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Analysis Report PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Analysis ID:	341478
MD5:	57090f9293d9a013c7ff7fb614681a46
SHA1:	c477a883773decabc0518173b640045802fac0e8
SHA256:	7f7afb406c8f911f21354b2ea60fd688ce8083ed0ab10156c6f3421d927d2fab
Tags:	exeNanoCorenVpnRAT
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Nanocore

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Detected Nanocore Rat

Found malware configuration

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location

Yara detected AntiVM_3

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

Machine Learning detection for sample

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Uses dynamic DNS services

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

Detected potential crypto function

Drops PE files

Enables debug privileges

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

Installs a raw input device (often for capturing keystrokes)

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

PE file contains strange resources

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara signature match

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe (PID: 6396 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe' MD5: 57090F9293D9A013C7FF7FB614681A46)

schtasks.exe (PID: 4712 cmdline: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\RbJJtmpPB' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpC0F9.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)

conhost.exe (PID: 6252 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe (PID: 4540 cmdline: {path} MD5: 57090F9293D9A013C7FF7FB614681A46)

dhcpmon.exe (PID: 6868 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' MD5: 57090F9293D9A013C7FF7FB614681A46)

schtasks.exe (PID: 7048 cmdline: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\RbJJtmpPB' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpB41.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)

conhost.exe (PID: 6952 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

dhcpmon.exe (PID: 6796 cmdline: {path} MD5: 57090F9293D9A013C7FF7FB614681A46)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: NanoCore

{"C2: ": ["185.140.53.131"], "Version: ": "NanoCore Client, Version=1.2.2.0"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000003.00000002.716409354.0000000005F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xf7ad:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xf7da:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
00000003.00000002.716409354.0000000005F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xf7ad:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x10888:$s4: PipeCreated 0xf7c7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
00000003.00000002.716409354.0000000005F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.364292242.0000000003FBF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x157b65:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x157ba2:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x15b6d5:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
00000000.00000002.364292242.0000000003FBF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.364292242.0000000003FBF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x1578cd:$a: NanoCore 0x1578dd:$a: NanoCore 0x157b11:$a: NanoCore 0x157b25:$a: NanoCore 0x157b65:$a: NanoCore 0x15792c:$b: ClientPlugin 0x157b2e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x157b6e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x111d00:$c: ProjectData 0x157a53:$c: ProjectData 0x112804:$d: DESCrypto 0x15845a:$d: DESCrypto 0x15fe26:$e: KeepAlive 0x15de14:$g: LogClientMessage 0x15a00f:$i: get_Connected 0x158790:$j: #=q 0x1587c0:$j: #=q 0x1587dc:$j: #=q 0x15880c:$j: #=q 0x158828:$j: #=q 0x158844:$j: #=q
00000003.00000002.716279193.0000000005830000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe75:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xe8f:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
00000003.00000002.716279193.0000000005830000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe75:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x1261:$s3: PipeExists 0x1136:$s4: PipeCreated 0xeb0:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
0000000B.00000002.416463226.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xff8d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xffca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x13afd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
0000000B.00000002.416463226.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
0000000B.00000002.416463226.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xfcf5:$a: NanoCore 0xfd05:$a: NanoCore 0xff39:$a: NanoCore 0xff4d:$a: NanoCore 0xff8d:$a: NanoCore 0xfd54:$b: ClientPlugin 0xff56:$b: ClientPlugin 0xff96:$b: ClientPlugin 0xfe7b:$c: ProjectData 0x10882:$d: DESCrypto 0x1824e:$e: KeepAlive 0x1623c:$g: LogClientMessage 0x12437:$i: get_Connected 0x10bb8:$j: #=q 0x10be8:$j: #=q 0x10c04:$j: #=q 0x10c34:$j: #=q 0x10c50:$j: #=q 0x10c6c:$j: #=q 0x10c9c:$j: #=q 0x10cb8:$j: #=q
00000003.00000002.710137249.0000000002E11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000007.00000002.404349364.000000000419F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x513c5:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x157b65:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x51402:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x157ba2:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x54f35:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x15b6d5:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
00000007.00000002.404349364.000000000419F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000007.00000002.404349364.000000000419F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x5112d:$a: NanoCore 0x5113d:$a: NanoCore 0x51371:$a: NanoCore 0x51385:$a: NanoCore 0x513c5:$a: NanoCore 0x1578cd:$a: NanoCore 0x1578dd:$a: NanoCore 0x157b11:$a: NanoCore 0x157b25:$a: NanoCore 0x157b65:$a: NanoCore 0x5118c:$b: ClientPlugin 0x5138e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x513ce:$b: ClientPlugin 0x15792c:$b: ClientPlugin 0x157b2e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x157b6e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x512b3:$c: ProjectData 0x111d00:$c: ProjectData 0x157a53:$c: ProjectData 0x51cba:$d: DESCrypto 0x112804:$d: DESCrypto
00000003.00000002.706369637.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xff8d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xffca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x13afd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
00000003.00000002.706369637.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000003.00000002.706369637.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xfcf5:$a: NanoCore 0xfd05:$a: NanoCore 0xff39:$a: NanoCore 0xff4d:$a: NanoCore 0xff8d:$a: NanoCore 0xfd54:$b: ClientPlugin 0xff56:$b: ClientPlugin 0xff96:$b: ClientPlugin 0xfe7b:$c: ProjectData 0x10882:$d: DESCrypto 0x1824e:$e: KeepAlive 0x1623c:$g: LogClientMessage 0x12437:$i: get_Connected 0x10bb8:$j: #=q 0x10be8:$j: #=q 0x10c04:$j: #=q 0x10c34:$j: #=q 0x10c50:$j: #=q 0x10c6c:$j: #=q 0x10c9c:$j: #=q 0x10cb8:$j: #=q
0000000B.00000002.418085053.0000000002F41000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
0000000B.00000002.418085053.0000000002F41000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x6943b:$a: NanoCore 0x69494:$a: NanoCore 0x694d1:$a: NanoCore 0x6954a:$a: NanoCore 0x6949d:$b: ClientPlugin 0x694da:$b: ClientPlugin 0x69dd8:$b: ClientPlugin 0x69de5:$b: ClientPlugin 0x5f0a4:$e: KeepAlive 0x69925:$g: LogClientMessage 0x698a5:$i: get_Connected 0x59871:$j: #=q 0x598a1:$j: #=q 0x598dd:$j: #=q 0x59905:$j: #=q 0x59935:$j: #=q 0x59965:$j: #=q 0x59995:$j: #=q 0x599c5:$j: #=q 0x599e1:$j: #=q 0x59a11:$j: #=q
0000000B.00000002.418172375.0000000003F49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
0000000B.00000002.418172375.0000000003F49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x42f0d:$a: NanoCore 0x42f66:$a: NanoCore 0x42fa3:$a: NanoCore 0x4301c:$a: NanoCore 0x566c7:$a: NanoCore 0x566dc:$a: NanoCore 0x56711:$a: NanoCore 0x6f19b:$a: NanoCore 0x6f1b0:$a: NanoCore 0x6f1e5:$a: NanoCore 0x42f6f:$b: ClientPlugin 0x42fac:$b: ClientPlugin 0x438aa:$b: ClientPlugin 0x438b7:$b: ClientPlugin 0x56483:$b: ClientPlugin 0x5649e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x564ce:$b: ClientPlugin 0x566e5:$b: ClientPlugin 0x5671a:$b: ClientPlugin 0x6ef57:$b: ClientPlugin 0x6ef72:$b: ClientPlugin
00000003.00000002.713378603.0000000003E4A000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000003.00000002.713378603.0000000003E4A000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x11f0d:$a: NanoCore 0x11f66:$a: NanoCore 0x11fa3:$a: NanoCore 0x1201c:$a: NanoCore 0x256c7:$a: NanoCore 0x256dc:$a: NanoCore 0x25711:$a: NanoCore 0x3e19b:$a: NanoCore 0x3e1b0:$a: NanoCore 0x3e1e5:$a: NanoCore 0x11f6f:$b: ClientPlugin 0x11fac:$b: ClientPlugin 0x128aa:$b: ClientPlugin 0x128b7:$b: ClientPlugin 0x25483:$b: ClientPlugin 0x2549e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x254ce:$b: ClientPlugin 0x256e5:$b: ClientPlugin 0x2571a:$b: ClientPlugin 0x3df57:$b: ClientPlugin 0x3df72:$b: ClientPlugin
00000007.00000002.403470150.00000000030A6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.364005154.0000000003E49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x1540dd:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x15411a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x157c4d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
00000000.00000002.364005154.0000000003E49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.364005154.0000000003E49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x153e45:$a: NanoCore 0x153e55:$a: NanoCore 0x154089:$a: NanoCore 0x15409d:$a: NanoCore 0x1540dd:$a: NanoCore 0x153ea4:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1540a6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1540e6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x153fcb:$c: ProjectData 0x1549d2:$d: DESCrypto 0x15c39e:$e: KeepAlive 0x15a38c:$g: LogClientMessage 0x156587:$i: get_Connected 0x154d08:$j: #=q 0x154d38:$j: #=q 0x154d54:$j: #=q 0x154d84:$j: #=q 0x154da0:$j: #=q 0x154dbc:$j: #=q 0x154dec:$j: #=q 0x154e08:$j: #=q
00000000.00000002.357322278.0000000002EC6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6796	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x172b3:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x61614:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xaaa92:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xb0651:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xc14ea:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x17314:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x6163a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0xaaab8:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0xb0696:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0xc152f:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x1c719:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x2a68b:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6796	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6796	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x16db8:$a: NanoCore 0x16dd4:$a: NanoCore 0x16f2f:$a: NanoCore 0x16f3e:$a: NanoCore 0x17217:$a: NanoCore 0x17243:$a: NanoCore 0x172b3:$a: NanoCore 0x26cf5:$a: NanoCore 0x26d07:$a: NanoCore 0x26d43:$a: NanoCore 0x39afa:$a: NanoCore 0x39b61:$a: NanoCore 0x39c05:$a: NanoCore 0x61506:$a: NanoCore 0x615a7:$a: NanoCore 0x61614:$a: NanoCore 0x616d5:$a: NanoCore 0x625a6:$a: NanoCore 0x625f9:$a: NanoCore 0x62632:$a: NanoCore 0x626a5:$a: NanoCore
Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6396	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x348f5c:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x348fbd:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x34e3c2:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x35c334:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6396	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6396	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6396	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x348a61:$a: NanoCore 0x348a7d:$a: NanoCore 0x348bd8:$a: NanoCore 0x348be7:$a: NanoCore 0x348ec0:$a: NanoCore 0x348eec:$a: NanoCore 0x348f5c:$a: NanoCore 0x35899e:$a: NanoCore 0x3589b0:$a: NanoCore 0x3589ec:$a: NanoCore 0x348b08:$b: ClientPlugin 0x348c31:$b: ClientPlugin 0x348ef5:$b: ClientPlugin 0x348f65:$b: ClientPlugin 0x3589b9:$b: ClientPlugin 0x3589f5:$b: ClientPlugin 0x2d4a62:$c: ProjectData 0x2d6f2a:$c: ProjectData 0x348d7e:$c: ProjectData 0x3588eb:$c: ProjectData 0x383fdb:$c: ProjectData
Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 4540	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x5dffd:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xfd73e:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x197107:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x21dc07:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x2237c6:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x23465e:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x5e042:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0xfd764:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x197168:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x21dc2d:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x22380b:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x2346a3:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x19c56d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x1aa4df:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 4540	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 4540	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x5df77:$a: NanoCore 0x5dfa4:$a: NanoCore 0x5dffd:$a: NanoCore 0x6580c:$a: NanoCore 0x6581f:$a: NanoCore 0x65851:$a: NanoCore 0xd78c9:$a: NanoCore 0xd7930:$a: NanoCore 0xd79d3:$a: NanoCore 0xfd630:$a: NanoCore 0xfd6d1:$a: NanoCore 0xfd73e:$a: NanoCore 0xfd7ff:$a: NanoCore 0xfe6d0:$a: NanoCore 0xfe723:$a: NanoCore 0xfe75c:$a: NanoCore 0xfe7cf:$a: NanoCore 0x196c0c:$a: NanoCore 0x196c28:$a: NanoCore 0x196d83:$a: NanoCore 0x196d92:$a: NanoCore
Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6868	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Click to see the 35 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x1018d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x101ca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x13cfd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xff05:$x1: NanoCore Client.exe 0x1018d:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x117c6:$s1: PluginCommand 0x117ba:$s2: FileCommand 0x1266b:$s3: PipeExists 0x18422:$s4: PipeCreated 0x101b7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xfef5:$a: NanoCore 0xff05:$a: NanoCore 0x10139:$a: NanoCore 0x1014d:$a: NanoCore 0x1018d:$a: NanoCore 0xff54:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10156:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10196:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1007b:$c: ProjectData 0x10a82:$d: DESCrypto 0x1844e:$e: KeepAlive 0x1643c:$g: LogClientMessage 0x12637:$i: get_Connected 0x10db8:$j: #=q 0x10de8:$j: #=q 0x10e04:$j: #=q 0x10e34:$j: #=q 0x10e50:$j: #=q 0x10e6c:$j: #=q 0x10e9c:$j: #=q 0x10eb8:$j: #=q
3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xf7ad:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xf7da:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xf7ad:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x10888:$s4: PipeCreated 0xf7c7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xd9ad:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xd9da:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xd9ad:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xea88:$s4: PipeCreated 0xd9c7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5830000.4.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe75:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xe8f:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5830000.4.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe75:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x1261:$s3: PipeExists 0x1136:$s4: PipeCreated 0xeb0:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
11.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x1018d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x101ca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x13cfd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
11.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xff05:$x1: NanoCore Client.exe 0x1018d:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x117c6:$s1: PluginCommand 0x117ba:$s2: FileCommand 0x1266b:$s3: PipeExists 0x18422:$s4: PipeCreated 0x101b7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
11.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
11.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xfef5:$a: NanoCore 0xff05:$a: NanoCore 0x10139:$a: NanoCore 0x1014d:$a: NanoCore 0x1018d:$a: NanoCore 0xff54:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10156:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10196:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1007b:$c: ProjectData 0x10a82:$d: DESCrypto 0x1844e:$e: KeepAlive 0x1643c:$g: LogClientMessage 0x12637:$i: get_Connected 0x10db8:$j: #=q 0x10de8:$j: #=q 0x10e04:$j: #=q 0x10e34:$j: #=q 0x10e50:$j: #=q 0x10e6c:$j: #=q 0x10e9c:$j: #=q 0x10eb8:$j: #=q
Click to see the 11 entries

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Show sources

Source: File created

Author: Joe Security: Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, ProcessId: 4540, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\run.dat

Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Joe Security: Data: Command: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\RbJJtmpPB' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpC0F9.tmp', CommandLine: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\RbJJtmpPB' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpC0F9.tmp', CommandLine|base64offset|contains: *j, Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, ParentCommandLine: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe' , ParentImage: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, ParentProcessId: 6396, ProcessCommandLine: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\RbJJtmpPB' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpC0F9.tmp', ProcessId: 4712

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.4540.3.memstr

Malware Configuration Extractor: NanoCore {"C2: ": ["185.140.53.131"], "Version: ": "NanoCore Client, Version=1.2.2.0"}

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.716409354.0000000005F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.364292242.0000000003FBF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000B.00000002.416463226.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.710137249.0000000002E11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.404349364.000000000419F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.706369637.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000B.00000002.418085053.0000000002F41000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000B.00000002.418172375.0000000003F49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.713378603.0000000003E4A000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.364005154.0000000003E49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6796, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6396, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 4540, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 11.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

Show sources

Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Joe Sandbox ML: detected
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\RbJJtmpPB.exe	Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Dropper.MSIL.Gen7
Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/NanoCore.fadte
Source: 11.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Dropper.MSIL.Gen7

Compliance:

Uses 32bit PE files

Show sources

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Contains modern PE file flags such as dynamic base (ASLR) or NX

Show sources

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Binary contains paths to debug symbols

Show sources

Source:

Binary string: mscorlib.pdb source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.708076133.0000000001083000.00000004.00000020.sdmp

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

IPs: 185.140.53.131

Uses dynamic DNS services

Show sources

Source: unknown

DNS query: name: amechi.duckdns.org

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.6:49727 -> 185.140.53.131:3190

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: DAVID_CRAIGGG DAVID_CRAIGGG

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: amechi.duckdns.org

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://fontfabrik.com
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.356878983.0000000002E41000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.403339864.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name
Source: dhcpmon.exe, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000B.00000002.416551395.0000000000B42000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://tempuri.org/experimentDataSet.xsd
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.coml
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.355257450.0000000000D97000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comion
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.355257450.0000000000D97000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comma
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.355257450.0000000000D97000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.como1
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fonts.com
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.goodfont.co.kr
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sajatypeworks.com
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sakkal.com
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.kr
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.com
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.typography.netD
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.urwpp.deDPlease
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.716409354.0000000005F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp

Binary or memory string: RegisterRawInputDevices

E-Banking Fraud:

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.716409354.0000000005F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.364292242.0000000003FBF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000B.00000002.416463226.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.710137249.0000000002E11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.404349364.000000000419F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.706369637.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000B.00000002.418085053.0000000002F41000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000B.00000002.418172375.0000000003F49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.713378603.0000000003E4A000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.364005154.0000000003E49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6796, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6396, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 4540, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 11.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

System Summary:

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Show sources

Source: 00000003.00000002.716409354.0000000005F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 00000000.00000002.364292242.0000000003FBF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 00000000.00000002.364292242.0000000003FBF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 00000003.00000002.716279193.0000000005830000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 0000000B.00000002.416463226.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 0000000B.00000002.416463226.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 00000007.00000002.404349364.000000000419F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 00000007.00000002.404349364.000000000419F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 00000003.00000002.706369637.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 00000003.00000002.706369637.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 0000000B.00000002.418085053.0000000002F41000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 0000000B.00000002.418172375.0000000003F49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 00000003.00000002.713378603.0000000003E4A000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 00000000.00000002.364005154.0000000003E49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 00000000.00000002.364005154.0000000003E49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6796, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6796, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6396, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6396, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 4540, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 4540, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5830000.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 11.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 11.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: Filename: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 0_2_02D8C154
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 0_2_02D8E598
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 0_2_02D8E589
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 3_2_0530E471
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 3_2_0530E480
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 3_2_0530BBD4
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 7_2_0147C154
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 7_2_0147E58A
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 7_2_0147E598
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_015BE471
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_015BE480
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_015BBBD4
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_054BF5F8
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_054B9788
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_054B3550
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_054BA610
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_055E3E30
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_055E4A40
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_055E4B08

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: RbJJtmpPB.exe.0.dr	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: dhcpmon.exe.3.dr	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368911203.0000000007660000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: System.OriginalFileName vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.369048566.00000000076C0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: originalfilename vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.369048566.00000000076C0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamepropsys.dll.mui@ vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.355058065.0000000000960000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameW( vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.369363284.00000000078A0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameAssemblyReferenceEntry.exeD vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.357322278.0000000002EC6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameTypeLibImporterFlags.dll4 vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.716409354.0000000005F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameLzma#.dll4 vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.716409354.0000000005F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameSurveillanceExClientPlugin.dll4 vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.710137249.0000000002E11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameClientPlugin.dll4 vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.706782824.0000000000A00000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameW( vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.707986928.000000000105A000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameclr.dllT vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.716348376.0000000005E90000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemscorrc.dllT vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.708465483.0000000001250000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameKernelbase.dll.muij% vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameW( vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: 00000003.00000002.716409354.0000000005F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 00000003.00000002.716409354.0000000005F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 00000000.00000002.364292242.0000000003FBF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 00000000.00000002.364292242.0000000003FBF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 00000003.00000002.716279193.0000000005830000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 00000003.00000002.716279193.0000000005830000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 0000000B.00000002.416463226.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 0000000B.00000002.416463226.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 00000007.00000002.404349364.000000000419F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 00000007.00000002.404349364.000000000419F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 00000003.00000002.706369637.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 00000003.00000002.706369637.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 0000000B.00000002.418085053.0000000002F41000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 0000000B.00000002.418172375.0000000003F49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 00000003.00000002.713378603.0000000003E4A000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 00000000.00000002.364005154.0000000003E49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 00000000.00000002.364005154.0000000003E49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6796, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6796, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6396, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6396, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 4540, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 4540, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5830000.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5830000.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 11.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 11.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 11.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore

Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqjIje6jGWLd2EOkfZXKqBbgu003du003d.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock', 'CreateDecryptor'
Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqVxXNKnhAcArgJoGGYXiyyQu003du003d.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'CreateDecryptor'
Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqVxXNKnhAcArgJoGGYXiyyQu003du003d.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock'

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@12/8@10/2

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

File created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\RbJJtmpPB.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\jTRDAFLnnzFLwfZ
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6952:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6252:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Global\{0135833c-e6c6-4c75-bdfb-60bbf26ea921}

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpC0F9.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\RbJJtmpPB' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpC0F9.tmp'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe {path}
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\RbJJtmpPB' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpB41.tmp'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe {path}
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\RbJJtmpPB' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpC0F9.tmp'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe {path}
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\RbJJtmpPB' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpB41.tmp'
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe {path}

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{95E15D0A-66E6-93D9-C53C-76E6219D3341}\InProcServer32

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source:

Binary string: mscorlib.pdb source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.708076133.0000000001083000.00000004.00000020.sdmp

Data Obfuscation:

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Show sources

Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqjIje6jGWLd2EOkfZXKqBbgu003du003d.cs	.Net Code: #=q_FL69pQf17BUSAFbWYu1SStMAbdu$R1GJ8VY8UL5_EA= System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqxoz66kOqvxr21iYXZYXWiumy9eZGwFWaiX4C5X8aecUu003d.cs	.Net Code: #=qKU0J1fiP8KA33eFK1owekQ== System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])

Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 7_2_0147F952 push eax; iretd
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_054BB5E0 push eax; retf
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_054B69FA push esp; retf
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_054B69F8 pushad ; retf
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 11_2_055E6E5D push FFFFFF8Bh; iretd

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.10175200758
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.10175200758
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.10175200758

Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqJT4I5hOweIku0024xYFEeDszbikglXCuquUdu0024v9AXtyq2nsu003d.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: '#=qBeOBlH6CwHFnQdZWWBgZ_pemudZ6CfCVcfOQtgpeG$Y=', '#=q5v5cLSMFBaxiTtOEjscx86gN2ozXlfytiL6UmXnyWtg=', '#=q_XA5h2lVGHLcY9dK754wKGrOjAm6aBbwPxcUJXgJThJUz83kMbCL53G5uuOLP6Rq', '#=qIFfr$DrKqIieRc688$vylAlBsEnx9Z3$TxvrDsPURfM=', '#=qejgvNXJQvgM2GomZsygLjreyguSPQ29pQHqjR_a0dWk=', '#=qCGokdf0OOxeMJLDkXSfc3NPmwygIQ29RjKQWj$wbNGB9C1pPgma_891QiNyTRXcA', '#=qDqyUVyJLXCtYqhZ0$opqkomqhUBn2WCeEEvGAXlNQ$I=', '#=qdImPAY1o3YhbLtukwCQ91cISaeIEWRKSYrGZ3dTVnkY=', '#=qza7O1AHrroJC7yRIJz4wINR_Sgo4hDpQrj_OYfIrlJE=', '#=q6Ct3QmvVLFC7my$dL1uEiHGmXJ5qCuK4WIhDwfhPTFs='
Source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqWrm21vQ8CBMZP_RBTwpusAu003du003d.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: '#=qCgU$tDqtOAyz2b$RwfSF7UzBcCAr0rFJWxm16x7Lre0=', '#=qeD3MBfedCIuKIQf9V1u2N3YS4VXE_FOHqw_XAjWtZK8=', '#=q$mvEHEBkZud$AdHPWqsMQnw5Xm5sD4vBSSmqrKuXGOk=', '#=qZaN94n8dM6tBEf$qCdY2kbTZb5BOW8Z134$2tNv7EJs=', '#=qtlZnL8mho$rv1eTFz0Mw9UYFC_yCabEZ0xtVePn6wR5aSHE7ti3UfKg2l7D0_xk8', '#=qVS$QmQjvFfsXSqQAKGSl6HGbkse2SG0XCab4upVjtRJkvhTEk$oIS2I9Zja7id1Q', '#=qxJg7RxTW1v5mnt12xXeJiYJv_bcctbtL2BCD5MjDi45Hlz6t8vwDNTv1Rv7tgIct', '#=qp$ZVC1r9spi890l$D7IwEd3faoKeWHvv42mVq8wIIWM=', '#=qCoWHlVuoVRMkOzC7RZubJCslkxaEWn9yZiIydECf69$ktj0IPD5wAwC2H5Cc8C$L', '#=qqs1moO$mYaS72OXOWe0Z6GycslEb6e9Ipoy7ppW0O5abIp05ajv8doqdJZHlN3cK'

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\RbJJtmpPB.exe			Jump to dropped file
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	File created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe			Jump to dropped file

Boot Survival:

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Show sources

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\RbJJtmpPB' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpC0F9.tmp'

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

File opened: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe:Zone.Identifier read attributes | delete

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Yara detected AntiVM_3

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.403470150.00000000030A6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.357322278.0000000002EC6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6396, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6868, type: MEMORY

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.363654344.00000000031F7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.403339864.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: WINE_GET_UNIX_FILE_NAME
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.363654344.00000000031F7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.403339864.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SBIEDLL.DLL

Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe

File opened / queried: SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 1368
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 8100
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Window / User API: foregroundWindowGot 447
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Window / User API: foregroundWindowGot 1302

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe TID: 6400	Thread sleep time: -31500s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe TID: 5764	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe TID: 4524	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe TID: 5748	Thread sleep time: -9223372036854770s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe TID: 6864	Thread sleep time: -31500s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe TID: 6960	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe TID: 6984	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe TID: 6408	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed

Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.404155111.00000000033D7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.708295753.0000000001108000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW%SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dll$Vr
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.708465483.0000000001250000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: A Virtual Machine could not be started because Hyper-V is not installed.
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.403339864.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmware
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.403339864.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: l%C:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.403339864.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWARE
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.404155111.00000000033D7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: InstallPath%C:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.708465483.0000000001250000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: A communication protocol error has occurred between the Hyper-V Host and Guest Compute Service.
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.708465483.0000000001250000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: The communication protocol version between the Hyper-V Host and Guest Compute Services is not supported.
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.404155111.00000000033D7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.404155111.00000000033D7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWARE"SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware ToolsLHARDWARE\DEVICEMAP\Scsi\Scsi Port 1\Scsi Bus 0\Target Id 0\Logical Unit Id 0LHARDWARE\DEVICEMAP\Scsi\Scsi Port 2\Scsi Bus 0\Target Id 0\Logical Unit Id 0'SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Disk\Enum
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.403339864.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA II
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.404155111.00000000033D7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmwareNSYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Class\{4D36E968-E325-11CE-BFC1-08002BE10318}\0000
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.403339864.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: l"SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.708465483.0000000001250000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: An unknown internal message was received by the Hyper-V Compute Service.

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Anti Debugging:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\RbJJtmpPB' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpC0F9.tmp'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe {path}
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\RbJJtmpPB' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpB41.tmp'
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe {path}

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.710392210.0000000002E7B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.711784919.0000000003104000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Managerpr
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.709420984.00000000017E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.709420984.00000000017E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.711119902.0000000002FDE000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program ManagerP
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.709420984.00000000017E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: &Program Manager
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.716686963.000000000645C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Managerx
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.709420984.00000000017E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arial.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariali.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariblk.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\bahnschrift.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibril.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrii.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrili.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrib.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibriz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambria.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candara.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candaraz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comic.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comici.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consola.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constan.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constani.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constanb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constanz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbel.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbeli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbelb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbelz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cour.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\couri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\courbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\courbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ebrima.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ebrimabd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\framd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADM.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\framdit.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADMIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAMDCN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADMCN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAHV.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAHVIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Gabriola.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\gadugi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\gadugib.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgia.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\impact.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Inkfree.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\javatext.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelawUI.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelUIsl.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelaUIb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\lucon.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\l_10646.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgun.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgunsl.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgunbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\himalaya.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjh.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjhl.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjhbd.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ntailu.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ntailub.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\phagspa.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\phagspab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\taile.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\taileb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyh.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyhl.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyhbd.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mingliub.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\monbaiti.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msgothic.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mvboli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mmrtext.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mmrtextb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Nirmala.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NirmalaS.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NirmalaB.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\pala.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palabi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoepr.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeprb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoesc.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoescb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguiemj.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguihis.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisym.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\simsun.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\simsunb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Sitka.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaI.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaB.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaZ.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\sylfaen.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\symbol.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\tahoma.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\tahomabd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebuc.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucit.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdana.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\webdings.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\wingding.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothR.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothM.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothL.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothB.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\holomdl2.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENTURY.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LEELAWAD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LEELAWDB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MSUIGHUR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MSUIGHUB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\WINGDNG2.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\WINGDNG3.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TEMPSITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PRISTINA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PAPYRUS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MISTRAL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LHANDW.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCKRIST.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\JUICE___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRSCRIPT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FREESCPT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRADHITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OUTLOOK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BKANT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUAI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUAB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUABI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARAIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARABD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTCORSVA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHIC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ALGER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BASKVILL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BAUHS93.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELLI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELLB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSDB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BERNHC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_PSTC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRITANIC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BROADW.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRUSHSCI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENTAUR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CHILLER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COLONNA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COOPBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FTLTLT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HARLOWSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HARNGTON.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HTOWERT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HTOWERTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\JOKERMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\KUNSTLER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITED.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITEI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITEDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LCALLIG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAGNETOB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MATURASC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MOD20.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGENG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGSOL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OLDENGL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ONYX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PARCHM.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PLAYBILL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\POORICH.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAVIE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\INFROMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SHOWG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SNAP____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\STENCIL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VINERITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VIVALDII.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VLADIMIR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LATINWD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCM_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCMI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCB_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCBI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCM____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCRIPTBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCCB___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAGE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTILI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTIBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PER_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PALSCRI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OCRAEXT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAIAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEBO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\IMPRISHA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HATTEN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDYSTO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIL_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLSNECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIGI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABKIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FORTE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FELIXTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASMD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASLGHT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASDEMI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ENGR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCEDSCR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CURLZ___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENSCBK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CASTELAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIST.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_R.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_I.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_B.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCBLKAD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARLRDBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BSSYM7.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSPCL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTEXTRA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\marlett.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.716409354.0000000005F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.364292242.0000000003FBF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000B.00000002.416463226.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.710137249.0000000002E11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.404349364.000000000419F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.706369637.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000B.00000002.418085053.0000000002F41000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000B.00000002.418172375.0000000003F49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.713378603.0000000003E4A000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.364005154.0000000003E49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6796, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6396, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 4540, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 11.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Remote Access Functionality:

Detected Nanocore Rat

Show sources

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.364005154.0000000003E49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.716409354.0000000005F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000003.00000002.710137249.0000000002E11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: <Module>mscorlibMicrosoft.VisualBasicMyApplicationNanoCore.MyMyComputerMyProjectMyWebServicesThreadSafeObjectProvider`1IClientNetworkNanoCore.ClientPluginIClientDataIClientAppIClientDataHostNanoCore.ClientPluginHostIClientNetworkHostIClientUIHostIClientLoggingHostIClientAppHostIClientNameObjectCollectionNanoCoreIClientReadOnlyNameObjectCollectionClientInvokeDelegateMicrosoft.VisualBasic.ApplicationServicesApplicationBase.ctorMicrosoft.VisualBasic.DevicesComputerSystemObject.cctorget_Computerm_ComputerObjectProviderget_Applicationm_AppObjectProviderUserget_Userm_UserObjectProviderget_WebServicesm_MyWebServicesObjectProviderApplicationWebServicesEqualsoGetHashCodeTypeGetTypeToStringCreate__Instance__TinstanceDispose__Instance__get_GetInstanceMicrosoft.VisualBasic.MyServices.InternalContextValue`1m_ContextGetInstanceReadPacketpipeNameparamsPipeCreatedPipeClosedConnectionStateChangedconnectedConnectionFailedhostportBuildingHostCacheVariableChangednameClientSettingChangedPluginUninstallingClientUninstallingget_Variablesget_ClientSettingsget_BuilderSettingsVariablesClientSettingsBuilderSettingsget_ConnectedClosePipePipeExistsRebuildHostCacheAddHostEntryDisconnectSendToServercompressConnectedInvokemethodstateLogClientMessagemessageExceptionLogClientExceptionexsiteRestartShutdownDisableProtectionRestoreProtectionUninstallEntryExistsSystem.Collections.GenericKeyValuePair`2GetEntriesGetValuedefaultValueSetValuevalueRemoveValueMulticastDelegateTargetObjectTargetMethodIAsyncResultAsyncCallbackBeginInvokeDelegateCallbackDelegateAsyncStateEndInvokeDelegateAsyncResultSystem.ComponentModelEditorBrowsableAttributeEditorBrowsableStateSystem.CodeDom.CompilerGeneratedCodeAttributeSystem.DiagnosticsDebuggerHiddenAttributeMicrosoft.VisualBasic.CompilerServicesStandardModuleAttributeHideModuleNameAttributeSystem.ComponentModel.DesignHelpKeywordAttributeSystem.Runtime.CompilerServicesRuntimeHelpersGetObjectValueRuntimeTypeHandleGetTypeFromHandleActivatorCreateInstanceMyGroupCollectionAttributeget_Valueset_ValueSystem.Runtime.InteropServicesComVisibleAttributeParamArrayAttributeCompilationRelaxationsAttributeRuntimeCompatibilityAttributeSystem.ReflectionAssemblyFileVersionAttributeGuidAttributeAssemblyTrademarkAttributeAssemblyCopyrightAttributeAssemblyProductAttributeAssemblyCompanyAttributeAssemblyDescriptionAttributeAssemblyTitleAttributeClientPluginClientPlugin.dll
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000B.00000002.416463226.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000B.00000002.418085053.0000000002F41000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: <Module>mscorlibMicrosoft.VisualBasicMyApplicationNanoCore.MyMyComputerMyProjectMyWebServicesThreadSafeObjectProvider`1IClientNetworkNanoCore.ClientPluginIClientDataIClientAppIClientDataHostNanoCore.ClientPluginHostIClientNetworkHostIClientUIHostIClientLoggingHostIClientAppHostIClientNameObjectCollectionNanoCoreIClientReadOnlyNameObjectCollectionClientInvokeDelegateMicrosoft.VisualBasic.ApplicationServicesApplicationBase.ctorMicrosoft.VisualBasic.DevicesComputerSystemObject.cctorget_Computerm_ComputerObjectProviderget_Applicationm_AppObjectProviderUserget_Userm_UserObjectProviderget_WebServicesm_MyWebServicesObjectProviderApplicationWebServicesEqualsoGetHashCodeTypeGetTypeToStringCreate__Instance__TinstanceDispose__Instance__get_GetInstanceMicrosoft.VisualBasic.MyServices.InternalContextValue`1m_ContextGetInstanceReadPacketpipeNameparamsPipeCreatedPipeClosedConnectionStateChangedconnectedConnectionFailedhostportBuildingHostCacheVariableChangednameClientSettingChangedPluginUninstallingClientUninstallingget_Variablesget_ClientSettingsget_BuilderSettingsVariablesClientSettingsBuilderSettingsget_ConnectedClosePipePipeExistsRebuildHostCacheAddHostEntryDisconnectSendToServercompressConnectedInvokemethodstateLogClientMessagemessageExceptionLogClientExceptionexsiteRestartShutdownDisableProtectionRestoreProtectionUninstallEntryExistsSystem.Collections.GenericKeyValuePair`2GetEntriesGetValuedefaultValueSetValuevalueRemoveValueMulticastDelegateTargetObjectTargetMethodIAsyncResultAsyncCallbackBeginInvokeDelegateCallbackDelegateAsyncStateEndInvokeDelegateAsyncResultSystem.ComponentModelEditorBrowsableAttributeEditorBrowsableStateSystem.CodeDom.CompilerGeneratedCodeAttributeSystem.DiagnosticsDebuggerHiddenAttributeMicrosoft.VisualBasic.CompilerServicesStandardModuleAttributeHideModuleNameAttributeSystem.ComponentModel.DesignHelpKeywordAttributeSystem.Runtime.CompilerServicesRuntimeHelpersGetObjectValueRuntimeTypeHandleGetTypeFromHandleActivatorCreateInstanceMyGroupCollectionAttributeget_Valueset_ValueSystem.Runtime.InteropServicesComVisibleAttributeParamArrayAttributeCompilationRelaxationsAttributeRuntimeCompatibilityAttributeSystem.ReflectionAssemblyFileVersionAttributeGuidAttributeAssemblyTrademarkAttributeAssemblyCopyrightAttributeAssemblyProductAttributeAssemblyCompanyAttributeAssemblyDescriptionAttributeAssemblyTitleAttributeClientPluginClientPlugin.dll

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.716409354.0000000005F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.364292242.0000000003FBF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000B.00000002.416463226.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.710137249.0000000002E11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.404349364.000000000419F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.706369637.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000B.00000002.418085053.0000000002F41000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000B.00000002.418172375.0000000003F49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.713378603.0000000003E4A000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.364005154.0000000003E49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6796, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6396, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 4540, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 11.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job1	Scheduled Task/Job1	Process Injection12	Masquerading2	Input Capture11	Security Software Discovery111	Remote Services	Input Capture11	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Scheduled Task/Job1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion3	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion3	Remote Desktop Protocol	Archive Collected Data11	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Non-Standard Port1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Disable or Modify Tools1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery2	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Remote Access Software1	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Process Injection12	NTDS	Application Window Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Non-Application Layer Protocol1	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information1	LSA Secrets	File and Directory Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Application Layer Protocol21	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Hidden Files and Directories1	Cached Domain Credentials	System Information Discovery12	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Obfuscated Files or Information2	DCSync	Network Sniffing	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	Software Packing12	Proc Filesystem	Network Service Scanning	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML
C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\RbJJtmpPB.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Download
3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Dropper.MSIL.Gen7	Download File
3.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f00000.6.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/NanoCore.fadte	Download File
11.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Dropper.MSIL.Gen7	Download File

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comma	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comion	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.como1	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	true	true		unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.comma	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.355257450.0000000000D97000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.tiro.com	dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.comion	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.355257450.0000000000D97000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers	dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.coml	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.typography.netD	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://fontfabrik.com	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.como1	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.355257450.0000000000D97000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fonts.com	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.356878983.0000000002E41000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.403339864.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sakkal.com	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000000.00000002.368359287.0000000006E12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 00000007.00000002.408064954.0000000006010000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
185.140.53.131	unknown	Sweden		209623	DAVID_CRAIGGG	true

Private

IP
192.168.2.1

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Red Diamond
Analysis ID:	341478
Start date:	19.01.2021
Start time:	12:59:11
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 12m 23s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	27
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@12/8@10/2
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Behavior information exceeds normal sizes, reducing to normal. Report will have missing behavior information. Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, RuntimeBroker.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 104.43.193.48, 40.88.32.150, 52.147.198.201, 51.11.168.160, 92.122.213.201, 92.122.213.247, 205.185.216.10, 205.185.216.42, 51.103.5.159, 52.254.96.93, 20.54.26.129, 104.84.56.60, 20.190.159.138, 40.126.31.1, 40.126.31.143, 20.190.159.132, 20.190.159.134, 40.126.31.8, 40.126.31.135, 40.126.31.6, 51.104.139.180 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): arc.msn.com.nsatc.net, www.tm.lg.prod.aadmsa.akadns.net, bn2eap.displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, wns.notify.windows.com.akadns.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, arc.msn.com, skypedataprdcoleus15.cloudapp.net, emea1.notify.windows.com.akadns.net, login.live.com, audownload.windowsupdate.nsatc.net, au.download.windowsupdate.com.hwcdn.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, watson.telemetry.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net, au-bg-shim.trafficmanager.net, displaycatalog-europeeap.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, client.wns.windows.com, fs.microsoft.com, displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, cds.d2s7q6s2.hwcdn.net, www.tm.a.prd.aadg.akadns.net, login.msa.msidentity.com, skypedataprdcolcus15.cloudapp.net, skypedataprdcoleus16.cloudapp.net, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, blobcollector.events.data.trafficmanager.net, par02p.wns.notify.trafficmanager.net Report size exceeded maximum capacity and may have missing behavior information. Report size getting too big, too many NtAllocateVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
13:00:09	API Interceptor	1409x Sleep call for process: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe modified
13:00:17	Autostart	Run: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run DHCP Monitor C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
13:00:28	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: dhcpmon.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link
185.140.53.131	Urgent order 1812021-672 Q30721,pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	R#U00d6SLER Puchase_tcs 10-28-2020,pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse

Domains

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
amechi.duckdns.org	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.131
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.82
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.69
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.69
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.69
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.69
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.69
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.71
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.71
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.71
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.71
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.71
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.71
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.71
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.73

ASN

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
DAVID_CRAIGGG	Proof of Payment.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.244.30.51
	DxCHoDnNLn.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.202
	T7gzTHDZ7g.rtf	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.202
	PO - 2021-000511.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.244.30.69
	PO AR483-1590436 _ J-3000 PROJT.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.202
	Qotation.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.154
	PO - 2021-000511.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.244.30.69
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.193.75.155
	Orden n.#U00ba 21115, pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.129
	Lists.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.136
	Quotation Request.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.244.30.171
	PO-PDF_PDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.244.30.69
	Quiero hacer el pedido de su producto.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.244.30.18
	PO 047428.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.183
	SLIP.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.244.30.171
	2owa3HlP0V.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.183
	TAtAHTebr6.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.183
	Quotation.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.244.30.29
	Halkbank_Ekstre_20210118_162356_389771.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.193.75.189
	Urgent order 1812021-672 Q30721,pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.131

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1018880
Entropy (8bit):	6.942682124565148
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12288:XqV5OpnI6faaeOd6/MTrklNE5b/wKB0dJ:k5OpnImys6/4kjE5bAJ
MD5:	57090F9293D9A013C7FF7FB614681A46
SHA1:	C477A883773DECABC0518173B640045802FAC0E8
SHA-256:	7F7AFB406C8F911F21354B2EA60FD688CE8083ED0AB10156C6F3421D927D2FAB
SHA-512:	398EC37B9927B59D8355D593BAE50289E2AC40529CB34B788D25D0FFA92F443218494C84B91B6A498A3940D78538F6B9A579E26242BF5F4C5CDB7A4A972D3D3A
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Joe Sandbox ML, Detection: 100%
Reputation:	low
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L......`..............0.............:.... ........@.. ....................................@.....................................O.................................................................................... ............... ..H............text...@.... ...................... ..`.rsrc...............................@..@.reloc..............................@..B........................H............$......k.......H...........................................".(.....Vr...p.....r...p.......0..L.........}.....(.......( .....(............s!.....("....o#.....($....o%.....(&.....0..K.........}........('........((.....,5...(............s!.....(.....o#.....(.....o%....8.....r...p.d...()...o...td.......(+..........9.....s.........s,...s-...o........o/...(0.......o1...(2.......o3...(4.......o5...(6.......o7...(8.......o9...(:.........(;.....(......+....s,...s-...(

C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe:Zone.Identifier Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	modified
Size (bytes):	26
Entropy (8bit):	3.95006375643621
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:ggPYV:rPYV
MD5:	187F488E27DB4AF347237FE461A079AD
SHA1:	6693BA299EC1881249D59262276A0D2CB21F8E64
SHA-256:	255A65D30841AB4082BD9D0EEA79D49C5EE88F56136157D8D6156AEF11C12309
SHA-512:	89879F237C0C051EBE784D0690657A6827A312A82735DA42DAD5F744D734FC545BEC9642C19D14C05B2F01FF53BC731530C92F7327BB7DC9CDE1B60FB21CD64E
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	[ZoneTransfer]....ZoneId=0

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1216
Entropy (8bit):	5.355304211458859
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:MLUE4K5E4Ks2E1qE4qXKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhPKIE4oKFKHKoZAE4Kzr7FE4x84j:MIHK5HKXE1qHiYHKhQnoPtHoxHhAHKzr
MD5:	FED34146BF2F2FA59DCF8702FCC8232E
SHA1:	B03BFEA175989D989850CF06FE5E7BBF56EAA00A
SHA-256:	123BE4E3590609A008E85501243AF5BC53FA0C26C82A92881B8879524F8C0D5C
SHA-512:	1CC89F2ED1DBD70628FA1DC41A32BA0BFA3E81EAE1A1CF3C5F6A48F2DA0BF1F21A5001B8A18B04043C5B8FE4FBE663068D86AA8C4BD8E17933F75687C3178FF6
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..2,"System.Windows.Forms, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089",0..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..2,"System.Drawing, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Configuration\8d67d92724ba494b6c7fd089d6f25b48\System.Configuration.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Xml, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Xml\b219d4630d26b88041b59c21

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\dhcpmon.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1216
Entropy (8bit):	5.355304211458859
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:MLUE4K5E4Ks2E1qE4qXKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhPKIE4oKFKHKoZAE4Kzr7FE4x84j:MIHK5HKXE1qHiYHKhQnoPtHoxHhAHKzr
MD5:	FED34146BF2F2FA59DCF8702FCC8232E
SHA1:	B03BFEA175989D989850CF06FE5E7BBF56EAA00A
SHA-256:	123BE4E3590609A008E85501243AF5BC53FA0C26C82A92881B8879524F8C0D5C
SHA-512:	1CC89F2ED1DBD70628FA1DC41A32BA0BFA3E81EAE1A1CF3C5F6A48F2DA0BF1F21A5001B8A18B04043C5B8FE4FBE663068D86AA8C4BD8E17933F75687C3178FF6
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..2,"System.Windows.Forms, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089",0..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..2,"System.Drawing, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Configuration\8d67d92724ba494b6c7fd089d6f25b48\System.Configuration.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Xml, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Xml\b219d4630d26b88041b59c21

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpB41.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1654
Entropy (8bit):	5.160770966789842
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:2dH4+SEqC/S7h2ulNMFp2O/rlMhEMjnGpwjpIgUYODOLD9RJh7h8gKB38tn:cbha7JlNQV/rydbz9I3YODOLNdq3Q
MD5:	C6367F6AFBFF748963C28C323A57DBB6
SHA1:	F12A2B73E3FE4048F7C3DDFA88475EA01F72ECB0
SHA-256:	44B4FFF536D6D4D1D8AAFFBBEEBA432505193B5DA48546AD2B8BEA6E91A6313C
SHA-512:	C539355185A6313EB8C1B804F68D11980F96DC70289DAF085A123D7A89D8CCC61A91B1B0E1EB728FE24F5C96B4129E96A7FDCBE4BD372BA99E540B982A98DEDD
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>..<Task version="1.2" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">.. <RegistrationInfo>.. <Date>2014-10-25T14:27:44.8929027</Date>.. <Author>computer\user</Author>.. </RegistrationInfo>.. <Triggers>.. <LogonTrigger>.. <Enabled>true</Enabled>.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. </LogonTrigger>.. <RegistrationTrigger>.. <Enabled>false</Enabled>.. </RegistrationTrigger>.. </Triggers>.. <Principals>.. <Principal id="Author">.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>.. <RunLevel>LeastPrivilege</RunLevel>.. </Principal>.. </Principals>.. <Settings>.. <MultipleInstancesPolicy>StopExisting</MultipleInstancesPolicy>.. <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>.. <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>.. <AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate>.. <StartWhenAvail

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpC0F9.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1654
Entropy (8bit):	5.160770966789842
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:2dH4+SEqC/S7h2ulNMFp2O/rlMhEMjnGpwjpIgUYODOLD9RJh7h8gKB38tn:cbha7JlNQV/rydbz9I3YODOLNdq3Q
MD5:	C6367F6AFBFF748963C28C323A57DBB6
SHA1:	F12A2B73E3FE4048F7C3DDFA88475EA01F72ECB0
SHA-256:	44B4FFF536D6D4D1D8AAFFBBEEBA432505193B5DA48546AD2B8BEA6E91A6313C
SHA-512:	C539355185A6313EB8C1B804F68D11980F96DC70289DAF085A123D7A89D8CCC61A91B1B0E1EB728FE24F5C96B4129E96A7FDCBE4BD372BA99E540B982A98DEDD
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	low
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>..<Task version="1.2" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">.. <RegistrationInfo>.. <Date>2014-10-25T14:27:44.8929027</Date>.. <Author>computer\user</Author>.. </RegistrationInfo>.. <Triggers>.. <LogonTrigger>.. <Enabled>true</Enabled>.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. </LogonTrigger>.. <RegistrationTrigger>.. <Enabled>false</Enabled>.. </RegistrationTrigger>.. </Triggers>.. <Principals>.. <Principal id="Author">.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>.. <RunLevel>LeastPrivilege</RunLevel>.. </Principal>.. </Principals>.. <Settings>.. <MultipleInstancesPolicy>StopExisting</MultipleInstancesPolicy>.. <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>.. <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>.. <AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate>.. <StartWhenAvail

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\run.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	8
Entropy (8bit):	3.0
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:aaOtn:aaC
MD5:	1A0740DC072472AB674A074D43DCE1AB
SHA1:	D9551A079277B57C5B32A3BD211D79792B5F8E83
SHA-256:	F0E68EE525ACE1BFDA5F6B5DD98529738CE5D40BB51709C7EBB2CA779387FD83
SHA-512:	3E0639D3159013E73D72DB6D65F63B8CCA7F1C3A2A8B2512FAFFFD15E226E3F923213341F4B8D1C26F96711ADFC48BCA7F3E9AE8BF58E8A1D64522459B8BC2B0
Malicious:	true
Preview:	...8...H

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\RbJJtmpPB.exe Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1018880
Entropy (8bit):	6.942682124565148
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12288:XqV5OpnI6faaeOd6/MTrklNE5b/wKB0dJ:k5OpnImys6/4kjE5bAJ
MD5:	57090F9293D9A013C7FF7FB614681A46
SHA1:	C477A883773DECABC0518173B640045802FAC0E8
SHA-256:	7F7AFB406C8F911F21354B2EA60FD688CE8083ED0AB10156C6F3421D927D2FAB
SHA-512:	398EC37B9927B59D8355D593BAE50289E2AC40529CB34B788D25D0FFA92F443218494C84B91B6A498A3940D78538F6B9A579E26242BF5F4C5CDB7A4A972D3D3A
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Joe Sandbox ML, Detection: 100%
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L......`..............0.............:.... ........@.. ....................................@.....................................O.................................................................................... ............... ..H............text...@.... ...................... ..`.rsrc...............................@..@.reloc..............................@..B........................H............$......k.......H...........................................".(.....Vr...p.....r...p.......0..L.........}.....(.......( .....(............s!.....("....o#.....($....o%.....(&.....0..K.........}........('........((.....,5...(............s!.....(.....o#.....(.....o%....8.....r...p.d...()...o...td.......(+..........9.....s.........s,...s-...o........o/...(0.......o1...(2.......o3...(4.......o5...(6.......o7...(8.......o9...(:.........(;.....(......+....s,...s-...(

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	6.942682124565148
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.83% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.78% Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73296/58) 0.36% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.01%
File name:	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
File size:	1018880
MD5:	57090f9293d9a013c7ff7fb614681a46
SHA1:	c477a883773decabc0518173b640045802fac0e8
SHA256:	7f7afb406c8f911f21354b2ea60fd688ce8083ed0ab10156c6f3421d927d2fab
SHA512:	398ec37b9927b59d8355d593bae50289e2ac40529cb34b788d25d0ffa92f443218494c84b91b6a498a3940d78538f6b9a579e26242bf5f4c5cdb7a4a972d3d3a
SSDEEP:	12288:XqV5OpnI6faaeOd6/MTrklNE5b/wKB0dJ:k5OpnImys6/4kjE5bAJ
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L......`..............0.............:.... ........@.. ....................................@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	926cd8b0b4d24f92

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4dee3a
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x60069D86 [Tue Jan 19 08:51:18 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v4.0.30319
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0xdede8	0x4f	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0xe0000	0x1b788	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0xfc000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0xdce40	0xdd000	False	0.471612300269	data	7.10175200758	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0xe0000	0x1b788	0x1b800	False	0.186869673295	data	3.43661210575	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0xfc000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.101910425663	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type
RT_ICON	0xe01a0	0x468	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_ICON	0xe0618	0x2ad0	PNG image data, 256 x 256, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced
RT_ICON	0xe30f8	0x25a8	dBase IV DBT of `.DBF, block length 9216, next free block index 40, next free block 3892081920, next used block 3187504384
RT_ICON	0xe56b0	0x10a8	dBase IV DBT of @.DBF, block length 4096, next free block index 40, next free block 4294866176, next used block 4294866176
RT_ICON	0xe6768	0x10828	dBase III DBT, version number 0, next free block index 40
RT_ICON	0xf6fa0	0x4228	dBase IV DBT of \200.DBF, blocks size 0, block length 16384, next free block index 40, next free block 670987520, next used block 0
RT_GROUP_ICON	0xfb1d8	0x5a	data
RT_VERSION	0xfb244	0x342	data
RT_MANIFEST	0xfb598	0x1ea	XML 1.0 document, UTF-8 Unicode (with BOM) text, with CRLF line terminators

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Copyright Hewlett-Packard 2016
Assembly Version	46.3.0.0
InternalName	W.exe
FileVersion	46.3.0.0
CompanyName	Hewlett-Packard
LegalTrademarks
Comments
ProductName
ProductVersion	46.3.0.0
FileDescription
OriginalFilename	W.exe

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:20.458858967 CET	49727	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:23.468259096 CET	49727	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:29.546869993 CET	49727	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:37.774944067 CET	49731	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:40.954102039 CET	49731	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:46.954551935 CET	49731	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:55.587681055 CET	49742	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:58.596179962 CET	49742	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:04.596689939 CET	49742	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:13.558219910 CET	49751	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:16.550934076 CET	49751	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:22.551265001 CET	49751	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:30.716780901 CET	49753	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:33.724112034 CET	49753	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:39.724651098 CET	49753	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:48.705497980 CET	49758	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:51.712265968 CET	49758	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:57.726008892 CET	49758	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:08.073179960 CET	49759	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:11.086462975 CET	49759	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:17.086971045 CET	49759	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:25.276586056 CET	49760	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:28.291044950 CET	49760	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:34.291505098 CET	49760	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:44.401058912 CET	49761	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:47.432745934 CET	49761	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:53.433733940 CET	49761	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:03:01.088367939 CET	49762	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131
Jan 19, 2021 13:03:04.090867043 CET	49762	3190	192.168.2.6	185.140.53.131

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Jan 19, 2021 12:59:55.805496931 CET	51774	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 12:59:55.853490114 CET	53	51774	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 12:59:56.807934046 CET	56023	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 12:59:56.864518881 CET	53	56023	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 12:59:57.750016928 CET	58384	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 12:59:57.798019886 CET	53	58384	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 12:59:58.920078039 CET	60261	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 12:59:58.967937946 CET	53	60261	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 12:59:59.899736881 CET	56061	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 12:59:59.947690010 CET	53	56061	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:00.908983946 CET	58336	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:00.959762096 CET	53	58336	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:01.726190090 CET	53781	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:01.774106979 CET	53	53781	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:02.676625013 CET	54064	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:02.727356911 CET	53	54064	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:03.732181072 CET	52811	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:03.782949924 CET	53	52811	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:05.037970066 CET	55299	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:05.094533920 CET	53	55299	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:05.990865946 CET	63745	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:06.041475058 CET	53	63745	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:06.870400906 CET	50055	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:06.918375015 CET	53	50055	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:08.621339083 CET	61374	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:08.672243118 CET	53	61374	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:20.191162109 CET	50339	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:20.418487072 CET	53	50339	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:24.397658110 CET	63307	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:24.445785046 CET	53	63307	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:31.901995897 CET	49694	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:31.965888023 CET	53	49694	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:37.717550993 CET	54982	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:37.773875952 CET	53	54982	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:44.926678896 CET	50010	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:44.975646019 CET	53	50010	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:46.890588999 CET	63718	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:46.941603899 CET	53	63718	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:48.181619883 CET	62116	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:48.241581917 CET	53	62116	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:49.147144079 CET	63816	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:49.206397057 CET	53	63816	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:49.908449888 CET	55014	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:49.975354910 CET	53	55014	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:50.204334974 CET	62208	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:50.263297081 CET	53	62208	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:51.036570072 CET	57574	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:51.092920065 CET	53	57574	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:51.918710947 CET	51818	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:51.977901936 CET	53	51818	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:52.906135082 CET	56628	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:52.967947006 CET	53	56628	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:54.188534975 CET	60778	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:54.237760067 CET	53	60778	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:55.359288931 CET	53799	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:55.585820913 CET	53	53799	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:56.010690928 CET	54683	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:56.067133904 CET	53	54683	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:56.214086056 CET	59329	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:56.271733999 CET	53	59329	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:57.452632904 CET	64021	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:57.509658098 CET	53	64021	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:58.588377953 CET	56129	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:58.644809961 CET	53	56129	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:13.499985933 CET	58177	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:13.556488991 CET	53	58177	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:30.495064020 CET	50700	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:30.714359999 CET	53	50700	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:32.905016899 CET	54069	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:32.965356112 CET	53	54069	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:41.057282925 CET	61178	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:41.116576910 CET	53	61178	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:41.876019955 CET	57017	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:41.924115896 CET	53	57017	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:48.640922070 CET	56327	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:48.701491117 CET	53	56327	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:08.015522957 CET	50243	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:08.071655989 CET	53	50243	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:25.218017101 CET	62055	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:25.274441004 CET	53	62055	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:44.175540924 CET	61249	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:44.397716045 CET	53	61249	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Jan 19, 2021 13:03:01.029556036 CET	65252	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Jan 19, 2021 13:03:01.087860107 CET	53	65252	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:20.191162109 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0x4d7a	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:37.717550993 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0xe58b	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:55.359288931 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0x8393	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:13.499985933 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0x366a	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:30.495064020 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0xb8e3	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:48.640922070 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0x639d	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:08.015522957 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0x3216	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:25.218017101 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0xb61	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:44.175540924 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0x3636	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 19, 2021 13:03:01.029556036 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0x70b8	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:20.418487072 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x4d7a	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org		185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:37.773875952 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0xe58b	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org		185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 19, 2021 13:00:55.585820913 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x8393	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org		185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:13.556488991 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x366a	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org		185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:30.714359999 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0xb8e3	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org		185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:41.116576910 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0xe7f9	No error (0)	prda.aadg.msidentity.com	www.tm.a.prd.aadg.akadns.net		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 19, 2021 13:01:48.701491117 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x639d	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org		185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:08.071655989 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x3216	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org		185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:25.274441004 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0xb61	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org		185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 19, 2021 13:02:44.397716045 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x3636	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org		185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 19, 2021 13:03:01.087860107 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x70b8	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org		185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6396 Parent PID: 5892

General

Start time:	13:00:00
Start date:	19/01/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe'
Imagebase:	0x880000
File size:	1018880 bytes
MD5 hash:	57090F9293D9A013C7FF7FB614681A46
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000000.00000002.364292242.0000000003FBF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000000.00000002.364292242.0000000003FBF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000000.00000002.364292242.0000000003FBF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net> Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000000.00000002.364005154.0000000003E49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000000.00000002.364005154.0000000003E49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000000.00000002.364005154.0000000003E49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net> Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000000.00000002.357322278.0000000002EC6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: schtasks.exe PID: 4712 Parent PID: 6396

General

Start time:	13:00:12
Start date:	19/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\RbJJtmpPB' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpC0F9.tmp'
Imagebase:	0x930000
File size:	185856 bytes
MD5 hash:	15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 6252 Parent PID: 4712

General

Start time:	13:00:12
Start date:	19/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff61de10000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 4540 Parent PID: 6396

General

Start time:	13:00:13
Start date:	19/01/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	{path}
Imagebase:	0x920000
File size:	1018880 bytes
MD5 hash:	57090F9293D9A013C7FF7FB614681A46
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000003.00000002.716409354.0000000005F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1, Description: Detects Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000003.00000002.716409354.0000000005F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000003.00000002.716409354.0000000005F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000003.00000002.716279193.0000000005830000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1, Description: Detects Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000003.00000002.716279193.0000000005830000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000003.00000002.710137249.0000000002E11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000003.00000002.706369637.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000003.00000002.706369637.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000003.00000002.706369637.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net> Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000003.00000002.713378603.0000000003E4A000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000003.00000002.713378603.0000000003E4A000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6868 Parent PID: 3440

General

Start time:	13:00:26
Start date:	19/01/2021
Path:	C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe'
Imagebase:	0xc10000
File size:	1018880 bytes
MD5 hash:	57090F9293D9A013C7FF7FB614681A46
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000007.00000002.404349364.000000000419F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000007.00000002.404349364.000000000419F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000007.00000002.404349364.000000000419F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net> Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000007.00000002.403470150.00000000030A6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Antivirus matches:	Detection: 100%, Joe Sandbox ML
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: schtasks.exe PID: 7048 Parent PID: 6868

General

Start time:	13:00:31
Start date:	19/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\RbJJtmpPB' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpB41.tmp'
Imagebase:	0x930000
File size:	185856 bytes
MD5 hash:	15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 6952 Parent PID: 7048

General

Start time:	13:00:32
Start date:	19/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff61de10000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6796 Parent PID: 6868

General

Start time:	13:00:33
Start date:	19/01/2021
Path:	C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	{path}
Imagebase:	0xb40000
File size:	1018880 bytes
MD5 hash:	57090F9293D9A013C7FF7FB614681A46
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 0000000B.00000002.416463226.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 0000000B.00000002.416463226.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 0000000B.00000002.416463226.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net> Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 0000000B.00000002.418085053.0000000002F41000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 0000000B.00000002.418085053.0000000002F41000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net> Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 0000000B.00000002.418172375.0000000003F49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 0000000B.00000002.418172375.0000000003F49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.
Tactics:	Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches ( `dir /a` for Windows and `ls –a` for Linux and macOS).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port paring that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088or port 587as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Analysis Report PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: NanoCore

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

E-Banking Fraud:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Boot Survival:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

Public

Private

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

DNS Queries