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Analysis Report GqSL8M2a72

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	GqSL8M2a72 (renamed file extension from none to exe)
Analysis ID:	355735
MD5:	4fc29198fcc9a9fe3b31f7549d54d8e9
SHA1:	5b112c77ea208d570eedaad0d5880e6fc19cffbc
SHA256:	98d8b13f297953a0b4f915e55cd527f0f1461d42b917b77aa99f05446f6fdd12
Tags:	uncategorizedZeuS
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

ZeusVM

Score:	92
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Detected ZeusVM e-Banking Trojan

Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)

Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Contains VNC / remote desktop functionality (version string found)

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Machine Learning detection for sample

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls

Contains functionality to enumerate network shares

Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user

Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Contains functionality to read the clipboard data

Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes

Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system

Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)

Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected potential crypto function

Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)

Found potential string decryption / allocating functions

May initialize a security null descriptor

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Tries to load missing DLLs

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

GqSL8M2a72.exe (PID: 1832 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe' MD5: 4FC29198FCC9A9FE3B31F7549D54D8E9)

GqSL8M2a72.exe (PID: 5864 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe' MD5: 4FC29198FCC9A9FE3B31F7549D54D8E9)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

No yara matches

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Show sources

Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe

Avira: detected

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 86%	Perma Link
Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe	Metadefender: Detection: 72%	Perma Link
Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 88%

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 2.2.GqSL8M2a72.exe.400000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Kazy.MK
Source: 1.2.GqSL8M2a72.exe.5e0000.1.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Kazy.MK

Cryptography:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 1_2_00401145 HeapAlloc,CryptStringToBinaryA,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_0040A14E CryptUnprotectData,LocalFree,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_0041764D CryptAcquireContextW,CryptCreateHash,CryptHashData,CryptGetHashParam,CryptDestroyHash,CryptReleaseContext,

Compliance:

Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Unpacked PE file: 2.2.GqSL8M2a72.exe.400000.0.unpack

Uses 32bit PE files

Show sources

Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Spreading:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_0040969D GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,LoadLibraryW,GetProcAddress,SHGetFolderPathW,StrCmpNIW,FreeLibrary,NetUserEnum,NetUserGetInfo,NetApiBufferFree,NetApiBufferFree,SHGetFolderPathW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_0041BA18 PathRemoveFileSpecW,FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,SetFileAttributesW,RemoveDirectoryW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_0041BAD3 FindFirstFileW,Sleep,WaitForSingleObject,PathMatchSpecW,Sleep,Sleep,FindNextFileW,FindClose,

Networking:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_00406095 getaddrinfo,freeaddrinfo,getsockname,getpeername,recv,recvfrom,getaddrinfo,freeaddrinfo,sendto,recvfrom,sendto,select,

Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://www.google.com/webhp
Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe, 00000001.00000002.197226170.000000000265E000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.google.com/webhpLb
Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe, 00000002.00000002.197084539.0000000000401000.00000020.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.google.com/webhpbc

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_00405EC6 GetClipboardData,GlobalLock,EnterCriticalSection,LeaveCriticalSection,GlobalUnlock,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_00405D60 EnterCriticalSection,GetTickCount,LeaveCriticalSection,GetKeyboardState,ToUnicode,TranslateMessage,

Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe, 00000001.00000002.197104411.000000000068A000.00000004.00000020.sdmp

Binary or memory string: <HOOK MODULE="DDRAW.DLL" FUNCTION="DirectDrawCreateEx"/>

E-Banking Fraud:

Detected ZeusVM e-Banking Trojan

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_0040DB94 lstrcmpiA,lstrcmpiA,lstrcmpiA,CloseHandle,

Protection of GUI:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_00404C67 OpenWindowStationW,CreateWindowStationW,GetProcessWindowStation,OpenDesktopW,CreateDesktopW,GetCurrentThreadId,GetThreadDesktop,SetThreadDesktop,CloseDesktop,CloseWindowStation,

System Summary:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 1_2_00401326 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 1_2_0042656B NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 1_2_0042694B CreateProcessW,NtGetContextThread,NtUnmapViewOfSection,SetUnhandledExceptionFilter,NtWriteVirtualMemory,NtWriteVirtualMemory,NtWriteVirtualMemory,NtProtectVirtualMemory,ExitProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 1_2_0042658E NtSetContextThread,NtResumeProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_00415C2E NtQueryInformationProcess,CloseHandle,NtCreateThread,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_00415CE5 NtCreateUserProcess,GetProcessId,GetThreadContext,SetThreadContext,VirtualFreeEx,CloseHandle,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_00415781 NtCreateUserProcess,NtCreateThread,LdrLoadDll,GetFileAttributesExW,HttpSendRequestW,HttpSendRequestA,HttpSendRequestExW,HttpSendRequestExA,InternetCloseHandle,InternetReadFile,InternetReadFileExA,InternetQueryDataAvailable,HttpQueryInfoA,closesocket,send,WSASend,OpenInputDesktop,SwitchDesktop,DefWindowProcW,DefWindowProcA,DefDlgProcW,DefDlgProcA,DefFrameProcW,DefFrameProcA,DefMDIChildProcW,DefMDIChildProcA,CallWindowProcW,CallWindowProcA,RegisterClassW,RegisterClassA,RegisterClassExW,RegisterClassExA,BeginPaint,EndPaint,GetDCEx,GetDC,GetWindowDC,ReleaseDC,GetUpdateRect,GetUpdateRgn,GetMessagePos,GetCursorPos,SetCursorPos,SetCapture,ReleaseCapture,GetCapture,GetMessageW,GetMessageA,PeekMessageW,PeekMessageA,TranslateMessage,GetClipboardData,PFXImportCertStore,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_00417CCA LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,CreateProcessAsUserW,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,FreeLibrary,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_004120CF InitiateSystemShutdownExW,ExitWindowsEx,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_0040F5BB CreateMutexW,GetLastError,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,ExitWindowsEx,OpenEventW,SetEvent,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,Sleep,IsWellKnownSid,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,GetFileAttributesExW,VirtualFree,CreateEventW,WaitForSingleObject,WaitForMultipleObjects,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_004190FB
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_00417559
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_00401A63
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_00410F8B

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: String function: 0040101D appears 51 times

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Section loaded: skembuptpwnoq.dll

Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal92.bank.troj.evad.winEXE@3/0@0/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_0041D5F1 CertOpenSystemStoreW,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,PFXExportCertStoreEx,PFXExportCertStoreEx,PFXExportCertStoreEx,CharLowerW,GetSystemTime,CertCloseStore,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_0041D766 CertOpenSystemStoreW,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertDuplicateCertificateContext,CertDeleteCertificateFromStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertCloseStore,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_00417A74 GetCurrentThread,OpenThreadToken,OpenProcessToken,LookupPrivilegeValueW,AdjustTokenPrivileges,GetLastError,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_00417A1D CreateToolhelp32Snapshot,Thread32First,Thread32Next,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_0040A86D CoCreateInstance,

Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 86%
Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe	Metadefender: Detection: 72%
Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 88%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe'

Data Obfuscation:

Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Unpacked PE file: 2.2.GqSL8M2a72.exe.400000.0.unpack .text:ER;.rdata:R;.data:W; vs .text:ER;.data:W;.reloc:R;

Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Unpacked PE file: 2.2.GqSL8M2a72.exe.400000.0.unpack

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_00417CCA LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,CreateProcessAsUserW,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,FreeLibrary,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_00401807 push FFFFFFF1h; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_00401CED push es; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_004093F2 push esi; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_00402383 push cs; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_004023B9 push cs; iretd

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_00411779 LoadLibraryA,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,LoadImageW,GetIconInfo,GetCursorPos,DrawIcon,lstrcmpiW,FreeLibrary,FreeLibrary,FreeLibrary,FreeLibrary,

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_0041BA18 PathRemoveFileSpecW,FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,SetFileAttributesW,RemoveDirectoryW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_0041BAD3 FindFirstFileW,Sleep,WaitForSingleObject,PathMatchSpecW,Sleep,Sleep,FindNextFileW,FindClose,

Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe

Binary or memory string: O1nvu1ctKOpA7eriBCpw6n8KOmhqynhk5NpS7zt6aKXNOvppepIl6mWFlZ9VmzJrWm5qYtXp1dqSKkm6aK8Vmzcrbmpqbx9S1WWbMGprLmpp1VqSKCp6a+LduuWdG68K5Zs26muC/jZp2OZdOqpqsapqtPoqemuWDjXafAn/umGqki16empi2m46ov4wYt43qmjeNyL9MCL+OmFi3jRo3jfmGq4x4mqCa5EivjOqb2WZNCjuSmL4b7Di/7CiaQt+ampi

Anti Debugging:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_00415E14 LdrLoadDll,LdrGetDllHandle,LdrLoadDll,EnterCriticalSection,lstrcmpiW,LeaveCriticalSection,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_00417CCA LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,CreateProcessAsUserW,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,FreeLibrary,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_0040E636 mov edx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 1_2_004015DA HeapCreate,GetProcessHeap,

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 1_2_0042694B CreateProcessW,NtGetContextThread,NtUnmapViewOfSection,SetUnhandledExceptionFilter,NtWriteVirtualMemory,NtWriteVirtualMemory,NtWriteVirtualMemory,NtProtectVirtualMemory,ExitProcess,

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Memory written: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe'

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_00419997 InitializeSecurityDescriptor,SetSecurityDescriptorDacl,ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW,GetSecurityDescriptorSacl,SetSecurityDescriptorSacl,LocalFree,

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_004164AA GetSystemTime,SystemTimeToFileTime,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_0041D595 GetUserNameExW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_004164D2 GetTimeZoneInformation,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe

Code function: 2_2_0040E447 GetVersionExW,GetNativeSystemInfo,

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe

Binary or memory string: S:(ML;;NRNWNX;;;LW)

Remote Access Functionality:

Contains VNC / remote desktop functionality (version string found)

Show sources

Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe	String found in binary or memory: RFB 003.003
Source: GqSL8M2a72.exe	String found in binary or memory: RFB 003.003

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_004194EA socket,bind,listen,closesocket,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe	Code function: 2_2_004197C8 socket,bind,closesocket,

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts1	Native API1	DLL Side-Loading1	DLL Side-Loading1	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information1	Input Capture21	System Time Discovery2	Remote Desktop Protocol1	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Ingress Tool Transfer1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	System Shutdown/Reboot1
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Application Shimming1	Application Shimming1	Obfuscated Files or Information2	LSASS Memory	Account Discovery1	Remote Desktop Protocol	Input Capture21	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Encrypted Channel2	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Create Account1	Valid Accounts1	Install Root Certificate1	Security Account Manager	File and Directory Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Clipboard Data1	Automated Exfiltration	Remote Access Software1	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Valid Accounts1	Access Token Manipulation11	Software Packing22	NTDS	System Information Discovery3	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Process Injection111	DLL Side-Loading1	LSA Secrets	Network Share Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Valid Accounts1	Cached Domain Credentials	Security Software Discovery11	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Access Token Manipulation11	DCSync	Process Discovery1	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	Process Injection111	Proc Filesystem	System Owner/User Discovery1	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
GqSL8M2a72.exe	86%	Virustotal		Browse
GqSL8M2a72.exe	78%	Metadefender		Browse
GqSL8M2a72.exe	88%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Zeus
GqSL8M2a72.exe	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1108096
GqSL8M2a72.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Download
2.2.GqSL8M2a72.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Kazy.MK	Download File
2.0.GqSL8M2a72.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1108090	Download File
1.0.GqSL8M2a72.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1108090	Download File
1.2.GqSL8M2a72.exe.5e0000.1.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Kazy.MK	Download File
1.2.GqSL8M2a72.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1108090	Download File

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	355735
Start date:	21.02.2021
Start time:	15:03:09
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 2m 34s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	GqSL8M2a72 (renamed file extension from none to exe)
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	3
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal92.bank.troj.evad.winEXE@3/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% (good quality ratio 92.4%) Quality average: 82.2% Quality standard deviation: 29.9%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): svchost.exe

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	6.080431308237134
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.96% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	GqSL8M2a72.exe
File size:	161962
MD5:	4fc29198fcc9a9fe3b31f7549d54d8e9
SHA1:	5b112c77ea208d570eedaad0d5880e6fc19cffbc
SHA256:	98d8b13f297953a0b4f915e55cd527f0f1461d42b917b77aa99f05446f6fdd12
SHA512:	a023c11edff4e1059bb3e22edb53d9774c66b44379c3121b761e9fa276eae42aca7b15b82b45aef4fc829095c2c264728147bb840f36650e4566136a79f6fead
SSDEEP:	3072:sK9smc3K+aCj93AnXGaNkdrgm9nl0JdqFJG2GztR07IVgfXs7ZsFz6x:JfcVho2eaJnl0JoLGtzz074IsYOx
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......%...a...a...a.......c.......`.......c...h...\|...a...1.....).`.......`...Richa...................PE..L......<.................^.

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x40156c
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:	TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, NO_ISOLATION
Time Stamp:	0x3CAFB40C [Sun Apr 7 02:50:52 2002 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	3d72c2249f14f4cc74dd098fd236f98a

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
sub esp, 1Ch
push 0042713Ch
call dword ptr [00427024h]
test eax, eax
jne 00007F7554D791E7h
call 00007F7554D79239h
push edi
xor edi, edi
cmp dword ptr [004294ECh], edi
je 00007F7554D79221h
call 00007F7554D78FACh
test eax, eax
je 00007F7554D79218h
push esi
push 004270C4h
call 00007F7554D78C5Dh
mov esi, dword ptr [00427080h]
pop ecx
jmp 00007F7554D791F6h
lea eax, dword ptr [ebp-1Ch]
push eax
call dword ptr [00427088h]
lea eax, dword ptr [ebp-1Ch]
push eax
call dword ptr [00427060h]
push edi
push edi
push edi
lea eax, dword ptr [ebp-1Ch]
push eax
call esi
test eax, eax
jne 00007F7554D791C1h
pop esi
mov eax, dword ptr [00428278h]
pop edi
leave
retn 000Ch
push 004270C4h
call 00007F7554D78C1Eh
pop ecx
push 00000000h
push 0016FCD8h
push 00000000h
call dword ptr [0042702Ch]
mov dword ptr [0042A4F4h], eax
test eax, eax
jne 00007F7554D791F1h
call dword ptr [00427030h]
mov dword ptr [0042A4F4h], eax
test eax, eax
je 00007F7554D791FDh
call 00007F7554D78BEAh
mov eax, dword ptr [eax+30h]
mov dword ptr [004294ECh], eax
test eax, eax
je 00007F7554D791ECh
mov eax, dword ptr [00428278h]
jmp 00007F7554D791E6h
ret
mov eax, dword ptr [004294ECh]
mov eax, dword ptr [eax+10h]
mov ecx, dword ptr [eax+44h]

Rich Headers

Programming Language:

[LNK] VS2010 build 30319
[IMP] VS2008 SP1 build 30729

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x271e0	0xb4	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x27000	0xac	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x25dc6	0x25e00	False	0.732924659653	data	5.98756571788	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rdata	0x27000	0x632	0x800	False	0.43115234375	zlib compressed data	4.18800845972	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x28000	0x2538	0x400	False	0.626953125	data	4.83990809034	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Imports

DLL	Import
KERNEL32.dll	LocalAlloc, GetModuleHandleA, OutputDebugStringA, lstrcpyA, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress, HeapCreate, GetProcessHeap, ExitProcess, SetUnhandledExceptionFilter, HeapAlloc, lstrlenA
USER32.dll	GetActiveWindow, DispatchMessageW, UpdateWindow, SetWindowPos, CreateWindowExA, MessageBoxA, ShowWindow, FindWindowA, MessageBoxW, GetMessageW, SetFocus, TranslateMessage, DefWindowProcW
POWRPROF.dll	GetPwrCapabilities, IsPwrShutdownAllowed, IsPwrHibernateAllowed, GetActivePwrScheme
WINTRUST.dll	WintrustGetRegPolicyFlags
CRYPT32.dll	CryptStringToBinaryA, CertCreateCertificateChainEngine
imagehlp.dll	ImageEnumerateCertificates
WINMM.dll	mciSendStringW
CLUSAPI.dll	ClusterEnum

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: GqSL8M2a72.exe PID: 1832 Parent PID: 5716

General

Start time:	15:03:53
Start date:	21/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	161962 bytes
MD5 hash:	4FC29198FCC9A9FE3B31F7549D54D8E9
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: GqSL8M2a72.exe PID: 5864 Parent PID: 1832

General

Start time:	15:03:54
Start date:	21/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\GqSL8M2a72.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	161962 bytes
MD5 hash:	4FC29198FCC9A9FE3B31F7549D54D8E9
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Authentication logs, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Adversaries may take advantage of vague references in the library manifest of a program by replacing a legitimate library with a malicious one, causing the operating system to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10.
Tactics:	Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
Tactics:	Persistence
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Authentication logs, Azure activity logs, Office 365 account logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Access tokens, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Digital certificate logs, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of accounts on a system or within an environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Azure activity logs, Office 365 account logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using OS Credential Dumping . The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Tactics:	Lateral Movement
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	API monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Analysis Report GqSL8M2a72

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Cryptography:

Compliance:

Spreading:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

E-Banking Fraud:

Protection of GUI:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Rich Headers

Data Directories

Sections

Imports

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: GqSL8M2a72.exe PID: 1832 Parent PID: 5716

General

Analysis Process: GqSL8M2a72.exe PID: 5864 Parent PID: 1832

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Description:	Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users.
Tactics:	Impact
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre