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Analysis Report Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe
Analysis ID:	337596
MD5:	767f88a961bfbc1b8f8419a32fbade0b
SHA1:	5577d0635fca390c305ff560ca80a6ea19ff7c5b
SHA256:	4f0035201ba7a3a536727862b8ac8dbf389038c5af1674ff7a982190fed1e30b
Tags:	exe
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Nanocore

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Detected Nanocore Rat

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Allocates memory in foreign processes

Executable has a suspicious name (potential lure to open the executable)

Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Machine Learning detection for sample

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Writes to foreign memory regions

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)

Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)

Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

Detected potential crypto function

Drops PE files

Enables debug privileges

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

Found potential string decryption / allocating functions

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

PE file contains executable resources (Code or Archives)

PE file contains strange resources

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara signature match

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe (PID: 2800 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe' MD5: 767F88A961BFBC1B8F8419A32FBADE0B)

vbc.exe (PID: 5332 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe MD5: B3A917344F5610BEEC562556F11300FA)

vbc.exe (PID: 5952 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe MD5: B3A917344F5610BEEC562556F11300FA)

vbc.exe (PID: 1516 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe MD5: B3A917344F5610BEEC562556F11300FA)

vbc.exe (PID: 5352 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe MD5: B3A917344F5610BEEC562556F11300FA)

schtasks.exe (PID: 4660 cmdline: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp863B.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)

conhost.exe (PID: 1304 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

schtasks.exe (PID: 2172 cmdline: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor Task' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp8988.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)

conhost.exe (PID: 5992 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

vbc.exe (PID: 3996 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe 0 MD5: B3A917344F5610BEEC562556F11300FA)

conhost.exe (PID: 5972 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

dhcpmon.exe (PID: 5836 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' 0 MD5: B3A917344F5610BEEC562556F11300FA)

conhost.exe (PID: 4604 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

dhcpmon.exe (PID: 1000 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' MD5: B3A917344F5610BEEC562556F11300FA)

conhost.exe (PID: 5796 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.233380857.0000000003A01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x472ed:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x79f1d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xac93d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x4732a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x79f5a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0xac97a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x4ae5d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x7da8d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0xb04ad:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
00000000.00000002.233380857.0000000003A01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.233380857.0000000003A01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x47055:$a: NanoCore 0x47065:$a: NanoCore 0x47299:$a: NanoCore 0x472ad:$a: NanoCore 0x472ed:$a: NanoCore 0x79c85:$a: NanoCore 0x79c95:$a: NanoCore 0x79ec9:$a: NanoCore 0x79edd:$a: NanoCore 0x79f1d:$a: NanoCore 0xac6a5:$a: NanoCore 0xac6b5:$a: NanoCore 0xac8e9:$a: NanoCore 0xac8fd:$a: NanoCore 0xac93d:$a: NanoCore 0x470b4:$b: ClientPlugin 0x472b6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x472f6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x79ce4:$b: ClientPlugin 0x79ee6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x79f26:$b: ClientPlugin
Process Memory Space: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe PID: 2800	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x131d1:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x31b3f:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x50410:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x13232:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x31ba0:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x50471:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x18637:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x265a9:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x36fa5:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x44f17:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x55876:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x637e8:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
Process Memory Space: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe PID: 2800	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe PID: 2800	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x12cd6:$a: NanoCore 0x12cf2:$a: NanoCore 0x12e4d:$a: NanoCore 0x12e5c:$a: NanoCore 0x13135:$a: NanoCore 0x13161:$a: NanoCore 0x131d1:$a: NanoCore 0x22c13:$a: NanoCore 0x22c25:$a: NanoCore 0x22c61:$a: NanoCore 0x31644:$a: NanoCore 0x31660:$a: NanoCore 0x317bb:$a: NanoCore 0x317ca:$a: NanoCore 0x31aa3:$a: NanoCore 0x31acf:$a: NanoCore 0x31b3f:$a: NanoCore 0x41581:$a: NanoCore 0x41593:$a: NanoCore 0x415cf:$a: NanoCore 0x4ff15:$a: NanoCore
Click to see the 1 entries

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Show sources

Source: File created

Author: Joe Security: Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe, ProcessId: 5352, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\run.dat

Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Joe Security: Data: Command: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp863B.tmp', CommandLine: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp863B.tmp', CommandLine|base64offset|contains: j, Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe, ParentImage: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe, ParentProcessId: 5352, ProcessCommandLine: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp863B.tmp', ProcessId: 4660

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Show sources

Source: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Avira: detected

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.233380857.0000000003A01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe PID: 2800, type: MEMORY

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 0.2.Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe.590000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Dropper.MSIL.Gen
Source: 0.0.Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe.590000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Dropper.MSIL.Gen

Source: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source:	Binary string: Accessibility.pdb source: vbc.exe, 00000009.00000003.246333764.0000000005245000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: RunPE.pdb source: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.233292165.0000000002A01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: vbc.pdb source: dhcpmon.exe, dhcpmon.exe.4.dr
Source:	Binary string: Accessibility.pdbBSJB source: vbc.exe, 00000009.00000003.246333764.0000000005245000.00000004.00000001.sdmp

Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe

Code function: 11_2_00DBD5B1 FindFirstFileW,WideCharToMultiByte,FindFirstFileA,

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.7:49724 -> 185.244.38.210:7008

Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.244.38.210

Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000D.00000002.263266383.0000000000BAA000.00000004.00000010.sdmp

String found in binary or memory: http://go.microsoft

E-Banking Fraud:

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.233380857.0000000003A01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe PID: 2800, type: MEMORY

System Summary:

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Show sources

Source: 00000000.00000002.233380857.0000000003A01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 00000000.00000002.233380857.0000000003A01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: Process Memory Space: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe PID: 2800, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: Process Memory Space: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe PID: 2800, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>

Executable has a suspicious name (potential lure to open the executable)

Show sources

Source: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Static file information: Suspicious name

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: Filename: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_00F46878
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_00F41820
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_00F41811
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_00F415C0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_00F415B1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_00F40682
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_00D420DD
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_00D42066
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_00E91438
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_00D41424
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_00EDE9EE
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_00EDF9BA
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_00D4DD20
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_00D5A699
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_00DAF65C
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_00F44BCE
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_00EDE3B9
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 13_2_00D420DD
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 13_2_00DD50F2
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 13_2_00D42066
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 13_2_00EDE9EE
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 13_2_00EDF9BA
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 13_2_00D47279
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 13_2_00F44BCE
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 13_2_00EDE3B9
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 13_2_00E91438
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 13_2_00D4E430
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 13_2_00D41424
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 13_2_00D4DD20
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 13_2_00DD7614

Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe

Code function: String function: 00E917B0 appears 150 times

Source: dhcpmon.exe.4.dr

Static PE information: Resource name: RT_STRING type: VAX-order2 68k Blit mpx/mux executable

Source: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.233292165.0000000002A01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp

Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameRunPE.dll" vs Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Source: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: 00000000.00000002.233380857.0000000003A01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 00000000.00000002.233380857.0000000003A01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: Process Memory Space: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe PID: 2800, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: Process Memory Space: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe PID: 2800, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore

Source: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe, hpCGGsxnBfkpZyTC.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock', 'CreateDecryptor'
Source: 0.2.Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe.590000.0.unpack, hpCGGsxnBfkpZyTC.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock', 'CreateDecryptor'
Source: 0.0.Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe.590000.0.unpack, hpCGGsxnBfkpZyTC.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock', 'CreateDecryptor'

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@21/12@0/1

Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe

Code function: 11_2_00EB9F6C GetSystemDefaultLangID,FormatMessageW,_ultow_s,SysAllocString,GetLastError,SysFreeString,SysFreeString,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe

File created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe.log

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:5972:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:5992:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Global\{8b524be1-f4fe-4386-bd3a-d447c26466aa}
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:4604:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:1304:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:5796:120:WilError_01

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp863B.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorlib.dll
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorlib.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: dhcpmon.exe	String found in binary or memory: </Stop>
Source: dhcpmon.exe	String found in binary or memory: </Stop>
Source: dhcpmon.exe	String found in binary or memory: </Stop>
Source: dhcpmon.exe	String found in binary or memory: </Stop>

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp863B.tmp'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor Task' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp8988.tmp'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe 0
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' 0
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp863B.tmp'
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor Task' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp8988.tmp'

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{0A29FF9E-7F9C-4437-8B11-F424491E3931}\InprocServer32

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Source: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source:	Binary string: Accessibility.pdb source: vbc.exe, 00000009.00000003.246333764.0000000005245000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: RunPE.pdb source: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.233292165.0000000002A01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: vbc.pdb source: dhcpmon.exe, dhcpmon.exe.4.dr
Source:	Binary string: Accessibility.pdbBSJB source: vbc.exe, 00000009.00000003.246333764.0000000005245000.00000004.00000001.sdmp

Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_00D43560 push eax; iretd
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_00D42AC8 push A80020C3h; ret
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_00D42B08 push B80020CAh; retf 0020h
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_00D42B30 push B80020CAh; retf 0020h
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 13_2_00D42AC8 push A80020C3h; ret
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 13_2_00D42B08 push B80020CAh; retf 0020h
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 13_2_00D42B30 push B80020CAh; retf 0020h
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 13_2_00D43560 push eax; iretd

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.99650215148

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe

File created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe

Jump to dropped file

Boot Survival:

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Show sources

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp863B.tmp'

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe:Zone.Identifier read attributes | delete

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 5145
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 4380
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Window / User API: foregroundWindowGot 565
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Window / User API: foregroundWindowGot 762

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe TID: 4472	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe TID: 204	Thread sleep time: -13835058055282155s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed

Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe

Code function: 11_2_00DBD5B1 FindFirstFileW,WideCharToMultiByte,FindFirstFileA,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe

Code function: 11_2_00F44FA1 IsDebuggerPresent,_crt_debugger_hook,__crtUnhandledException,_crt_debugger_hook,__crtTerminateProcess,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Allocates memory in foreign processes

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Memory allocated: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe base: 400000 protect: page execute and read and write

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A

Writes to foreign memory regions

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe base: 400000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe base: 402000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe base: 420000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe base: 422000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe base: 51A1008

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp863B.tmp'
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor Task' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp8988.tmp'

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Management.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe

Code function: 11_2_00DCFAFA GetSystemTimeAsFileTime,GetCurrentThreadId,GetCurrentProcessId,QueryPerformanceCounter,

Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe

Code function: 11_2_00DBCB89 GetVersionExA,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.233380857.0000000003A01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe PID: 2800, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality:

Detected Nanocore Rat

Show sources

Source: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.233380857.0000000003A01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
Source: vbc.exe, 00000004.00000003.262074990.000000000A8CE000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.233380857.0000000003A01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe PID: 2800, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_00DB7B2A CorBindToCurrentRuntime,
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 13_2_00DB7B2A CorBindToCurrentRuntime,

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation1	Scheduled Task/Job1	Process Injection311	Masquerading2	OS Credential Dumping	System Time Discovery1	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data11	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Command and Scripting Interpreter2	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Scheduled Task/Job1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion2	LSASS Memory	Security Software Discovery2	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Non-Standard Port1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job1	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Disable or Modify Tools1	Security Account Manager	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion2	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Remote Access Software1	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Process Injection311	NTDS	Process Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information11	LSA Secrets	Application Window Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Hidden Files and Directories1	Cached Domain Credentials	File and Directory Discovery1	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Obfuscated Files or Information3	DCSync	System Information Discovery14	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	Software Packing3	Proc Filesystem	Network Service Scanning	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	100%	Avira	TR/Dropper.MSIL.Gen
Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	2%	Metadefender		Browse
C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	0%	ReversingLabs

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link	Download
0.2.Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe.590000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Dropper.MSIL.Gen		Download File
0.0.Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe.590000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Dropper.MSIL.Gen		Download File

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
http://go.microsoft	0%	Virustotal		Browse
http://go.microsoft	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://go.microsoft	dhcpmon.exe, 0000000D.00000002.263266383.0000000000BAA000.00000004.00000010.sdmp	false	0%, Virustotal, Browse Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
185.244.38.210	unknown	Netherlands		8100	ASN-QUADRANET-GLOBALUS	false

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Red Diamond
Analysis ID:	337596
Start date:	08.01.2021
Start time:	20:06:25
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 10m 12s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	37
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@21/12@0/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 18% (good quality ratio 16.5%) Quality average: 68.6% Quality standard deviation: 28.6%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Behavior information exceeds normal sizes, reducing to normal. Report will have missing behavior information. TCP Packets have been reduced to 100 Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Report size exceeded maximum capacity and may have missing behavior information. Report size getting too big, too many NtAllocateVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
20:07:19	Autostart	Run: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run DHCP Monitor C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
20:07:20	Task Scheduler	Run new task: DHCP Monitor path: "C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe" s>$(Arg0)
20:07:20	API Interceptor	1408x Sleep call for process: vbc.exe modified
20:07:21	Task Scheduler	Run new task: DHCP Monitor Task path: "C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe" s>$(Arg0)

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
ASN-QUADRANET-GLOBALUS	npp.7.9.2.Installer (1).exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.6.95
	https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffindcloud.id%2fwp-includes%2f8JTmzq3FN6z3OBJBdBCfXrdcZl5H7ZxOaOZzfl2H%2f&c=E,1,2CiyC7FGbs3Pvr1yrAWkewOmRL-xyrP42HL37xX4omRyLZqRrqWOt_1RKb6pLtfzxs7zIBTrrVMEwQ8pOUIr2mFuNwrd9eHNrfkptUp83QPlV-CrGIoXMw,,&typo=1	Get hash	malicious	Browse	173.254.250.226
	https://mrveggy.com/resgatecarrinho/jcWVa69vj8IDsQRCud8h6RNI9Mz17JqsPPJ0DFnlbXZGyMM2GcZ3/	Get hash	malicious	Browse	173.254.250.226
	1I72L29IL3F.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	173.254.250.226
	https://x9sademwnet.gb.net/bnbgfvgrthbg456tr54g6trvecds/?tuk5sx4dsb3=7df34dj4csa	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.129.25.9
	xLH4kwOjXR.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.223.94.66
	utox.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.223.122.15
	QUOTES.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.174.99.26
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.161.187.200
	http://jb092.com/rxlbakzd/goqmmbmi.html?kjmikw5x.3hllr	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.174.103.81
	https://www.trackins.org/sale/cat/sale-c199387IoAL&C_fTkoAvATBo-1LAvvTgoAKL6_.T5.html?_emr=12e4edca-8183-44e0-bccb-e3d6e0eeb447&wfcs=cs2&dcrectxid=d48055ba-93d6-4b3f-80c6-70de3252bde6&_eml=2ec38d65-f3da-4587-bd38-7c1f333c6dc8&source=batch&batchid=04&varid=5&csnid=1eab81b4-e54d-4cc2-8735-a5d571cfe688&brcid=13&sm=1&refid=MKTEML_31000&emlid=1131&maiid=1913	Get hash	malicious	Browse	173.205.83.250
	Shipment Document BLINV And Packing List Attached.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.161.187.200
	kWbmxCNnPIYLMvvPIVlMbDKbbQCNjT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.174.99.26
	Purchase Order.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.129.26.162
	SecuriteInfo.com.Variant.Bulz.265335.2250.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	66.63.162.20
	New order.xls	Get hash	malicious	Browse	66.63.162.20
	https://app.box.com/s/rdobxcyrhp1cdxwej3pfeyvngfh3lwag	Get hash	malicious	Browse	173.254.237.250
	https://bit.ly/2VPfIRO	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.174.103.81
	https://bit.ly/2VPfIRO	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.174.103.81
	PO122020.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.129.26.162

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link
C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	LIST OF ITEMS.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Swift.pdf.gz.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	EXPORT SHIPMENT CERTIFIED 1.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	SWIFT_CONFIRMATION.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	FIRST ORDER_NOVEMBER.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	W89xuljgFe.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	MANDATORY ADVISORY.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	MTCopy.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	FIRST ORDER_NOVEMBER.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Required SMS quantity.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	arrival notice-ETA 10th-11,2020.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	SecuriteInfo.com.Generic.mg.56564e2f274ac218.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Purchase Order #016543.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	ORT09937378200002.PDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Purchase Order..exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Transfer form.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	paymentslip.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Dekont.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Bank Receipt.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	PAYMENT COPY.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse

Created / dropped Files

C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (console) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	2688096
Entropy (8bit):	6.409257767499659
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	49152:PAa87OQFMC/tWcHUgeRjRKW+0UpzIrFjB5u901ACUTum:PAa87zLtWI6jX+0UFIrZ//1a
MD5:	B3A917344F5610BEEC562556F11300FA
SHA1:	F7B1AC747E7705A21ACDD582B63800016BE21774
SHA-256:	7BA4838E3356B69254730E891ADD84092E3143016A515FF3E990CE19874A2459
SHA-512:	2D1515D75C3E5870F2FB57B321E02CF9611D30F3716A5670F0C32781AEB96576508B3B1C9717B2AC041B7752865842DD8AF7AF712988FF90FE3E6847821FFE60
Malicious:	false
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Metadefender, Detection: 2%, Browse Antivirus: ReversingLabs, Detection: 0%
Joe Sandbox View:	Filename: LIST OF ITEMS.pdf.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: Swift.pdf.gz.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: EXPORT SHIPMENT CERTIFIED 1.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: SWIFT_CONFIRMATION.pdf.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: FIRST ORDER_NOVEMBER.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: W89xuljgFe.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: MANDATORY ADVISORY.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: MTCopy.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: FIRST ORDER_NOVEMBER.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: Required SMS quantity.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: arrival notice-ETA 10th-11,2020.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: SecuriteInfo.com.Generic.mg.56564e2f274ac218.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: Purchase Order #016543.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: ORT09937378200002.PDF.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: Purchase Order..exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: Transfer form.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: paymentslip.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: Dekont.pdf.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: Bank Receipt.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: PAYMENT COPY.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse
Preview:	MZ......................@...................................(...........!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.........d..O..O..O......O......O..v...O..v...O.....O......O.....O..=:..O..=:..O..=:..O..=:..O..v...O..O...N.......O......O......O......O..Rich.O..........PE..L....`.Z.........."......."..8............... "...@.......................... )......!)...@...... ..................d.".V.....#.......#.L.............(.`>....'.46....".T...........................`...@.............#..............................text...d."......."................. ..`.data...,.....".......".............@....idata........#.......#.............@..@.tls..........#.......#.............@....rsrc...L.....#.......#.............@..@.reloc..46....'..8....'.............@..B........................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	522
Entropy (8bit):	5.348034597186669
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12:Q3La/hz92n4M9tDLI4MWuPk21OKbbDLI4MWuPJKiUrRZ9I0ZKhav:MLU84qpE4Ks2wKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhk
MD5:	D4AF6B20AEA9906B4FF574A174E96287
SHA1:	81655019BB100FAADD5B36755F798EE5FB09E672
SHA-256:	DD8AE93DA079839B31327D22A2408E0C3EA4DDE92FD389CD5B96AD57CCE7B2E1
SHA-512:	6D912AC17876D9C21E61ED8C1B435AEA0FBB27FB97626A40903B4DFFC1204BEF3A43B02805DEDD2531822FD6F62CF06F0D758C1B2CA07258E82F95225D71C16E
Malicious:	true
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..2,"Microsoft.VisualBasic, Version=10.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp863B.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1316
Entropy (8bit):	5.1354471369850545
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:2dH4+S/4oL600QlMhEMjn5pwjVLUYODOLG9RJh7h8gK0mcEXxtn:cbk4oL600QydbQxIYODOLedq3ZPj
MD5:	808C6E96C170C90D0DB522E8947EB2BD
SHA1:	44583694C3C23410D637BB96C0DF0921363533AD
SHA-256:	C6B75FB7740D34D55D74B8664FF1EA778638A4916C2B52348EA34DE60EDD3AFC
SHA-512:	928B85E9FDDFD7C93623E954DC53367AAF355F74A14601D77E45612EBDB77F3D6C0FC853E154F91F61E64306361885467C16FC211CF1BBDC023658AD35DBA1EB
Malicious:	true
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>..<Task version="1.2" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">.. <RegistrationInfo />.. <Triggers />.. <Principals>.. <Principal id="Author">.. <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>.. <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>.. </Principal>.. </Principals>.. <Settings>.. <MultipleInstancesPolicy>Parallel</MultipleInstancesPolicy>.. <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>.. <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>.. <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>.. <StartWhenAvailable>false</StartWhenAvailable>.. <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>.. <IdleSettings>.. <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>.. <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>.. </IdleSettings>.. <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>.. <Enabled>true</Enabled>.. <Hidden>false</Hidden>.. <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>.. <Wak

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp8988.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1310
Entropy (8bit):	5.109425792877704
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:2dH4+S/4oL600QlMhEMjn5pwjVLUYODOLG9RJh7h8gK0R3xtn:cbk4oL600QydbQxIYODOLedq3S3j
MD5:	5C2F41CFC6F988C859DA7D727AC2B62A
SHA1:	68999C85FC7E37BAB9216E0099836D40D4545C1C
SHA-256:	98B6E66B6C2173B9B91FC97FE51805340EFDE978B695453742EBAB631018398B
SHA-512:	B5DA5DA378D038AFBF8A7738E47921ED39F9B726E2CAA2993D915D9291A3322F94EFE8CCA6E7AD678A670DB19926B22B20E5028460FCC89CEA7F6635E7557334
Malicious:	false
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>..<Task version="1.2" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">.. <RegistrationInfo />.. <Triggers />.. <Principals>.. <Principal id="Author">.. <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>.. <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>.. </Principal>.. </Principals>.. <Settings>.. <MultipleInstancesPolicy>Parallel</MultipleInstancesPolicy>.. <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>.. <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>.. <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>.. <StartWhenAvailable>false</StartWhenAvailable>.. <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>.. <IdleSettings>.. <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>.. <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>.. </IdleSettings>.. <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>.. <Enabled>true</Enabled>.. <Hidden>false</Hidden>.. <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>.. <Wak

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\catalog.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1160
Entropy (8bit):	7.024371743172393
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:IQnybgCUtvd7xCFhwUuQnybgCUtvd7xCFhwUuQnybgCUtvd7xCFhwUuQnybgCUtd:Ik/lCrwfk/lCrwfk/lCrwfk/lCrwfk/a
MD5:	786E4F1138F3E30FB67C690E55AC5A4F
SHA1:	828C2B627BCB54053173B54C3A4C289EF3476641
SHA-256:	D953043AE0955AA739AF97A60DAC7541048D83FC7601365A861A527E59DBFA38
SHA-512:	5FA075AB5626579DFE5A96E5B6DABF60DC3DDBA8A6E5ADEF0538032E8FB000772C7DCB73D315B208A04125F014ACCB92FAA194108D4C76443B9FB7B97719FF26
Malicious:	false
Preview:	Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.....@.3..{...grv+V...B.......].P...W.4C}uL.....s~..F...}......E......E...6E.....{...{.yS...7..".hK.!.x.2..i..zJ... ....f..?._....0.:e[7w{1.!.4.....&.Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.....@.3..{...grv+V...B.......].P...W.4C}uL.....s~..F...}......E......E...6E.....{...{.yS...7..".hK.!.x.2..i..zJ... ....f..?._....0.:e[7w{1.!.4.....&.Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.....@.3..{...grv+V...B.......].P...W.4C}uL.....s~..F...}......E......E...6E.....{...{.yS...7..".hK.!.x.2..i..zJ... ....f..?._....0.:e[7w{1.!.4.....&.Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.....@.3..{...grv+V...B.......].P...W.4C}uL.....s~..F...}......E......E...6E.....{...{.yS...7..".hK.!.x.2..i..zJ... ....f..?._....0.:e[7w{1.!.4.....&.Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\run.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	8
Entropy (8bit):	3.0
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:CWtn:Cqn
MD5:	98CFF23FC74E31CD53B1E5F35EDC7355
SHA1:	F3AF7CA1FF18550C89C1808F024B964BFA4466FB
SHA-256:	F1039C77669BBB367B0A5E8638902597904D389A5117680B171337DFF6D8E5E2
SHA-512:	48A6BC86AAC31DD55B328282240F4F4E8D6683870A0C8FBBA454BF0E2405B848567A206A75C58B0904A261A0AC09F2A3E51269666B7CE03A41EB2351B29125DF
Malicious:	true
Preview:	..y.T..H

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\settings.bin Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	40
Entropy (8bit):	5.221928094887364
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:9bzY6oRDMjmPl:RzWDMCd
MD5:	AE0F5E6CE7122AF264EC533C6B15A27B
SHA1:	1265A495C42EED76CC043D50C60C23297E76CCE1
SHA-256:	73B0B92179C61C26589B47E9732CE418B07EDEE3860EE5A2A5FB06F3B8AA9B26
SHA-512:	DD44C2D24D4E3A0F0B988AD3D04683B5CB128298043134649BBE33B2512CE0C9B1A8E7D893B9F66FBBCDD901E2B0646C4533FB6C0C8C4AFCB95A0EFB95D446F8
Malicious:	false
Preview:	9iH...}Z.4..f..... 8.j....\|.&X..e.F.*.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\storage.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	327432
Entropy (8bit):	7.99938831605763
Encrypted:	true
SSDEEP:	6144:oX44S90aTiB66x3Pl6nGV4bfD6wXPIZ9iBj0UeprGm2d7Tm:LkjYGsfGUc9iB4UeprKdnm
MD5:	7E8F4A764B981D5B82D1CC49D341E9C6
SHA1:	D9F0685A028FB219E1A6286AEFB7D6FCFC778B85
SHA-256:	0BD3AAC12623520C4E2031C8B96B4A154702F36F97F643158E91E987D317B480
SHA-512:	880E46504FCFB4B15B86B9D8087BA88E6C4950E433616EBB637799F42B081ABF6F07508943ECB1F786B2A89E751F5AE62D750BDCFFDDF535D600CF66EC44E926
Malicious:	false
Preview:	pT..!..W..G.J..a.).@.i..wpK.so@...5.=.^..Q.oy.=e@9.B...F..09u"3.. 0t..RDn_4d.....E...i......~...\|..fX_...Xf.p^......>a..$...e.6:7d.(a.A...=.).....{B.[...y%...i.Q.<..xt.X..H.. ..HF7g...I.3.{.n....L.y;i..s-....(5i...........J.5b7}..fK..HV..,...0.... ....n.w6PMl.......v."".v.......#..X.a....../...cC...i..l{>5n.._+.e.d'...}...[..../...D.t..GVp.zz......(...o......b...+`J.{....hS1G.^I..v&.jm.#u..1..Mg!.E..U.T.....6.2>...6.l.K.w"o..E..."K%{....z.7....<...,....]t.:.....[.Z.u...3X8.QI..j_.&..N..q.e.2...6.R.~..9.Bq..A.v.6.G..#y.....O....Z)G...w..E..k(....+..O..........Vg.2xC......O...jc.....z..~.P...q../.-.'.h.._.cj.=..B.x.Q9.pu.\|i4...i...;O...n.?.,. ....v?.5}.OY@.dG\|<.._[.69@.2..m..I..oP=...xrK.?............b..5....i&...l.c\b}..Q..O+.V.mJ.....pz....>F.......H...6$...d...\|m...N..1.R..B.i..........$....$........CY}..$....r.....H...8...li.....7 P......?h....R.iF..6...q(.@LI.s..+K.....?m..H....*. l..&<}....`\|.B....3.....I..o...u1..8i=.z.W..7

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\task.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with no line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	53
Entropy (8bit):	4.763403181378978
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:oMty8WddSyHG0dAn:oMLW6yRCn
MD5:	D59322238EE2622C9CA6BF1613C78F1E
SHA1:	736603F46BB58920D0F5AB9C967693FDDED9EC8C
SHA-256:	309FD7269277F93FBA977DAF50596F41F1822DDC9EC10BFA1F90FE931D86B07B
SHA-512:	F4E5CF790E254356B1785C83389BEB07B82563626B52FAD00E74FBEAB17B1ACBAEBDC8E41CC42EABD60E8E81684516BC45611094F3D9A4D733C1AF0F065E5EDF
Malicious:	false
Preview:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe

\Device\ConDrv Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with very long lines
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	6809
Entropy (8bit):	4.315685828355093
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	96:zKHDGKD7zrrRYZZ/HPw4//HP/HH6K1jqQiGyGTFchzCKtihKCsO2b0N/+7vKAKPO:YrRYZXCKgQifr8sC/635P
MD5:	DA37CE62FC9ABAB3226A1797FF449487
SHA1:	18F29B4F3B1D12BA18DF2EF8964DA20107EEFFC9
SHA-256:	80EAB2A83F12150619544DBFFDD130D60B6869EE742F9000F8E3109F406FAD6E
SHA-512:	5A8BF4140440BCB218CFE90A3371AE761212BC4364DC7E7C055980D3FAB4C4E4499B1CADB13666D4D5F03B6AE835AEE4B44F78D4B2A4AA4ABDF20D8161B12F66
Malicious:	false
Preview:	Microsoft (R) Visual Basic Compiler version 14.7.3056.for Visual Basic 2012.Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved...This compiler is provided as part of the Microsoft (R) .NET Framework, but only supports language versions up to Visual Basic 2012, which is no longer the latest version. For compilers that support newer versions of the Visual Basic programming language, see http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=533241.. Visual Basic Compiler Options.. - OUTPUT FILE -./out:<file> Specifies the output file name../target:exe Create a console application (default). (Short form: /t)./target:winexe Create a Windows application../target:library Create a library assembly../target:module Create a module that can be added to an assembly../target:appcontainerexe Create a Windows application that runs in AppContainer../ta

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.126661889459997
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.83% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.78% Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73296/58) 0.36% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.01%
File name:	Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe
File size:	446464
MD5:	767f88a961bfbc1b8f8419a32fbade0b
SHA1:	5577d0635fca390c305ff560ca80a6ea19ff7c5b
SHA256:	4f0035201ba7a3a536727862b8ac8dbf389038c5af1674ff7a982190fed1e30b
SHA512:	c5ebaabcd0ecdd1d0a29e8964b02b8fad9961d7b2f144f0ad9a9b00e94cff1c4656c3154219a08ff062d97ad8d2b083a584cab7dd6e0417f233249ac3a2926c3
SSDEEP:	12288:hEvO+l2ttKdpbLFI3Xuchx/f0ymCusZ+uhQM:G6tK6Ocf89sRh
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L...n.._.................L..........^k... ........@.. ....................... ............@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	d8c0ecccd4ccc4d4

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x446b5e
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x5FF7B26E [Fri Jan 8 01:16:30 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v4.0.30319
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [00402000h]
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x46b10	0x4b	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x48000	0x27f38	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x70000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0x44b64	0x44c00	False	0.983721590909	data	7.99650215148	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x48000	0x27f38	0x28000	False	0.192211914062	data	4.03959679951	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x70000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.0980041756627	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type
RT_ICON	0x48280	0x10828	dBase IV DBT, blocks size 0, block length 2048, next free block index 40, next free block 33554432, next used block 16777216
RT_ICON	0x58aa8	0x94a8	data
RT_ICON	0x61f50	0x5488	data
RT_ICON	0x673d8	0x4228	dBase IV DBT of \200.DBF, blocks size 0, block length 16896, next free block index 40, next free block 49407, next used block 4278190080
RT_ICON	0x6b600	0x25a8	data
RT_ICON	0x6dba8	0x10a8	data
RT_ICON	0x6ec50	0x988	data
RT_ICON	0x6f5d8	0x468	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x6fa40	0x76	data
RT_VERSION	0x6fab8	0x294	data
RT_MANIFEST	0x6fd4c	0x1ea	XML 1.0 document, UTF-8 Unicode (with BOM) text, with CRLF line terminators

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
LegalCopyright
Assembly Version	0.0.0.0
InternalName	Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe
FileVersion	0.0.0.0
ProductVersion	0.0.0.0
FileDescription
OriginalFilename	Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:21.510366917 CET	49724	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:21.688452959 CET	7008	49724	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:21.688581944 CET	49724	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:21.819392920 CET	49724	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:22.366861105 CET	49724	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:23.070003033 CET	49724	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:23.984666109 CET	7008	49724	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:23.984740973 CET	49724	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:23.993175983 CET	7008	49724	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:24.070086002 CET	49724	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:24.121284008 CET	49724	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:24.239244938 CET	7008	49724	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:24.239358902 CET	49724	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:28.420263052 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:28.597956896 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:28.598109961 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:28.599396944 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:28.787283897 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:28.787615061 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:28.966084003 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:28.982891083 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.205984116 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.206049919 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.206094027 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.206130028 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.206130981 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.206168890 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.206175089 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.206207037 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.206243038 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.206247091 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.206280947 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.206321001 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.206325054 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.206368923 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.206423044 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384334087 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384399891 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384438992 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384471893 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384474993 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384512901 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384551048 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384551048 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384593010 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384603977 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384619951 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384644985 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384658098 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384665966 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384687901 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384701014 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384720087 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384742022 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384759903 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384769917 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384793997 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384810925 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384815931 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384839058 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384854078 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384860039 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384882927 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384906054 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384910107 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.384954929 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.562388897 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.562436104 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.562472105 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.562520027 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.562568903 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.562597990 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.562825918 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563023090 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563085079 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563149929 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563324928 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563366890 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563380957 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563405991 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563446045 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563450098 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563483000 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563523054 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563534021 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563561916 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563607931 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563607931 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563649893 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563687086 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563692093 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563724995 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563761950 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563764095 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563796997 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563836098 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563846111 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563875914 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563922882 CET	7008	49726	185.244.38.210	192.168.2.7
Jan 8, 2021 20:07:29.563936949 CET	49726	7008	192.168.2.7	185.244.38.210

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe PID: 2800 Parent PID: 5660

General

Start time:	20:07:12
Start date:	08/01/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe'
Imagebase:	0x590000
File size:	446464 bytes
MD5 hash:	767F88A961BFBC1B8F8419A32FBADE0B
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000000.00000002.233380857.0000000003A01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000000.00000002.233380857.0000000003A01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000000.00000002.233380857.0000000003A01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: vbc.exe PID: 5332 Parent PID: 2800

General

Start time:	20:07:13
Start date:	08/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Imagebase:	0xc00000
File size:	2688096 bytes
MD5 hash:	B3A917344F5610BEEC562556F11300FA
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: vbc.exe PID: 5952 Parent PID: 2800

General

Start time:	20:07:14
Start date:	08/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Imagebase:	0xc00000
File size:	2688096 bytes
MD5 hash:	B3A917344F5610BEEC562556F11300FA
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: vbc.exe PID: 1516 Parent PID: 2800

General

Start time:	20:07:15
Start date:	08/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Imagebase:	0xc00000
File size:	2688096 bytes
MD5 hash:	B3A917344F5610BEEC562556F11300FA
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: vbc.exe PID: 5352 Parent PID: 2800

General

Start time:	20:07:16
Start date:	08/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Imagebase:	0xc00000
File size:	2688096 bytes
MD5 hash:	B3A917344F5610BEEC562556F11300FA
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: schtasks.exe PID: 4660 Parent PID: 5352

General

Start time:	20:07:18
Start date:	08/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp863B.tmp'
Imagebase:	0x1d0000
File size:	185856 bytes
MD5 hash:	15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 1304 Parent PID: 4660

General

Start time:	20:07:19
Start date:	08/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff774ee0000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: schtasks.exe PID: 2172 Parent PID: 5352

General

Start time:	20:07:19
Start date:	08/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor Task' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp8988.tmp'
Imagebase:	0x1d0000
File size:	185856 bytes
MD5 hash:	15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 5992 Parent PID: 2172

General

Start time:	20:07:20
Start date:	08/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff774ee0000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: vbc.exe PID: 3996 Parent PID: 1104

General

Start time:	20:07:21
Start date:	08/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe 0
Imagebase:	0xc00000
File size:	2688096 bytes
MD5 hash:	B3A917344F5610BEEC562556F11300FA
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 5972 Parent PID: 3996

General

Start time:	20:07:21
Start date:	08/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff774ee0000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: dhcpmon.exe PID: 5836 Parent PID: 1104

General

Start time:	20:07:21
Start date:	08/01/2021
Path:	C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' 0
Imagebase:	0xd40000
File size:	2688096 bytes
MD5 hash:	B3A917344F5610BEEC562556F11300FA
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Antivirus matches:	Detection: 2%, Metadefender, Browse Detection: 0%, ReversingLabs
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 4604 Parent PID: 5836

General

Start time:	20:07:22
Start date:	08/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff774ee0000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: dhcpmon.exe PID: 1000 Parent PID: 3292

General

Start time:	20:07:28
Start date:	08/01/2021
Path:	C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe'
Imagebase:	0xd40000
File size:	2688096 bytes
MD5 hash:	B3A917344F5610BEEC562556F11300FA
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 5796 Parent PID: 1000

General

Start time:	20:07:29
Start date:	08/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff774ee0000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell .
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.
Tactics:	Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches ( `dir /a` for Windows and `ls –a` for Linux and macOS).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port paring that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088or port 587as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Analysis Report Payment_Confirmation pdf.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Spreading:

Networking:

E-Banking Fraud:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Boot Survival:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

Public

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

System Behavior