAC81661A23530BAFB)

conhost.exe (PID: 8072 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)

cleanup

Malware Threat Intel

Provided by

Name	Description	Attribution	Blogpost URLs	Link
RedLine Stealer	RedLine Stealer is a malware available on underground forums for sale apparently as a standalone ($100/$150 depending on the version) or also on a subscription basis ($100/month). This malware harvests information from browsers such as saved credentials, autocomplete data, and credit card information. A system inventory is also taken when running on a target machine, to include details such as the username, location data, hardware configuration, and information regarding installed security software. More recent versions of RedLine added the ability to steal cryptocurrency. FTP and IM clients are also apparently targeted by this family, and this malware has the ability to upload and download files, execute commands, and periodically send back information about the infected computer.	No Attribution	https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/crackedcantil-breakdown/ https://apophis133.medium.com/redline-technical-analysis-report-5034e16ad152 https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/30445/ https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/35981/ https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/25837/	https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.redline_stealer

Malware Configuration

Threatname: RedLine

{"C2 url": ["89.23.98.216:81"], "Bot Id": "button1"}

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
Process Memory Space: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe PID: 8048	JoeSecurity_RedLine	Yara detected RedLine Stealer	Joe Security

Sigma Signatures

⊘No Sigma rule has matched

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Avira: detected

Found malware configuration

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Malware Configuration Extractor: RedLine {"C2 url": ["89.23.98.216:81"], "Bot Id": "button1"}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 68%
Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 75%			Perma Link

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Static PE information: EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Static PE information: DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Networking

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: 89.23.98.216:81

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:59204 -> 162.159.36.2:53

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: query: 18.31.95.13.in-addr.arpa replaycode: Name error (3)

Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 162.159.36.2
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 162.159.36.2
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 162.159.36.2
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 162.159.36.2
Source: unknown	UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, 00000003.00000002.1285546909.0000000002781000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: #www.youtube.com_0.indexeddb.leveldb equals www.youtube.com (Youtube)
Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, 00000003.00000002.1285546909.0000000002781000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: 3IndexedDB\https_www.youtube.com_0.indexeddb.leveldb equals www.youtube.com (Youtube)
Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, 00000003.00000002.1285546909.0000000002781000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: IndexedDB\https_www.youtube.com_0.indexeddb.leveldb equals www.youtube.com (Youtube)

Source: global traffic

DNS traffic detected: DNS query: 18.31.95.13.in-addr.arpa

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, 00000003.00000002.1285546909.0000000002748000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.ip.s
Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, 00000003.00000002.1285546909.0000000002748000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.ip.sb/ip
Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, 00000003.00000002.1285546909.0000000002748000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.ip.sb/ippai
Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, 00000003.00000002.1285546909.000000000280D000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://discord.com/api/v9/users/

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, 00000003.00000002.1285546909.0000000002920000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Binary or memory string: GetRawInputData

memstr_7257947e-5

Spam, unwanted Advertisements and Ransom Demands

Reads the System eventlog

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\EventLog\System

Jump to behavior

System Summary

.NET source code contains very large array initializations

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, Strings.cs

Large array initialization: Strings: array initializer size 6160

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Process token adjusted: Security

Jump to behavior

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, 00000003.00000000.1271247652.00000000001AE000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameSpulebane.exe" vs jtijhkasdjrhg.exe
Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameSpulebane.exe" vs jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Static PE information: EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, PBE.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock'
Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, Strings.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'CreateDecryptor'

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal88.troj.evad.winEXE@2/1@1/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe.log

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Mutant created: NULL
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:8072:120:WilError_03

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Static file information: TRID: Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.83%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 68%
Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 75%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe"
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Section loaded: mscoree.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Section loaded: apphelp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Section loaded: vcruntime140_clr0400.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Section loaded: ucrtbase_clr0400.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Section loaded: ucrtbase_clr0400.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Section loaded: uxtheme.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Section loaded: rsaenh.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Section loaded: cryptbase.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Section loaded: windows.storage.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Section loaded: wldp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Section loaded: profapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Section loaded: dwrite.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Section loaded: textshaping.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Static PE information: DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Static PE information: 0xB86EFD41 [Fri Jan 20 10:38:57 2068 UTC]

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Code function: 3_2_00007FF7C817715D push E962C8DAh; ret		3_2_00007FF7C8177199
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Code function: 3_2_00007FF7C817456C push cs; retf		3_2_00007FF7C817456F

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, 00000003.00000002.1285546909.000000000280D000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Binary or memory string: \QEMU-GA.EXE

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Memory allocated: 670000 memory reserve \| memory write watch			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Memory allocated: 1A6E0000 memory reserve \| memory write watch			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe TID: 6724

Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Jump to behavior

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, 00000003.00000002.1285546909.000000000280D000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Binary or memory string: \qemu-ga.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Process token adjusted: Debug

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

Jump to behavior

Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, 00000003.00000002.1285546909.0000000002920000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: GetProgmanWindow
Source: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, 00000003.00000002.1285546909.0000000002920000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SetProgmanWindow

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe VolumeInformation			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Jump to behavior

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Yara detected RedLine Stealer

Source: Yara match

File source: Process Memory Space: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe PID: 8048, type: MEMORYSTR

Remote Access Functionality

Yara detected RedLine Stealer

Source: Yara match

File source: Process Memory Space: jtijhkasdjrhg.exe PID: 8048, type: MEMORYSTR

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	1 DLL Side-Loading	2 Process Injection	1 Masquerading	11 Input Capture	11 Security Software Discovery	Remote Services	11 Input Capture	1 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Disable or Modify Tools	LSASS Memory	1 Process Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	1 Archive Collected Data	11 Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	31 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Security Account Manager	31 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Steganography	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	2 Process Injection	NTDS	12 System Information Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	LSA Secrets	Internet Connection Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact
Domain Properties	Botnet	Replication Through Removable Media	Scheduled Task	RC Scripts	RC Scripts	1 Obfuscated Files or Information	Cached Domain Credentials	Wi-Fi Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Multiband Communication	Data Transfer Size Limits	Service Stop
DNS	Web Services	External Remote Services	Systemd Timers	Startup Items	Startup Items	1 Timestomp	DCSync	Remote System Discovery	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Commonly Used Port	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Inhibit System Recovery
Network Trust Dependencies	Serverless	Drive-by Compromise	Container Orchestration Job	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	1 DLL Side-Loading	Proc Filesystem	System Owner/User Discovery	Cloud Services	Credential API Hooking	Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Defacement

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	68%	ReversingLabs	ByteCode-MSIL.Ransomware.RedLine
jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	75%	Virustotal		Browse
jtijhkasdjrhg.exe	100%	Avira	TR/Spy.RedLine.jtxjt

Dropped Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Domains

⊘No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
89.23.98.216:81	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
https://api.ip.s	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
18.31.95.13.in-addr.arpa	unknown	unknown	false		high

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
89.23.98.216:81	true	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
https://api.ip.sb/ip	jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, 00000003.00000002.1285546909.0000000002748000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		high
https://api.ip.s	jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, 00000003.00000002.1285546909.0000000002748000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://api.ip.sb/ippai	jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, 00000003.00000002.1285546909.0000000002748000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		high
https://discord.com/api/v9/users/	jtijhkasdjrhg.exe, 00000003.00000002.1285546909.000000000280D000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		high

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	42.0.0 Malachite
Analysis ID:	1635469
Start date and time:	2025-03-11 17:41:27 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 16s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	18
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	jtijhkasdjrhg.exe
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal88.troj.evad.winEXE@2/1@1/0
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 1 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .exe

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, sppsvc.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, RuntimeBroker.exe, WMIADAP.exe, SIHClient.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe
Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 23.60.203.209, 4.245.163.56, 150.171.27.10, 13.95.31.18, 172.202.163.200
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): fs.microsoft.com, slscr.update.microsoft.com, g.bing.com, fe3cr.delivery.mp.microsoft.com
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

⊘No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

⊘No context

Domains

⊘No context

ASNs

⊘No context

JA3 Fingerprints

⊘No context

Dropped Files

⊘No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe.log

Download File

Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe
File Type:	CSV text
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1281
Entropy (8bit):	5.370111951859942
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:ML9E4KQ71qE4GIs0E4KCKDE4KGKZI6KhPKIE4TKBGKoZAE4KKUNb:MxHKQ71qHGIs0HKCYHKGSI6oPtHTHhA2
MD5:	12C61586CD59AA6F2A21DF30501F71BD
SHA1:	E6B279DC134544867C868E3FF3C267A06CE340C7
SHA-256:	EC20A856DBBCF320F7F24C823D6E9D2FD10E9335F5DE2F56AB9A7DF1ED358543
SHA-512:	B0731F59C74C9D25A4C82E166B3DC300BBCF89F6969918EC748B867C641ED0D8E0DE81AAC68209EF140219861B4939F1B07D0885ACA112D494D23AAF9A9C03FE
Malicious:	true
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\System\b187b7f31cee3e87b56c8edca55324e0\System.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Drawing, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\System.Drawing\567ff6b0de7f9dcd8111001e94ab7cf6\System.Drawing.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Windows.Forms, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\System.Windows.Forms\2a7fffeef3976b2a6f273db66b1f0107\System.Windows.Forms.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\System.Core\31326613607f69254f3284ec964796c8\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\S

Static File Info

General

File type:	PE32 executable (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.301386431095736
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.83% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.78% Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73296/58) 0.36% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.01%
File name:	jtijhkasdjrhg.exe
File size:	550'912 bytes
MD5:	a0c0ee4d7de0c9cac81661a23530bafb
SHA1:	b2027c880471cfc27de4465c0f008b8cb6038a84
SHA256:	077364482914188a642ea8de919005104d1609840ac543f6479bf63fc3c54d67
SHA512:	449dc825e4daa0b108b0362c15dce8599f6a78863b3f25fd3076812f89183f69ff64e7c458ac0ad0b427868b6cc89d6e9d6e8c9bb9495786fbc31472026e191f
SSDEEP:	6144:EYqdc0NkzDV4L3eTIlA41qpcN3p0NIb88WsNMPaKFP3b2V122J0sL:E9J8+jPycN3CNIb88WsNMP5F1k
TLSH:	DFC49D81B359AD12DA6B06F6900518A01E71FF79E90BC71AAEC77FBF7EB23215111807
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L...A.n...............0.................. ........@.. ....................................@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	079d1d1d4c72e64b

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x42cace
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows cui
Image File Characteristics:	EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE
DLL Characteristics:	DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE
Time Stamp:	0xB86EFD41 [Fri Jan 20 10:38:57 2068 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [00402000h]
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x2ca7c	0x4f	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x2e000	0x5b662	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x8a000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	MD5	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0x2aad4	0x2ac00	1454ebf39ad9272ee06bb4e2ba86b993	False	0.4838724415204678	data	6.343840538809773	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x2e000	0x5b662	0x5b800	278a80ccc3a5e692c64084f117be5586	False	0.2557873335040984	data	4.464105663187214	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x8a000	0xc	0x200	ba22bcbaf74c8c3ec0d92fb8827fe2db	False	0.044921875	data	0.10191042566270775	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	ZLIB Complexity
RT_ICON	0x2e250	0x42028	Device independent bitmap graphic, 256 x 512 x 32, image size 270336	0.20358685682161137
RT_ICON	0x70278	0x10828	Device independent bitmap graphic, 128 x 256 x 32, image size 67584	0.34492192121140425
RT_ICON	0x80aa0	0x4228	Device independent bitmap graphic, 64 x 128 x 32, image size 16896	0.4390056683986774
RT_ICON	0x84cc8	0x25a8	Device independent bitmap graphic, 48 x 96 x 32, image size 9600	0.5059128630705394
RT_ICON	0x87270	0x10a8	Device independent bitmap graphic, 32 x 64 x 32, image size 4224	0.5218105065666041
RT_ICON	0x88318	0x988	Device independent bitmap graphic, 24 x 48 x 32, image size 2400	0.6020491803278688
RT_ICON	0x88ca0	0x468	Device independent bitmap graphic, 16 x 32 x 32, image size 1088	0.6338652482269503
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x89108	0x68	data	0.7403846153846154
RT_VERSION	0x89170	0x306	data	0.46382428940568476
RT_MANIFEST	0x89478	0x1ea	XML 1.0 document, Unicode text, UTF-8 (with BOM) text, with CRLF line terminators	0.5489795918367347

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
Comments	Rubaiyat App
CompanyName	Group
FileDescription	Group
FileVersion	39.55.12
InternalName	Spulebane.exe
LegalCopyright	Group Corp. 2005
OriginalFilename	Spulebane.exe
ProductName
ProductVersion	39.55.12
Assembly Version	37.40.78.0

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Mar 11, 2025 17:42:50.997287989 CET	59204	53	192.168.2.5	162.159.36.2
Mar 11, 2025 17:42:51.001972914 CET	53	59204	162.159.36.2	192.168.2.5
Mar 11, 2025 17:42:51.002049923 CET	59204	53	192.168.2.5	162.159.36.2
Mar 11, 2025 17:42:51.007039070 CET	53	59204	162.159.36.2	192.168.2.5
Mar 11, 2025 17:42:51.504803896 CET	59204	53	192.168.2.5	162.159.36.2
Mar 11, 2025 17:42:51.509619951 CET	53	59204	162.159.36.2	192.168.2.5
Mar 11, 2025 17:42:51.509696007 CET	59204	53	192.168.2.5	162.159.36.2

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Mar 11, 2025 17:42:50.995135069 CET	53	63423	162.159.36.2	192.168.2.5
Mar 11, 2025 17:42:51.638498068 CET	53304	53	192.168.2.5	1.1.1.1
Mar 11, 2025 17:42:51.645762920 CET	53	53304	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.5

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Mar 11, 2025 17:42:51.638498068 CET	192.168.2.5	1.1.1.1	0x652b	Standard query (0)	18.31.95.13.in-addr.arpa	PTR (Pointer record)	IN (0x0001)	false

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Mar 11, 2025 17:42:51.645762920 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.5	0x652b	Name error (3)	18.31.95.13.in-addr.arpa	none	none	PTR (Pointer record)	IN (0x0001)	false

Statistics

CPU Usage

Click to jump to process

Memory Usage

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High Level Behavior Distribution

Click to dive into process behavior distribution

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: jtijhkasdjrhg.exePID: 8048, Parent PID: 3084

General

Target ID:	3
Start time:	12:42:17
Start date:	11/03/2025
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe"
Imagebase:	0x180000
File size:	550'912 bytes
MD5 hash:	A0C0EE4D7DE0C9CAC81661A23530BAFB
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: conhost.exePID: 8072, Parent PID: 8048

General

Target ID:	4
Start time:	12:42:17
Start date:	11/03/2025
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff7e2000000
File size:	862'208 bytes
MD5 hash:	0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

Reset < >

Analysis Process: jtijhkasdjrhg.exePID: 8048, Parent PID: 3084COMMON

Execution Graph

Execution Coverage:	20.7%
Dynamic/Decrypted Code Coverage:	100%
Signature Coverage:	0%
Total number of Nodes:	3
Total number of Limit Nodes:	0

Executed Functions

Function 00007FF7C81784E1 Relevance: 1.6, APIs: 1, Instructions: 143
COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Control-flow Graph

Executed
Not Executed

APIs

GetConsoleWindow.KERNELBASE ref: 00007FF7C81785B0

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000003.00000002.1288855691.00007FF7C8170000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FF7C8170000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_3_2_7ff7c8170000_jtijhkasdjrhg.jbxd

Similarity

API ID: ConsoleWindow
String ID:
API String ID: 2863861424-0
Opcode ID: b66accb9d97f83f5a0ec3feca256f579c2b35d69cf78a5341c397d63c096195c
Instruction ID: a0fafe3bcadec942836055613df093156fba8506a1b9837fc2ea255ecf9f29bd
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: b66accb9d97f83f5a0ec3feca256f579c2b35d69cf78a5341c397d63c096195c
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 3B41977090CA9C8FDB55EBA89845AEDBBF0FB5A310F1041AAD049D3252DA74A886CB41

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Image: Image Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata
Platforms:	Containers, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also disable updates to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools on victim systems.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Driver: Driver Load, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Sensor Health: Host Status, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
Platforms:	Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution, WMI: WMI Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	Driver: Driver Load, File: File Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Threat Intel

Malware Configuration

Threatname: RedLine

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Sigma Signatures

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

Networking

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing

Spam, unwanted Advertisements and Ransom Demands

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Remote Access Functionality

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\jtijhkasdjrhg.exe.log

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

Windows Analysis Report
jtijhkasdjrhg.exe

Function 00007FF7C81784E1 Relevance: 1.6, APIs: 1, Instructions: 143
COMMON