Loading ...

Play interactive tourEdit tour

Analysis Report ORDER15102020.exe


General Information

Sample Name:ORDER15102020.exe
Analysis ID:299157

Most interesting Screenshot:


HawkEye MailPassView
Range:0 - 100


Detected HawkEye Rat
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Detected unpacking (creates a PE file in dynamic memory)
Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Snort IDS alert for network traffic (e.g. based on Emerging Threat rules)
Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger
Yara detected MailPassView
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
Changes the view of files in windows explorer (hidden files and folders)
Contains functionality to detect sleep reduction / modifications
Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name
Installs a global keyboard hook
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Machine Learning detection for sample
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
May check the online IP address of the machine
Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)
Contains functionality to create guard pages, often used to hinder reverse engineering and debugging
Contains functionality to detect sandboxes (mouse cursor move detection)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
May check if the current machine is a sandbox (GetTickCount - Sleep)
May infect USB drives
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)
One or more processes crash
PE file contains strange resources
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Stores large binary data to the registry
Tries to load missing DLLs
Uses SMTP (mail sending)
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses the system / local time for branch decision (may execute only at specific dates)
Yara detected Keylogger Generic
Yara signature match



  • System is w10x64
  • ORDER15102020.exe (PID: 6516 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\ORDER15102020.exe' MD5: 420B35E94A60ED57BBDE123F0039F16F)
    • ORDER15102020.exe (PID: 6540 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\ORDER15102020.exe' MD5: 420B35E94A60ED57BBDE123F0039F16F)
      • Windows Update.exe (PID: 6740 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Windows Update.exe' MD5: 420B35E94A60ED57BBDE123F0039F16F)
        • Windows Update.exe (PID: 6772 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Windows Update.exe' MD5: 420B35E94A60ED57BBDE123F0039F16F)
          • dw20.exe (PID: 6944 cmdline: dw20.exe -x -s 2304 MD5: 8D10DA8A3E11747E51F23C882C22BBC3)
          • vbc.exe (PID: 7112 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holdermail.txt' MD5: C63ED21D5706A527419C9FBD730FFB2E)
  • WindowsUpdate.exe (PID: 6500 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\WindowsUpdate.exe' MD5: 420B35E94A60ED57BBDE123F0039F16F)
    • WindowsUpdate.exe (PID: 5696 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\WindowsUpdate.exe' MD5: 420B35E94A60ED57BBDE123F0039F16F)
      • Windows Update.exe (PID: 5444 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Windows Update.exe' MD5: 420B35E94A60ED57BBDE123F0039F16F)
        • Windows Update.exe (PID: 6732 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Windows Update.exe' MD5: 420B35E94A60ED57BBDE123F0039F16F)
          • dw20.exe (PID: 6412 cmdline: dw20.exe -x -s 2316 MD5: 8D10DA8A3E11747E51F23C882C22BBC3)
  • WindowsUpdate.exe (PID: 1200 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\WindowsUpdate.exe' MD5: 420B35E94A60ED57BBDE123F0039F16F)
    • WindowsUpdate.exe (PID: 7164 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\WindowsUpdate.exe' MD5: 420B35E94A60ED57BBDE123F0039F16F)
  • cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: HawkEye

{"Modules": ["WebBrowserPassView", "mailpv", "Mail PassView"], "Version": ""}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

00000014.00000002.305990600.0000000000497000.00000040.00000001.sdmpRAT_HawkEyeDetects HawkEye RATKevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
  • 0x7b99b:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger
  • 0x7dc05:$salt: 099u787978786
  • 0x7bff8:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
  • 0x7ce37:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
  • 0x7db65:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
  • 0x7c3cd:$string2: holdermail.txt
  • 0x7c3ed:$string2: holdermail.txt
  • 0x7c30f:$string3: wallet.dat
  • 0x7c327:$string3: wallet.dat
  • 0x7c33d:$string3: wallet.dat
  • 0x7d729:$string4: Keylog Records
  • 0x7da41:$string4: Keylog Records
  • 0x7dc5d:$string5: do not script -->
  • 0x7b983:$string6: \pidloc.txt
  • 0x7ba11:$string7: BSPLIT
  • 0x7ba21:$string7: BSPLIT
00000014.00000002.305990600.0000000000497000.00000040.00000001.sdmpJoeSecurity_MailPassViewYara detected MailPassViewJoe Security
    00000014.00000002.305990600.0000000000497000.00000040.00000001.sdmpJoeSecurity_HawkEyeYara detected HawkEye KeyloggerJoe Security
      00000014.00000002.305990600.0000000000497000.00000040.00000001.sdmpJoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassViewYara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery toolJoe Security
        00000014.00000002.305990600.0000000000497000.00000040.00000001.sdmpHawkeyedetect HawkEye in memoryJPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
        • 0x7c050:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
        • 0x7ce7d:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
        • 0x7d1ac:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
        • 0x7d307:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
        • 0x7d46a:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
        • 0x7d701:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
        • 0x7bbc2:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
        • 0x7d1ff:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
        • 0x7d356:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
        • 0x7d4bd:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
        • 0x7bce3:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details:
        Click to see the 241 entries

        Unpacked PEs

        20.2.WindowsUpdate.exe.7b0000.1.unpackRAT_HawkEyeDetects HawkEye RATKevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
        • 0x79ab3:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger
        • 0x7bd1d:$salt: 099u787978786
        • 0x7a110:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
        • 0x7af4f:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
        • 0x7bc7d:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
        • 0x7a4e5:$string2: holdermail.txt
        • 0x7a505:$string2: holdermail.txt
        • 0x7a427:$string3: wallet.dat
        • 0x7a43f:$string3: wallet.dat
        • 0x7a455:$string3: wallet.dat
        • 0x7b841:$string4: Keylog Records
        • 0x7bb59:$string4: Keylog Records
        • 0x7bd75:$string5: do not script -->
        • 0x79a9b:$string6: \pidloc.txt
        • 0x79b29:$string7: BSPLIT
        • 0x79b39:$string7: BSPLIT
        20.2.WindowsUpdate.exe.7b0000.1.unpackJoeSecurity_MailPassViewYara detected MailPassViewJoe Security
          20.2.WindowsUpdate.exe.7b0000.1.unpackJoeSecurity_HawkEyeYara detected HawkEye KeyloggerJoe Security
            20.2.WindowsUpdate.exe.7b0000.1.unpackJoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassViewYara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery toolJoe Security
              20.2.WindowsUpdate.exe.7b0000.1.unpackHawkeyedetect HawkEye in memoryJPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
              • 0x7a168:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
              • 0x7af95:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
              • 0x7b2c4:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
              • 0x7b41f:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
              • 0x7b582:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
              • 0x7b819:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
              • 0x79cda:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
              • 0x7b317:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
              • 0x7b46e:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
              • 0x7b5d5:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
              • 0x79dfb:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details: