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Analysis Report PO.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	PO.exe
Analysis ID:	321086
MD5:	1a278a89f8176f9d38a04f4e58a8c072
SHA1:	50beebd33a8b68602632e1ec065cc6e3b70b40ea
SHA256:	73a8ac37a0f0c6761800a276b77b0fd34d1cf43830f822ef18ff50dbda934751
Tags:	exeFormbook
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

FormBook

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected FormBook

Hides threads from debuggers

Machine Learning detection for sample

Maps a DLL or memory area into another process

Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)

Modifies the prolog of user mode functions (user mode inline hooks)

Queues an APC in another process (thread injection)

Sample uses process hollowing technique

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Uses netsh to modify the Windows network and firewall settings

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Checks if the current process is being debugged

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected potential crypto function

Enables debug privileges

Found potential string decryption / allocating functions

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

One or more processes crash

Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Stores large binary data to the registry

Tries to load missing DLLs

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara signature match

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

PO.exe (PID: 3064 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe' MD5: 1A278A89F8176F9D38A04F4E58A8C072)

PO.exe (PID: 5820 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe MD5: 1A278A89F8176F9D38A04F4E58A8C072)

explorer.exe (PID: 3388 cmdline: MD5: AD5296B280E8F522A8A897C96BAB0E1D)

netsh.exe (PID: 6964 cmdline: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe MD5: A0AA3322BB46BBFC36AB9DC1DBBBB807)

cmd.exe (PID: 7052 cmdline: /c del 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe' MD5: F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D)

conhost.exe (PID: 7060 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

WerFault.exe (PID: 4456 cmdline: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 3064 -s 1204 MD5: 9E2B8ACAD48ECCA55C0230D63623661B)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000003.00000002.314545610.0000000001580000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000003.00000002.314545610.0000000001580000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b62:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15685:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15171:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15787:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ff:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa57a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143ec:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb273:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b4f7:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c4fa:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000003.00000002.314545610.0000000001580000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x18419:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1852c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18448:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1856d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1845b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18583:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000010.00000002.484649434.00000000031B0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000010.00000002.484649434.00000000031B0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b62:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15685:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15171:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15787:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ff:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa57a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143ec:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb273:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b4f7:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c4fa:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000010.00000002.484649434.00000000031B0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x18419:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1852c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18448:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1856d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1845b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18583:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000010.00000002.483269971.0000000002E50000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000010.00000002.483269971.0000000002E50000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b62:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15685:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15171:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15787:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ff:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa57a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143ec:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb273:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b4f7:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c4fa:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000010.00000002.483269971.0000000002E50000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x18419:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1852c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18448:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1856d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1845b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18583:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000003.00000002.313036443.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000003.00000002.313036443.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b62:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15685:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15171:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15787:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ff:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa57a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143ec:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb273:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b4f7:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c4fa:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000003.00000002.313036443.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x18419:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1852c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18448:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1856d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1845b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18583:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000003.00000002.314657268.00000000015B0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000003.00000002.314657268.00000000015B0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b62:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15685:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15171:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15787:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ff:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa57a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143ec:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb273:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b4f7:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c4fa:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000003.00000002.314657268.00000000015B0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x18419:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1852c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18448:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1856d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1845b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18583:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000010.00000002.483171472.0000000002DB0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000010.00000002.483171472.0000000002DB0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b62:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15685:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15171:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15787:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ff:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa57a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143ec:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb273:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b4f7:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c4fa:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000010.00000002.483171472.0000000002DB0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x18419:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1852c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18448:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1856d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1845b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18583:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
Click to see the 13 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b62:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15685:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15171:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15787:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ff:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa57a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143ec:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb273:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b4f7:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c4fa:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x18419:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1852c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18448:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1856d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1845b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18583:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.unpack	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x8ae8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x8d62:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x14885:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x14371:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x14987:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x14aff:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0x977a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x135ec:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xa473:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1a6f7:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1b6fa:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.unpack	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x17619:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1772c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x17648:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1776d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1765b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x17783:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
Click to see the 1 entries

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Show sources

Source: PO.exe

Avira: detected

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: PO.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 38%			Perma Link
Source: PO.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 10%

Yara detected FormBook

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.314545610.0000000001580000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.484649434.00000000031B0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.483269971.0000000002E50000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.313036443.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.314657268.00000000015B0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.483171472.0000000002DB0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: PO.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.unpack

Avira: Label: TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen2

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: www.novavitarealty.com

Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.299457272.000000000F5C0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.globalsign.net/root-r2.crl0
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000002.484389821.0000000001398000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.v
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://fontfabrik.com
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.coml
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fonts.com
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.goodfont.co.kr
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sajatypeworks.com
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sakkal.com
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.kr
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.com
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.typography.netD
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.urwpp.deDPlease
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn
Source: netsh.exe, 00000010.00000002.491969634.000000000432F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/font-awesome/4.7.0/css/font-awesome.min.css

E-Banking Fraud:

Yara detected FormBook

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.314545610.0000000001580000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.484649434.00000000031B0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.483269971.0000000002E50000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.313036443.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.314657268.00000000015B0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.483171472.0000000002DB0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

System Summary:

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Show sources

Source: 00000003.00000002.314545610.0000000001580000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000003.00000002.314545610.0000000001580000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000010.00000002.484649434.00000000031B0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000010.00000002.484649434.00000000031B0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000010.00000002.483269971.0000000002E50000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000010.00000002.483269971.0000000002E50000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000003.00000002.313036443.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000003.00000002.313036443.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000003.00000002.314657268.00000000015B0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000003.00000002.314657268.00000000015B0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000010.00000002.483171472.0000000002DB0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000010.00000002.483171472.0000000002DB0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_0041A060 NtClose,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_0041A110 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_00419F30 NtCreateFile,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_00419FE0 NtReadFile,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_0041A05B NtClose,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_0041A10A NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_00419F2B NtCreateFile,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_00419FDA NtReadFile,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709710 NtQueryInformationToken,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709FE0 NtCreateMutant,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709780 NtMapViewOfSection,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709A50 NtCreateFile,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037096E0 NtFreeVirtualMemory,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037096D0 NtCreateKey,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709540 NtReadFile,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709910 NtAdjustPrivilegesToken,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037095D0 NtClose,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037099A0 NtCreateSection,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709860 NtQuerySystemInformation,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709840 NtDelayExecution,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709770 NtSetInformationFile,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0370A770 NtOpenThread,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709760 NtOpenProcess,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709730 NtQueryVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0370A710 NtOpenProcessToken,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709B00 NtSetValueKey,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0370A3B0 NtGetContextThread,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037097A0 NtUnmapViewOfSection,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709670 NtQueryInformationProcess,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709660 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709650 NtQueryValueKey,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709A20 NtResumeThread,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709610 NtEnumerateValueKey,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709A10 NtQuerySection,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709A00 NtProtectVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709A80 NtOpenDirectoryObject,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709560 NtWriteFile,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709950 NtQueueApcThread,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0370AD30 NtSetContextThread,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709520 NtWaitForSingleObject,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037095F0 NtQueryInformationFile,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037099D0 NtCreateProcessEx,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0370B040 NtSuspendThread,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03709820 NtEnumerateKey,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037098F0 NtReadVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037098A0 NtWriteVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02DCA060 NtClose,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02DC9FE0 NtReadFile,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02DC9F30 NtCreateFile,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02DCA05B NtClose,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02DC9FDA NtReadFile,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02DC9F2B NtCreateFile,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_00401030
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_0041D173
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_0041DB48
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_0041D4FF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_0041DD04
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_00402D88
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_00402D90
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_00409E40
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_0041E79E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_00402FB0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_00739116
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_0068035A
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036FEBB0
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036E6E30
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03791D55
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C0D20
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036E4120
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036CF900
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036DD5E0
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F2581
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D841F
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03781002
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F20A0
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036DB090
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02DB9E40
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02DCE79E
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02DB2FB0
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02DB2D90
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02DB2D88

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe

Code function: String function: 036CB150 appears 35 times

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 3064 -s 1204

Source: PO.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs PO.exe
Source: PO.exe, 00000003.00000003.267458022.00000000011CF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamentdll.dllj% vs PO.exe
Source: PO.exe, 00000003.00000002.316029296.0000000002F4C000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamenetsh.exej% vs PO.exe
Source: PO.exe, 00000003.00000002.313036443.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamecdcd aaa.exe2 vs PO.exe

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Section loaded: sfc.dll
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Section loaded: phoneinfo.dll
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Section loaded: ext-ms-win-xblauth-console-l1.dll
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Section loaded: ext-ms-win-xblauth-console-l1.dll

Source: 00000003.00000002.314545610.0000000001580000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000003.00000002.314545610.0000000001580000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000010.00000002.484649434.00000000031B0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000010.00000002.484649434.00000000031B0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000010.00000002.483269971.0000000002E50000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000010.00000002.483269971.0000000002E50000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000003.00000002.313036443.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000003.00000002.313036443.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000003.00000002.314657268.00000000015B0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000003.00000002.314657268.00000000015B0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000010.00000002.483171472.0000000002DB0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000010.00000002.483171472.0000000002DB0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@8/4@2/1

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\WERReportingForProcess3064
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:7060:120:WilError_01

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe

File created: C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WERD2F6.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: PO.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior

Source: PO.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 38%
Source: PO.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 10%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 3064 -s 1204
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe /c del 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe /c del 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe'

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{0A29FF9E-7F9C-4437-8B11-F424491E3931}\InprocServer32

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Source: PO.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: PO.exe

Static PE information: Virtual size of .text is bigger than: 0x100000

Source: PO.exe

Static file information: File size 2490880 > 1048576

Source: PO.exe

Static PE information: Raw size of .text is bigger than: 0x100000 < 0x25fe00

Source: PO.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source:	Binary string: System.Core.ni.pdbRSDSD source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: System.Xml.ni.pdb source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: wscui.pdbUGP source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.297582675.000000000E6C0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: System.ni.pdbRSDS source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: wntdll.pdbUGP source: PO.exe, 00000003.00000003.267283620.00000000010B0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, netsh.exe, 00000010.00000002.485583016.00000000036A0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: wntdll.pdb source: PO.exe, 00000003.00000003.267283620.00000000010B0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, netsh.exe
Source:	Binary string: System.Configuration.ni.pdb source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: mscorlib.ni.pdbRSDS source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: System.Configuration.pdb source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: Microsoft.VisualBasic.pdb*p@# source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: System.Xml.pdb source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: System.pdb source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: wscui.pdb source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.297582675.000000000E6C0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: System.Xml.pdbH'g source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: System.Core.ni.pdb source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: Microsoft.VisualBasic.pdb source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: System.Windows.Forms.pdb source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: mscorlib.pdb source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: System.Core.pdb9 source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: netsh.pdb source: PO.exe, 00000003.00000002.315870877.0000000002F30000.00000040.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: mscorlib.ni.pdb source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: netsh.pdbGCTL source: PO.exe, 00000003.00000002.315870877.0000000002F30000.00000040.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: System.Configuration.ni.pdbRSDSO* source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: System.Core.pdb source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: System.Xml.ni.pdbRSDS source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: System.ni.pdb source: WERD2F6.tmp.dmp.5.dr

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_0041D0D2 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_0041D0DB push eax; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_0040D8E6 push ecx; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_0041D085 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_0041D13C push eax; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_0040EC2D push edx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_006F0218 push AA20259Ch; retn 0000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Code function: 3_2_006F02C8 push B120259Ch; retn 0000h
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0371D0D1 push ecx; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02DCD0DB push eax; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02DCD0D2 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02DBD8E6 push ecx; retf
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02DCD085 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02DCD13C push eax; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02DBEC2D push edx; iretd

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Modifies the prolog of user mode functions (user mode inline hooks)

Show sources

Source: explorer.exe

User mode code has changed: module: user32.dll function: PeekMessageA new code: 0x48 0x8B 0xB8 0x80 0x0E 0xE7

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe

Key value created or modified: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{67082621-8D18-4333-9C64-10DE93676363} DeviceTicket

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: FAILCRITICALERRORS \| NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX \| NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000004098E4 second address: 00000000004098EA instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor ecx, ecx 0x00000004 add ecx, eax 0x00000006 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000409B5E second address: 0000000000409B64 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor ecx, ecx 0x00000004 add ecx, eax 0x00000006 rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002DB98E4 second address: 0000000002DB98EA instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor ecx, ecx 0x00000004 add ecx, eax 0x00000006 rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002DB9B5E second address: 0000000002DB9B64 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor ecx, ecx 0x00000004 add ecx, eax 0x00000006 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe

Code function: 3_2_00409A90 rdtsc

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe TID: 3596	Thread sleep time: -50000s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe TID: 1328	Thread sleep time: -36000s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe

File opened: PhysicalDrive0

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Last function: Thread delayed

Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.286114617.000000000871F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SCSI\Disk&Ven_VMware&Prod_Virtual_disk\5&1ec51bf7&0&000000
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.286114617.000000000871F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SCSI\CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00\5&280b647&0&000000:
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.285548658.0000000008220000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: A Virtual Machine could not be started because Hyper-V is not installed.
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.285912938.0000000008640000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\scsi#cdrom&ven_necvmwar&prod_vmware_sata_cd00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f56308-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.280827283.00000000055D0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\scsi#cdrom&ven_necvmwar&prod_vmware_sata_cd00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f56308-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}V*(E
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.286114617.000000000871F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\scsi#cdrom&ven_necvmwar&prod_vmware_sata_cd00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f56308-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}~
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.286114617.000000000871F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SCSI\CDROM&VEN_NECVMWAR&PROD_VMWARE_SATA_CD00\5&280B647&0&000000
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.286194290.00000000087D1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SATA CD00ices
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.280856309.0000000005603000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b},
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.285548658.0000000008220000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: A communication protocol error has occurred between the Hyper-V Host and Guest Compute Service.
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.285548658.0000000008220000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: The communication protocol version between the Hyper-V Host and Guest Compute Services is not supported.
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.285548658.0000000008220000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: An unknown internal message was received by the Hyper-V Compute Service.

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Anti Debugging:

Hides threads from debuggers

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Thread information set: HideFromDebugger
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Thread information set: HideFromDebugger
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Thread information set: HideFromDebugger
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Thread information set: HideFromDebugger
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Thread information set: HideFromDebugger
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Thread information set: HideFromDebugger
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Thread information set: HideFromDebugger
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Thread information set: HideFromDebugger
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Thread information set: HideFromDebugger

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process queried: DebugPort
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process queried: DebugPort
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process queried: DebugPort
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process queried: DebugPort

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe

Code function: 3_2_00409A90 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe

Code function: 3_2_0040ACD0 LdrLoadDll,

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036CDB60 mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036DFF60 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03798F6A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F3B7A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F3B7A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03798B58 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036CDB40 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036DEF40 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036CF358 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C4F2E mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C4F2E mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036FE730 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036FA70E mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036FA70E mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0378131B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0375FF10 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0375FF10 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379070D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379070D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036EF716 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037037F5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036EDBE9 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F03E2 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F03E2 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F03E2 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F03E2 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F03E2 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F03E2 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037453CA mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037453CA mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F4BAD mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F4BAD mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F4BAD mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03795BA5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03747794 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03747794 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03747794 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D1B8F mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D1B8F mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0378138A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0377D380 mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F2397 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D8794 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036FB390 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D766D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0370927A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0377B260 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0377B260 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03798A62 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036EAE73 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036EAE73 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036EAE73 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036EAE73 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036EAE73 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03754257 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C9240 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C9240 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C9240 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C9240 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D7E41 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D7E41 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D7E41 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D7E41 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D7E41 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D7E41 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0377FE3F mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036CE620 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03704A2C mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03704A2C mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D8A0A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036CC600 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036CC600 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036CC600 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F8E00 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03781608 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036E3A1C mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036FA61C mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036FA61C mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036CAA16 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036CAA16 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C5210 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C5210 mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C5210 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C5210 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F2AE4 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F16E0 mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D76E2 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F36CC mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F2ACB mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03798ED6 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0377FEC0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03708EC7 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C52A5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C52A5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C52A5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C52A5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C52A5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037446A7 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03790EA5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03790EA5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03790EA5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036DAAB0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036DAAB0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036FFAB0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0375FE87 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036FD294 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036FD294 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036CC962 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036EC577 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036EC577 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036CB171 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036CB171 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036EB944 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036EB944 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03703D43 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03743540 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036E7D50 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0374A537 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03798D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036E4120 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036E4120 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036E4120 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036E4120 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036E4120 mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F4D3B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F4D3B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F4D3B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F513A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F513A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036CAD30 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C9100 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C9100 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C9100 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03778DF1 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036CB1E1 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036CB1E1 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036CB1E1 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036DD5E0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036DD5E0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037541E8 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03746DC9 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03746DC9 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03746DC9 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03746DC9 mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03746DC9 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03746DC9 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037451BE mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037451BE mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037451BE mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037451BE mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F35A1 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F61A0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F61A0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037469A6 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037905AC mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037905AC mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F1DB5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F1DB5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F1DB5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C2D8A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C2D8A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C2D8A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C2D8A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C2D8A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036FA185 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036EC182 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F2581 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F2581 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F2581 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F2581 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036FFD9B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036FFD9B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F2990 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036E746D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03782073 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03791074 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036FA44B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0375C450 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0375C450 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036E0050 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036E0050 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F002D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F002D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F002D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F002D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F002D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036FBC2C mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036DB02A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036DB02A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036DB02A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036DB02A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03747016 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03747016 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03747016 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03794015 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03794015 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379740D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379740D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379740D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03781C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03781C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03781C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03781C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03781C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03781C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03781C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03781C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03781C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03781C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03781C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03781C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03781C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03781C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03746C0A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03746C0A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03746C0A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03746C0A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C58EC mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037814FB mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03746CF0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03746CF0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03746CF0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0375B8D0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0375B8D0 mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0375B8D0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0375B8D0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0375B8D0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0375B8D0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03798CD6 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F20A0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F20A0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F20A0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F20A0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F20A0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036F20A0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036FF0BF mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036FF0BF mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036FF0BF mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037090AF mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036C9080 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03743884 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03743884 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_036D849B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Maps a DLL or memory area into another process

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\explorer.exe protection: execute and read and write
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe protection: execute and read and write
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe protection: execute and read and write
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\explorer.exe protection: read write
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\explorer.exe protection: execute and read and write

Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Thread register set: target process: 3388
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Thread register set: target process: 3388

Queues an APC in another process (thread injection)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe

Thread APC queued: target process: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

Sample uses process hollowing technique

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe

Section unmapped: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe base address: D90000

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe /c del 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe'

Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000002.484389821.0000000001398000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: ProgmanamF
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.271617096.0000000001980000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, netsh.exe, 00000010.00000002.492076136.0000000004EA0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.271617096.0000000001980000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, netsh.exe, 00000010.00000002.492076136.0000000004EA0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.271617096.0000000001980000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, netsh.exe, 00000010.00000002.492076136.0000000004EA0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.271617096.0000000001980000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, netsh.exe, 00000010.00000002.492076136.0000000004EA0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Uses netsh to modify the Windows network and firewall settings

Show sources

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected FormBook

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.314545610.0000000001580000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.484649434.00000000031B0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.483269971.0000000002E50000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.313036443.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.314657268.00000000015B0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.483171472.0000000002DB0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Remote Access Functionality:

Yara detected FormBook

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.314545610.0000000001580000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.484649434.00000000031B0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.483269971.0000000002E50000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.313036443.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.314657268.00000000015B0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.483171472.0000000002DB0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Shared Modules1	DLL Side-Loading1	Process Injection412	Rootkit1	Credential API Hooking1	Security Software Discovery231	Remote Services	Credential API Hooking1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	DLL Side-Loading1	Modify Registry1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion13	Remote Desktop Protocol	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Non-Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion13	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery2	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Disable or Modify Tools11	NTDS	Remote System Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Process Injection412	LSA Secrets	System Information Discovery122	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information1	Cached Domain Credentials	System Owner/User Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Obfuscated Files or Information2	DCSync	Network Sniffing	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	Software Packing1	Proc Filesystem	Network Service Scanning	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue
Exploit Public-Facing Application	PowerShell	At (Linux)	At (Linux)	DLL Side-Loading1	/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow	System Network Connections Discovery	Software Deployment Tools	Data Staged	Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Web Protocols	Rogue Cellular Base Station		Data Destruction

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
PO.exe	39%	Virustotal		Browse
PO.exe	10%	ReversingLabs
PO.exe	100%	Avira	TR/Injector.eajju
PO.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link	Download
3.2.PO.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen2		Download File

Domains

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
www.flexultralounge.com	0%	Virustotal		Browse

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://crl.v	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
blooming-guava-cawr4blrtfppsz67r0r2wz0v.herokudns.com	34.232.47.250	true	false		unknown
www.novavitarealty.com	unknown	unknown	true		unknown
www.flexultralounge.com	unknown	unknown	true	0%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/font-awesome/4.7.0/css/font-awesome.min.css	netsh.exe, 00000010.00000002.491969634.000000000432F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.tiro.com	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.coml	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.typography.netD	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://fontfabrik.com	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fonts.com	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.sakkal.com	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.288649915.0000000008B46000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://crl.v	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000002.484389821.0000000001398000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious

Private

IP
192.168.2.1

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Red Diamond
Analysis ID:	321086
Start date:	20.11.2020
Start time:	10:59:15
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 9m 44s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	PO.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	28
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	1
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@8/4@2/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 29.7% (good quality ratio 26.3%) Quality average: 72.7% Quality standard deviation: 32.4%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, WerFault.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 40.88.32.150, 104.43.193.48, 23.210.248.85, 51.104.139.180, 8.248.121.254, 8.241.11.126, 67.26.83.254, 8.241.9.126, 8.248.113.254, 52.155.217.156, 20.54.26.129, 95.101.22.134, 95.101.22.125 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): displaycatalog-europeeap.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, fs.microsoft.com, arc.msn.com.nsatc.net, db3p-ris-pf-prod-atm.trafficmanager.net, displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, arc.msn.com, skypedataprdcolcus15.cloudapp.net, db5eap.displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, skypedataprdcoleus15.cloudapp.net, umwatsonrouting.trafficmanager.net, audownload.windowsupdate.nsatc.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, watson.telemetry.microsoft.com, auto.au.download.windowsupdate.com.c.footprint.net, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net, au-bg-shim.trafficmanager.net Report size getting too big, too many NtAllocateVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtSetInformationFile calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
11:00:38	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: WerFault.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\AppCrash_PO.exe_501eda88e083e4b8ea75a1ac83a7c11b0f8b4_f9ae678b_1136dfa8\Report.wer Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe
File Type:	Little-endian UTF-16 Unicode text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	14094
Entropy (8bit):	3.7695922857449777
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	192:pigwqmHBUZMXCaKKYKd9/u7sFS274ItI/:m7BUZMXCad9/u7sFX4ItI/
MD5:	D77377036B2D229A28FD4B25F0044C71
SHA1:	52D3B8CE5C9ACBEB6F4F0920D840AA10105B2BCA
SHA-256:	A157F350D251B06DEF44269C215FD29D559D99C65D617D99A96301288122A534
SHA-512:	904701C489605A0C4736E45BFED1CC00394C8DDA7D7EAA7DFCCBF73489850563BA7BA88E51A7508A7C1AF9511CAC9327EA80F02A7BF2F4B8AB1874322B2CC7C2
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	low
Preview:	..V.e.r.s.i.o.n.=.1.....E.v.e.n.t.T.y.p.e.=.C.L.R.2.0.r.3.....E.v.e.n.t.T.i.m.e.=.1.3.2.5.0.3.7.2.4.3.5.0.7.6.9.0.4.7.....R.e.p.o.r.t.T.y.p.e.=.2.....C.o.n.s.e.n.t.=.1.....U.p.l.o.a.d.T.i.m.e.=.1.3.2.5.0.3.7.2.4.3.6.4.8.3.1.5.0.0.....R.e.p.o.r.t.S.t.a.t.u.s.=.2.6.8.4.3.5.4.5.6.....R.e.p.o.r.t.I.d.e.n.t.i.f.i.e.r.=.e.d.b.1.e.c.7.8.-.2.5.8.b.-.4.d.2.e.-.8.e.d.d.-.d.a.9.c.c.e.9.7.3.8.2.a.....I.n.t.e.g.r.a.t.o.r.R.e.p.o.r.t.I.d.e.n.t.i.f.i.e.r.=.1.f.1.9.9.3.2.e.-.8.4.b.7.-.4.5.b.3.-.a.d.2.f.-.f.7.a.6.3.0.4.c.4.2.f.7.....W.o.w.6.4.H.o.s.t.=.3.4.4.0.4.....W.o.w.6.4.G.u.e.s.t.=.3.3.2.....N.s.A.p.p.N.a.m.e.=.P.O...e.x.e.....A.p.p.S.e.s.s.i.o.n.G.u.i.d.=.0.0.0.0.0.b.f.8.-.0.0.0.1.-.0.0.1.7.-.b.5.7.c.-.6.0.5.e.6.f.b.f.d.6.0.1.....T.a.r.g.e.t.A.p.p.I.d.=.W.:.0.0.0.6.3.1.5.5.8.2.5.8.1.7.f.b.3.c.a.1.d.e.4.7.3.6.2.b.f.7.d.2.2.7.6.e.0.0.0.0.f.f.f.f.!.0.0.0.0.5.0.b.e.e.b.d.3.3.a.8.b.6.8.6.0.2.6.3.2.e.1.e.c.0.6.5.c.c.6.e.3.b.7.0.b.4.0.e.a.!.P.O...e.x.e.....T.a.r.g.e.t.A.p.p.V.e.r.=.2.0.2.0././.1.1././.

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WERD2F6.tmp.dmp Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe
File Type:	Mini DuMP crash report, 14 streams, Fri Nov 20 19:00:35 2020, 0x1205a4 type
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	241083
Entropy (8bit):	3.943938856250719
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3072:+90FUCgUdQjOJsR0Zjd+p+EeYE18oe9gIOgF5L2:AmTj160OpIYlf9RpDC
MD5:	6CDBA3737AB2EFAD72CCC19F1C0466BC
SHA1:	FB09AC375E482B6916422B243BDFDFBF7076E35F
SHA-256:	4B617196F7F20BE5F6551F2478B4E11C3491789CA047C324E145563267B949E0
SHA-512:	4069D5F9D62486F5057EB95155C7C1AAFE70AB0F1DD801555A4F9ADB8AA4EC929BFF42A6B7A965949C9DE401D786833947271F94894F32B4A4FC3E2436E11327
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	MDMP....... .......S.._...................U...........B.......#......GenuineIntelW...........T...........9.._.............................0..................P.a.c.i.f.i.c. .S.t.a.n.d.a.r.d. .T.i.m.e...........................................P.a.c.i.f.i.c. .D.a.y.l.i.g.h.t. .T.i.m.e...........................................1.7.1.3.4...1...x.8.6.f.r.e...r.s.4._.r.e.l.e.a.s.e...1.8.0.4.1.0.-.1.8.0.4.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................d.b.g.c.o.r.e...i.3.8.6.,.1.0...0...1.7.1.3.4...1.........................................................................................................

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WERD73D.tmp.WERInternalMetadata.xml Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, Little-endian UTF-16 Unicode text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	8376
Entropy (8bit):	3.69264885519139
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	192:Rrl7r3GLNiHa6A/6YSvSUZ2YTgmfZlSjCprR389b9vsf2fm:RrlsNi66A/6Y6SUZ20gmfrSgo9Uf/
MD5:	A73C345620533EB3DE4FE45689A7A1C7
SHA1:	43E861C1A038FF6EB5DC382876BB7BAE2FE5ADFB
SHA-256:	0AD12BBDA211A7FD2C51F4189CDB84CF223BD5F4977F37E8DDA7411B3A60A803
SHA-512:	4DD6D27F349DADE56F291D80112D700336468C0E0CC266888F95B39CB9A460DF42838D91E148F9C9E73F9372C867A4FA6EDD506B99982005A895F917DBEB52AD
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	..<.?.x.m.l. .v.e.r.s.i.o.n.=.".1...0.". .e.n.c.o.d.i.n.g.=.".U.T.F.-.1.6.".?.>.....<.W.E.R.R.e.p.o.r.t.M.e.t.a.d.a.t.a.>.......<.O.S.V.e.r.s.i.o.n.I.n.f.o.r.m.a.t.i.o.n.>.........<.W.i.n.d.o.w.s.N.T.V.e.r.s.i.o.n.>.1.0...0.<./.W.i.n.d.o.w.s.N.T.V.e.r.s.i.o.n.>.........<.B.u.i.l.d.>.1.7.1.3.4.<./.B.u.i.l.d.>.........<.P.r.o.d.u.c.t.>.(.0.x.3.0.).:. .W.i.n.d.o.w.s. .1.0. .P.r.o.<./.P.r.o.d.u.c.t.>.........<.E.d.i.t.i.o.n.>.P.r.o.f.e.s.s.i.o.n.a.l.<./.E.d.i.t.i.o.n.>.........<.B.u.i.l.d.S.t.r.i.n.g.>.1.7.1.3.4...1...a.m.d.6.4.f.r.e...r.s.4._.r.e.l.e.a.s.e...1.8.0.4.1.0.-.1.8.0.4.<./.B.u.i.l.d.S.t.r.i.n.g.>.........<.R.e.v.i.s.i.o.n.>.1.<./.R.e.v.i.s.i.o.n.>.........<.F.l.a.v.o.r.>.M.u.l.t.i.p.r.o.c.e.s.s.o.r. .F.r.e.e.<./.F.l.a.v.o.r.>.........<.A.r.c.h.i.t.e.c.t.u.r.e.>.X.6.4.<./.A.r.c.h.i.t.e.c.t.u.r.e.>.........<.L.C.I.D.>.1.0.3.3.<./.L.C.I.D.>.......<./.O.S.V.e.r.s.i.o.n.I.n.f.o.r.m.a.t.i.o.n.>.......<.P.r.o.c.e.s.s.I.n.f.o.r.m.a.t.i.o.n.>.........<.P.i.d.>.3.0.6.4.<./.P.i.d.>.......

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WERD809.tmp.xml Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	4645
Entropy (8bit):	4.446423142087213
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	48:cvIwSD8zsIJgtWI9yiVhWSC8Bu8fm8M4Jw0RFFgt+q8vARxYNUZCqvBL6d:uITfO5imSNlJw5KsYOvBL6d
MD5:	2C42EEB13CBB3E68A1ECA68B67CFA1BA
SHA1:	869D79D69054BCB04B98A69DD4D05970B310CF3B
SHA-256:	4E7957DE3EFE71E934F817E1CDA120347C1188ACEE25B6412B299706763E135B
SHA-512:	04D94FA3F1873C7195B4750512CD1B4A1651A8F6FF106EFBA732900F1225B6C3C4D670FB39814C21C94DBF350EB2B8461AED2241A0024640A34F6A000CE85610
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>..<req ver="2">.. <tlm>.. <src>.. <desc>.. <mach>.. <os>.. <arg nm="vermaj" val="10" />.. <arg nm="vermin" val="0" />.. <arg nm="verbld" val="17134" />.. <arg nm="vercsdbld" val="1" />.. <arg nm="verqfe" val="1" />.. <arg nm="csdbld" val="1" />.. <arg nm="versp" val="0" />.. <arg nm="arch" val="9" />.. <arg nm="lcid" val="1033" />.. <arg nm="geoid" val="244" />.. <arg nm="sku" val="48" />.. <arg nm="domain" val="0" />.. <arg nm="prodsuite" val="256" />.. <arg nm="ntprodtype" val="1" />.. <arg nm="platid" val="2" />.. <arg nm="tmsi" val="737531" />.. <arg nm="osinsty" val="1" />.. <arg nm="iever" val="11.1.17134.0-11.0.47" />.. <arg nm="portos" val="0" />.. <arg nm="ram" val="4096" />..

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.014394252916949
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.83% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.78% Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73296/58) 0.36% Win16/32 Executable Delphi generic (2074/23) 0.01% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01%
File name:	PO.exe
File size:	2490880
MD5:	1a278a89f8176f9d38a04f4e58a8c072
SHA1:	50beebd33a8b68602632e1ec065cc6e3b70b40ea
SHA256:	73a8ac37a0f0c6761800a276b77b0fd34d1cf43830f822ef18ff50dbda934751
SHA512:	7c2d439eaae875951c07a5f216448f17b93561e3f6083eee94de7c6241c24ea4da1021c3f12b7986d9edc7ef281d5604d30aae8ce61d90be76d34f3fbfb41291
SSDEEP:	24576:GDJXK2pQMdCIUPf20glUlSFDHucLADt25NcJ60f4fj:E6HtX2NpucA+
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L......_..................%.........n.&.. ... &...@.. .......................@&...........@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x661c6e
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x5FB6EFFB [Thu Nov 19 22:21:47 2020 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v4.0.30319
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [00402000h]
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x261c14	0x57	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x262000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0x25fc74	0x25fe00	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x262000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.101910425663	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:06.446355104 CET	60152	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:06.474493980 CET	53	60152	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:07.272624016 CET	57544	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:07.299825907 CET	53	57544	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:09.618983984 CET	55984	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:09.646159887 CET	53	55984	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:10.788634062 CET	64185	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:10.815763950 CET	53	64185	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:11.596980095 CET	65110	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:11.624150038 CET	53	65110	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:12.485497952 CET	58361	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:12.512454987 CET	53	58361	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:14.322824955 CET	63492	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:14.349788904 CET	53	63492	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:20.443007946 CET	60831	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:20.470057964 CET	53	60831	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:22.127502918 CET	60100	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:22.154567957 CET	53	60100	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:25.648582935 CET	53195	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:25.675843000 CET	53	53195	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:26.850882053 CET	50141	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:26.878113031 CET	53	50141	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:28.221642971 CET	53023	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:28.248595953 CET	53	53023	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:29.089920044 CET	49563	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:29.117016077 CET	53	49563	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:29.745894909 CET	51352	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:29.772902966 CET	53	51352	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:31.008836031 CET	59349	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:31.044528008 CET	53	59349	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:32.229650021 CET	57084	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:32.256700993 CET	53	57084	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:32.679534912 CET	58823	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:32.716883898 CET	53	58823	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:33.041760921 CET	57568	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:33.068943024 CET	53	57568	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:37.599292040 CET	50540	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:37.626326084 CET	53	50540	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:37.886054993 CET	54366	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:37.913269043 CET	53	54366	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:53.379832029 CET	53034	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:00:53.406965971 CET	53	53034	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:06.848416090 CET	57762	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:06.896358013 CET	53	57762	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:07.781565905 CET	55435	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:07.840471029 CET	53	55435	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:08.251220942 CET	50713	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:08.286914110 CET	53	50713	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:08.575808048 CET	56132	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:08.611509085 CET	53	56132	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:08.945375919 CET	58987	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:08.981035948 CET	53	58987	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:09.396877050 CET	56579	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:09.434571981 CET	53	56579	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:09.708476067 CET	60633	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:09.735516071 CET	53	60633	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:09.859127998 CET	61292	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:09.894753933 CET	53	61292	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:10.490293026 CET	63619	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:10.525974989 CET	53	63619	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:11.119065046 CET	64938	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:11.146034956 CET	53	64938	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:11.605583906 CET	61946	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:11.641343117 CET	53	61946	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:24.849941015 CET	64910	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:24.887193918 CET	53	64910	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:50.388691902 CET	52123	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:50.415774107 CET	53	52123	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:51.969986916 CET	56130	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:51.997040987 CET	53	56130	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:56.846453905 CET	56338	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:56.901777983 CET	53	56338	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Nov 20, 2020 11:02:17.057722092 CET	59420	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Nov 20, 2020 11:02:17.100363970 CET	53	59420	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:56.846453905 CET	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0x2335	Standard query (0)	www.novavitarealty.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Nov 20, 2020 11:02:17.057722092 CET	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0x380c	Standard query (0)	www.flexultralounge.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class
Nov 20, 2020 11:01:56.901777983 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x2335	Name error (3)	www.novavitarealty.com	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Nov 20, 2020 11:02:17.100363970 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x380c	No error (0)	www.flexultralounge.com	blooming-guava-cawr4blrtfppsz67r0r2wz0v.herokudns.com		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)
Nov 20, 2020 11:02:17.100363970 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x380c	No error (0)	blooming-guava-cawr4blrtfppsz67r0r2wz0v.herokudns.com		34.232.47.250	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Nov 20, 2020 11:02:17.100363970 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x380c	No error (0)	blooming-guava-cawr4blrtfppsz67r0r2wz0v.herokudns.com		34.227.164.168	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Nov 20, 2020 11:02:17.100363970 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x380c	No error (0)	blooming-guava-cawr4blrtfppsz67r0r2wz0v.herokudns.com		3.209.148.13	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Nov 20, 2020 11:02:17.100363970 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x380c	No error (0)	blooming-guava-cawr4blrtfppsz67r0r2wz0v.herokudns.com		3.222.114.249	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Nov 20, 2020 11:02:17.100363970 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x380c	No error (0)	blooming-guava-cawr4blrtfppsz67r0r2wz0v.herokudns.com		54.164.152.149	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Nov 20, 2020 11:02:17.100363970 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x380c	No error (0)	blooming-guava-cawr4blrtfppsz67r0r2wz0v.herokudns.com		3.90.94.177	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Nov 20, 2020 11:02:17.100363970 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x380c	No error (0)	blooming-guava-cawr4blrtfppsz67r0r2wz0v.herokudns.com		3.213.190.117	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Nov 20, 2020 11:02:17.100363970 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x380c	No error (0)	blooming-guava-cawr4blrtfppsz67r0r2wz0v.herokudns.com		35.170.115.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

Code Manipulations

User Modules

Hook Summary

Function Name	Hook Type	Active in Processes
PeekMessageA	INLINE	explorer.exe
PeekMessageW	INLINE	explorer.exe
GetMessageW	INLINE	explorer.exe
GetMessageA	INLINE	explorer.exe

Processes

Process: explorer.exe, Module: user32.dll

Function Name	Hook Type	New Data
PeekMessageA	INLINE	0x48 0x8B 0xB8 0x80 0x0E 0xE7
PeekMessageW	INLINE	0x48 0x8B 0xB8 0x88 0x8E 0xE7
GetMessageW	INLINE	0x48 0x8B 0xB8 0x88 0x8E 0xE7
GetMessageA	INLINE	0x48 0x8B 0xB8 0x80 0x0E 0xE7

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: PO.exe PID: 3064 Parent PID: 5736

General

Start time:	11:00:10
Start date:	20/11/2020
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe'
Imagebase:	0xe30000
File size:	2490880 bytes
MD5 hash:	1A278A89F8176F9D38A04F4E58A8C072
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: PO.exe PID: 5820 Parent PID: 3064

General

Start time:	11:00:32
Start date:	20/11/2020
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe
Imagebase:	0x670000
File size:	2490880 bytes
MD5 hash:	1A278A89F8176F9D38A04F4E58A8C072
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000003.00000002.314545610.0000000001580000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000003.00000002.314545610.0000000001580000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000003.00000002.314545610.0000000001580000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000003.00000002.313036443.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000003.00000002.313036443.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000003.00000002.313036443.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000003.00000002.314657268.00000000015B0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000003.00000002.314657268.00000000015B0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000003.00000002.314657268.00000000015B0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: WerFault.exe PID: 4456 Parent PID: 3064

General

Start time:	11:00:34
Start date:	20/11/2020
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 3064 -s 1204
Imagebase:	0xee0000
File size:	434592 bytes
MD5 hash:	9E2B8ACAD48ECCA55C0230D63623661B
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: explorer.exe PID: 3388 Parent PID: 5820

General

Start time:	11:00:35
Start date:	20/11/2020
Path:	C:\Windows\explorer.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:
Imagebase:	0x7ff714890000
File size:	3933184 bytes
MD5 hash:	AD5296B280E8F522A8A897C96BAB0E1D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: netsh.exe PID: 6964 Parent PID: 3388

General

Start time:	11:00:52
Start date:	20/11/2020
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe
Imagebase:	0xd90000
File size:	82944 bytes
MD5 hash:	A0AA3322BB46BBFC36AB9DC1DBBBB807
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000010.00000002.484649434.00000000031B0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000010.00000002.484649434.00000000031B0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000010.00000002.484649434.00000000031B0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000010.00000002.483269971.0000000002E50000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000010.00000002.483269971.0000000002E50000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000010.00000002.483269971.0000000002E50000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000010.00000002.483171472.0000000002DB0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000010.00000002.483171472.0000000002DB0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000010.00000002.483171472.0000000002DB0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: cmd.exe PID: 7052 Parent PID: 6964

General

Start time:	11:00:56
Start date:	20/11/2020
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	/c del 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PO.exe'
Imagebase:	0xbd0000
File size:	232960 bytes
MD5 hash:	F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 7060 Parent PID: 7052

General

Start time:	11:00:56
Start date:	20/11/2020
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff6b2800000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious payloads. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like `CreateProcess` , `LoadLibrary` , etc. of the Win32 API.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Adversaries may take advantage of vague references in the library manifest of a program by replacing a legitimate library with a malicious one, causing the operating system to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	BIOS, MBR, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.Unlike Keylogging , this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Analysis Report PO.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Networking:

E-Banking Fraud:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

Public

Private

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Imports

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

Code Manipulations

User Modules

Hook Summary

Processes

Statistics

Behavior

System Behavior