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Analysis Report 5pB35gGfZ5

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:5pB35gGfZ5 (renamed file extension from none to exe)
Analysis ID:317251
MD5:01c03727d5d9f94fc7c47a622effc217
SHA1:a7a446111da017ee275964af46ac71ff7745c7f6
SHA256:a68aaf370bd46ec00abef5b522d5c6faf6c1beff6a3af3098e4a6dd1e25fce05
Tags:HawkEye

Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

HawkEye MailPassView
Score:100
Range:0 - 100
Whitelisted:false
Confidence:100%

Signatures

Detected HawkEye Rat
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Detected unpacking (creates a PE file in dynamic memory)
Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger
Yara detected MailPassView
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Changes the view of files in windows explorer (hidden files and folders)
Contains functionality to detect sleep reduction / modifications
Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs a global keyboard hook
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Machine Learning detection for sample
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
May check the online IP address of the machine
Sample uses process hollowing technique
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Instant Messenger accounts or passwords
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool
Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)
Contains functionality to detect sandboxes (mouse cursor move detection)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to query network adapater information
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
May check if the current machine is a sandbox (GetTickCount - Sleep)
May infect USB drives
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
One or more processes crash
PE file contains strange resources
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Stores large binary data to the registry
Tries to load missing DLLs
Uses SMTP (mail sending)
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Yara detected Keylogger Generic
Yara signature match

Classification

Startup

  • System is w10x64
  • 5pB35gGfZ5.exe (PID: 4548 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\5pB35gGfZ5.exe' MD5: 01C03727D5D9F94FC7C47A622EFFC217)
    • 5pB35gGfZ5.exe (PID: 4904 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\5pB35gGfZ5.exe' MD5: 01C03727D5D9F94FC7C47A622EFFC217)
      • Windows Update.exe (PID: 3756 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Windows Update.exe' MD5: 01C03727D5D9F94FC7C47A622EFFC217)
        • Windows Update.exe (PID: 6176 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Windows Update.exe' MD5: 01C03727D5D9F94FC7C47A622EFFC217)
          • dw20.exe (PID: 6300 cmdline: dw20.exe -x -s 2312 MD5: 8D10DA8A3E11747E51F23C882C22BBC3)
          • vbc.exe (PID: 6424 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holdermail.txt' MD5: C63ED21D5706A527419C9FBD730FFB2E)
          • vbc.exe (PID: 6436 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holderwb.txt' MD5: C63ED21D5706A527419C9FBD730FFB2E)
          • WerFault.exe (PID: 6704 cmdline: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 6176 -s 2524 MD5: 9E2B8ACAD48ECCA55C0230D63623661B)
  • WindowsUpdate.exe (PID: 7088 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\WindowsUpdate.exe' MD5: 01C03727D5D9F94FC7C47A622EFFC217)
    • WindowsUpdate.exe (PID: 7116 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\WindowsUpdate.exe' MD5: 01C03727D5D9F94FC7C47A622EFFC217)
  • WindowsUpdate.exe (PID: 5632 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\WindowsUpdate.exe' MD5: 01C03727D5D9F94FC7C47A622EFFC217)
    • WindowsUpdate.exe (PID: 5680 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\WindowsUpdate.exe' MD5: 01C03727D5D9F94FC7C47A622EFFC217)
      • dw20.exe (PID: 6364 cmdline: dw20.exe -x -s 1152 MD5: 8D10DA8A3E11747E51F23C882C22BBC3)
  • cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: HawkEye

{"Modules": ["mailpv", "Mail PassView", "WebBrowserPassView"], "Version": ""}

Yara Overview

Dropped Files

SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\AppCrash_Windows Update.e_6a6f311e9719a5d71a22c288f7552ededf6144d_6f3ec437_1a7dea1b\Report.werSUSP_WER_Suspicious_Crash_DirectoryDetects a crashed application executed in a suspicious directoryFlorian Roth
  • 0x11c:$a1: ReportIdentifier=
  • 0x19e:$a1: ReportIdentifier=
  • 0x75c:$a2: .Name=Fault Module Name
  • 0x4ade:$a3: AppPath=
  • 0x4ade:$l4: AppPath=C:\Users\
  • 0x4ade:$s8: AppPath=C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Windows Update.exe
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WERC55C.tmp.mdmpJoeSecurity_MailPassViewYara detected MailPassViewJoe Security
    C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WERC55C.tmp.mdmpJoeSecurity_HawkEyeYara detected HawkEye KeyloggerJoe Security
      C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WERC55C.tmp.mdmpHawkeyedetect HawkEye in memoryJPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
      • 0x5a20f7:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
      • 0x5a225a:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
      • 0x5a24f1:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
      • 0x57afda:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
      • 0x5a2146:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
      • 0x5a22ad:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
      • 0x57b0fb:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details:

      Memory Dumps

      SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
      00000001.00000002.264664326.0000000000AD0000.00000004.00000001.sdmpRAT_HawkEyeDetects HawkEye RATKevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
      • 0x7b8b3:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger
      • 0x7db1d:$salt: 099u787978786
      • 0x7bf10:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
      • 0x7cd4f:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
      • 0x7da7d:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
      • 0x7c2e5:$string2: holdermail.txt
      • 0x7c305:$string2: holdermail.txt
      • 0x7c227:$string3: wallet.dat
      • 0x7c23f:$string3: wallet.dat
      • 0x7c255:$string3: wallet.dat
      • 0x7d641:$string4: Keylog Records
      • 0x7d959:$string4: Keylog Records
      • 0x7db75:$string5: do not script -->
      • 0x7b89b:$string6: \pidloc.txt
      • 0x7b929:$string7: BSPLIT
      • 0x7b939:$string7: BSPLIT
      00000001.00000002.264664326.0000000000AD0000.00000004.00000001.sdmpJoeSecurity_MailPassViewYara detected MailPassViewJoe Security
        00000001.00000002.264664326.0000000000AD0000.00000004.00000001.sdmpJoeSecurity_HawkEyeYara detected HawkEye KeyloggerJoe Security
          00000001.00000002.264664326.0000000000AD0000.00000004.00000001.sdmpJoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassViewYara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery toolJoe Security
            00000001.00000002.264664326.0000000000AD0000.00000004.00000001.sdmpHawkeyedetect HawkEye in memoryJPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
            • 0x7bf68:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
            • 0x7cd95:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
            • 0x7d0c4:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
            • 0x7d21f:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
            • 0x7d382:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
            • 0x7d619:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
            • 0x7bada:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
            • 0x7d117:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
            • 0x7d26e:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
            • 0x7d3d5:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
            • 0x7bbfb:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details:
            Click to see the 192 entries

            Unpacked PEs

            SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
            1.2.5pB35gGfZ5.exe.400000.0.unpackRAT_HawkEyeDetects HawkEye RATKevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
            • 0x47b6b3:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger
            • 0x47d91d:$salt: 099u787978786
            • 0x47bd10:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
            • 0x47cb4f:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
            • 0x47d87d:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger
            • 0x47c0e5:$string2: holdermail.txt
            • 0x47c105:$string2: holdermail.txt
            • 0x47c027:$string3: wallet.dat
            • 0x47c03f:$string3: wallet.dat
            • 0x47c055:$string3: wallet.dat
            • 0x47d441:$string4: Keylog Records
            • 0x47d759:$string4: Keylog Records
            • 0x47d975:$string5: do not script -->
            • 0x47b69b:$string6: \pidloc.txt
            • 0x47b729:$string7: BSPLIT
            • 0x47b739:$string7: BSPLIT
            1.2.5pB35gGfZ5.exe.400000.0.unpackJoeSecurity_MailPassViewYara detected MailPassViewJoe Security
              1.2.5pB35gGfZ5.exe.400000.0.unpackJoeSecurity_HawkEyeYara detected HawkEye KeyloggerJoe Security
                1.2.5pB35gGfZ5.exe.400000.0.unpackJoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassViewYara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery toolJoe Security
                  1.2.5pB35gGfZ5.exe.400000.0.unpackHawkeyedetect HawkEye in memoryJPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
                  • 0x47bd68:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
                  • 0x47cb95:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
                  • 0x47cec4:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
                  • 0x47d01f:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
                  • 0x47d182:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
                  • 0x47d419:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger
                  • 0x47b8da:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
                  • 0x47cf17:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
                  • 0x47d06e:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
                  • 0x47d1d5:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers!
                  • 0x47b9fb:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details:
                  Click to see the 146 entries

                  Sigma Overview

                  No Sigma rule has matched

                  Signature Overview

                  Click to jump to signature section

                  Show All Signature Results

                  AV Detection:

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