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Analysis Report order13102020.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:order13102020.exe
Analysis ID:297545
MD5:827ec267fae10fb3b211fd6bdd6a5861
SHA1:e84d9d2a3023223f10854941b7087a1799332d07
SHA256:6c079c4f5a7a118e8047d2d81d204a4986353adbcc8f129320e6895a4502601f
Tags:exeHawkEye

Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

HawkEye MailPassView
Score:100
Range:0 - 100
Whitelisted:false
Confidence:100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Detected HawkEye Rat
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Snort IDS alert for network traffic (e.g. based on Emerging Threat rules)
Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger
Yara detected MailPassView
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Changes the view of files in windows explorer (hidden files and folders)
Contains functionality to detect sleep reduction / modifications
Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs a global keyboard hook
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Machine Learning detection for sample
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
May check the online IP address of the machine
Sample uses process hollowing technique
Writes to foreign memory regions
Yara detected Keylogger Generic
Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)
Contains functionality to detect sandboxes (mouse cursor move detection)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May check if the current machine is a sandbox (GetTickCount - Sleep)
May infect USB drives
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)
One or more processes crash
PE file contains strange resources
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Stores large binary data to the registry
Tries to load missing DLLs
Uses SMTP (mail sending)
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses the system / local time for branch decision (may execute only at specific dates)
Yara signature match

Classification

Startup

  • System is w10x64
  • order13102020.exe (PID: 6680 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\order13102020.exe' MD5: 827EC267FAE10FB3B211FD6BDD6A5861)
    • order13102020.exe (PID: 6708 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\order13102020.exe' MD5: 827EC267FAE10FB3B211FD6BDD6A5861)
      • Windows Update.exe (PID: 6820 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Windows Update.exe' MD5: 827EC267FAE10FB3B211FD6BDD6A5861)
        • Windows Update.exe (PID: 6968 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Windows Update.exe' MD5: 827EC267FAE10FB3B211FD6BDD6A5861)
          • dw20.exe (PID: 6392 cmdline: dw20.exe -x -s 2304 MD5: 8D10DA8A3E11747E51F23C882C22BBC3)
          • vbc.exe (PID: 6428 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holdermail.txt' MD5: C63ED21D5706A527419C9FBD730FFB2E)
            • WerFault.exe (PID: 6176 cmdline: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 6428 -s 176 MD5: 9E2B8ACAD48ECCA55C0230D63623661B)
          • vbc.exe (PID: 6648 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holderwb.txt' MD5: C63ED21D5706A527419C9FBD730FFB2E)
            • WerFault.exe (PID: 4364 cmdline: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 6648 -s 176 MD5: 9E2B8ACAD48ECCA55C0230D63623661B)
          • WerFault.exe (PID: 4764 cmdline: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 6968 -s 2316 MD5: 9E2B8ACAD48ECCA55C0230D63623661B)
  • WindowsUpdate.exe (PID: 6800 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\WindowsUpdate.exe' MD5: 827EC267FAE10FB3B211FD6BDD6A5861)
    • WindowsUpdate.exe (PID: 6712 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\WindowsUpdate.exe' MD5: 827EC267FAE10FB3B211FD6BDD6A5861)
      • Windows Update.exe (PID: 1936 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Windows Update.exe' MD5: 827EC267FAE10FB3B211FD6BDD6A5861)
        • Windows Update.exe (PID: 5436 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Windows Update.exe' MD5: 827EC267FAE10FB3B211FD6BDD6A5861)
  • WindowsUpdate.exe (PID: 7104 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\WindowsUpdate.exe' MD5: 827EC267FAE10FB3B211FD6BDD6A5861)
    • WindowsUpdate.exe (PID: 3540 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\WindowsUpdate.exe' MD5: 827EC267FAE10FB3B211FD6BDD6A5861)
      • dw20.exe (PID: 6968 cmdline: dw20.exe -x -s 2452 MD5: 8D10DA8A3E11747E51F23C882C22BBC3)
      • vbc.exe (PID: 6240 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holdermail.txt' MD5: C63ED21D5706A527419C9FBD730FFB2E)
      • vbc.exe (PID: 4824 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holderwb.txt' MD5: C63ED21D5706A527419C9FBD730FFB2E)
  • cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: HawkEye

{"Modules": ["WebBrowserPassView", "mailpv", "Mail PassView"], "Version": ""}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
0000001B.00000002.359960423.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmpRAT_HawkEyeDetects HawkEye RATKevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
  • 0x7b705:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger
  • 0x7d991:$salt: 099u787978786
  • 0x7bd84:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
  • 0x7cbc3:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
  • 0x7d8f1:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
  • 0x7c159:$string2: holdermail.txt
  • 0x7c179:$string2: holdermail.txt
  • 0x7c09b:$string3: wallet.dat
  • 0x7c0b3:$string3: wallet.dat
  • 0x7c0c9:$string3: wallet.dat
  • 0x7d4b5:$string4: Keylog Records
  • 0x7d7cd:$string4: Keylog Records
  • 0x7d9e9:$string5: do not script -->
  • 0x7b6ed:$string6: \pidloc.txt
  • 0x7b77b:$string7: BSPLIT
  • 0x7b78b:$string7: BSPLIT
0000001B.00000002.359960423.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmpJoeSecurity_MailPassViewYara detected MailPassViewJoe Security
    0000001B.00000002.359960423.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmpJoeSecurity_HawkEyeYara detected HawkEye KeyloggerJoe Security
      0000001B.00000002.359960423.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmpJoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassViewYara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery toolJoe Security
        0000001B.00000002.359960423.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmpHawkeyedetect HawkEye in memoryJPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
        • 0x7bddc:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
        • 0x7cc09:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
        • 0x7cf38:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
        • 0x7d093:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
        • 0x7d1f6:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
        • 0x7d48d:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
        • 0x7b94e:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
        • 0x7cf8b:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
        • 0x7d0e2:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
        • 0x7d249:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
        • 0x7ba6f:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details:
        Click to see the 227 entries

        Unpacked PEs

        SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
        24.2.WindowsUpdate.exe.400000.0.unpackRAT_HawkEyeDetects HawkEye RATKevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
        • 0x47b705:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger
        • 0x47d991:$salt: 099u787978786
        • 0x47bd84:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
        • 0x47cbc3:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
        • 0x47d8f1:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
        • 0x47c159:$string2: holdermail.txt
        • 0x47c179:$string2: holdermail.txt
        • 0x47c09b:$string3: wallet.dat
        • 0x47c0b3:$string3: wallet.dat
        • 0x47c0c9:$string3: wallet.dat
        • 0x47d4b5:$string4: Keylog Records
        • 0x47d7cd:$string4: Keylog Records
        • 0x47d9e9:$string5: do not script -->
        • 0x47b6ed:$string6: \pidloc.txt
        • 0x47b77b:$string7: BSPLIT
        • 0x47b78b:$string7: BSPLIT
        24.2.WindowsUpdate.exe.400000.0.unpackJoeSecurity_MailPassViewYara detected MailPassViewJoe Security
          24.2.WindowsUpdate.exe.400000.0.unpackJoeSecurity_HawkEyeYara detected HawkEye KeyloggerJoe Security
            24.2.WindowsUpdate.exe.400000.0.unpackJoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassViewYara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery toolJoe Security
              24.2.WindowsUpdate.exe.400000.0.unpackHawkeyedetect HawkEye in memoryJPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
              • 0x47bddc:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
              • 0x47cc09:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
              • 0x47cf38:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
              • 0x47d093:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
              • 0x47d1f6:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
              • 0x47d48d:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
              • 0x47b94e:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
              • 0x47cf8b:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
              • 0x47d0e2:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
              • 0x47d249:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
              • 0x47ba6f:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details: