Windows
Analysis Report
nK8noQeiXl.exe
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | nK8noQeiXl.exerenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | 32f7fa32fafc74bb0b26089e37a7fde1.exe |
Analysis ID: | 1665555 |
MD5: | 32f7fa32fafc74bb0b26089e37a7fde1 |
SHA1: | f608bb9d9ba24bc86db2436e612bb84f31be2e97 |
SHA256: | c5308205d4d84ddc2a96194fcc509522ada976c3f5ee60e4208008ede1935359 |
Tags: | exeuser-abuse_ch |
Infos: | |
Detection
HTMLPhisher, CryptOne, LummaC Stealer, Socks5Systemz, Tofsee
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Detected unpacking (creates a PE file in dynamic memory)
Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Powershell launch regsvr32
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
Yara detected BlockedWebSite
Yara detected CryptOne packer
Yara detected LummaC Stealer
Yara detected Socks5Systemz
Yara detected Tofsee
Allocates memory in foreign processes
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Contains functionality to infect the boot sector
Creates HTML files with .exe extension (expired dropper behavior)
Found API chain indicative of debugger detection
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Query firmware table information (likely to detect VMs)
Sample uses process hollowing technique
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious Child Process Of Regsvr32
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Crypto Currency Wallets
Writes to foreign memory regions
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (OutputDebugString,GetLastError)
Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)
Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user
Contains functionality to launch a program with higher privileges
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to query network adapater information
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Downloads executable code via HTTP
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the application program directory (C:\ProgramData)
Drops files with a non-matching file extension (content does not match file extension)
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found decision node followed by non-executed suspicious APIs
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found evasive API chain (date check)
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after accessing registry keys)
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking a module file name)
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains executable resources (Code or Archives)
PE file contains more sections than normal
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries keyboard layouts
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Searches for user specific document files
Sigma detected: Network Connection Initiated By Regsvr32.EXE
Sigma detected: Potential Regsvr32 Commandline Flag Anomaly
Sigma detected: Suspicious Outbound SMTP Connections
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses SMTP (mail sending)
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Yara detected Keylogger Generic
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
nK8noQeiXl.exe (PID: 8572 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\nK8noQe iXl.exe" MD5: 32F7FA32FAFC74BB0B26089E37A7FDE1) svchost015.exe (PID: 8648 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\nK8noQe iXl.exe" MD5: B826DD92D78EA2526E465A34324EBEEA) DrjfIAN86u.exe (PID: 8856 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \bWZ9UJzQu KA\DrjfIAN 86u.exe" MD5: 76435E8885559A7C3EF955DE05646970) DrjfIAN86u.tmp (PID: 8872 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\is-GHU 9V.tmp\Drj fIAN86u.tm p" /SL5="$ 60254,3470 653,54272, C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Roaming\ bWZ9UJzQuK A\DrjfIAN8 6u.exe" MD5: 4979D6D3415EF991208E0E4B04C0474D) ntfs2fat32converter102.exe (PID: 8920 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\N TFS to FAT 32 Convert er 1.0.2\n tfs2fat32c onverter10 2.exe" -i MD5: 6AC5078FC3C5177D6E45251A0E889475) Qv4wdsLMG.exe (PID: 8940 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \LuNQpSc12 \Qv4wdsLMG .exe" MD5: FF6CABE0A00FC853F2D889075700D537) Qv4wdsLMG.tmp (PID: 8960 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\is-T1I UL.tmp\Qv4 wdsLMG.tmp " /SL5="$5 0036,21409 10,174080, C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Roaming\ LuNQpSc12\ Qv4wdsLMG. exe" MD5: 1066651F2FDEF4FB17C5A6D7F3976C0A) Qv4wdsLMG.exe (PID: 8992 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \LuNQpSc12 \Qv4wdsLMG .exe" /VER YSILENT MD5: FF6CABE0A00FC853F2D889075700D537) Qv4wdsLMG.tmp (PID: 9012 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\is-BQE 1B.tmp\Qv4 wdsLMG.tmp " /SL5="$2 0528,21409 10,174080, C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Roaming\ LuNQpSc12\ Qv4wdsLMG. exe" /VERY SILENT MD5: 1066651F2FDEF4FB17C5A6D7F3976C0A) regsvr32.exe (PID: 9056 cmdline:
"regsvr32. exe" /s /i :INSTALL " C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Roaming\ \user32_8. drv" MD5: 878E47C8656E53AE8A8A21E927C6F7E0) powershell.exe (PID: 9072 cmdline:
"powershel l" -Comman d "if (Get -Scheduled Task | Whe re-Object { $_.Actio ns.Execute -eq 'regs vr32' -and $_.Action s.Argument s -eq '/s /i:INSTALL \"%APPDAT A%\user32_ 8.drv\"' } ) { exit 0 } else { exit 1 }" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) conhost.exe (PID: 9080 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) powershell.exe (PID: 8372 cmdline:
"PowerShel l.exe" -No Profile -N onInteract ive -Comma nd - MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) conhost.exe (PID: 8344 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) powershell.exe (PID: 4836 cmdline:
"powershel l" -Comman d "if (Get -Scheduled Task | Whe re-Object { $_.Actio ns.Execute -eq 'regs vr32' -and $_.Action s.Argument s -eq '/s /i:INSTALL \"%APPDAT A%\user32_ 8.drv\"' } ) { exit 0 } else { exit 1 }" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) conhost.exe (PID: 1784 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) vn6ZAuKJ8m7U3.exe (PID: 6776 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \NrbpQDo\v n6ZAuKJ8m7 U3.exe" MD5: 9208C64CF054174E106794F95A8E0D76)
regsvr32.exe (PID: 2540 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ regsvr32.E XE /s /i:I NSTALL "C: \Windows\s ystem32\co nfig\syste mprofile\A ppData\Roa ming\user3 2_8.drv" MD5: B0C2FA35D14A9FAD919E99D9D75E1B9E)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Tofsee | According to PCrisk, Tofsee (also known as Gheg) is a malicious Trojan-type program that is capable of performing DDoS attacks, mining cryptocurrency, sending emails, stealing various account credentials, updating itself, and more.Cyber criminals mainly use this program as an email-oriented tool (they target users' email accounts), however, having Tofsee installed can also lead to many other problems. | No Attribution |
{"C2 url": ["proenhann.digital/thnb", "jawdedmirror.run/ewqd", "changeaie.top/geps", "lonfgshadow.live/xawi", "liftally.top/xasj", "nighetwhisper.top/lekd", "salaccgfa.top/gsooz", "zestmodp.top/zeda", "owlflright.digital/qopy"], "Build id": "609a3af8f2b5fbb695363717b3ddf4a67885df"}
{"C2 list": ["185.39.17.76"]}
{"C2 list": ["quag.cn:443", "jotunheim.name:443"]}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_LummaCStealer_3 | Yara detected LummaC Stealer | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_BlockedWebSite | Yara detected BlockedWebSite | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Keylogger_Generic | Yara detected Keylogger Generic | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_DelphiSystemParamCount | Detected Delphi use of System.ParamCount() | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
Windows_Trojan_Tofsee_26124fe4 | unknown | unknown |
| |
JoeSecurity_LummaCStealer_4 | Yara detected LummaC Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Tofsee | Yara detected Tofsee | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Socks5Systemz | Yara detected Socks5Systemz | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Tofsee | Yara detected Tofsee | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 16 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
Windows_Trojan_Tofsee_26124fe4 | unknown | unknown |
| |
MALWARE_Win_Tofsee | Detects Tofsee | ditekSHen |
| |
Windows_Trojan_Tofsee_26124fe4 | unknown | unknown |
| |
MALWARE_Win_Tofsee | Detects Tofsee | ditekSHen |
| |
JoeSecurity_Tofsee | Yara detected Tofsee | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 7 entries |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: elhoim, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Dmitriy Lifanov, oscd.community: |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: frack113: |
Source: | Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements): |
HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion |
---|
Source: | Author: Joe Security: |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-04-15T17:03:28.269534+0200 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49699 | 104.21.40.117 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:30.657833+0200 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49700 | 104.21.40.117 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:32.504005+0200 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49701 | 104.21.40.117 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:35.512321+0200 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49702 | 104.21.40.117 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:40.237184+0200 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49703 | 104.21.40.117 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:43.500528+0200 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49704 | 104.21.40.117 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:47.469658+0200 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49708 | 104.21.40.117 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:48.515770+0200 | 2028371 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49710 | 104.21.53.21 | 443 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-04-15T17:03:43.911877+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49705 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:45.144954+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49706 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:47.164133+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49707 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:48.373264+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49709 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:49.598875+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49711 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:51.277894+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49712 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:52.496270+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49713 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:53.697078+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49714 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:54.993303+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49715 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:56.187347+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49716 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:57.477033+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49717 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:58.681384+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49718 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:59.886936+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49719 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:01.087303+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49720 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:02.294736+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49721 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:06.083976+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49725 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:07.292855+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49726 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:08.867662+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49729 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:10.050757+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49730 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:11.253616+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49731 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:12.646671+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49732 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:13.897169+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49733 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:15.110168+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49734 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:16.314426+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49735 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:17.527443+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49736 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:18.743684+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49737 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:19.956274+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49738 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:21.164318+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49739 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:22.350415+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49740 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:23.552882+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49741 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:24.772904+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49742 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:25.983833+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49744 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:27.169765+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49745 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:28.340285+0200 | 2028765 | 3 | Unknown Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49746 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025-04-15T17:03:44.499897+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49705 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:45.748023+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49706 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:47.760397+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49707 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:48.965041+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49709 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:50.196294+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49711 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:51.882433+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49712 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:53.077764+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49713 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:54.291244+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49714 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:55.586164+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49715 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:56.779745+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49716 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:58.076567+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49717 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:03:59.267842+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49718 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:00.485608+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49719 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:01.673865+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49720 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:02.881133+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49721 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:06.683045+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49725 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:07.885801+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49726 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:09.448365+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49729 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:10.630222+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49730 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:11.848892+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49731 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:13.248561+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49732 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:14.497524+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49733 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:15.705980+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49734 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:16.912150+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49735 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:18.120175+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49736 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:19.343099+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49737 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:20.558681+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49738 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:21.752336+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49739 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:22.929222+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49740 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:24.151162+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49741 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:25.364741+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49742 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:26.577262+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49744 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
2025-04-15T17:04:27.742805+0200 | 2803274 | 2 | Potentially Bad Traffic | 192.168.2.5 | 49745 | 185.39.17.76 | 443 | TCP |
Click to jump to signature section
Show All Signature Results
AV Detection |
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Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: |
Source: | Malware Configuration Extractor: | ||
Source: | Malware Configuration Extractor: | ||
Source: | Malware Configuration Extractor: |
Source: | ReversingLabs: | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: |
Source: | Virustotal: | Perma Link | ||
Source: | ReversingLabs: |
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: | ||
Source: | String decryptor: |
Source: | Code function: | 4_2_0045D4EC | |
Source: | Code function: | 4_2_0045D5A0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 4_2_0045D5B8 | |
Source: | Code function: | 4_2_10001000 | |
Source: | Code function: | 4_2_10001130 |
Phishing |
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Source: | File source: |
Compliance |
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Source: | Unpacked PE file: |
Source: | Unpacked PE file: |
Source: | Static PE information: |
Source: | Registry value created: | Jump to behavior |
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: | ||
Source: | HTTPS traffic detected: |
Source: | Code function: | 1_2_100081AE | |
Source: | Code function: | 4_2_00452A4C | |
Source: | Code function: | 4_2_004751F8 | |
Source: | Code function: | 4_2_00464048 | |
Source: | Code function: | 4_2_004644C4 | |
Source: | Code function: | 4_2_00462ABC | |
Source: | Code function: | 4_2_00497A74 |
Networking |
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Source: | Network Connect: | Jump to behavior | ||
Source: | Network Connect: | Jump to behavior | ||
Source: | Network Connect: | Jump to behavior |
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: | ||
Source: | URLs: |
Source: | File created: |
Source: | TCP traffic: |
Source: | HTTP traffic detected: |