Windows
Analysis Report
FortniteHack.exe1.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
LummaC Stealer, Xmrig
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Found malware configuration
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Schedule system process
Yara detected LummaC Stealer
Yara detected Xmrig cryptocurrency miner
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Connects to a pastebin service (likely for C&C)
Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes
Encrypted powershell cmdline option found
Found many strings related to Crypto-Wallets (likely being stolen)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Modifies power options to not sleep / hibernate
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Query firmware table information (likely to detect VMs)
Sample is not signed and drops a device driver
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Files With System Process Name In Unsuspected Locations
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Crypto Currency Wallets
Uses powercfg.exe to modify the power settings
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to record screenshots
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates driver files
Detected non-DNS traffic on DNS port
Detected potential crypto function
Downloads executable code via HTTP
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the application program directory (C:\ProgramData)
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
One or more processes crash
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains more sections than normal
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
PE file does not import any functions
PE file overlay found
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Searches for user specific document files
Sigma detected: Suspicious Execution of Powershell with Base64
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Classification
- System is w10x64
FortniteHack.exe1.exe (PID: 6684 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\Fortnit eHack.exe1 .exe" MD5: 28BA19E1DCAEB26263BECC4EE53FFE66) conhost.exe (PID: 6712 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) FortniteHack.exe1.exe (PID: 6908 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\Fortnit eHack.exe1 .exe" MD5: 28BA19E1DCAEB26263BECC4EE53FFE66) 6Y9CVTAOHZQ67PGGTWC454FW0.exe (PID: 7572 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\6Y9CVT AOHZQ67PGG TWC454FW0. exe" MD5: C11A82D699A06D9B8BA4296E0C562AE4) cmd.exe (PID: 7636 cmdline:
"cmd.exe" /C powersh ell -Encod edCommand "PAAjAFUAa gBvAGkATwB EAFQAbgAjA D4AIABBAGQ AZAAtAE0Ac ABQAHIAZQB mAGUAcgBlA G4AYwBlACA APAAjAEEAZ QBzACMAPgA gAC0ARQB4A GMAbAB1AHM AaQBvAG4AU ABhAHQAaAA gAEAAKAAkA GUAbgB2ADo AVQBzAGUAc gBQAHIAbwB mAGkAbABlA CwAJABlAG4 AdgA6AFMAe QBzAHQAZQB tAEQAcgBpA HYAZQApACA APAAjAGQAO QA2AGYAYwB EAHYAYwBjA DUAIwA+ACA ALQBGAG8Ac gBjAGUAIAA 8ACMAWQBKA E8AUwA4AHg AIwA+AA==" & powercf g /x -hibe rnate-time out-ac 0 & powercfg /x -hibern ate-timeou t-dc 0 & p owercfg /x -standby- timeout-ac 0 & power cfg /x -st andby-time out-dc 0 & powercfg /hibernate off MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) conhost.exe (PID: 7644 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) powershell.exe (PID: 7688 cmdline:
powershell -EncodedC ommand "PA AjAFUAagBv AGkATwBEAF QAbgAjAD4A IABBAGQAZA AtAE0AcABQ AHIAZQBmAG UAcgBlAG4A YwBlACAAPA AjAEEAZQBz ACMAPgAgAC 0ARQB4AGMA bAB1AHMAaQ BvAG4AUABh AHQAaAAgAE AAKAAkAGUA bgB2ADoAVQ BzAGUAcgBQ AHIAbwBmAG kAbABlACwA JABlAG4Adg A6AFMAeQBz AHQAZQBtAE QAcgBpAHYA ZQApACAAPA AjAGQAOQA2 AGYAYwBEAH YAYwBjADUA IwA+ACAALQ BGAG8AcgBj AGUAIAA8AC MAWQBKAE8A UwA4AHgAIw A+AA==" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) WmiPrvSE.exe (PID: 7800 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ wbem\wmipr vse.exe -s ecured -Em bedding MD5: 60FF40CFD7FB8FE41EE4FE9AE5FE1C51) powercfg.exe (PID: 7876 cmdline:
powercfg / x -hiberna te-timeout -ac 0 MD5: 9D71DBDD3AD017EC69554ACF9CAADD05) powercfg.exe (PID: 7892 cmdline:
powercfg / x -hiberna te-timeout -dc 0 MD5: 9D71DBDD3AD017EC69554ACF9CAADD05) powercfg.exe (PID: 7908 cmdline:
powercfg / x -standby -timeout-a c 0 MD5: 9D71DBDD3AD017EC69554ACF9CAADD05) powercfg.exe (PID: 7924 cmdline:
powercfg / x -standby -timeout-d c 0 MD5: 9D71DBDD3AD017EC69554ACF9CAADD05) powercfg.exe (PID: 7944 cmdline:
powercfg / hibernate off MD5: 9D71DBDD3AD017EC69554ACF9CAADD05) cmd.exe (PID: 7972 cmdline:
"cmd.exe" /c SCHTASK S /CREATE /SC MINUTE /MO 5 /TN "dllhost" /TR "C:\P rogramData \Dllhost\d llhost.exe " MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) conhost.exe (PID: 8008 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) schtasks.exe (PID: 8064 cmdline:
SCHTASKS / CREATE /SC MINUTE /M O 5 /TN "d llhost" /T R "C:\Prog ramData\Dl lhost\dllh ost.exe" MD5: 48C2FE20575769DE916F48EF0676A965) cmd.exe (PID: 8000 cmdline:
"cmd.exe" /c SCHTASK S /CREATE /SC HOURLY /TN "NvSt ray\NvStra yService_b k4422" /TR "C:\Progr amData\Dll host\dllho st.exe" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) conhost.exe (PID: 8016 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) schtasks.exe (PID: 8088 cmdline:
SCHTASKS / CREATE /SC HOURLY /T N "NvStray \NvStraySe rvice_bk44 22" /TR "C :\ProgramD ata\Dllhos t\dllhost. exe" MD5: 48C2FE20575769DE916F48EF0676A965) WerFault.exe (PID: 7132 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ WerFault.e xe -u -p 6 684 -s 392 MD5: C31336C1EFC2CCB44B4326EA793040F2)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
xmrig | According to PCrisk, XMRIG is a completely legitimate open-source application that utilizes system CPUs to mine Monero cryptocurrency. Unfortunately, criminals generate revenue by infiltrating this app into systems without users' consent. This deceptive marketing method is called "bundling".In most cases, "bundling" is used to infiltrate several potentially unwanted programs (PUAs) at once. So, there is a high probability that XMRIG Virus came with a number of adware-type applications that deliver intrusive ads and gather sensitive information. | No Attribution |
{"C2 url": ["citydisco.bet/gdJIS", "featureccus.shop/bdMAn", "mrodularmall.top/aNzS", "jowinjoinery.icu/bdWUa", "legenassedk.top/bdpWO", "htardwarehu.icu/Sbdsa", "cjlaspcorne.icu/DbIps", "bugildbett.top/bAuz"]}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Xmrig | Yara detected Xmrig cryptocurrency miner | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer | Yara detected Credential Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_LummaCStealer_4 | Yara detected LummaC Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_LummaCStealer_4 | Yara detected LummaC Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Xmrig | Yara detected Xmrig cryptocurrency miner | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 3 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_LummaCStealer_4 | Yara detected LummaC Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_LummaCStealer_4 | Yara detected LummaC Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Xmrig | Yara detected Xmrig cryptocurrency miner | Joe Security |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Sander Wiebing, Tim Shelton, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: frack113: |
Source: | Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements): |
Persistence and Installation Behavior |
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Source: | Author: Joe Security: |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-03-13T13:35:14.662194+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.12 | 49684 | 188.114.96.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-03-13T13:35:17.777699+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.12 | 49688 | 188.114.96.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-03-13T13:35:20.825726+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.12 | 49692 | 188.114.96.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-03-13T13:35:23.161912+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.12 | 49697 | 188.114.96.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-03-13T13:35:26.553501+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.12 | 49698 | 188.114.96.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-03-13T13:35:29.850571+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.12 | 49699 | 188.114.96.3 | 443 | TCP |
2025-03-13T13:35:34.357672+0100 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.12 | 49702 | 188.114.96.3 | 443 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-03-13T13:35:41.760175+0100 | 2829056 | 2 | Crypto Currency Mining Activity Detected | 192.168.2.12 | 49705 | 185.215.113.51 | 80 | TCP |
Click to jump to signature section
Show All Signature Results
AV Detection |
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Source: | Avira: |
Source: | Malware Configuration Extractor: |
Source: | ReversingLabs: |
Source: | Virustotal: | Perma Link | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: |
Source: | Integrated Neural Analysis Model: |
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
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Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0041D132 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0041DD7B |
Bitcoin Miner |
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Source: | File source: | ||
Source: | File source: | ||
Source: | File source: | ||
Source: | File source: |
Source: | Static PE information: |
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: |
Source: | Static PE information: |
Source: | Binary string: | ||
Source: | Binary string: |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00F0FCDE | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00F0FD8F | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00F0FCDE | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00F0FD8F |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0044A03F | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00449915 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00412299 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0044BB00 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00437C16 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0044D430 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_004114A0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0041DD7B | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00412500 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00412500 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0044D630 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00420F00 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00420F00 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0042387C | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00436001 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0044B810 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00420819 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00420819 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0041F8F7 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_004320FE | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00423893 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00433177 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00448130 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00444930 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_004359DC | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00429190 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00431278 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00431278 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00431A2E | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00431A2E | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00433AD0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0041BAD4 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00447B50 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00408B60 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00437315 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00437319 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00437319 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0040A3E0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0040A3E0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0044C3F0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00435B86 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00430390 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00430390 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00437BAF | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00435BB7 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00424450 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00428C50 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00435C00 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00436C10 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00436C10 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00447CA0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00436CA9 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00436CA9 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00423CB0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00423CB0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00410D42 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00410D42 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0044955F | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00447D60 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00447D60 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00440520 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00436D82 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00436D82 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00445651 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00432E70 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00437E32 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0042D6D1 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0042D6D1 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0040C6E0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00412F3E | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_00431FC0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0044BFE0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0044BFE0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0041A790 | |
Source: | Code function: | 2_2_0041FFA6 | |
Source: | Code function: | 15_2_03154668 |
Networking |
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Source: | URLs: | ||
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Source: | URLs: |
Source: | DNS query: |
Source: | TCP traffic: |
Source: | HTTP traffic detected: |