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Analysis Report New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
Analysis ID:	326328
MD5:	a0ce94d59dc8204e8cdbce7c4d635d32
SHA1:	8599d6d2c48067e3c29cd751dba94ed06313fd75
SHA256:	415e3b94a339a45d036814c1bfbae3a24befccaf6bbba44a5265613f3aec3ef7
Tags:	AgentTeslaexe
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

AgentTesla

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Sigma detected: Suspicious Double Extension

Snort IDS alert for network traffic (e.g. based on Emerging Threat rules)

Yara detected AgentTesla

Yara detected AntiVM_3

.NET source code contains very large strings

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Installs a global keyboard hook

Machine Learning detection for sample

Moves itself to temp directory

Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)

Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)

Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)

Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access)

Uses an obfuscated file name to hide its real file extension (double extension)

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities

Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

Detected potential crypto function

Enables debug privileges

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

IP address seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)

Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses SMTP (mail sending)

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara detected Credential Stealer

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe (PID: 6604 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe' MD5: A0CE94D59DC8204E8CDBCE7C4D635D32)

New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe (PID: 6808 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe MD5: A0CE94D59DC8204E8CDBCE7C4D635D32)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Agenttesla

{"Username: ": "thMm2wh2OXe", "URL: ": "https://8vhVWmhsLg6p.com", "To: ": "billyfunds@divasvalves.com", "ByHost: ": "smtp.divasvalves.com:587", "Password: ": "dz2o9HgMmb", "From: ": "billyfunds@divasvalves.com"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author
00000002.00000002.489798075.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.230902914.0000000002461000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.231364054.0000000003469000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe PID: 6604	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe PID: 6604	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe PID: 6808	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe PID: 6808	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
Click to see the 4 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
2.2.New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Sigma detected: Suspicious Double Extension

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Florian Roth (rule), @blu3_team (idea): Data: Command: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, CommandLine: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: :^, Image: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, ParentCommandLine: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe' , ParentImage: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, ParentProcessId: 6604, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, ProcessId: 6808

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe.6808.2.memstr

Malware Configuration Extractor: Agenttesla {"Username: ": "thMm2wh2OXe", "URL: ": "https://8vhVWmhsLg6p.com", "To: ": "billyfunds@divasvalves.com", "ByHost: ": "smtp.divasvalves.com:587", "Password: ": "dz2o9HgMmb", "From: ": "billyfunds@divasvalves.com"}

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 2.2.New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack

Avira: Label: TR/Spy.Gen8

Networking:

Snort IDS alert for network traffic (e.g. based on Emerging Threat rules)

Show sources

Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2030171 ET TROJAN AgentTesla Exfil Via SMTP 192.168.2.3:49743 -> 208.91.198.143:587
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2030171 ET TROJAN AgentTesla Exfil Via SMTP 192.168.2.3:49744 -> 208.91.198.143:587

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.3:49743 -> 208.91.198.143:587

Source: Joe Sandbox View

IP Address: 208.91.198.143 208.91.198.143

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.3:49743 -> 208.91.198.143:587

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: smtp.divasvalves.com

Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://DynDns.comDynDNS
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.496450719.00000000035FB000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://smtp.divasvalves.com
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.496450719.00000000035FB000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://us2.smtp.mailhostbox.com
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://zwdNmL.com
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.445087309.0000000001554000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://8vhVWmhsLg6p.com
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://8vhVWmhsLg6p.comH#7
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.ipify.orgGETMozilla/5.0
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.231364054.0000000003469000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.489798075.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.telegram.org/bot%telegramapi%/
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.telegram.org/bot%telegramapi%/sendDocumentdocument---------------------------x
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.231364054.0000000003469000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.489798075.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

Installs a global keyboard hook

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Windows user hook set: 0 keyboard low level C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Window created: window name: CLIPBRDWNDCLASS

System Summary:

.NET source code contains very large strings

Show sources

Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, MMqB??p??W/??BuWDp??pvBH.cs	Long String: Length: 81136
Source: 0.0.New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe.70000.0.unpack, MMqB??p??W/??BuWDp??pvBH.cs	Long String: Length: 81136
Source: 0.2.New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe.70000.0.unpack, MMqB??p??W/??BuWDp??pvBH.cs	Long String: Length: 81136
Source: 2.2.New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe.ed0000.1.unpack, MMqB??p??W/??BuWDp??pvBH.cs	Long String: Length: 81136
Source: 2.0.New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe.ed0000.0.unpack, MMqB??p??W/??BuWDp??pvBH.cs	Long String: Length: 81136

