Windows
Analysis Report
theants-2.0.3-Setup-dkp3z.7x5ols.spqn44#U007ex.exe
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | theants-2.0.3-Setup-dkp3z.7x5ols.spqn44#U007ex.exerenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | theants-2.0.3-Setup-dkp3z.7x5ols.spqn44~x.exe |
Analysis ID: | 1639984 |
MD5: | ba000790d0759848b49131957f4b53e9 |
SHA1: | 96651f44b2ccceae3d9429418253f3ace41a9544 |
SHA256: | 1248bf51c48a4325bf5765060d16d36f7d787f283e61513b6fa025d1b37c8b4c |
Tags: | exemalwaresalitytrojanvirususer-2huMarisa |
Infos: | |
Detection
Sality
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Yara detected Sality
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Changes security center settings (notifications, updates, antivirus, firewall)
Contains functionality to inject threads in other processes
Disables UAC (registry)
Disables user account control notifications
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking mutex)
Found stalling execution ending in API Sleep call
Injects code into the Windows Explorer (explorer.exe)
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
May modify the system service descriptor table (often done to hook functions)
Modifies the windows firewall
Modifies the windows firewall notifications settings
PE file has a writeable .text section
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Checks for available system drives (often done to infect USB drives)
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking a module file name)
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Installs a raw input device (often for capturing keystrokes)
May infect USB drives
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Modifies existing windows services
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sigma detected: Uncommon Svchost Parent Process
Stores files to the Windows start menu directory
Stores large binary data to the registry
Tries to connect to HTTP servers, but all servers are down (expired dropper behavior)
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
theants-2.0.3-Setup-dkp3z.7x5ols.spqn44#U007ex.exe (PID: 5392 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\theants -2.0.3-Set up-dkp3z.7 x5ols.spqn 44#U007ex. exe" MD5: BA000790D0759848B49131957F4B53E9) fontdrvhost.exe (PID: 788 cmdline:
"fontdrvho st.exe" MD5: BBCB897697B3442657C7D6E3EDDBD25F) fontdrvhost.exe (PID: 796 cmdline:
"fontdrvho st.exe" MD5: BBCB897697B3442657C7D6E3EDDBD25F) dwm.exe (PID: 1000 cmdline:
"dwm.exe" MD5: 5C27608411832C5B39BA04E33D53536C) sihost.exe (PID: 3444 cmdline:
sihost.exe MD5: A21E7719D73D0322E2E7D61802CB8F80) svchost.exe (PID: 3464 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k Unist ackSvcGrou p -s CDPUs erSvc MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) svchost.exe (PID: 3512 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k Unist ackSvcGrou p -s WpnUs erService MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) ctfmon.exe (PID: 3800 cmdline:
"ctfmon.ex e" MD5: B625C18E177D5BEB5A6F6432CCF46FB3) explorer.exe (PID: 4056 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Explorer. EXE MD5: 662F4F92FDE3557E86D110526BB578D5) theants.exe (PID: 2612 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Th e Ants\the ants.exe" MD5: 84679E7D0E4DB56B1DF2C065594E691A) svchost.exe (PID: 3508 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k Clipb oardSvcGro up -p -s c bdhsvc MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) StartMenuExperienceHost.exe (PID: 4632 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\SystemAp ps\Microso ft.Windows .StartMenu Experience Host_cw5n1 h2txyewy\S tartMenuEx perienceHo st.exe" -S erverName: App.AppXyw brabmsek0g m3tkwpr5kw zbs55tkqay .mca MD5: 5CDDF06A40E89358807A2B9506F064D9) RuntimeBroker.exe (PID: 4720 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ RuntimeBro ker.exe -E mbedding MD5: BA4CFE6461AFA1004C52F19C8F2169DC) SearchApp.exe (PID: 4824 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\SystemAp ps\Microso ft.Windows .Search_cw 5n1h2txyew y\SearchAp p.exe" -Se rverName:C ortanaUI.A ppX8z9r6jm 96hw4bsbne egw0kyxx29 6wr9t.mca MD5: 5E1C9231F1F1DCBA168CA9F3227D9168) RuntimeBroker.exe (PID: 5012 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ RuntimeBro ker.exe -E mbedding MD5: BA4CFE6461AFA1004C52F19C8F2169DC) smartscreen.exe (PID: 4388 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ smartscree n.exe -Emb edding MD5: 02FB7069B8D8426DC72C9D8A495AF55A) conhost.exe (PID: 5804 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0x4 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) backgroundTaskHost.exe (PID: 2752 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \backgroun dTaskHost. exe" -Serv erName:App .AppX43256 22ft6437f3 xfywcfxgbe dfvpn0x.mc a MD5: DA7063B17DBB8BBB3015351016868006)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
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Sality | F-Secure states that the Sality virus family has been circulating in the wild as early as 2003. Over the years, the malware has been developed and improved with the addition of new features, such as rootkit or backdoor functionality, and so on, keeping it an active and relevant threat despite the relative age of the malware.Modern Sality variants also have the ability to communicate over a peer-to-peer (P2P) network, allowing an attacker to control a botnet of Sality-infected machines. The combined resources of the Sality botnet may also be used by its controller(s) to perform other malicious actions, such as attacking routers.InfectionSality viruses typically infect executable files on local, shared and removable drives. In earlier variants, the Sality virus simply added its own malicious code to the end of the infected (or host) file, a technique known as prepending. The viral code that Sality inserts is polymorphic, a form of complex code that is intended to make analysis more difficult.Earlier Sality variants were regarded as technically sophisticated in that they use an Entry Point Obscuration (EPO) technique to hide their presence on the system. This technique means that the virus inserts a command somewhere in the middle of an infected file's code, so that when the system is reading the file to execute it and comes to the command, it forces the system to 'jump' to the malware's code and execute that instead. This technique was used to make discovery and disinfection of the malicious code harder.PayloadOnce installed on the computer system, Sality viruses usually also execute a malicious payload. The specific actions performed depend on the specific variant in question, but generally Sality viruses will attempt to terminate processes, particularly those related to security programs. The virus may also attempt to open connections to remote sites, download and run additional malicious files, and steal data from the infected machine. |
⊘No configs have been found
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
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INDICATOR_EXE_Packed_SimplePolyEngine | Detects executables packed with Sality Polymorphic Code Generator or Simple Poly Engine or Sality | ditekSHen |
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Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
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JoeSecurity_Sality | Yara detected Sality | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Sality | Yara detected Sality | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
INDICATOR_EXE_Packed_SimplePolyEngine | Detects executables packed with Sality Polymorphic Code Generator or Simple Poly Engine or Sality | ditekSHen |
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INDICATOR_EXE_Packed_SimplePolyEngine | Detects executables packed with Sality Polymorphic Code Generator or Simple Poly Engine or Sality | ditekSHen |
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INDICATOR_EXE_Packed_SimplePolyEngine | Detects executables packed with Sality Polymorphic Code Generator or Simple Poly Engine or Sality | ditekSHen |
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JoeSecurity_Sality | Yara detected Sality | Joe Security | ||
INDICATOR_EXE_Packed_SimplePolyEngine | Detects executables packed with Sality Polymorphic Code Generator or Simple Poly Engine or Sality | ditekSHen |
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System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: frack113: |
Source: | Author: vburov: |
⊘No Suricata rule has matched
Click to jump to signature section
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Spreading |
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