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Analysis Report IMD_09920100.scr

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:IMD_09920100.scr (renamed file extension from scr to exe)
MD5:7c96bd010e89acbdd3f8606ce25f0aea
SHA1:34f16f8e66329d969c691c7484dde73becedc710
SHA256:f5b99bdcb3a09ccef9455e82dff1902b6913280d293be51d87de78fc418e9f72

Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Nanocore
Score:100
Range:0 - 100
Whitelisted:false
Confidence:100%

Signatures

Detected Nanocore Rat
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Copy itself to suspicious location via type command
Sigma detected: NanoCore
Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location
Snort IDS alert for network traffic (e.g. based on Emerging Threat rules)
Yara detected AntiVM autoit script
Yara detected Nanocore RAT
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Connects to many ports of the same IP (likely port scanning)
Creates autostart registry keys with suspicious values (likely registry only malware)
Creates multiple autostart registry keys
Drops PE files with a suspicious file extension
Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Uses dynamic DNS services
Uses ping.exe to check the status of other devices and networks
Uses ping.exe to sleep
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Writes to foreign memory regions
Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to block mouse and keyboard input (often used to hinder debugging)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)
Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to execute programs as a different user
Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user
Contains functionality to launch a program with higher privileges
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate keystroke presses
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
File is packed with WinRar
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found evaded block containing many API calls
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Installs a raw input device (often for capturing keystrokes)
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
OS version to string mapping found (often used in BOTs)
PE file contains strange resources
Potential key logger detected (key state polling based)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Tries to load missing DLLs
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses taskkill to terminate processes
Yara signature match

Classification

Startup

  • System is w10x64
  • IMD_09920100.exe (PID: 4236 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\IMD_09920100.exe' MD5: 7C96BD010E89ACBDD3F8606CE25F0AEA)
    • rjnkgdmk.pif (PID: 4716 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\22895710\rjnkgdmk.pif' paquaenj.jad MD5: A75BC752C50FB74F7597C2BB59B93D43)
      • RegSvcs.exe (PID: 592 cmdline: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RegSvcs.exe MD5: 2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28)
        • schtasks.exe (PID: 4256 cmdline: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'WPA Service' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp11E5.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)
          • conhost.exe (PID: 1480 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
        • schtasks.exe (PID: 4216 cmdline: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'WPA Service Task' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp163C.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)
          • conhost.exe (PID: 4324 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
        • schtasks.exe (PID: 5044 cmdline: 'schtasks.exe' /delete /f /tn 'WPA Service' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)
          • conhost.exe (PID: 4504 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
        • schtasks.exe (PID: 3952 cmdline: 'schtasks.exe' /delete /f /tn 'WPA Service Task' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)
          • conhost.exe (PID: 4892 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
        • cmd.exe (PID: 2912 cmdline: 'cmd.exe' /C taskkill /f /im 'RegSvcs.exe' & ping -n 1 -w 3000 1.1.1.1 & type nul > 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RegSvcs.exe' & del /f /q 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RegSvcs.exe' MD5: F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D)
          • conhost.exe (PID: 3440 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
          • taskkill.exe (PID: 2656 cmdline: taskkill /f /im 'RegSvcs.exe' MD5: 15E2E0ACD891510C6268CB8899F2A1A1)
          • PING.EXE (PID: 3788 cmdline: ping -n 1 -w 3000 1.1.1.1 MD5: 70C24A306F768936563ABDADB9CA9108)
  • RegSvcs.exe (PID: 3632 cmdline: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RegSvcs.exe 0 MD5: 2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28)
    • conhost.exe (PID: 4564 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
  • wpasv.exe (PID: 3236 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\WPA Service\wpasv.exe' 0 MD5: 2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28)
    • conhost.exe (PID: 1208 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
  • rjnkgdmk.pif (PID: 724 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\22895710\rjnkgdmk.pif' C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\22895710\paquaenj.jad MD5: A75BC752C50FB74F7597C2BB59B93D43)
    • RegSvcs.exe (PID: 4728 cmdline: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RegSvcs.exe MD5: 2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28)
  • wscript.exe (PID: 1200 cmdline: 'C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe' 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\22895710\Update.vbs' MD5: 9A68ADD12EB50DDE7586782C3EB9FF9C)
  • wpasv.exe (PID: 3764 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\WPA Service\wpasv.exe' MD5: 2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28)
    • conhost.exe (PID: 3760 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
  • rjnkgdmk.pif (PID: 4180 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\22895710\rjnkgdmk.pif' C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\22895710\paquaenj.jad MD5: A75BC752C50FB74F7597C2BB59B93D43)
    • RegSvcs.exe (PID: 1160 cmdline: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RegSvcs.exe MD5: 2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28)
  • wscript.exe (PID: 4068 cmdline: 'C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe' 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\22895710\Update.vbs' MD5: 9A68ADD12EB50DDE7586782C3EB9FF9C)
  • rjnkgdmk.pif (PID: 2876 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\22895710\rjnkgdmk.pif' C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\22895710\paquaenj.jad MD5: A75BC752C50FB74F7597C2BB59B93D43)
    • RegSvcs.exe (PID: 3112 cmdline: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RegSvcs.exe MD5: 2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28)
  • wscript.exe (PID: 2376 cmdline: 'C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe' 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\22895710\Update.vbs' MD5: 9A68ADD12EB50DDE7586782C3EB9FF9C)
  • cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: NanoCore

{"C2: ": ["79.134.225.111"], "Version: ": "NanoCore Client, Version=1.2.2.0"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
00000011.00000003.614460785.00000000045A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmpNanocore_RAT_Gen_2Detetcs the Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
  • 0x10c1d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
  • 0x10c5a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
  • 0x1478d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
00000011.00000003.614460785.00000000045A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmpJoeSecurity_NanocoreYara detected Nanocore RATJoe Security
    00000011.00000003.614460785.00000000045A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmpNanoCoreunknown Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
    • 0x10985:$a: NanoCore
    • 0x10995:$a: NanoCore
    • 0x10bc9:$a: NanoCore
    • 0x10bdd:$a: NanoCore
    • 0x10c1d:$a: NanoCore
    • 0x109e4:$b: ClientPlugin
    • 0x10be6:$b: ClientPlugin
    • 0x10c26:$b: ClientPlugin
    • 0x10b0b:$c: ProjectData
    • 0x11512:$d: DESCrypto
    • 0x18ede:$e: KeepAlive
    • 0x16ecc:$g: LogClientMessage
    • 0x130c7:$i: get_Connected
    • 0x11848:$j: #=q
    • 0x11878:$j: #=q
    • 0x11894:$j: #=q
    • 0x118c4:$j: #=q
    • 0x118e0:$j: #=q
    • 0x118fc:$j: #=q
    • 0x1192c:$j: #=q
    • 0x11948:$j: #=q
    00000011.00000003.613735908.000000000456F000.00000004.00000001.sdmpNanocore_RAT_Gen_2Detetcs the Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
    • 0xf415:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
    • 0x43c1d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
    • 0xf452:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
    • 0x43c5a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
    • 0x12f85:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
    • 0x4778d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
    00000011.00000003.613735908.000000000456F000.00000004.00000001.sdmpJoeSecurity_NanocoreYara detected Nanocore RATJoe Security