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Show sources

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: Filename: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: Filename: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_009CA908
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_009C9CF0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_009C7F7E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_009C6B64
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_016E4860
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_016E3D9C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_016E4770
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_016E4852
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_016E4810
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_016E5550
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_017059F8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_017008F6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_01704B30
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_01708D98
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_0170B420
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_01700FB4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_0170D928
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_0170D550
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_01709F88
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_01736510
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_01735DD8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_017323BB
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_017357A0

Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.235583981.0000000005971000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameNT1.dll, vs New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.230902914.0000000002461000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamexQPaXEtXLxQxMXsDyBVeeCdxdcLaKUF.exe4 vs New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000000.221683014.0000000000118000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameContinuationTaskFromTask.exe@ vs New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.231364054.0000000003469000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameGlaxoSmithKline.dll@ vs New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493347759.00000000018D0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamewshom.ocx.mui vs New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.489798075.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamexQPaXEtXLxQxMXsDyBVeeCdxdcLaKUF.exe4 vs New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.499432901.0000000006720000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemscorrc.dllT vs New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.491234427.0000000001338000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameUNKNOWN_FILET vs New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493326344.00000000018C0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamewshom.ocx vs New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.491149432.0000000000F78000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameContinuationTaskFromTask.exe@ vs New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameContinuationTaskFromTask.exe@ vs New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.spyw.evad.winEXE@3/2@2/2

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe.log

Jump to behavior

Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe:Zone.Identifier

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{172BDDF8-CEEA-11D1-8B05-00600806D9B6}\InProcServer32

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676

Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_016ED331 push esp; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_0173B5FF push edi; retn 0000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_0173D458 pushad ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_0173D44C pushad ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_017356F0 push es; ret

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.00471391573

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Moves itself to temp directory

Show sources

Source: c:\users\user\desktop\new order inquiry.pdf.exe

File moved: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpG468.tmp

Jump to behavior

Uses an obfuscated file name to hide its real file extension (double extension)

Show sources

Source: Possible double extension: pdf.exe

Static PE information: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Registry key monitored for changes: HKEY_CURRENT_USER_Classes

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Yara detected AntiVM_3

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.230902914.0000000002461000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe PID: 6604, type: MEMORY

Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_BaseBoard

Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.230902914.0000000002461000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SBIEDLL.DLL
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.230902914.0000000002461000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: KERNEL32.DLL.WINE_GET_UNIX_FILE_NAME

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 8287
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 1570

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe TID: 6608	Thread sleep time: -51538s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe TID: 6632	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe TID: 3664	Thread sleep time: -14757395258967632s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe TID: 5388	Thread sleep count: 8287 > 30
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe TID: 5388	Thread sleep count: 1570 > 30

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor

Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.230902914.0000000002461000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: InstallPathJC:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.230902914.0000000002461000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmware
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.230902914.0000000002461000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA II
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.230902914.0000000002461000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWAREDSOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Code function: 2_2_01704068 LdrInitializeThunk,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493438325.0000000001C90000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493438325.0000000001C90000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493438325.0000000001C90000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493438325.0000000001C90000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\System.Data\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Data.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\System.Data\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Data.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\System.Data\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Data.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Management.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected AgentTesla

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.489798075.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.231364054.0000000003469000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe PID: 6604, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe PID: 6808, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Martin Prikryl\WinSCP 2\Sessions

Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\profiles.ini
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cookies
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data

Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\SmartFTP\Client 2.0\Favorites\Quick Connect\
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\FileZilla\recentservers.xml

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\profiles.ini
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\profiles.ini
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\IncrediMail\Identities
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Messaging Subsystem\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe PID: 6808, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality:

Yara detected AgentTesla

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.489798075.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.231364054.0000000003469000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe PID: 6604, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe PID: 6808, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation211	Path Interception	Process Injection12	Masquerading21	OS Credential Dumping2	Query Registry1	Remote Services	Email Collection1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion13	Input Capture11	Security Software Discovery211	Remote Desktop Protocol	Input Capture11	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Non-Standard Port1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Disable or Modify Tools1	Credentials in Registry1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion13	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Archive Collected Data1	Automated Exfiltration	Non-Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Process Injection12	NTDS	Process Discovery2	Distributed Component Object Model	Data from Local System2	Scheduled Transfer	Application Layer Protocol11	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Obfuscated Files or Information12	LSA Secrets	Application Window Discovery1	SSH	Clipboard Data1	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Software Packing3	Cached Domain Credentials	Remote System Discovery1	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Compile After Delivery	DCSync	System Information Discovery114	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link	Download
2.2.New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Spy.Gen8		Download File

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://smtp.divasvalves.com	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
https://8vhVWmhsLg6p.comH#7	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://zwdNmL.com	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://8vhVWmhsLg6p.com	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://api.ipify.orgGETMozilla/5.0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://api.ipify.orgGETMozilla/5.0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://api.ipify.orgGETMozilla/5.0	0%	URL Reputation	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
us2.smtp.mailhostbox.com	208.91.198.143	true	false		high
smtp.divasvalves.com	unknown	unknown	true		unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://smtp.divasvalves.com	New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.496450719.00000000035FB000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://8vhVWmhsLg6p.comH#7	New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1	New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	low
http://zwdNmL.com	New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://8vhVWmhsLg6p.com	New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.445087309.0000000001554000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	true	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://us2.smtp.mailhostbox.com	New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.496450719.00000000035FB000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://api.telegram.org/bot%telegramapi%/	New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.231364054.0000000003469000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.489798075.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	false		high
https://api.telegram.org/bot%telegramapi%/sendDocumentdocument---------------------------x	New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.231364054.0000000003469000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.489798075.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://api.ipify.orgGETMozilla/5.0	New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
208.91.198.143	unknown	United States		394695	PUBLIC-DOMAIN-REGISTRYUS	false

Private

IP
192.168.2.1

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Red Diamond
Analysis ID:	326328
Start date:	03.12.2020
Start time:	09:55:52
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 8m 9s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	22
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.spyw.evad.winEXE@3/2@2/2
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 0.3% (good quality ratio 0.2%) Quality average: 55.4% Quality standard deviation: 23.5%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 13.88.21.125, 13.64.90.137, 104.43.193.48, 92.122.144.200, 51.11.168.160, 20.54.26.129, 2.20.142.209, 2.20.142.210, 51.104.144.132, 92.122.213.247, 92.122.213.194 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): au.download.windowsupdate.com.edgesuite.net, skypedataprdcolwus17.cloudapp.net, fs.microsoft.com, arc.msn.com.nsatc.net, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, a767.dscg3.akamai.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, arc.msn.com, skypedataprdcolcus15.cloudapp.net, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, blobcollector.events.data.trafficmanager.net, audownload.windowsupdate.nsatc.net, watson.telemetry.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net, skypedataprdcolwus15.cloudapp.net, au-bg-shim.trafficmanager.net Report size getting too big, too many NtAllocateVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found. VT rate limit hit for: /opt/package/joesandbox/database/analysis/326328/sample/New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
09:56:50	API Interceptor	810x Sleep call for process: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link
208.91.198.143	Swift Copy.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	SecuriteInfo.com.Generic.mg.0944e0c972d02445.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	dULgYAKQ5L.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	SOA_payment_balance.doc.gz.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	CORRECT INVOICE.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Payment copy.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	BILL OF LADING SHIPPING DOCSPDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	0hgHwEkIWY.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Shipping doc.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Shipping Details.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	PAYMENT SLIP.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	fx2C5jUjRT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	SecuriteInfo.com.Trojan.PackedNET.461.31996.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	qLCU7kIsgt.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	sFCFmEXJ2e.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	wJsynh1HNX.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	MELaXQrtDH.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	On0dcNYXhD.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	New Order.gz.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	NINO.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse

Domains

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
us2.smtp.mailhostbox.com	Salary_PMT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.224
	Swift Copy.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.198.143
	Scan0202.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.225
	F9g721I4sS.rtf	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.224
	Payment advise_pdf__________________________________.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.225
	Fagner Order_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.223
	PO-789906504.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.224
	Al Jaber Dubai.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.223
	SecuriteInfo.com.Generic.mg.bcffd84bcd9111df.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.224
	SecuriteInfo.com.Generic.mg.db37503e0e66b5c4.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.224
	New Order.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.225
	vbc.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.223
	SecuriteInfo.com.Generic.mg.0944e0c972d02445.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.198.143
	inquiry.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.224
	vbc.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.223
	Invoice.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.224
	Purchase Order 1508521.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.223
	Purchase Order 1508521.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.224
	PO. NO. 20201240001.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.198.143
	Shipping Documents.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.224

ASN

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
PUBLIC-DOMAIN-REGISTRYUS	Salary_PMT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.224
	Swift Copy.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.198.143
	Scan0202.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.225
	F9g721I4sS.rtf	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.225
	Payment advise_pdf__________________________________.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.225
	Fagner Order_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.224
	PO-789906504.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.224
	Al Jaber Dubai.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.223
	AddressValidateForm-490710598-12022020.xls	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.195.185.149
	AddressValidateForm-490710598-12022020.xls	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.195.185.149
	https://dynalist.io/d/TcKkPvWijzGN4uv-0OCmM26A	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.79.62.144
	https://www.paperturn-view.com/?pid=MTI128610	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.79.62.243
	r.dll	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.53.40.79
	SecuriteInfo.com.Generic.mg.bcffd84bcd9111df.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.224
	SecuriteInfo.com.Generic.mg.db37503e0e66b5c4.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.224
	New Order.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.225
	vbc.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.223
	SecuriteInfo.com.Generic.mg.0944e0c972d02445.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.198.143
	inquiry.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.224
	vbc.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	208.91.199.223

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	792
Entropy (8bit):	5.331449916613832
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:MLKE4K5E4Ks29E4Kx1qE4x84qXKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhk:MuHK5HKX9HKx1qHxviYHKhQnok
MD5:	48C35637F4E5AE32A768BDF159A4B32E
SHA1:	C27B5E37426D6496AF195A39B7882DF50341EE4A
SHA-256:	43567270C0C1C1BCD458595B138034B2A6F6DC4B2DFFA475AE7D629BE4C93BD2
SHA-512:	B4E98A592CC5EDB8E3379283756A01B7712922748BF4FC19E41B1205DD404367C11357BB17824419A2C4B2CE007BEAA55EBA97F602BC5B361EABC222CBC0374D
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..2,"System.Data, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089",0..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..2,"System.Windows.Forms, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089",0..2,"System.Drawing, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..2,"Microsoft.VisualBasic, Version=10.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\pwrpouac.23y\Chrome\Default\Cookies Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
File Type:	SQLite 3.x database, last written using SQLite version 3032001
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	20480
Entropy (8bit):	0.6970840431455908
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:TLbJLbXaFpEO5bNmISHn06UwcQPx5fBocLgAZOZD/0:T5LLOpEO5J/Kn7U1uBo8NOZ0
MD5:	00681D89EDDB6AD25E6F4BD2E66C61C6
SHA1:	14B2FBFB460816155190377BBC66AB5D2A15F7AB
SHA-256:	8BF06FD5FAE8199D261EB879E771146AE49600DBDED7FDC4EAC83A8C6A7A5D85
SHA-512:	159A9DE664091A3986042B2BE594E989FD514163094AC606DC3A6A7661A66A78C0D365B8CA2C94B8BC86D552E59D50407B4680EDADB894320125F0E9F48872D3
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	SQLite format 3......@ ..........................................................................C....... ..g... .8....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	6.9921837086019565
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.80% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.75% Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73296/58) 0.36% Windows Screen Saver (13104/52) 0.07% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01%
File name:	New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
File size:	678912
MD5:	a0ce94d59dc8204e8cdbce7c4d635d32
SHA1:	8599d6d2c48067e3c29cd751dba94ed06313fd75
SHA256:	415e3b94a339a45d036814c1bfbae3a24befccaf6bbba44a5265613f3aec3ef7
SHA512:	727df172278b6efb0b6659c51502f76e2d2d9288691796244d8a2719f54c8d87436c37cc2ac1c08edd2e084cbe0e252fc9ac7494a74304836efdd9e3b95b5cea
SSDEEP:	12288:dCwIOQkVSTBzKLpq5ymZviBzXCBkfSdT7MvZgwu22qPVGNbTuMuKBD7hpvA:dDfkBzoA5ymYZx6VAmwuKST0sDd
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L......_.................P...........o... ........@.. ....................................@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4a6f2e
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x5FC88D2E [Thu Dec 3 07:01:02 2020 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v4.0.30319
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [00402000h]
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0xa6ed4	0x57	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0xa8000	0x800	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0xaa000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0xa4f34	0xa5000	False	0.703693181818	data	7.00471391573	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0xa8000	0x800	0x800	False	0.32763671875	data	3.42290303979	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0xaa000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.101910425663	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_VERSION	0xa8090	0x374	data
RT_MANIFEST	0xa8414	0x1ea	XML 1.0 document, UTF-8 Unicode (with BOM) text, with CRLF line terminators

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Copyright 2011
Assembly Version	1.0.0.0
InternalName	ContinuationTaskFromTask.exe
FileVersion	1.0.0.0
CompanyName
LegalTrademarks
Comments
ProductName	LoginWindowsApp
ProductVersion	1.0.0.0
FileDescription	LoginWindowsApp
OriginalFilename	ContinuationTaskFromTask.exe

Network Behavior

Snort IDS Alerts

Timestamp	Protocol	SID	Message	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
12/03/20-09:58:38.637407	TCP	2030171	ET TROJAN AgentTesla Exfil Via SMTP	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
12/03/20-09:58:41.432598	TCP	2030171	ET TROJAN AgentTesla Exfil Via SMTP	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.322230101 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.461915970 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.462390900 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.775552034 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.776420116 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.916065931 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.916114092 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.918484926 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.058747053 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.061753988 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.203701019 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.204740047 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.345262051 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.346117020 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.493155003 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.493746996 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.633471966 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.637407064 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.637665033 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.638276100 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.638465881 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.777288914 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.777864933 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.832415104 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.873779058 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.145986080 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.285917997 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.285938025 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.286468983 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.287077904 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.289532900 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.426557064 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.428800106 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.428898096 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.571547985 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.571976900 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.711266994 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.711296082 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.712019920 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.851943970 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.852921009 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.994543076 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.995024920 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.135726929 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.136359930 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.289124966 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.289815903 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.429452896 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.432312012 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.432598114 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.432821989 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.433048964 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.433401108 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.433559895 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.433722973 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.433903933 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.571940899 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.572151899 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.572629929 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.572997093 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.612982035 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.626679897 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.671094894 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:48.413141966 CET	65110	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:48.440310001 CET	53	65110	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:49.669513941 CET	58361	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:49.697546005 CET	53	58361	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:51.843302011 CET	63492	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:51.881151915 CET	53	63492	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:53.498092890 CET	60831	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:53.533838987 CET	53	60831	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:54.551094055 CET	60100	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:54.586663961 CET	53	60100	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:55.626498938 CET	53195	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:55.653539896 CET	53	53195	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:56.557205915 CET	50141	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:56.584311962 CET	53	50141	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:57.588658094 CET	53023	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:57.615704060 CET	53	53023	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:58.660268068 CET	49563	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:58.687514067 CET	53	49563	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:59.742705107 CET	51352	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:56:59.769891977 CET	53	51352	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:00.550704956 CET	59349	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:00.577928066 CET	53	59349	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:02.920561075 CET	57084	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:02.947576046 CET	53	57084	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:04.738662004 CET	58823	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:04.765906096 CET	53	58823	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:08.357239008 CET	57568	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:08.384326935 CET	53	57568	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:10.999969006 CET	50540	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:11.027070045 CET	53	50540	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:11.334321976 CET	54366	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:11.361403942 CET	53	54366	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:31.371471882 CET	53034	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:31.417356968 CET	53	53034	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:32.592148066 CET	57762	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:32.629029989 CET	53	57762	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:46.007513046 CET	55435	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:46.034692049 CET	53	55435	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:50.918421030 CET	50713	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:57:50.955744982 CET	53	50713	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:22.869045019 CET	56132	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:22.895895958 CET	53	56132	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:24.926687002 CET	58987	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:24.962284088 CET	53	58987	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:36.954673052 CET	56579	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.120395899 CET	53	56579	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.145148039 CET	60633	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.182770014 CET	53	60633	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:36.954673052 CET	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0x70bb	Standard query (0)	smtp.divasvalves.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.145148039 CET	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0x9d6e	Standard query (0)	smtp.divasvalves.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.120395899 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x70bb	No error (0)	smtp.divasvalves.com	us2.smtp.mailhostbox.com		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.120395899 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x70bb	No error (0)	us2.smtp.mailhostbox.com		208.91.198.143	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.120395899 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x70bb	No error (0)	us2.smtp.mailhostbox.com		208.91.199.224	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.120395899 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x70bb	No error (0)	us2.smtp.mailhostbox.com		208.91.199.225	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.120395899 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x70bb	No error (0)	us2.smtp.mailhostbox.com		208.91.199.223	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.182770014 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x9d6e	No error (0)	smtp.divasvalves.com	us2.smtp.mailhostbox.com		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.182770014 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x9d6e	No error (0)	us2.smtp.mailhostbox.com		208.91.198.143	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.182770014 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x9d6e	No error (0)	us2.smtp.mailhostbox.com		208.91.199.224	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.182770014 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x9d6e	No error (0)	us2.smtp.mailhostbox.com		208.91.199.225	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.182770014 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x9d6e	No error (0)	us2.smtp.mailhostbox.com		208.91.199.223	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

SMTP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP	Commands
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.775552034 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3	220 us2.outbound.mailhostbox.com ESMTP Postfix
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.776420116 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143	EHLO 818225
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.916114092 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3	250-us2.outbound.mailhostbox.com 250-PIPELINING 250-SIZE 41648128 250-VRFY 250-ETRN 250-STARTTLS 250-AUTH PLAIN LOGIN 250-AUTH=PLAIN LOGIN 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES 250-8BITMIME 250 DSN
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:37.918484926 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143	AUTH login YmlsbHlmdW5kc0BkaXZhc3ZhbHZlcy5jb20=
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.058747053 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3	334 UGFzc3dvcmQ6
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.203701019 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3	235 2.7.0 Authentication successful
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.204740047 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143	MAIL FROM:<billyfunds@divasvalves.com>
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.345262051 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3	250 2.1.0 Ok
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.346117020 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143	RCPT TO:<billyfunds@divasvalves.com>
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.493155003 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3	250 2.1.5 Ok
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.493746996 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143	DATA
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.633471966 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3	354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.638465881 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143	.
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:38.832415104 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3	250 2.0.0 Ok: queued as 67E531C2528
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.145986080 CET	49743	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143	QUIT
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.285917997 CET	587	49743	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3	221 2.0.0 Bye
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.571547985 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3	220 us2.outbound.mailhostbox.com ESMTP Postfix
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.571976900 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143	EHLO 818225
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.711296082 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3	250-us2.outbound.mailhostbox.com 250-PIPELINING 250-SIZE 41648128 250-VRFY 250-ETRN 250-STARTTLS 250-AUTH PLAIN LOGIN 250-AUTH=PLAIN LOGIN 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES 250-8BITMIME 250 DSN
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.712019920 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143	AUTH login YmlsbHlmdW5kc0BkaXZhc3ZhbHZlcy5jb20=
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.851943970 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3	334 UGFzc3dvcmQ6
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.994543076 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3	235 2.7.0 Authentication successful
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:40.995024920 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143	MAIL FROM:<billyfunds@divasvalves.com>
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.135726929 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3	250 2.1.0 Ok
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.136359930 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143	RCPT TO:<billyfunds@divasvalves.com>
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.289124966 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3	250 2.1.5 Ok
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.289815903 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143	DATA
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.429452896 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3	354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.433903933 CET	49744	587	192.168.2.3	208.91.198.143	.
Dec 3, 2020 09:58:41.626679897 CET	587	49744	208.91.198.143	192.168.2.3	250 2.0.0 Ok: queued as 361741C188F

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe PID: 6604 Parent PID: 5532

General

Start time:	09:56:48
Start date:	03/12/2020
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe'
Imagebase:	0x70000
File size:	678912 bytes
MD5 hash:	A0CE94D59DC8204E8CDBCE7C4D635D32
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000000.00000002.230902914.0000000002461000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000000.00000002.231364054.0000000003469000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe PID: 6808 Parent PID: 6604

General

Start time:	09:56:51
Start date:	03/12/2020
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe
Imagebase:	0xed0000
File size:	678912 bytes
MD5 hash:	A0CE94D59DC8204E8CDBCE7C4D635D32
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000002.00000002.489798075.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer, Description: Yara detected Credential Stealer, Source: 00000002.00000002.493883297.00000000032E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Email gateway, File monitoring, Mail server, Office 365 trace logs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	API monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port paring that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088or port 587as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading ...

Warning!

Analysis Report New Order Inquiry.PDF.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Agenttesla

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

Public

Private

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

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Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre