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Analysis Report BL.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:BL.exe
Analysis ID:299360
MD5:edaec24d8ff87a8f5d409d68422837e4
SHA1:4b6201d6eecd4279d0757f7dc1a6aceb6ac6a17f
SHA256:3d31f84f9248f65e779c58c2e409069f5bc6c34444459a29fec8e485bfeee36d
Tags:exe

Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Nanocore
Score:100
Range:0 - 100
Whitelisted:false
Confidence:100%

Signatures

Detected Nanocore Rat
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Detected unpacking (creates a PE file in dynamic memory)
Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Drops script at startup location
Sigma detected: NanoCore
Snort IDS alert for network traffic (e.g. based on Emerging Threat rules)
Yara detected Nanocore RAT
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Contains functionality to detect sleep reduction / modifications
Delayed program exit found
Drops VBS files to the startup folder
Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Machine Learning detection for sample
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Queues an APC in another process (thread injection)
Sample uses process hollowing technique
Writes to foreign memory regions
Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)
Contains functionality to create guard pages, often used to hinder reverse usering and debugging
Contains functionality to detect sandboxes (mouse cursor move detection)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to record screenshots
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\Programs\Startup)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
Installs a raw input device (often for capturing keystrokes)
May check if the current machine is a sandbox (GetTickCount - Sleep)
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE file contains strange resources
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Stores files to the Windows start menu directory
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses the system / local time for branch decision (may execute only at specific dates)
Yara signature match

Classification

Startup

  • System is w10x64
  • BL.exe (PID: 352 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\BL.exe' MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
    • notepad.exe (PID: 240 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\notepad.exe MD5: D693F13FE3AA2010B854C4C60671B8E2)
    • BL.exe (PID: 4668 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\BL.exe' MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
    • BL.exe (PID: 4704 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\BL.exe' 2 4668 5739218 MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
  • wscript.exe (PID: 6500 cmdline: 'C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe' 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\windows.vbs' MD5: 9A68ADD12EB50DDE7586782C3EB9FF9C)
    • BL.exe (PID: 5564 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\BL.exe' MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
      • notepad.exe (PID: 2468 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\notepad.exe MD5: D693F13FE3AA2010B854C4C60671B8E2)
      • BL.exe (PID: 6204 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\BL.exe' MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
      • BL.exe (PID: 6216 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\BL.exe' 2 6204 5751187 MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
        • BL.exe (PID: 2920 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BL.exe MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
          • notepad.exe (PID: 6900 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\notepad.exe MD5: D693F13FE3AA2010B854C4C60671B8E2)
          • BL.exe (PID: 4836 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BL.exe MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
          • BL.exe (PID: 6404 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\BL.exe' 2 4836 5767078 MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
            • BL.exe (PID: 6488 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BL.exe MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
              • notepad.exe (PID: 5760 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\notepad.exe MD5: D693F13FE3AA2010B854C4C60671B8E2)
              • BL.exe (PID: 6376 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BL.exe MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
              • BL.exe (PID: 6364 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\BL.exe' 2 6376 5783125 MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
                • BL.exe (PID: 6904 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BL.exe MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
                  • notepad.exe (PID: 6084 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\notepad.exe MD5: D693F13FE3AA2010B854C4C60671B8E2)
  • dhcpmon.exe (PID: 7004 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
    • notepad.exe (PID: 6876 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\notepad.exe MD5: D693F13FE3AA2010B854C4C60671B8E2)
    • dhcpmon.exe (PID: 6952 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
    • dhcpmon.exe (PID: 972 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' 2 6952 5763703 MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
      • dhcpmon.exe (PID: 1984 cmdline: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
        • notepad.exe (PID: 4640 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\notepad.exe MD5: D693F13FE3AA2010B854C4C60671B8E2)
        • dhcpmon.exe (PID: 6860 cmdline: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
        • dhcpmon.exe (PID: 6468 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' 2 6860 5779656 MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
          • dhcpmon.exe (PID: 6944 cmdline: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
            • notepad.exe (PID: 6536 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\notepad.exe MD5: D693F13FE3AA2010B854C4C60671B8E2)
            • dhcpmon.exe (PID: 5676 cmdline: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
            • dhcpmon.exe (PID: 4760 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' 2 5676 5794890 MD5: EDAEC24D8FF87A8F5D409D68422837E4)
  • cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: NanoCore

{"C2: ": ["4.4.4.4:444"], "Version: ": "NanoCore Client, Version=1.2.2.0"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
0000001B.00000002.449415455.0000000003971000.00000004.00000001.sdmpJoeSecurity_NanocoreYara detected Nanocore RATJoe Security
    0000001B.00000002.449415455.0000000003971000.00000004.00000001.sdmpNanoCoreunknown Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
    • 0x493e5:$a: NanoCore
    • 0x4943e:$a: NanoCore
    • 0x4947b:$a: NanoCore
    • 0x494f4:$a: NanoCore
    • 0x5cb9f:$a: NanoCore
    • 0x5cbb4:$a: NanoCore
    • 0x5cbe9:$a: NanoCore
    • 0x7566b:$a: NanoCore
    • 0x75680:$a: NanoCore
    • 0x756b5:$a: NanoCore
    • 0x49447:$b: ClientPlugin
    • 0x49484:$b: ClientPlugin
    • 0x49d82:$b: ClientPlugin
    • 0x49d8f:$b: ClientPlugin
    • 0x5c95b:$b: ClientPlugin
    • 0x5c976:$b: ClientPlugin
    • 0x5c9a6:$b: ClientPlugin
    • 0x5cbbd:$b: ClientPlugin
    • 0x5cbf2:$b: ClientPlugin
    • 0x75427:$b: ClientPlugin
    • 0x75442:$b: ClientPlugin
    00000013.00000002.423306111.0000000002282000.00000040.00000001.sdmpNanocore_RAT_Gen_2Detetcs the Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
    • 0xff8d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
    • 0xffca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
    • 0x13afd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
    00000013.00000002.423306111.0000000002282000.00000040.00000001.sdmpJoeSecurity_NanocoreYara detected Nanocore RATJoe Security
      00000013.00000002.423306111.0000000002282000.00000040.00000001.sdmpNanoCoreunknown Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
      • 0xfcf5:$a: NanoCore
      • 0xfd05:$a: NanoCore
      • 0xff39:$a: NanoCore
      • 0xff4d:$a: NanoCore
      • 0xff8d:$a: NanoCore
      • 0xfd54:$b: ClientPlugin
      • 0xff56:$b: ClientPlugin
      • 0xff96:$b: ClientPlugin
      • 0xfe7b:$c: ProjectData
      • 0x10882:$d: DESCrypto
      • 0x1824e:$e: KeepAlive
      • 0x1623c:$g: LogClientMessage
      • 0x12437:$i: get_Connected
      • 0x10bb8:$j: #=q
      • 0x10be8:$j: #=q
      • 0x10c04:$j: #=q
      • 0x10c34:$j: #=q
      • 0x10c50:$j: #=q
      • 0x10c6c:$j: #=q
      • 0x10c9c:$j: #=q
      • 0x10cb8:$j: #=q
      Click to see the 196 entries

      Unpacked PEs

      SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
      31.2.BL.exe.21e0000.1.raw.unpackNanocore_RAT_Gen_2Detetcs the Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
      • 0x1018d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
      • 0x101ca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
      • 0x13cfd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
      31.2.BL.exe.21e0000.1.raw.unpackNanocore_RAT_Feb18_1Detects Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
      • 0xff05:$x1: NanoCore Client.exe
      • 0x1018d:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
      • 0x117c6:$s1: PluginCommand
      • 0x117ba:$s2: FileCommand
      • 0x1266b:$s3: PipeExists
      • 0x18422:$s4: PipeCreated
      • 0x101b7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
      31.2.BL.exe.21e0000.1.raw.unpackJoeSecurity_NanocoreYara detected Nanocore RATJoe Security
        31.2.BL.exe.21e0000.1.raw.unpackNanoCoreunknown Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
        • 0xfef5:$a: NanoCore
        • 0xff05:$a: NanoCore
        • 0x10139:$a: NanoCore
        • 0x1014d:$a: NanoCore
        • 0x1018d:$a: NanoCore
        • 0xff54:$b: ClientPlugin
        • 0x10156:$b: ClientPlugin
        • 0x10196:$b: ClientPlugin
        • 0x1007b:$c: ProjectData
        • 0x10a82:$d: DESCrypto
        • 0x1844e:$e: KeepAlive
        • 0x1643c:$g: LogClientMessage
        • 0x12637:$i: get_Connected
        • 0x10db8:$j: #=q
        • 0x10de8:$j: #=q
        • 0x10e04:$j: #=q
        • 0x10e34:$j: #=q
        • 0x10e50:$j: #=q
        • 0x10e6c:$j: #=q
        • 0x10e9c:$j: #=q
        • 0x10eb8:$j: #=q
        27.1.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpackNanocore_RAT_Gen_2Detetcs the Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
        • 0x571e5:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
        • 0x57222:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
        • 0x5ad55:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe