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Analysis Report order11082020.exe


General Information

Sample Name:order11082020.exe
Analysis ID:262036

Most interesting Screenshot:


HawkEye MailPassView
Range:0 - 100


Detected HawkEye Rat
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Detected unpacking (creates a PE file in dynamic memory)
Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Snort IDS alert for network traffic (e.g. based on Emerging Threat rules)
Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger
Yara detected MailPassView
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Changes the view of files in windows explorer (hidden files and folders)
Contains functionality to detect sleep reduction / modifications
Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs a global keyboard hook
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Machine Learning detection for sample
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
May check the online IP address of the machine
Sample uses process hollowing technique
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)
Contains functionality to detect sandboxes (mouse cursor move detection)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
May infect USB drives
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
One or more processes crash
PE file contains strange resources
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Sigma detected: Suspicious Process Creation
Stores large binary data to the registry
Tries to load missing DLLs
Uses SMTP (mail sending)
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Yara signature match



  • System is w10x64
  • order11082020.exe (PID: 6908 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\order11082020.exe' MD5: A0B802EF353D5C6815E6C62591A8F838)
    • order11082020.exe (PID: 6928 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\order11082020.exe' MD5: A0B802EF353D5C6815E6C62591A8F838)
      • Windows Update.exe (PID: 6996 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Windows Update.exe' MD5: A0B802EF353D5C6815E6C62591A8F838)
        • Windows Update.exe (PID: 7020 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Windows Update.exe' MD5: A0B802EF353D5C6815E6C62591A8F838)
          • dw20.exe (PID: 6216 cmdline: dw20.exe -x -s 2540 MD5: 8D10DA8A3E11747E51F23C882C22BBC3)
          • vbc.exe (PID: 4764 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holdermail.txt' MD5: C63ED21D5706A527419C9FBD730FFB2E)
          • vbc.exe (PID: 6360 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holderwb.txt' MD5: C63ED21D5706A527419C9FBD730FFB2E)
            • WerFault.exe (PID: 6636 cmdline: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 6360 -s 704 MD5: 9E2B8ACAD48ECCA55C0230D63623661B)
  • WindowsUpdate.exe (PID: 4108 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\WindowsUpdate.exe' MD5: A0B802EF353D5C6815E6C62591A8F838)
  • WindowsUpdate.exe (PID: 5268 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\WindowsUpdate.exe' MD5: A0B802EF353D5C6815E6C62591A8F838)
    • WindowsUpdate.exe (PID: 7012 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\WindowsUpdate.exe' MD5: A0B802EF353D5C6815E6C62591A8F838)
      • Windows Update.exe (PID: 5776 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Windows Update.exe' MD5: A0B802EF353D5C6815E6C62591A8F838)
        • Windows Update.exe (PID: 6172 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Windows Update.exe' MD5: A0B802EF353D5C6815E6C62591A8F838)
          • dw20.exe (PID: 6252 cmdline: dw20.exe -x -s 2612 MD5: 8D10DA8A3E11747E51F23C882C22BBC3)
          • vbc.exe (PID: 4392 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holdermail.txt' MD5: C63ED21D5706A527419C9FBD730FFB2E)
          • vbc.exe (PID: 6616 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holderwb.txt' MD5: C63ED21D5706A527419C9FBD730FFB2E)
  • WindowsUpdate.exe (PID: 6992 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\WindowsUpdate.exe' MD5: A0B802EF353D5C6815E6C62591A8F838)
  • WindowsUpdate.exe (PID: 5112 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\WindowsUpdate.exe' MD5: A0B802EF353D5C6815E6C62591A8F838)
    • WindowsUpdate.exe (PID: 6508 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\WindowsUpdate.exe' MD5: A0B802EF353D5C6815E6C62591A8F838)
  • cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: HawkEye

{"Modules": ["WebBrowserPassView", "mailpv", "Mail PassView"], "Version": ""}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

00000003.00000002.1318527483.0000000002080000.00000004.00000001.sdmpRAT_HawkEyeDetects HawkEye RATKevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
  • 0x7b913:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger
  • 0x7db7d:$salt: 099u787978786
  • 0x7bf70:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
  • 0x7cdaf:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
  • 0x7dadd:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
  • 0x7c345:$string2: holdermail.txt
  • 0x7c365:$string2: holdermail.txt
  • 0x7c287:$string3: wallet.dat
  • 0x7c29f:$string3: wallet.dat
  • 0x7c2b5:$string3: wallet.dat
  • 0x7d6a1:$string4: Keylog Records
  • 0x7d9b9:$string4: Keylog Records
  • 0x7dbd5:$string5: do not script -->
  • 0x7b8fb:$string6: \pidloc.txt
  • 0x7b989:$string7: BSPLIT
  • 0x7b999:$string7: BSPLIT
00000003.00000002.1318527483.0000000002080000.00000004.00000001.sdmpJoeSecurity_MailPassViewYara detected MailPassViewJoe Security
    00000003.00000002.1318527483.0000000002080000.00000004.00000001.sdmpJoeSecurity_HawkEyeYara detected HawkEye KeyloggerJoe Security
      00000003.00000002.1318527483.0000000002080000.00000004.00000001.sdmpJoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassViewYara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery toolJoe Security
        00000003.00000002.1318527483.0000000002080000.00000004.00000001.sdmpHawkeyedetect HawkEye in memoryJPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
        • 0x7bfc8:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
        • 0x7cdf5:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
        • 0x7d124:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
        • 0x7d27f:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
        • 0x7d3e2:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
        • 0x7d679:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
        • 0x7bb3a:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
        • 0x7d177:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
        • 0x7d2ce:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
        • 0x7d435:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
        • 0x7bc5b:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details:
        Click to see the 211 entries

        Unpacked PEs

        3.2.Windows Update.exe.2080000.1.unpackRAT_HawkEyeDetects HawkEye RATKevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
        • 0x79b13:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger
        • 0x7bd7d:$salt: 099u787978786
        • 0x7a170:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
        • 0x7afaf:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
        • 0x7bcdd:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
        • 0x7a545:$string2: holdermail.txt
        • 0x7a565:$string2: holdermail.txt
        • 0x7a487:$string3: wallet.dat
        • 0x7a49f:$string3: wallet.dat
        • 0x7a4b5:$string3: wallet.dat
        • 0x7b8a1:$string4: Keylog Records
        • 0x7bbb9:$string4: Keylog Records
        • 0x7bdd5:$string5: do not script -->
        • 0x79afb:$string6: \pidloc.txt
        • 0x79b89:$string7: BSPLIT
        • 0x79b99:$string7: BSPLIT
        3.2.Windows Update.exe.2080000.1.unpackJoeSecurity_MailPassViewYara detected MailPassViewJoe Security
          3.2.Windows Update.exe.2080000.1.unpackJoeSecurity_HawkEyeYara detected HawkEye KeyloggerJoe Security
            3.2.Windows Update.exe.2080000.1.unpackJoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassViewYara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery toolJoe Security
              3.2.Windows Update.exe.2080000.1.unpackHawkeyedetect HawkEye in memoryJPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
              • 0x7a1c8:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
              • 0x7aff5:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
              • 0x7b324:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
              • 0x7b47f:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
              • 0x7b5e2:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
              • 0x7b879:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
              • 0x79d3a:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
              • 0x7b377:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
              • 0x7b4ce:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
              • 0x7b635:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
              • 0x79e5b:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details: