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Analysis Report PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Analysis ID:	342778
MD5:	dcf168394ef0a6d6774b099dd8493b75
SHA1:	565c77fa9f7f22229ff5aabad52f6f9e0c5fbce0
SHA256:	373e294fccf1cbc447469aeb6fc86678efbfd072b5035a295d1fc74ce6e9fd79
Tags:	exeNanoCoreRAT
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Nanocore

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Detected Nanocore Rat

Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)

Found malware configuration

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location

Yara detected AntiVM_3

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Binary contains a suspicious time stamp

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent)

Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

Machine Learning detection for sample

PE file contains section with special chars

PE file has nameless sections

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Uses dynamic DNS services

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Checks if the current process is being debugged

Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

Detected potential crypto function

Drops PE files

Enables debug privileges

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)

Installs a raw input device (often for capturing keystrokes)

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

PE file contains sections with non-standard names

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara signature match

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe (PID: 7064 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe' MD5: DCF168394EF0A6D6774B099DD8493B75)

schtasks.exe (PID: 6012 cmdline: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\pJrVfPIhXgkUp' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpE52C.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)

conhost.exe (PID: 5700 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe (PID: 6816 cmdline: {path} MD5: DCF168394EF0A6D6774B099DD8493B75)

dhcpmon.exe (PID: 5820 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' MD5: DCF168394EF0A6D6774B099DD8493B75)

schtasks.exe (PID: 2208 cmdline: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\pJrVfPIhXgkUp' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5106.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)

conhost.exe (PID: 2044 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

dhcpmon.exe (PID: 6780 cmdline: {path} MD5: DCF168394EF0A6D6774B099DD8493B75)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: NanoCore

{"C2: ": ["185.140.53.131"], "Version: ": "NanoCore Client, Version=1.2.2.0"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000011.00000002.770483355.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xff8d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xffca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x13afd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
00000011.00000002.770483355.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000011.00000002.770483355.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xfcf5:$a: NanoCore 0xfd05:$a: NanoCore 0xff39:$a: NanoCore 0xff4d:$a: NanoCore 0xff8d:$a: NanoCore 0xfd54:$b: ClientPlugin 0xff56:$b: ClientPlugin 0xff96:$b: ClientPlugin 0xfe7b:$c: ProjectData 0x10882:$d: DESCrypto 0x1824e:$e: KeepAlive 0x1623c:$g: LogClientMessage 0x12437:$i: get_Connected 0x10bb8:$j: #=q 0x10be8:$j: #=q 0x10c04:$j: #=q 0x10c34:$j: #=q 0x10c50:$j: #=q 0x10c6c:$j: #=q 0x10c9c:$j: #=q 0x10cb8:$j: #=q
00000007.00000002.1026361866.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xff8d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xffca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x13afd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
00000007.00000002.1026361866.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000007.00000002.1026361866.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xfcf5:$a: NanoCore 0xfd05:$a: NanoCore 0xff39:$a: NanoCore 0xff4d:$a: NanoCore 0xff8d:$a: NanoCore 0xfd54:$b: ClientPlugin 0xff56:$b: ClientPlugin 0xff96:$b: ClientPlugin 0xfe7b:$c: ProjectData 0x10882:$d: DESCrypto 0x1824e:$e: KeepAlive 0x1623c:$g: LogClientMessage 0x12437:$i: get_Connected 0x10bb8:$j: #=q 0x10be8:$j: #=q 0x10c04:$j: #=q 0x10c34:$j: #=q 0x10c50:$j: #=q 0x10c6c:$j: #=q 0x10c9c:$j: #=q 0x10cb8:$j: #=q
00000007.00000002.1028093890.0000000002D01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000007.00000002.1029421863.0000000003D49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000007.00000002.1029421863.0000000003D49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x2ef5:$a: NanoCore 0x2f4e:$a: NanoCore 0x2f8b:$a: NanoCore 0x3004:$a: NanoCore 0x166af:$a: NanoCore 0x166c4:$a: NanoCore 0x166f9:$a: NanoCore 0x2f183:$a: NanoCore 0x2f198:$a: NanoCore 0x2f1cd:$a: NanoCore 0x2f57:$b: ClientPlugin 0x2f94:$b: ClientPlugin 0x3892:$b: ClientPlugin 0x389f:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1646b:$b: ClientPlugin 0x16486:$b: ClientPlugin 0x164b6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x166cd:$b: ClientPlugin 0x16702:$b: ClientPlugin 0x2ef3f:$b: ClientPlugin 0x2ef5a:$b: ClientPlugin
00000007.00000002.1031888458.0000000005F70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xf7ad:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xf7da:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
00000007.00000002.1031888458.0000000005F70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xf7ad:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x10888:$s4: PipeCreated 0xf7c7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
00000007.00000002.1031888458.0000000005F70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000001.00000002.701087056.0000000003B39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x1e1195:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x1e11d2:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x1e4d05:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
00000001.00000002.701087056.0000000003B39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000001.00000002.701087056.0000000003B39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x1e0efd:$a: NanoCore 0x1e0f0d:$a: NanoCore 0x1e1141:$a: NanoCore 0x1e1155:$a: NanoCore 0x1e1195:$a: NanoCore 0x1e0f5c:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1e115e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1e119e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x19b5b3:$c: ProjectData 0x1e1083:$c: ProjectData 0x19c07e:$d: DESCrypto 0x1e1a8a:$d: DESCrypto 0x1e9456:$e: KeepAlive 0x1e7444:$g: LogClientMessage 0x1e363f:$i: get_Connected 0x1e1dc0:$j: #=q 0x1e1df0:$j: #=q 0x1e1e0c:$j: #=q 0x1e1e3c:$j: #=q 0x1e1e58:$j: #=q 0x1e1e74:$j: #=q
00000001.00000002.697967874.0000000002B2B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
00000001.00000002.701602201.0000000003D39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x16d785:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x16d7c2:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x1712f5:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
00000001.00000002.701602201.0000000003D39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000001.00000002.701602201.0000000003D39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x16d4ed:$a: NanoCore 0x16d4fd:$a: NanoCore 0x16d731:$a: NanoCore 0x16d745:$a: NanoCore 0x16d785:$a: NanoCore 0x16d54c:$b: ClientPlugin 0x16d74e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x16d78e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x16d673:$c: ProjectData 0x16e07a:$d: DESCrypto 0x175a46:$e: KeepAlive 0x173a34:$g: LogClientMessage 0x16fc2f:$i: get_Connected 0x16e3b0:$j: #=q 0x16e3e0:$j: #=q 0x16e3fc:$j: #=q 0x16e42c:$j: #=q 0x16e448:$j: #=q 0x16e464:$j: #=q 0x16e494:$j: #=q 0x16e4b0:$j: #=q
00000011.00000002.772863265.0000000003EA9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000011.00000002.772863265.0000000003EA9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x42ef5:$a: NanoCore 0x42f4e:$a: NanoCore 0x42f8b:$a: NanoCore 0x43004:$a: NanoCore 0x566af:$a: NanoCore 0x566c4:$a: NanoCore 0x566f9:$a: NanoCore 0x6f183:$a: NanoCore 0x6f198:$a: NanoCore 0x6f1cd:$a: NanoCore 0x42f57:$b: ClientPlugin 0x42f94:$b: ClientPlugin 0x43892:$b: ClientPlugin 0x4389f:$b: ClientPlugin 0x5646b:$b: ClientPlugin 0x56486:$b: ClientPlugin 0x564b6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x566cd:$b: ClientPlugin 0x56702:$b: ClientPlugin 0x6ef3f:$b: ClientPlugin 0x6ef5a:$b: ClientPlugin
0000000C.00000002.758221792.0000000004617000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x16d245:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x16d282:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x170db5:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
0000000C.00000002.758221792.0000000004617000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
0000000C.00000002.758221792.0000000004617000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x16cfad:$a: NanoCore 0x16cfbd:$a: NanoCore 0x16d1f1:$a: NanoCore 0x16d205:$a: NanoCore 0x16d245:$a: NanoCore 0x16d00c:$b: ClientPlugin 0x16d20e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x16d24e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x16d133:$c: ProjectData 0x16db3a:$d: DESCrypto 0x175506:$e: KeepAlive 0x1734f4:$g: LogClientMessage 0x16f6ef:$i: get_Connected 0x16de70:$j: #=q 0x16dea0:$j: #=q 0x16debc:$j: #=q 0x16deec:$j: #=q 0x16df08:$j: #=q 0x16df24:$j: #=q 0x16df54:$j: #=q 0x16df70:$j: #=q
0000000C.00000002.757375675.000000000441B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x1dcc55:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x1dcc92:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x1e07c5:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
0000000C.00000002.757375675.000000000441B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
0000000C.00000002.757375675.000000000441B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x1dc9bd:$a: NanoCore 0x1dc9cd:$a: NanoCore 0x1dcc01:$a: NanoCore 0x1dcc15:$a: NanoCore 0x1dcc55:$a: NanoCore 0x1dca1c:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1dcc1e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1dcc5e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x197073:$c: ProjectData 0x1dcb43:$c: ProjectData 0x197b3e:$d: DESCrypto 0x1dd54a:$d: DESCrypto 0x1e4f16:$e: KeepAlive 0x1e2f04:$g: LogClientMessage 0x1df0ff:$i: get_Connected 0x1dd880:$j: #=q 0x1dd8b0:$j: #=q 0x1dd8cc:$j: #=q 0x1dd8fc:$j: #=q 0x1dd918:$j: #=q 0x1dd934:$j: #=q
00000011.00000002.772748001.0000000002EA1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000011.00000002.772748001.0000000002EA1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x69437:$a: NanoCore 0x69490:$a: NanoCore 0x694cd:$a: NanoCore 0x69546:$a: NanoCore 0x69499:$b: ClientPlugin 0x694d6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x69dd4:$b: ClientPlugin 0x69de1:$b: ClientPlugin 0x5f09f:$e: KeepAlive 0x69921:$g: LogClientMessage 0x698a1:$i: get_Connected 0x5986d:$j: #=q 0x5989d:$j: #=q 0x598d9:$j: #=q 0x59901:$j: #=q 0x59931:$j: #=q 0x59961:$j: #=q 0x59991:$j: #=q 0x599c1:$j: #=q 0x599dd:$j: #=q 0x59a0d:$j: #=q
00000007.00000002.1031725645.0000000005EE0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe75:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xe8f:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
00000007.00000002.1031725645.0000000005EE0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe75:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x1261:$s3: PipeExists 0x1136:$s4: PipeCreated 0xeb0:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 7064	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6816	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x13dcc6:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x15d4fa:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x182bfe:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x1887bd:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x19963e:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x1bbc0c:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x3cf4d3:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x13dcec:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x15d55b:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x182c24:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x188802:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x199683:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x1bbc51:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x3cf4f9:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x162960:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x1708d2:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6816	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6816	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xe18fa:$a: NanoCore 0xe191a:$a: NanoCore 0xe43ed:$a: NanoCore 0x12f618:$a: NanoCore 0x12f67f:$a: NanoCore 0x12f722:$a: NanoCore 0x13dbb8:$a: NanoCore 0x13dc59:$a: NanoCore 0x13dcc6:$a: NanoCore 0x13dd87:$a: NanoCore 0x13ec58:$a: NanoCore 0x13ecab:$a: NanoCore 0x13ece4:$a: NanoCore 0x13ed57:$a: NanoCore 0x15cfff:$a: NanoCore 0x15d01b:$a: NanoCore 0x15d176:$a: NanoCore 0x15d185:$a: NanoCore 0x15d45e:$a: NanoCore 0x15d48a:$a: NanoCore 0x15d4fa:$a: NanoCore
Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 5820	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6780	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x11538:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x32624:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x381e3:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x49079:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x7eac1:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x11599:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x3264a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x38228:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x490be:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x7eae7:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x1699e:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x24910:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6780	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6780	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x1103d:$a: NanoCore 0x11059:$a: NanoCore 0x111b4:$a: NanoCore 0x111c3:$a: NanoCore 0x1149c:$a: NanoCore 0x114c8:$a: NanoCore 0x11538:$a: NanoCore 0x20f7a:$a: NanoCore 0x20f8c:$a: NanoCore 0x20fc8:$a: NanoCore 0x2d3fe:$a: NanoCore 0x32516:$a: NanoCore 0x325b7:$a: NanoCore 0x32624:$a: NanoCore 0x326e5:$a: NanoCore 0x335b6:$a: NanoCore 0x33609:$a: NanoCore 0x33642:$a: NanoCore 0x336b5:$a: NanoCore 0x3815d:$a: NanoCore 0x3818a:$a: NanoCore
Click to see the 34 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xd9ad:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xd9da:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xd9ad:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xea88:$s4: PipeCreated 0xd9c7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5ee0000.4.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe75:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xe8f:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5ee0000.4.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe75:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x1261:$s3: PipeExists 0x1136:$s4: PipeCreated 0xeb0:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xf7ad:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xf7da:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xf7ad:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x10888:$s4: PipeCreated 0xf7c7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x1018d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x101ca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x13cfd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xff05:$x1: NanoCore Client.exe 0x1018d:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x117c6:$s1: PluginCommand 0x117ba:$s2: FileCommand 0x1266b:$s3: PipeExists 0x18422:$s4: PipeCreated 0x101b7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xfef5:$a: NanoCore 0xff05:$a: NanoCore 0x10139:$a: NanoCore 0x1014d:$a: NanoCore 0x1018d:$a: NanoCore 0xff54:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10156:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10196:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1007b:$c: ProjectData 0x10a82:$d: DESCrypto 0x1844e:$e: KeepAlive 0x1643c:$g: LogClientMessage 0x12637:$i: get_Connected 0x10db8:$j: #=q 0x10de8:$j: #=q 0x10e04:$j: #=q 0x10e34:$j: #=q 0x10e50:$j: #=q 0x10e6c:$j: #=q 0x10e9c:$j: #=q 0x10eb8:$j: #=q
7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x1018d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x101ca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x13cfd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xff05:$x1: NanoCore Client.exe 0x1018d:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x117c6:$s1: PluginCommand 0x117ba:$s2: FileCommand 0x1266b:$s3: PipeExists 0x18422:$s4: PipeCreated 0x101b7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xfef5:$a: NanoCore 0xff05:$a: NanoCore 0x10139:$a: NanoCore 0x1014d:$a: NanoCore 0x1018d:$a: NanoCore 0xff54:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10156:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10196:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1007b:$c: ProjectData 0x10a82:$d: DESCrypto 0x1844e:$e: KeepAlive 0x1643c:$g: LogClientMessage 0x12637:$i: get_Connected 0x10db8:$j: #=q 0x10de8:$j: #=q 0x10e04:$j: #=q 0x10e34:$j: #=q 0x10e50:$j: #=q 0x10e6c:$j: #=q 0x10e9c:$j: #=q 0x10eb8:$j: #=q
Click to see the 11 entries

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Show sources

Source: File created

Author: Joe Security: Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, ProcessId: 6816, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\run.dat

Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Joe Security: Data: Command: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\pJrVfPIhXgkUp' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpE52C.tmp', CommandLine: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\pJrVfPIhXgkUp' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpE52C.tmp', CommandLine|base64offset|contains: *j, Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, ParentCommandLine: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe' , ParentImage: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, ParentProcessId: 7064, ProcessCommandLine: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\pJrVfPIhXgkUp' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpE52C.tmp', ProcessId: 6012

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.6816.7.memstr

Malware Configuration Extractor: NanoCore {"C2: ": ["185.140.53.131"], "Version: ": "NanoCore Client, Version=1.2.2.0"}

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000011.00000002.770483355.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.1026361866.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.1028093890.0000000002D01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.1029421863.0000000003D49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.1031888458.0000000005F70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.701087056.0000000003B39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.701602201.0000000003D39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000011.00000002.772863265.0000000003EA9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000C.00000002.758221792.0000000004617000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000C.00000002.757375675.000000000441B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000011.00000002.772748001.0000000002EA1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6816, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6780, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

Show sources

Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Joe Sandbox ML: detected
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\pJrVfPIhXgkUp.exe	Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/NanoCore.fadte
Source: 17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Dropper.MSIL.Gen7
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Dropper.MSIL.Gen7

Compliance:

Uses 32bit PE files

Show sources

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Contains modern PE file flags such as dynamic base (ASLR) or NX

Show sources

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Binary contains paths to debug symbols

Show sources

Source:

Binary string: ?\C:\Windows\dll\mscorlib.pdb source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1027251638.0000000001081000.00000004.00000020.sdmp

Software Vulnerabilities:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 4x nop then cmp dword ptr [ebp-20h], 00000000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov ecx, dword ptr [ebp-38h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov ecx, dword ptr [ebp-38h]
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 4x nop then cmp dword ptr [ebp-20h], 00000000h
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 4x nop then cmp dword ptr [ebp-20h], 00000000h

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

IPs: 185.140.53.131

Uses dynamic DNS services

Show sources

Source: unknown

DNS query: name: amechi.duckdns.org

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.4:49750 -> 185.140.53.131:3190

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: DAVID_CRAIGGG DAVID_CRAIGGG

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: amechi.duckdns.org

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://fontfabrik.com
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.698087475.0000000002BA6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.755447551.0000000003486000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667540587.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667540587.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html:
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666802005.000000000B3A4000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.com
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667062493.000000000B3A5000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.com(
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666742269.000000000B3A6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comD
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666742269.000000000B3A6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comR
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666802005.000000000B3A4000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.come
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666802005.000000000B3A4000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comf
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.coml
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667062493.000000000B3A5000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comt
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666802005.000000000B3A4000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comueX
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666802005.000000000B3A4000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comva
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666802005.000000000B3A4000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comz
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.671353872.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.675123633.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers(
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.668834638.000000000B3C9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.670641038.000000000B3C3000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.html
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.670715362.000000000B3C3000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlormal
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.669981678.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-user.html
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.670107984.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-user.html.
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.668897969.000000000B3A5000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersZ
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.668897969.000000000B3A5000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersj
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.669540752.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comFf
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.670674990.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comalic_
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.671353872.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comals
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.671353872.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comcomd
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.670107984.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comcomd_
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.696672589.000000000B390000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comcommm
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.669540752.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comd
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.669540752.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comd_
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.669540752.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comdiaF
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.669540752.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comessed
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.675123633.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comionF
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.675123633.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.commm
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.668748768.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comnc.
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.669066568.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.como
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.671106569.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.como.
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.696672589.000000000B390000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.como5
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.671353872.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comtuedm
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.671353872.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comued
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fonts.com
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666742269.000000000B3A6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666474096.000000000B3A5000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666474096.000000000B3A5000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666474096.000000000B3A5000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cnf
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666474096.000000000B3A5000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cnl
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666474096.000000000B3A5000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cnz
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.672895387.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.672733617.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/.
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.674156675.000000000B3C3000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htmY
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.goodfont.co.kr
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667540587.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667385656.000000000B39C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667263984.000000000B39C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp//Mo_
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667540587.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/0
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667540587.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/5
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667540587.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/P
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666912527.000000000B395000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Sue
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667263984.000000000B39C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/anie
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666912527.000000000B395000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/e
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667540587.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/f
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667540587.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/jp/
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667077696.000000000B399000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/on
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667077696.000000000B399000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/roso
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667540587.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/t
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.665018666.00000000010DC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sajatypeworks.com
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sakkal.com
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.kr
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.com
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.typography.netD
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.urwpp.deDPlease
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666742269.000000000B3A6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666742269.000000000B3A6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.zhongyicts.com.cno.

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.754370160.0000000001598000.00000004.00000020.sdmp

Binary or memory string: <HOOK MODULE="DDRAW.DLL" FUNCTION="DirectDrawCreateEx"/>

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1029421863.0000000003D49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp

Binary or memory string: RegisterRawInputDevices

E-Banking Fraud:

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000011.00000002.770483355.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.1026361866.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.1028093890.0000000002D01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.1029421863.0000000003D49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.1031888458.0000000005F70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.701087056.0000000003B39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.701602201.0000000003D39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000011.00000002.772863265.0000000003EA9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000C.00000002.758221792.0000000004617000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000C.00000002.757375675.000000000441B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000011.00000002.772748001.0000000002EA1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6816, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6780, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

System Summary:

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Show sources

Source: 00000011.00000002.770483355.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 00000011.00000002.770483355.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 00000007.00000002.1026361866.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 00000007.00000002.1026361866.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 00000007.00000002.1029421863.0000000003D49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 00000007.00000002.1031888458.0000000005F70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 00000001.00000002.701087056.0000000003B39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 00000001.00000002.701087056.0000000003B39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 00000001.00000002.701602201.0000000003D39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 00000001.00000002.701602201.0000000003D39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 00000011.00000002.772863265.0000000003EA9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 0000000C.00000002.758221792.0000000004617000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 0000000C.00000002.758221792.0000000004617000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 0000000C.00000002.757375675.000000000441B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 0000000C.00000002.757375675.000000000441B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 00000011.00000002.772748001.0000000002EA1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 00000007.00000002.1031725645.0000000005EE0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6816, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6816, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6780, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6780, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5ee0000.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: Filename: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

PE file contains section with special chars

Show sources

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Static PE information: section name: \D\|.aH
Source: pJrVfPIhXgkUp.exe.1.dr	Static PE information: section name: \D\|.aH
Source: dhcpmon.exe.7.dr	Static PE information: section name: \D\|.aH

PE file has nameless sections

Show sources

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Static PE information: section name:
Source: pJrVfPIhXgkUp.exe.1.dr	Static PE information: section name:
Source: dhcpmon.exe.7.dr	Static PE information: section name:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E704F9
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E718BF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E74498
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E72450
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E76C5F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E735F8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E7C260
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E72BF8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E7A880
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E7448F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E7784F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E76800
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E76810
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E765E7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E765F0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E7B5B0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E76AA0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E76A97
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E76270
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E75360
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E75F60
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_0508942C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_0508B440
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_0508B450
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 7_2_00A21DC8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 7_2_02CDE480
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 7_2_02CDE471
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 7_2_02CDBBD4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 7_2_06360040
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D2BF8
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D35F8
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D6C59
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D2450
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D4498
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D18B8
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D04FA
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D5351
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D5F51
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D5360
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D5F60
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D779A
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D43B1
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D23B2
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D6270
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D6A90
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D6AA0
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D5ED0
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031DB5B0
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D65F0
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D65E0
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D6810
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D6800
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031DA880
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_05BBD598
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_05BBF2D8
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_05BBDE00
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 17_2_00B71DC8
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 17_2_02D5E480
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 17_2_02D5E471
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 17_2_02D5BBD4
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 17_2_0541F5F8
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 17_2_05419788
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 17_2_0541A610

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.705882982.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: originalfilename vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.705882982.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamepropsys.dll.mui@ vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.697879693.0000000002AE1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameTypeLibImporterFlags.dll4 vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.705705198.00000000058F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: System.OriginalFileName vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.697967874.0000000002B2B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameAssemblyReferenceEntry.exeD vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.696982311.0000000000741000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameW4.exe4 vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1027198906.0000000001058000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameclr.dllT vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1031587707.0000000005E70000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemscorrc.dllT vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000003.700302329.00000000010E1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameW4.exe4 vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1028093890.0000000002D01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameClientPlugin.dll4 vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1029421863.0000000003D49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameLzma#.dll4 vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1029421863.0000000003D49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameSurveillanceExClientPlugin.dll4 vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1033040120.0000000006D30000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameKernelbase.dll.muij% vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameW4.exe4 vs PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: 00000011.00000002.770483355.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 00000011.00000002.770483355.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 00000007.00000002.1026361866.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 00000007.00000002.1026361866.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 00000007.00000002.1029421863.0000000003D49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 00000007.00000002.1031888458.0000000005F70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 00000007.00000002.1031888458.0000000005F70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 00000001.00000002.701087056.0000000003B39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 00000001.00000002.701087056.0000000003B39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 00000001.00000002.701602201.0000000003D39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 00000001.00000002.701602201.0000000003D39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 00000011.00000002.772863265.0000000003EA9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 0000000C.00000002.758221792.0000000004617000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 0000000C.00000002.758221792.0000000004617000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 0000000C.00000002.757375675.000000000441B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 0000000C.00000002.757375675.000000000441B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 00000011.00000002.772748001.0000000002EA1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 00000007.00000002.1031725645.0000000005EE0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 00000007.00000002.1031725645.0000000005EE0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6816, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6816, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6780, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6780, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5ee0000.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5ee0000.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Static PE information: Section: \D\|.aH ZLIB complexity 1.00031458436
Source: pJrVfPIhXgkUp.exe.1.dr	Static PE information: Section: \D\|.aH ZLIB complexity 1.00031458436
Source: dhcpmon.exe.7.dr	Static PE information: Section: \D\|.aH ZLIB complexity 1.00031458436

Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqjIje6jGWLd2EOkfZXKqBbgu003du003d.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock', 'CreateDecryptor'
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqVxXNKnhAcArgJoGGYXiyyQu003du003d.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'CreateDecryptor'
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqVxXNKnhAcArgJoGGYXiyyQu003du003d.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock'
Source: 17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqjIje6jGWLd2EOkfZXKqBbgu003du003d.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock', 'CreateDecryptor'
Source: 17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqVxXNKnhAcArgJoGGYXiyyQu003du003d.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'CreateDecryptor'
Source: 17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqVxXNKnhAcArgJoGGYXiyyQu003du003d.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock'

Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqjIje6jGWLd2EOkfZXKqBbgu003du003d.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqjIje6jGWLd2EOkfZXKqBbgu003du003d.cs	Security API names: System.Boolean System.Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal::IsInRole(System.Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole)
Source: 17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqjIje6jGWLd2EOkfZXKqBbgu003du003d.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: 17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqjIje6jGWLd2EOkfZXKqBbgu003du003d.cs	Security API names: System.Boolean System.Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal::IsInRole(System.Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole)

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@12/8@27/2

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

File created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\pJrVfPIhXgkUp.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\PnmXhPVzgJDQDpLkGDRIrZrAwD
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Global\{c3f2ffac-72ce-4a70-9d04-4f6a62cc4c81}
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:5700:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:2044:120:WilError_01

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpE52C.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\pJrVfPIhXgkUp' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpE52C.tmp'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe {path}
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\pJrVfPIhXgkUp' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5106.tmp'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe {path}
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\pJrVfPIhXgkUp' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpE52C.tmp'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe {path}
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\pJrVfPIhXgkUp' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5106.tmp'
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe {path}

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{95E15D0A-66E6-93D9-C53C-76E6219D3341}\InProcServer32

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Static file information: File size 1168384 > 1048576

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source:

Binary string: ?\C:\Windows\dll\mscorlib.pdb source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1027251638.0000000001081000.00000004.00000020.sdmp

Data Obfuscation:

Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Unpacked PE file: 1.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.640000.0.unpack \D\|.aH:EW;.text:ER;.rsrc:R;.reloc:R;Unknown_Section4:ER; vs Unknown_Section0:EW;Unknown_Section1:ER;Unknown_Section2:R;Unknown_Section3:R;Unknown_Section4:ER;
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Unpacked PE file: 12.2.dhcpmon.exe.e60000.0.unpack \D\|.aH:EW;.text:ER;.rsrc:R;.reloc:R;Unknown_Section4:ER; vs Unknown_Section0:EW;Unknown_Section1:ER;Unknown_Section2:R;Unknown_Section3:R;Unknown_Section4:ER;

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Show sources

Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqjIje6jGWLd2EOkfZXKqBbgu003du003d.cs	.Net Code: #=q_FL69pQf17BUSAFbWYu1SStMAbdu$R1GJ8VY8UL5_EA= System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqxoz66kOqvxr21iYXZYXWiumy9eZGwFWaiX4C5X8aecUu003d.cs	.Net Code: #=qKU0J1fiP8KA33eFK1owekQ== System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqjIje6jGWLd2EOkfZXKqBbgu003du003d.cs	.Net Code: #=q_FL69pQf17BUSAFbWYu1SStMAbdu$R1GJ8VY8UL5_EA= System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqxoz66kOqvxr21iYXZYXWiumy9eZGwFWaiX4C5X8aecUu003d.cs	.Net Code: #=qKU0J1fiP8KA33eFK1owekQ== System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])

Binary contains a suspicious time stamp

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: 0x83ABA3EF [Sun Jan 1 20:51:59 2040 UTC]

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Static PE information: section name: \D\|.aH
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Static PE information: section name:
Source: pJrVfPIhXgkUp.exe.1.dr	Static PE information: section name: \D\|.aH
Source: pJrVfPIhXgkUp.exe.1.dr	Static PE information: section name:
Source: dhcpmon.exe.7.dr	Static PE information: section name: \D\|.aH
Source: dhcpmon.exe.7.dr	Static PE information: section name:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00721604 push cs; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_007215D8 push cs; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00722989 push ebp; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E73A43 push esi; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Code function: 1_2_00E71F2A push ebp; retf
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_00F415D8 push cs; iretd
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_00F42989 push ebp; retf
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_00F41604 push cs; iretd
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D1F2A push ebp; retf
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_031D3A43 push esi; retf
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 12_2_05BB34A6 push edx; iretd
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 17_2_0541B5E0 push eax; retf
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 17_2_054169F8 pushad ; retf
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 17_2_054169FB push esp; retf

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: \D\|.aH entropy: 7.99982924254
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: \D\|.aH entropy: 7.99982924254
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: \D\|.aH entropy: 7.99982924254

Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqJT4I5hOweIku0024xYFEeDszbikglXCuquUdu0024v9AXtyq2nsu003d.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: '#=qBeOBlH6CwHFnQdZWWBgZ_pemudZ6CfCVcfOQtgpeG$Y=', '#=q5v5cLSMFBaxiTtOEjscx86gN2ozXlfytiL6UmXnyWtg=', '#=q_XA5h2lVGHLcY9dK754wKGrOjAm6aBbwPxcUJXgJThJUz83kMbCL53G5uuOLP6Rq', '#=qIFfr$DrKqIieRc688$vylAlBsEnx9Z3$TxvrDsPURfM=', '#=qejgvNXJQvgM2GomZsygLjreyguSPQ29pQHqjR_a0dWk=', '#=qCGokdf0OOxeMJLDkXSfc3NPmwygIQ29RjKQWj$wbNGB9C1pPgma_891QiNyTRXcA', '#=qDqyUVyJLXCtYqhZ0$opqkomqhUBn2WCeEEvGAXlNQ$I=', '#=qdImPAY1o3YhbLtukwCQ91cISaeIEWRKSYrGZ3dTVnkY=', '#=qza7O1AHrroJC7yRIJz4wINR_Sgo4hDpQrj_OYfIrlJE=', '#=q6Ct3QmvVLFC7my$dL1uEiHGmXJ5qCuK4WIhDwfhPTFs='
Source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqWrm21vQ8CBMZP_RBTwpusAu003du003d.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: '#=qCgU$tDqtOAyz2b$RwfSF7UzBcCAr0rFJWxm16x7Lre0=', '#=qeD3MBfedCIuKIQf9V1u2N3YS4VXE_FOHqw_XAjWtZK8=', '#=q$mvEHEBkZud$AdHPWqsMQnw5Xm5sD4vBSSmqrKuXGOk=', '#=qZaN94n8dM6tBEf$qCdY2kbTZb5BOW8Z134$2tNv7EJs=', '#=qtlZnL8mho$rv1eTFz0Mw9UYFC_yCabEZ0xtVePn6wR5aSHE7ti3UfKg2l7D0_xk8', '#=qVS$QmQjvFfsXSqQAKGSl6HGbkse2SG0XCab4upVjtRJkvhTEk$oIS2I9Zja7id1Q', '#=qxJg7RxTW1v5mnt12xXeJiYJv_bcctbtL2BCD5MjDi45Hlz6t8vwDNTv1Rv7tgIct', '#=qp$ZVC1r9spi890l$D7IwEd3faoKeWHvv42mVq8wIIWM=', '#=qCoWHlVuoVRMkOzC7RZubJCslkxaEWn9yZiIydECf69$ktj0IPD5wAwC2H5Cc8C$L', '#=qqs1moO$mYaS72OXOWe0Z6GycslEb6e9Ipoy7ppW0O5abIp05ajv8doqdJZHlN3cK'
Source: 17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqWrm21vQ8CBMZP_RBTwpusAu003du003d.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: '#=qCgU$tDqtOAyz2b$RwfSF7UzBcCAr0rFJWxm16x7Lre0=', '#=qeD3MBfedCIuKIQf9V1u2N3YS4VXE_FOHqw_XAjWtZK8=', '#=q$mvEHEBkZud$AdHPWqsMQnw5Xm5sD4vBSSmqrKuXGOk=', '#=qZaN94n8dM6tBEf$qCdY2kbTZb5BOW8Z134$2tNv7EJs=', '#=qtlZnL8mho$rv1eTFz0Mw9UYFC_yCabEZ0xtVePn6wR5aSHE7ti3UfKg2l7D0_xk8', '#=qVS$QmQjvFfsXSqQAKGSl6HGbkse2SG0XCab4upVjtRJkvhTEk$oIS2I9Zja7id1Q', '#=qxJg7RxTW1v5mnt12xXeJiYJv_bcctbtL2BCD5MjDi45Hlz6t8vwDNTv1Rv7tgIct', '#=qp$ZVC1r9spi890l$D7IwEd3faoKeWHvv42mVq8wIIWM=', '#=qCoWHlVuoVRMkOzC7RZubJCslkxaEWn9yZiIydECf69$ktj0IPD5wAwC2H5Cc8C$L', '#=qqs1moO$mYaS72OXOWe0Z6GycslEb6e9Ipoy7ppW0O5abIp05ajv8doqdJZHlN3cK'
Source: 17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqJT4I5hOweIku0024xYFEeDszbikglXCuquUdu0024v9AXtyq2nsu003d.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: '#=qBeOBlH6CwHFnQdZWWBgZ_pemudZ6CfCVcfOQtgpeG$Y=', '#=q5v5cLSMFBaxiTtOEjscx86gN2ozXlfytiL6UmXnyWtg=', '#=q_XA5h2lVGHLcY9dK754wKGrOjAm6aBbwPxcUJXgJThJUz83kMbCL53G5uuOLP6Rq', '#=qIFfr$DrKqIieRc688$vylAlBsEnx9Z3$TxvrDsPURfM=', '#=qejgvNXJQvgM2GomZsygLjreyguSPQ29pQHqjR_a0dWk=', '#=qCGokdf0OOxeMJLDkXSfc3NPmwygIQ29RjKQWj$wbNGB9C1pPgma_891QiNyTRXcA', '#=qDqyUVyJLXCtYqhZ0$opqkomqhUBn2WCeEEvGAXlNQ$I=', '#=qdImPAY1o3YhbLtukwCQ91cISaeIEWRKSYrGZ3dTVnkY=', '#=qza7O1AHrroJC7yRIJz4wINR_Sgo4hDpQrj_OYfIrlJE=', '#=q6Ct3QmvVLFC7my$dL1uEiHGmXJ5qCuK4WIhDwfhPTFs='

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\pJrVfPIhXgkUp.exe			Jump to dropped file
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	File created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe			Jump to dropped file

Boot Survival:

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Show sources

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\pJrVfPIhXgkUp' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpE52C.tmp'

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

File opened: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe:Zone.Identifier read attributes | delete

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Yara detected AntiVM_3

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.697967874.0000000002B2B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 7064, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 5820, type: MEMORY

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.697967874.0000000002B2B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.755412411.0000000003455000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: WINE_GET_UNIX_FILE_NAME
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.697967874.0000000002B2B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.755412411.0000000003455000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SBIEDLL.DLL

Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe

File opened / queried: SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 3488
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 5648
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Window / User API: foregroundWindowGot 1157
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Window / User API: foregroundWindowGot 410

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe TID: 7068	Thread sleep time: -31500s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe TID: 7140	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe TID: 6616	Thread sleep time: -7378697629483816s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe TID: 6044	Thread sleep time: -31500s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe TID: 6652	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe TID: 7092	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed

Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.755412411.0000000003455000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1033040120.0000000006D30000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: A Virtual Machine could not be started because Hyper-V is not installed.
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.755412411.0000000003455000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmware
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.755412411.0000000003455000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: l%C:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.755412411.0000000003455000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWARE
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.755412411.0000000003455000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: InstallPath%C:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1033040120.0000000006D30000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: A communication protocol error has occurred between the Hyper-V Host and Guest Compute Service.
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1033040120.0000000006D30000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: The communication protocol version between the Hyper-V Host and Guest Compute Services is not supported.
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.755412411.0000000003455000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWARE"SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware ToolsLHARDWARE\DEVICEMAP\Scsi\Scsi Port 1\Scsi Bus 0\Target Id 0\Logical Unit Id 0LHARDWARE\DEVICEMAP\Scsi\Scsi Port 2\Scsi Bus 0\Target Id 0\Logical Unit Id 0'SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Disk\Enum
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.755412411.0000000003455000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA II
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.755412411.0000000003455000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.755412411.0000000003455000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmwareNSYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Class\{4D36E968-E325-11CE-BFC1-08002BE10318}\0000
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.755412411.0000000003455000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: l"SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1027324927.00000000010E0000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW%SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dll
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1033040120.0000000006D30000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: An unknown internal message was received by the Hyper-V Compute Service.

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Anti Debugging:

Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Code function: 1_2_00E71698 CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process queried: DebugPort
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process queried: DebugPort
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process queried: DebugPort
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process queried: DebugPort
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process queried: DebugPort

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\pJrVfPIhXgkUp' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpE52C.tmp'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe {path}
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\pJrVfPIhXgkUp' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5106.tmp'
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe {path}

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1029260124.000000000328A000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1027657692.0000000001790000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1027657692.0000000001790000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1031493566.0000000005E5B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program ManagerP
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1027657692.0000000001790000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1032071709.00000000060FC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program ManagerPB
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1028629577.0000000002E90000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program ManagerHa8k

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arial.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariali.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariblk.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\bahnschrift.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibril.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrii.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrili.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrib.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibriz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambria.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candara.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candaraz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comic.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comici.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consola.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constan.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constani.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constanb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constanz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbel.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbeli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbelb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbelz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cour.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\couri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\courbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\courbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ebrima.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ebrimabd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\framd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADM.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\framdit.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADMIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAMDCN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADMCN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAHV.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAHVIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Gabriola.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\gadugi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\gadugib.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgia.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\impact.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Inkfree.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\javatext.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelawUI.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelUIsl.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelaUIb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\lucon.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\l_10646.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgun.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgunsl.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgunbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\himalaya.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjh.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjhl.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjhbd.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ntailu.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ntailub.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\phagspa.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\phagspab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\taile.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\taileb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyh.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyhl.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyhbd.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mingliub.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\monbaiti.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msgothic.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mvboli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mmrtext.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mmrtextb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Nirmala.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NirmalaS.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NirmalaB.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\pala.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palabi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoepr.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeprb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoesc.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoescb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguiemj.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguihis.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisym.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\simsun.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\simsunb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Sitka.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaI.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaB.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaZ.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\sylfaen.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\symbol.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\tahoma.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\tahomabd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebuc.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucit.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdana.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\webdings.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\wingding.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothR.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothM.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothL.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothB.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\holomdl2.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENTURY.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LEELAWAD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LEELAWDB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MSUIGHUR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MSUIGHUB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\WINGDNG2.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\WINGDNG3.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TEMPSITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PRISTINA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PAPYRUS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MISTRAL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LHANDW.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCKRIST.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\JUICE___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRSCRIPT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FREESCPT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRADHITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OUTLOOK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BKANT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUAI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUAB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUABI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARAIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARABD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTCORSVA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHIC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ALGER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BASKVILL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BAUHS93.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELLI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELLB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSDB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BERNHC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_PSTC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRITANIC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BROADW.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRUSHSCI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENTAUR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CHILLER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COLONNA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COOPBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FTLTLT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HARLOWSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HARNGTON.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HTOWERT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HTOWERTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\JOKERMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\KUNSTLER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITED.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITEI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITEDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LCALLIG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAGNETOB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MATURASC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MOD20.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGENG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGSOL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OLDENGL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ONYX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PARCHM.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PLAYBILL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\POORICH.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAVIE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\INFROMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SHOWG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SNAP____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\STENCIL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VINERITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VIVALDII.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VLADIMIR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LATINWD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCM_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCMI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCB_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCBI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCM____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCRIPTBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCCB___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAGE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTILI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTIBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PER_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PALSCRI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OCRAEXT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAIAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEBO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\IMPRISHA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HATTEN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDYSTO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIL_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLSNECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIGI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABKIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FORTE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FELIXTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASMD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASLGHT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASDEMI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ENGR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCEDSCR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CURLZ___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENSCBK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CASTELAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIST.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_R.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_I.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_B.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCBLKAD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARLRDBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BSSYM7.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSPCL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTEXTRA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\marlett.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000011.00000002.770483355.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.1026361866.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.1028093890.0000000002D01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.1029421863.0000000003D49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.1031888458.0000000005F70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.701087056.0000000003B39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.701602201.0000000003D39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000011.00000002.772863265.0000000003EA9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000C.00000002.758221792.0000000004617000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000C.00000002.757375675.000000000441B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000011.00000002.772748001.0000000002EA1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6816, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6780, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Remote Access Functionality:

Detected Nanocore Rat

Show sources

Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1028093890.0000000002D01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
Source: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000007.00000002.1028093890.0000000002D01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: <Module>mscorlibMicrosoft.VisualBasicMyApplicationNanoCore.MyMyComputerMyProjectMyWebServicesThreadSafeObjectProvider`1IClientNetworkNanoCore.ClientPluginIClientDataIClientAppIClientDataHostNanoCore.ClientPluginHostIClientNetworkHostIClientUIHostIClientLoggingHostIClientAppHostIClientNameObjectCollectionNanoCoreIClientReadOnlyNameObjectCollectionClientInvokeDelegateMicrosoft.VisualBasic.ApplicationServicesApplicationBase.ctorMicrosoft.VisualBasic.DevicesComputerSystemObject.cctorget_Computerm_ComputerObjectProviderget_Applicationm_AppObjectProviderUserget_Userm_UserObjectProviderget_WebServicesm_MyWebServicesObjectProviderApplicationWebServicesEqualsoGetHashCodeTypeGetTypeToStringCreate__Instance__TinstanceDispose__Instance__get_GetInstanceMicrosoft.VisualBasic.MyServices.InternalContextValue`1m_ContextGetInstanceReadPacketpipeNameparamsPipeCreatedPipeClosedConnectionStateChangedconnectedConnectionFailedhostportBuildingHostCacheVariableChangednameClientSettingChangedPluginUninstallingClientUninstallingget_Variablesget_ClientSettingsget_BuilderSettingsVariablesClientSettingsBuilderSettingsget_ConnectedClosePipePipeExistsRebuildHostCacheAddHostEntryDisconnectSendToServercompressConnectedInvokemethodstateLogClientMessagemessageExceptionLogClientExceptionexsiteRestartShutdownDisableProtectionRestoreProtectionUninstallEntryExistsSystem.Collections.GenericKeyValuePair`2GetEntriesGetValuedefaultValueSetValuevalueRemoveValueMulticastDelegateTargetObjectTargetMethodIAsyncResultAsyncCallbackBeginInvokeDelegateCallbackDelegateAsyncStateEndInvokeDelegateAsyncResultSystem.ComponentModelEditorBrowsableAttributeEditorBrowsableStateSystem.CodeDom.CompilerGeneratedCodeAttributeSystem.DiagnosticsDebuggerHiddenAttributeMicrosoft.VisualBasic.CompilerServicesStandardModuleAttributeHideModuleNameAttributeSystem.ComponentModel.DesignHelpKeywordAttributeSystem.Runtime.CompilerServicesRuntimeHelpersGetObjectValueRuntimeTypeHandleGetTypeFromHandleActivatorCreateInstanceMyGroupCollectionAttributeget_Valueset_ValueSystem.Runtime.InteropServicesComVisibleAttributeParamArrayAttributeCompilationRelaxationsAttributeRuntimeCompatibilityAttributeSystem.ReflectionAssemblyFileVersionAttributeGuidAttributeAssemblyTrademarkAttributeAssemblyCopyrightAttributeAssemblyProductAttributeAssemblyCompanyAttributeAssemblyDescriptionAttributeAssemblyTitleAttributeClientPluginClientPlugin.dll
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000011.00000002.770483355.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000011.00000002.772863265.0000000003EA9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: <Module>mscorlibMicrosoft.VisualBasicMyApplicationNanoCore.MyMyComputerMyProjectMyWebServicesThreadSafeObjectProvider`1IClientNetworkNanoCore.ClientPluginIClientDataIClientAppIClientDataHostNanoCore.ClientPluginHostIClientNetworkHostIClientUIHostIClientLoggingHostIClientAppHostIClientNameObjectCollectionNanoCoreIClientReadOnlyNameObjectCollectionClientInvokeDelegateMicrosoft.VisualBasic.ApplicationServicesApplicationBase.ctorMicrosoft.VisualBasic.DevicesComputerSystemObject.cctorget_Computerm_ComputerObjectProviderget_Applicationm_AppObjectProviderUserget_Userm_UserObjectProviderget_WebServicesm_MyWebServicesObjectProviderApplicationWebServicesEqualsoGetHashCodeTypeGetTypeToStringCreate__Instance__TinstanceDispose__Instance__get_GetInstanceMicrosoft.VisualBasic.MyServices.InternalContextValue`1m_ContextGetInstanceReadPacketpipeNameparamsPipeCreatedPipeClosedConnectionStateChangedconnectedConnectionFailedhostportBuildingHostCacheVariableChangednameClientSettingChangedPluginUninstallingClientUninstallingget_Variablesget_ClientSettingsget_BuilderSettingsVariablesClientSettingsBuilderSettingsget_ConnectedClosePipePipeExistsRebuildHostCacheAddHostEntryDisconnectSendToServercompressConnectedInvokemethodstateLogClientMessagemessageExceptionLogClientExceptionexsiteRestartShutdownDisableProtectionRestoreProtectionUninstallEntryExistsSystem.Collections.GenericKeyValuePair`2GetEntriesGetValuedefaultValueSetValuevalueRemoveValueMulticastDelegateTargetObjectTargetMethodIAsyncResultAsyncCallbackBeginInvokeDelegateCallbackDelegateAsyncStateEndInvokeDelegateAsyncResultSystem.ComponentModelEditorBrowsableAttributeEditorBrowsableStateSystem.CodeDom.CompilerGeneratedCodeAttributeSystem.DiagnosticsDebuggerHiddenAttributeMicrosoft.VisualBasic.CompilerServicesStandardModuleAttributeHideModuleNameAttributeSystem.ComponentModel.DesignHelpKeywordAttributeSystem.Runtime.CompilerServicesRuntimeHelpersGetObjectValueRuntimeTypeHandleGetTypeFromHandleActivatorCreateInstanceMyGroupCollectionAttributeget_Valueset_ValueSystem.Runtime.InteropServicesComVisibleAttributeParamArrayAttributeCompilationRelaxationsAttributeRuntimeCompatibilityAttributeSystem.ReflectionAssemblyFileVersionAttributeGuidAttributeAssemblyTrademarkAttributeAssemblyCopyrightAttributeAssemblyProductAttributeAssemblyCompanyAttributeAssemblyDescriptionAttributeAssemblyTitleAttributeClientPluginClientPlugin.dll

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000011.00000002.770483355.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.1026361866.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.1028093890.0000000002D01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.1029421863.0000000003D49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.1031888458.0000000005F70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.701087056.0000000003B39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.701602201.0000000003D39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000011.00000002.772863265.0000000003EA9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000C.00000002.758221792.0000000004617000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000C.00000002.757375675.000000000441B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000011.00000002.772748001.0000000002EA1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6816, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6780, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job1	Scheduled Task/Job1	Process Injection12	Masquerading2	Input Capture21	Security Software Discovery221	Remote Services	Input Capture21	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Scheduled Task/Job1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion4	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion4	Remote Desktop Protocol	Archive Collected Data11	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Non-Standard Port1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Disable or Modify Tools1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery2	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Remote Access Software1	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Process Injection12	NTDS	Application Window Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Non-Application Layer Protocol1	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information1	LSA Secrets	File and Directory Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Application Layer Protocol21	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Hidden Files and Directories1	Cached Domain Credentials	System Information Discovery12	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Obfuscated Files or Information3	DCSync	Network Sniffing	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	Software Packing23	Proc Filesystem	Network Service Scanning	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue
Exploit Public-Facing Application	PowerShell	At (Linux)	At (Linux)	Timestomp1	/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow	System Network Connections Discovery	Software Deployment Tools	Data Staged	Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Web Protocols	Rogue Cellular Base Station		Data Destruction

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML
C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\pJrVfPIhXgkUp.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Download
12.2.dhcpmon.exe.e60000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.5f70000.5.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/NanoCore.fadte	Download File
1.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.640000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
17.2.dhcpmon.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Dropper.MSIL.Gen7	Download File
7.2.PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Dropper.MSIL.Gen7	Download File

Domains

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
amechi.duckdns.org	4%	Virustotal		Browse

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://www.fontbureau.comionF	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comueX	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comva	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comdiaF	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comtuedm	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comessed	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comessed	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comessed	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comued	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.com(	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comcomd_	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/roso	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htmY	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/5	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comD	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html:	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cnl	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comR	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.como.	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.commm	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cnf	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.como5	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comnc.	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comf	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.carterandcone.come	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.come	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.come	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comcomd	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/P	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/P	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/P	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cnz	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comt	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comt	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comt	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comd_	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/on	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comd	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comd	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comd	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp//Mo_	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Sue	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	true	true	4%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://www.fontbureau.comionF	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.675123633.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.comueX	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666802005.000000000B3A4000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.carterandcone.comva	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666802005.000000000B3A4000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-user.html.	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.670107984.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.comdiaF	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.669540752.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.tiro.com	dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers	dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.comtuedm	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.671353872.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.comessed	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.669540752.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersZ	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.668897969.000000000B3A5000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.comued	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.671353872.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.com	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666802005.000000000B3A4000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.com(	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667062493.000000000B3A5000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	low
http://www.fontbureau.comcomd_	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.670107984.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	low
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.665018666.00000000010DC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/roso	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667077696.000000000B399000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.typography.netD	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htmY	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.674156675.000000000B3C3000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://fontfabrik.com	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/5	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667540587.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.comD	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666742269.000000000B3A6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html:	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667540587.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersj	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.668897969.000000000B3A5000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cnl	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666474096.000000000B3A5000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/0	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667540587.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlormal	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.670715362.000000000B3C3000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.carterandcone.comR	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666742269.000000000B3A6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.como.	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.671106569.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667540587.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.commm	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.675123633.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fonts.com	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666742269.000000000B3A6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.698087475.0000000002BA6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.755447551.0000000003486000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cnf	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666474096.000000000B3A5000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.sakkal.com	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.como5	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.696672589.000000000B390000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.671353872.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.672895387.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.comnc.	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.668748768.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.comf	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666802005.000000000B3A4000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.come	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666802005.000000000B3A4000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.comcomd	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.671353872.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/P	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667540587.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cnz	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666474096.000000000B3A5000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.comt	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667062493.000000000B3A5000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.comd_	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.669540752.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	low
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/jp/	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667540587.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/on	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667077696.000000000B399000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.comd	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.669540752.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp//Mo_	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667263984.000000000B39C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Sue	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666912527.000000000B395000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.coml	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666474096.000000000B3A5000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers(	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.675123633.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666742269.000000000B3A6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666474096.000000000B3A5000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/.	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.672733617.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-user.html	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.669981678.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/t	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667540587.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.comz	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666802005.000000000B3A4000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.html	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.670641038.000000000B3C3000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/anie	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667263984.000000000B39C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667540587.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667385656.000000000B39C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.como	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.669066568.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cno.	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666742269.000000000B3A6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000002.707113887.000000000B480000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000C.00000002.767911748.000000000BD80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.comFf	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.669540752.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.comals	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.671353872.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/e	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.666912527.000000000B395000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/f	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.667540587.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.comcommm	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.696672589.000000000B390000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.comalic_	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.670674990.000000000B39D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	low
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe, 00000001.00000003.668834638.000000000B3C9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
185.140.53.131	unknown	Sweden		209623	DAVID_CRAIGGG	true

Private

IP
192.168.2.1

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Red Diamond
Analysis ID:	342778
Start date:	21.01.2021
Start time:	18:19:11
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 11m 58s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	26
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@12/8@27/2
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 1.9% (good quality ratio 0.7%) Quality average: 22.7% Quality standard deviation: 33.2%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 95% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Behavior information exceeds normal sizes, reducing to normal. Report will have missing behavior information. TCP Packets have been reduced to 100 Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 104.43.193.48, 23.211.6.115, 40.88.32.150, 51.11.168.160, 92.122.213.247, 92.122.213.194, 2.20.142.209, 2.20.142.210, 52.155.217.156, 20.54.26.129 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): au.download.windowsupdate.com.edgesuite.net, displaycatalog-europeeap.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, arc.msn.com.nsatc.net, displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, store-images.s-microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, a767.dscg3.akamai.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, arc.msn.com, skypedataprdcolcus15.cloudapp.net, db5eap.displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, e12564.dspb.akamaiedge.net, skypedataprdcoleus15.cloudapp.net, store-images.s-microsoft.com, blobcollector.events.data.trafficmanager.net, audownload.windowsupdate.nsatc.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, watson.telemetry.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, au-bg-shim.trafficmanager.net Report size exceeded maximum capacity and may have missing behavior information. Report size getting too big, too many NtAllocateVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
18:20:12	API Interceptor	1323x Sleep call for process: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe modified
18:20:26	Autostart	Run: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run DHCP Monitor C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
18:20:42	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: dhcpmon.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link
185.140.53.131	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Urgent order 1812021-672 Q30721,pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	R#U00d6SLER Puchase_tcs 10-28-2020,pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse

Domains

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
amechi.duckdns.org	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.131
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.131
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.82
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.69
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.69
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.69
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.69
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.69
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.71
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.71
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.71
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.71
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.71
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.71
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.71
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	79.134.225.73

ASN

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
DAVID_CRAIGGG	SecuriteInfo.com.Artemis1A5E2411DEA6.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.193.75.204
	Payment Invoice PDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.244.30.18
	New Doc 20211401#_our new price.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.193.75.243
	company profile.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.227
	NEWORDERrefno0992883jpg.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.253
	richiealvin.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.193.75.185
	Quotation.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.154
	DHL Delivery Shipping Cargo. Pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.244.30.18
	CompanyLicense.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.253
	Purchase Order 2094742424.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.244.30.132
	PURCHASE OREDER. PRINT. pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.193.75.45
	PO.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.234
	SWIFT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.154
	SecuriteInfo.com.BScope.Trojan-Dropper.Injector.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.234
	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.131
	Orden n.#U00ba STL21119, pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.129
	Proof of Payment.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.244.30.51
	DxCHoDnNLn.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.202
	T7gzTHDZ7g.rtf	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.140.53.202
	PO - 2021-000511.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.244.30.69

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1168384
Entropy (8bit):	7.897636731334413
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24576:E2cXDkZfhBL97dNqehj/5L3xqpljbfrRUoq7Ohn:E2MiBBRNb5LBepfrhqyN
MD5:	DCF168394EF0A6D6774B099DD8493B75
SHA1:	565C77FA9F7F22229FF5AABAD52F6F9E0C5FBCE0
SHA-256:	373E294FCCF1CBC447469AEB6FC86678EFBFD072B5035A295D1FC74CE6E9FD79
SHA-512:	6F19BD8C1CE255848FC9E60B92B758AC960C81E3CB4C3C7BC5E520DE5B03CFC0A2244891150B50ECC179FC35A9D7F9477E567BDD275B32B4873FE640DAFE7AC9
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Joe Sandbox ML, Detection: 100%
Reputation:	low
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L...................0..............@....... ....@.. .......................`............@.....................................O............................ .......................................................@..................H............\.D\|.aH..... ......................@....text............................... ..`.rsrc...............................@..@.reloc....... ......................@..B.............@...................... ..`........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe:Zone.Identifier Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	modified
Size (bytes):	26
Entropy (8bit):	3.95006375643621
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:ggPYV:rPYV
MD5:	187F488E27DB4AF347237FE461A079AD
SHA1:	6693BA299EC1881249D59262276A0D2CB21F8E64
SHA-256:	255A65D30841AB4082BD9D0EEA79D49C5EE88F56136157D8D6156AEF11C12309
SHA-512:	89879F237C0C051EBE784D0690657A6827A312A82735DA42DAD5F744D734FC545BEC9642C19D14C05B2F01FF53BC731530C92F7327BB7DC9CDE1B60FB21CD64E
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	[ZoneTransfer]....ZoneId=0

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1216
Entropy (8bit):	5.355304211458859
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:ML9E4Ks29E4Kx1qE4qXKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhPKIE4oKFKHKoZAE4Kzr7FE4x84j:MxHKX9HKx1qHiYHKhQnoPtHoxHhAHKzr
MD5:	B666A4404B132B2BF6C04FBF848EB948
SHA1:	D2EFB3D43F8B8806544D3A47F7DAEE8534981739
SHA-256:	7870616D981C8C0DE9A54E7383CD035470DB20CBF75ACDF729C32889D4B6ED96
SHA-512:	00E955EE9F14CEAE07E571A8EF2E103200CF421BAE83A66ED9F9E1AA6A9F449B653EDF1BFDB662A364D58ECF9B5FE4BB69D590DB2653F2F46A09F4D47719A862
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..2,"System.Windows.Forms, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089",0..2,"System.Drawing, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Configuration\8d67d92724ba494b6c7fd089d6f25b48\System.Configuration.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Xml, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Xml\b219d4630d26b88041b59c21

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\dhcpmon.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1216
Entropy (8bit):	5.355304211458859
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:ML9E4Ks29E4Kx1qE4qXKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhPKIE4oKFKHKoZAE4Kzr7FE4x84j:MxHKX9HKx1qHiYHKhQnoPtHoxHhAHKzr
MD5:	B666A4404B132B2BF6C04FBF848EB948
SHA1:	D2EFB3D43F8B8806544D3A47F7DAEE8534981739
SHA-256:	7870616D981C8C0DE9A54E7383CD035470DB20CBF75ACDF729C32889D4B6ED96
SHA-512:	00E955EE9F14CEAE07E571A8EF2E103200CF421BAE83A66ED9F9E1AA6A9F449B653EDF1BFDB662A364D58ECF9B5FE4BB69D590DB2653F2F46A09F4D47719A862
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..2,"System.Windows.Forms, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089",0..2,"System.Drawing, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Configuration\8d67d92724ba494b6c7fd089d6f25b48\System.Configuration.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Xml, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Xml\b219d4630d26b88041b59c21

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5106.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1646
Entropy (8bit):	5.189454496599504
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:2dH4+SEqC/S7hblNMFp//rlMhEMjnGpwjpIgUYODOLD9RJh7h8gKBGwTtn:cbhK79lNQR/rydbz9I3YODOLNdq3Z
MD5:	C6FAB75DB50999549C6154EF264BE80C
SHA1:	EB84E6A1F6F4CDA87BC0BFA0C33FB853876123E5
SHA-256:	BE05BA07F3B94AE7D7C76A5FEF997D900D5DFA9A9E6A190EA2DD5A8736AE5391
SHA-512:	8E1054F87068027847AFDF2F60CB2B6BBE2FB674C31E1A1B8C93DEF4438591709A2E705E4AD7898C236028A3A3D3972BE62FF57AF5965139C9ECF2FD2D43720D
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>..<Task version="1.2" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">.. <RegistrationInfo>.. <Date>2014-10-25T14:27:44.8929027</Date>.. <Author>computer\user</Author>.. </RegistrationInfo>.. <Triggers>.. <LogonTrigger>.. <Enabled>true</Enabled>.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. </LogonTrigger>.. <RegistrationTrigger>.. <Enabled>false</Enabled>.. </RegistrationTrigger>.. </Triggers>.. <Principals>.. <Principal id="Author">.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>.. <RunLevel>LeastPrivilege</RunLevel>.. </Principal>.. </Principals>.. <Settings>.. <MultipleInstancesPolicy>StopExisting</MultipleInstancesPolicy>.. <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>.. <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>.. <AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate>.. <StartWhenAvailable>true

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpE52C.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1646
Entropy (8bit):	5.189454496599504
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:2dH4+SEqC/S7hblNMFp//rlMhEMjnGpwjpIgUYODOLD9RJh7h8gKBGwTtn:cbhK79lNQR/rydbz9I3YODOLNdq3Z
MD5:	C6FAB75DB50999549C6154EF264BE80C
SHA1:	EB84E6A1F6F4CDA87BC0BFA0C33FB853876123E5
SHA-256:	BE05BA07F3B94AE7D7C76A5FEF997D900D5DFA9A9E6A190EA2DD5A8736AE5391
SHA-512:	8E1054F87068027847AFDF2F60CB2B6BBE2FB674C31E1A1B8C93DEF4438591709A2E705E4AD7898C236028A3A3D3972BE62FF57AF5965139C9ECF2FD2D43720D
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	low
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>..<Task version="1.2" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">.. <RegistrationInfo>.. <Date>2014-10-25T14:27:44.8929027</Date>.. <Author>computer\user</Author>.. </RegistrationInfo>.. <Triggers>.. <LogonTrigger>.. <Enabled>true</Enabled>.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. </LogonTrigger>.. <RegistrationTrigger>.. <Enabled>false</Enabled>.. </RegistrationTrigger>.. </Triggers>.. <Principals>.. <Principal id="Author">.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>.. <RunLevel>LeastPrivilege</RunLevel>.. </Principal>.. </Principals>.. <Settings>.. <MultipleInstancesPolicy>StopExisting</MultipleInstancesPolicy>.. <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>.. <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>.. <AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate>.. <StartWhenAvailable>true

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\run.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
File Type:	ISO-8859 text, with no line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	8
Entropy (8bit):	3.0
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:mVbP:mxP
MD5:	9CC98A9DC31882B52047540E4E0B3CD1
SHA1:	3C4DEE67488C1716C349FD7977DAEFCCEDE7064B
SHA-256:	022A875D410DE3708A424EC637D04CF866BD83D95FE141EB0B20C3072924646A
SHA-512:	CA91BA3B6DD9E4929D4F7C0CEAA0CD248D3833C04CA2E0C32BD5A203183DCBB8EC837D4ED00661979E31D310682FAD1DA675DF05DC742EE7D9E057366EB0CA54
Malicious:	true
Preview:	..}.0..H

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\pJrVfPIhXgkUp.exe Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1168384
Entropy (8bit):	7.897636731334413
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24576:E2cXDkZfhBL97dNqehj/5L3xqpljbfrRUoq7Ohn:E2MiBBRNb5LBepfrhqyN
MD5:	DCF168394EF0A6D6774B099DD8493B75
SHA1:	565C77FA9F7F22229FF5AABAD52F6F9E0C5FBCE0
SHA-256:	373E294FCCF1CBC447469AEB6FC86678EFBFD072B5035A295D1FC74CE6E9FD79
SHA-512:	6F19BD8C1CE255848FC9E60B92B758AC960C81E3CB4C3C7BC5E520DE5B03CFC0A2244891150B50ECC179FC35A9D7F9477E567BDD275B32B4873FE640DAFE7AC9
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Joe Sandbox ML, Detection: 100%
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L...................0..............@....... ....@.. .......................`............@.....................................O............................ .......................................................@..................H............\.D\|.aH..... ......................@....text............................... ..`.rsrc...............................@..@.reloc....... ......................@..B.............@...................... ..`........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.897636731334413
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 50.01% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.96% Win16/32 Executable Delphi generic (2074/23) 0.01% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.01%
File name:	PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
File size:	1168384
MD5:	dcf168394ef0a6d6774b099dd8493b75
SHA1:	565c77fa9f7f22229ff5aabad52f6f9e0c5fbce0
SHA256:	373e294fccf1cbc447469aeb6fc86678efbfd072b5035a295d1fc74ce6e9fd79
SHA512:	6f19bd8c1ce255848fc9e60b92b758ac960c81e3cb4c3c7bc5e520de5b03cfc0a2244891150b50ecc179fc35a9d7f9477e567bdd275b32b4873fe640dafe7ac9
SSDEEP:	24576:E2cXDkZfhBL97dNqehj/5L3xqpljbfrRUoq7Ohn:E2MiBBRNb5LBepfrhqyN
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L.....................0..............@....... ....@.. .......................`............@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x52400a
Entrypoint Section:
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x83ABA3EF [Sun Jan 1 20:51:59 2040 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v4.0.30319
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [00524000h]
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x1008ac	0x4f	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x120000	0x608	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x122000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x124000	0x8
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x100000	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
\D\|.aH	0x2000	0xfcf8c	0xfd000	False	1.00031458436	data	7.99982924254	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.text	0x100000	0x1f3b8	0x1f400	False	0.35140625	data	4.85294552494	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x120000	0x608	0x800	False	0.33154296875	data	3.4379516301	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x122000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.0980041756627	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
	0x124000	0x10	0x200	False	0.044921875	Applesoft BASIC program data, first line number 16	0.142635768149	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_VERSION	0x1200a0	0x376	data
RT_MANIFEST	0x120418	0x1ea	XML 1.0 document, UTF-8 Unicode (with BOM) text, with CRLF line terminators

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Made Solutions International 2016
Assembly Version	36.5.0.8
InternalName	W4.exe
FileVersion	36.5.0.8
CompanyName	Made Solutions International
LegalTrademarks
Comments	Easynote
ProductName	Admin App
ProductVersion	36.5.0.8
FileDescription	Admin App
OriginalFilename	W4.exe

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:26.636646986 CET	49750	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:26.686963081 CET	3190	49750	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:27.198801041 CET	49750	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:27.247421980 CET	3190	49750	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:27.750178099 CET	49750	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:27.801548958 CET	3190	49750	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:32.339077950 CET	49753	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:32.387886047 CET	3190	49753	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:32.899369001 CET	49753	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:32.948204041 CET	3190	49753	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:33.467303991 CET	49753	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:33.516005993 CET	3190	49753	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:38.044141054 CET	49755	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:38.093015909 CET	3190	49755	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:38.665368080 CET	49755	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:38.714430094 CET	3190	49755	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:39.368534088 CET	49755	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:39.417536974 CET	3190	49755	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:43.754842997 CET	49756	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:43.803443909 CET	3190	49756	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:44.368943930 CET	49756	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:44.417614937 CET	3190	49756	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:45.056510925 CET	49756	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:45.105313063 CET	3190	49756	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:49.941091061 CET	49759	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:49.989852905 CET	3190	49759	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:50.599390984 CET	49759	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:50.647996902 CET	3190	49759	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:51.338809967 CET	49759	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:51.387382030 CET	3190	49759	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:55.870851040 CET	49768	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:55.919444084 CET	3190	49768	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:56.432501078 CET	49768	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:56.481225014 CET	3190	49768	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:56.995039940 CET	49768	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:57.043771029 CET	3190	49768	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:01.385477066 CET	49771	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:01.434214115 CET	3190	49771	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:01.948607922 CET	49771	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:01.998749971 CET	3190	49771	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:02.511146069 CET	49771	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:02.560031891 CET	3190	49771	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:06.981112003 CET	49777	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:07.030205011 CET	3190	49777	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:07.620959997 CET	49777	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:07.669727087 CET	3190	49777	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:08.184009075 CET	49777	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:08.232570887 CET	3190	49777	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:14.020345926 CET	49778	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:14.069040060 CET	3190	49778	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:14.574636936 CET	49778	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:14.623289108 CET	3190	49778	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:15.137156010 CET	49778	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:15.185831070 CET	3190	49778	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:19.581602097 CET	49779	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:19.632669926 CET	3190	49779	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:20.137590885 CET	49779	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:20.186188936 CET	3190	49779	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:20.700217962 CET	49779	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:20.748981953 CET	3190	49779	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:25.395379066 CET	49780	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:25.444143057 CET	3190	49780	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:25.950561047 CET	49780	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:25.999279976 CET	3190	49780	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:26.513206005 CET	49780	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:26.561887980 CET	3190	49780	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:30.962618113 CET	49781	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:31.011766911 CET	3190	49781	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:31.529175043 CET	49781	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:31.579611063 CET	3190	49781	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:32.107358932 CET	49781	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:32.156056881 CET	3190	49781	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:36.731923103 CET	49783	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:36.780670881 CET	3190	49783	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:37.295358896 CET	49783	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:37.344342947 CET	3190	49783	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:37.857836962 CET	49783	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:37.906586885 CET	3190	49783	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:42.471095085 CET	49785	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:42.519733906 CET	3190	49785	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:43.030142069 CET	49785	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:43.078917980 CET	3190	49785	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:43.592746019 CET	49785	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:43.641819000 CET	3190	49785	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:48.097086906 CET	49786	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:48.145708084 CET	3190	49786	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:48.655638933 CET	49786	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:48.704374075 CET	3190	49786	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:49.218244076 CET	49786	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:49.267738104 CET	3190	49786	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:53.814023972 CET	49787	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:53.862994909 CET	3190	49787	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:54.374924898 CET	49787	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:54.423679113 CET	3190	49787	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:54.937490940 CET	49787	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:54.986247063 CET	3190	49787	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:59.346096992 CET	49788	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:59.394851923 CET	3190	49788	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:59.906557083 CET	49788	3190	192.168.2.4	185.140.53.131
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:59.955153942 CET	3190	49788	185.140.53.131	192.168.2.4

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Jan 21, 2021 18:19:55.067909002 CET	58028	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:19:55.124077082 CET	53	58028	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:19:55.292099953 CET	53097	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:19:55.360272884 CET	53	53097	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:19:56.059154987 CET	49257	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:19:56.111537933 CET	53	49257	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:19:57.197954893 CET	62389	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:19:57.248848915 CET	53	62389	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:19:58.334696054 CET	49910	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:19:58.382865906 CET	53	49910	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:19:59.385020971 CET	55854	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:19:59.432925940 CET	53	55854	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:00.752772093 CET	64549	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:00.800936937 CET	53	64549	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:01.719530106 CET	63153	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:01.767502069 CET	53	63153	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:03.152363062 CET	52991	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:03.200278997 CET	53	52991	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:04.301790953 CET	53700	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:04.349843979 CET	53	53700	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:05.165674925 CET	51726	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:05.213634014 CET	53	51726	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:06.164575100 CET	56794	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:06.212635040 CET	53	56794	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:07.111299038 CET	56534	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:07.159250975 CET	53	56534	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:08.289347887 CET	56627	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:08.340187073 CET	53	56627	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:09.239306927 CET	56621	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:09.290049076 CET	53	56621	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:10.020481110 CET	63116	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:10.068592072 CET	53	63116	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:11.006031990 CET	64078	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:11.065057039 CET	53	64078	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:11.964874983 CET	64801	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:12.021156073 CET	53	64801	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:26.377454042 CET	61721	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:26.597150087 CET	53	61721	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:26.736705065 CET	51255	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:26.788639069 CET	53	51255	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:32.287314892 CET	61522	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:32.338031054 CET	53	61522	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:32.374512911 CET	52337	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:32.432138920 CET	53	52337	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:37.819787979 CET	55046	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:38.041517019 CET	53	55046	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:43.690567970 CET	49612	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:43.753215075 CET	53	49612	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:45.001816034 CET	49285	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:45.061233044 CET	53	49285	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:49.048403025 CET	50601	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:49.099143982 CET	53	50601	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:49.716054916 CET	60875	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:49.896989107 CET	56448	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:49.939874887 CET	53	60875	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:49.953588963 CET	53	56448	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:50.628110886 CET	59172	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:50.689544916 CET	53	59172	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:51.162794113 CET	62420	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:51.219170094 CET	53	62420	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:51.649856091 CET	60579	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:51.713937044 CET	53	60579	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:51.780478001 CET	50183	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:51.829261065 CET	53	50183	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:52.846740961 CET	61531	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:52.897475004 CET	53	61531	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:53.946583033 CET	49228	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:53.997590065 CET	53	49228	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:55.800205946 CET	59794	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:55.812844992 CET	55916	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:55.848177910 CET	53	59794	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:55.869412899 CET	53	55916	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:56.771868944 CET	52752	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:56.822704077 CET	53	52752	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:57.481784105 CET	60542	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:57.532876015 CET	53	60542	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:01.327616930 CET	60689	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:01.384275913 CET	53	60689	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:05.048038960 CET	64206	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:05.106128931 CET	53	64206	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:06.923330069 CET	50904	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:06.979444981 CET	53	50904	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:13.962409019 CET	57525	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:14.018889904 CET	53	57525	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:19.522490978 CET	53814	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:19.579447985 CET	53	53814	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:25.142821074 CET	53418	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:25.363347054 CET	53	53418	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:30.839421988 CET	62833	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:30.887420893 CET	53	62833	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:35.675800085 CET	59260	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:35.726835966 CET	53	59260	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:36.682862997 CET	49944	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:36.730860949 CET	53	49944	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:37.322103024 CET	63300	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:37.378932953 CET	53	63300	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:42.412513018 CET	61449	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:42.468755960 CET	53	61449	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:48.038727045 CET	51275	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:48.094996929 CET	53	51275	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:53.752360106 CET	63492	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:53.811616898 CET	53	63492	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:59.287313938 CET	58945	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:59.344736099 CET	53	58945	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:06.958884001 CET	60779	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:07.179647923 CET	53	60779	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:13.336189985 CET	64014	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:13.397027969 CET	53	64014	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:19.120923996 CET	57091	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:19.180563927 CET	53	57091	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:24.973064899 CET	55904	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:25.033624887 CET	53	55904	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:30.705987930 CET	52109	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:30.762120962 CET	53	52109	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:36.456420898 CET	54450	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:36.686892986 CET	53	54450	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:42.330946922 CET	49374	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:42.389832020 CET	53	49374	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:48.195000887 CET	50436	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:48.251329899 CET	53	50436	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:54.368314981 CET	62605	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:54.424686909 CET	53	62605	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:59.616128922 CET	54256	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:59.672491074 CET	53	54256	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:26.377454042 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0x25e9	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:32.287314892 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0xe11e	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:37.819787979 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0x7842	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:43.690567970 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0xd26f	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:49.716054916 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0xe4b8	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:55.812844992 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0xf037	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:01.327616930 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0x619f	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:06.923330069 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0x7af2	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:13.962409019 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0xa328	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:19.522490978 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0x75b9	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:25.142821074 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0xca7e	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:30.839421988 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0xa158	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:36.682862997 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0x7ced	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:42.412513018 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0xdd3a	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:48.038727045 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0x7241	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:53.752360106 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0xff5c	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:59.287313938 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0xf33b	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:06.958884001 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0x4d84	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:13.336189985 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0x3e3b	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:19.120923996 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0xbcb1	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:24.973064899 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0x3699	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:30.705987930 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0xf2cf	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:36.456420898 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0x9a64	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:42.330946922 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0x4f70	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:48.195000887 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0xde87	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:54.368314981 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0xc231	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:59.616128922 CET	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0x2a6b	Standard query (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	Address	Type	Class
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:26.597150087 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0x25e9	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:32.338031054 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0xe11e	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:38.041517019 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0x7842	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:43.753215075 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0xd26f	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:49.939874887 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0xe4b8	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:20:55.869412899 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0xf037	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:01.384275913 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0x619f	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:06.979444981 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0x7af2	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:14.018889904 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0xa328	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:19.579447985 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0x75b9	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:25.363347054 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0xca7e	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:30.887420893 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0xa158	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:36.730860949 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0x7ced	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:42.468755960 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0xdd3a	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:48.094996929 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0x7241	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:53.811616898 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0xff5c	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:21:59.344736099 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0xf33b	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:07.179647923 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0x4d84	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:13.397027969 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0x3e3b	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:19.180563927 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0xbcb1	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:25.033624887 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0x3699	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:30.762120962 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0xf2cf	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:36.686892986 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0x9a64	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:42.389832020 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0x4f70	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:48.251329899 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0xde87	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:54.424686909 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0xc231	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:22:59.672491074 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0x2a6b	No error (0)	amechi.duckdns.org	185.140.53.131	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 7064 Parent PID: 5900

General

Start time:	18:19:59
Start date:	21/01/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe'
Imagebase:	0x640000
File size:	1168384 bytes
MD5 hash:	DCF168394EF0A6D6774B099DD8493B75
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000001.00000002.701087056.0000000003B39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000001.00000002.701087056.0000000003B39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000001.00000002.701087056.0000000003B39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net> Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000001.00000002.697967874.0000000002B2B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000001.00000002.701602201.0000000003D39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000001.00000002.701602201.0000000003D39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000001.00000002.701602201.0000000003D39000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: schtasks.exe PID: 6012 Parent PID: 7064

General

Start time:	18:20:20
Start date:	21/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\pJrVfPIhXgkUp' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpE52C.tmp'
Imagebase:	0x1390000
File size:	185856 bytes
MD5 hash:	15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 5700 Parent PID: 6012

General

Start time:	18:20:21
Start date:	21/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff724c50000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe PID: 6816 Parent PID: 7064

General

Start time:	18:20:21
Start date:	21/01/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	{path}
Imagebase:	0x920000
File size:	1168384 bytes
MD5 hash:	DCF168394EF0A6D6774B099DD8493B75
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000007.00000002.1026361866.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000007.00000002.1026361866.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000007.00000002.1026361866.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net> Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000007.00000002.1028093890.0000000002D01000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000007.00000002.1029421863.0000000003D49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000007.00000002.1029421863.0000000003D49000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net> Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000007.00000002.1031888458.0000000005F70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1, Description: Detects Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000007.00000002.1031888458.0000000005F70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000007.00000002.1031888458.0000000005F70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000007.00000002.1031725645.0000000005EE0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1, Description: Detects Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000007.00000002.1031725645.0000000005EE0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: dhcpmon.exe PID: 5820 Parent PID: 3424

General

Start time:	18:20:36
Start date:	21/01/2021
Path:	C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe'
Imagebase:	0xe60000
File size:	1168384 bytes
MD5 hash:	DCF168394EF0A6D6774B099DD8493B75
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 0000000C.00000002.758221792.0000000004617000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 0000000C.00000002.758221792.0000000004617000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 0000000C.00000002.758221792.0000000004617000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net> Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 0000000C.00000002.757375675.000000000441B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 0000000C.00000002.757375675.000000000441B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 0000000C.00000002.757375675.000000000441B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Antivirus matches:	Detection: 100%, Joe Sandbox ML
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: schtasks.exe PID: 2208 Parent PID: 5820

General

Start time:	18:20:45
Start date:	21/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\pJrVfPIhXgkUp' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5106.tmp'
Imagebase:	0x1390000
File size:	185856 bytes
MD5 hash:	15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 2044 Parent PID: 2208

General

Start time:	18:20:46
Start date:	21/01/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff724c50000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6780 Parent PID: 5820

General

Start time:	18:20:46
Start date:	21/01/2021
Path:	C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	{path}
Imagebase:	0xa70000
File size:	1168384 bytes
MD5 hash:	DCF168394EF0A6D6774B099DD8493B75
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000011.00000002.770483355.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000011.00000002.770483355.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000011.00000002.770483355.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net> Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000011.00000002.772863265.0000000003EA9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000011.00000002.772863265.0000000003EA9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net> Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000011.00000002.772748001.0000000002EA1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000011.00000002.772748001.0000000002EA1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.
Tactics:	Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches ( `dir /a` for Windows and `ls –a` for Linux and macOS).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port paring that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088or port 587as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Analysis Report PROOF OF PAYMENT.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: NanoCore

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Software Vulnerabilities:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

E-Banking Fraud:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Boot Survival:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

Public

Private

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre