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Analysis Report OC 136584.PDF.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	OC 136584.PDF.exe
Analysis ID:	356562
MD5:	cd02744201573e3ac3c7dfde851005f3
SHA1:	3d39dd04c23ba52ed6f660e51e7510fef647186b
SHA256:	559bf7a1059928bb51ba72f92ff7c8348b219c0bcc92e59376a4d0f553ae3ee7
Tags:	AgentTeslaexe
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

AgentTesla

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Sigma detected: Suspicious Double Extension

Yara detected AgentTesla

Yara detected AntiVM_3

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

.NET source code contains very large array initializations

.NET source code contains very large strings

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Installs a global keyboard hook

Machine Learning detection for sample

Moves itself to temp directory

Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)

Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)

Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)

Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access)

Uses an obfuscated file name to hide its real file extension (double extension)

Uses the Telegram API (likely for C&C communication)

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities

Detected potential crypto function

Enables debug privileges

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)

IP address seen in connection with other malware

JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)

Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara detected Credential Stealer

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

OC 136584.PDF.exe (PID: 6736 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe' MD5: CD02744201573E3AC3C7DFDE851005F3)

OC 136584.PDF.exe (PID: 6988 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe MD5: CD02744201573E3AC3C7DFDE851005F3)

OC 136584.PDF.exe (PID: 6996 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe MD5: CD02744201573E3AC3C7DFDE851005F3)

OC 136584.PDF.exe (PID: 7124 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe MD5: CD02744201573E3AC3C7DFDE851005F3)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author
00000000.00000002.262677197.0000000002511000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
00000006.00000002.498958297.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.266834340.0000000003519000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000006.00000002.505611814.0000000002BF1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.262887194.000000000254D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: OC 136584.PDF.exe PID: 7124	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: OC 136584.PDF.exe PID: 7124	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: OC 136584.PDF.exe PID: 6736	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: OC 136584.PDF.exe PID: 6736	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Click to see the 4 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author
0.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.2539e90.1.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
6.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.37e4050.2.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.36e3da0.4.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.37e4050.2.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.3686180.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Click to see the 1 entries

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Sigma detected: Suspicious Double Extension

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Florian Roth (rule), @blu3_team (idea): Data: Command: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe, CommandLine: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe, ParentCommandLine: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe' , ParentImage: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe, ParentProcessId: 6736, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe, ProcessId: 6988

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Show sources

Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe

Avira: detected

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 20%

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 6.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack

Avira: Label: TR/Spy.Gen8

Compliance:

Uses 32bit PE files

Show sources

Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Uses secure TLS version for HTTPS connections

Show sources

Source: unknown

HTTPS traffic detected: 149.154.167.220:443 -> 192.168.2.7:49750 version: TLS 1.2

Contains modern PE file flags such as dynamic base (ASLR) or NX

Show sources

Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Software Vulnerabilities:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov dword ptr [ebp-18h], 00000000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov dword ptr [ebp-18h], 00000000h

Networking:

Uses the Telegram API (likely for C&C communication)

Show sources

Source: unknown

DNS query: name: api.telegram.org

Source: Joe Sandbox View

IP Address: 149.154.167.220 149.154.167.220

Source: Joe Sandbox View

JA3 fingerprint: 3b5074b1b5d032e5620f69f9f700ff0e

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: api.telegram.org

Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.505611814.0000000002BF1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.505611814.0000000002BF1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://DXpmYY.com
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.505611814.0000000002BF1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://DynDns.comDynDNS
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510407923.0000000002ECD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://api.telegram.org
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510407923.0000000002ECD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/0
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510407923.0000000002ECD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/gdig2.crt0
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510407923.0000000002ECD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://certs.godaddy.com/repository/1301
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510407923.0000000002ECD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.godaddy.com/gdig2s1-1823.crl0
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510407923.0000000002ECD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.godaddy.com/gdroot-g2.crl0F
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510407923.0000000002ECD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.godaddy.com/gdroot.crl0F
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://fontfabrik.com
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.505611814.0000000002BF1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://mIjlctNEsyMKGExgO3.org
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510407923.0000000002ECD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.godaddy.com/0
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510407923.0000000002ECD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.godaddy.com/02
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510407923.0000000002ECD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.godaddy.com/05
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510324365.0000000002EBA000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.coml
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fonts.com
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.goodfont.co.kr
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sajatypeworks.com
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sakkal.com
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.kr
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.com
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.typography.netD
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.urwpp.deDPlease
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510324365.0000000002EBA000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.telegram.org
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.266834340.0000000003519000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.498958297.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.telegram.org/bot1683948232:AAHc7uMmgJY5DzV0V0BhJXUizPMr1l1dubE/
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510324365.0000000002EBA000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.telegram.org/bot1683948232:AAHc7uMmgJY5DzV0V0BhJXUizPMr1l1dubE/sendDocument
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.505611814.0000000002BF1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.telegram.org/bot1683948232:AAHc7uMmgJY5DzV0V0BhJXUizPMr1l1dubE/sendDocumentdocument-----
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510324365.0000000002EBA000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.telegram.org4Zk
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510407923.0000000002ECD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://certs.godaddy.com/repository/0
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.262677197.0000000002511000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://stackpath.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.5.0/css/bootstrap.min.css
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.266834340.0000000003519000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.498958297.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.505611814.0000000002BF1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha

Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49750
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49750 -> 443

Source: unknown

HTTPS traffic detected: 149.154.167.220:443 -> 192.168.2.7:49750 version: TLS 1.2

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

Installs a global keyboard hook

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe

Windows user hook set: 0 keyboard low level C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe

Window created: window name: CLIPBRDWNDCLASS

System Summary:

.NET source code contains very large array initializations

Show sources

Source: 6.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, u003cPrivateImplementationDetailsu003eu007b4684B1B8u002dC958u002d4048u002d8A08u002d25BA90DDBDB5u007d/D349AD1Eu002d1EF9u002d4CDCu002d922Eu002dBCA1EB563A87.cs

Large array initialization: .cctor: array initializer size 12004

.NET source code contains very large strings

Show sources

Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, frmlogin.cs	Long String: Length: 13656
Source: 0.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.140000.0.unpack, frmlogin.cs	Long String: Length: 13656
Source: 0.0.OC 136584.PDF.exe.140000.0.unpack, frmlogin.cs	Long String: Length: 13656
Source: 3.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.190000.0.unpack, frmlogin.cs	Long String: Length: 13656
Source: 3.0.OC 136584.PDF.exe.190000.0.unpack, frmlogin.cs	Long String: Length: 13656
Source: 4.0.OC 136584.PDF.exe.10000.0.unpack, frmlogin.cs	Long String: Length: 13656
Source: 4.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.10000.0.unpack, frmlogin.cs	Long String: Length: 13656
Source: 6.0.OC 136584.PDF.exe.5f0000.0.unpack, frmlogin.cs	Long String: Length: 13656
Source: 6.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.5f0000.1.unpack, frmlogin.cs	Long String: Length: 13656

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: Filename: OC 136584.PDF.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_00149526
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_00AAC0D4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_00AAE5A0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_00AAE591
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_06AA0040
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_06AA8EF0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_06AAEA30
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_06AA2E8A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_06AA2E98
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_06AA8EE0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_06AA2C39
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_06AA2C48
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_06AA0D90
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_06AAD9B8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_06AAD9C8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_06AA693D
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_00199526
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 4_2_00019526
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_005F9526
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_007EB0D0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_007E8498
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_007E3958
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_007E5D88
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_007EE588
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_007E27F8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00BB47A0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00BB3CCC
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00BB4790
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00BB5470
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00BBD841
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00E0E220
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00E06450
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00E05D18
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00E056F0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00E0D8C0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00E0C2F5
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00E821B0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00E83250
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00E8B728
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00E86C07
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00E846C0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00E8324F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00E8BF6F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00E8BF70
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00E80470

Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.262677197.0000000002511000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameAsyncState.dllF vs OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.262677197.0000000002511000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameRGPorLNwUYdycrXetcefyHvNETDMsxfMMCuNPPo.exe4 vs OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.266834340.0000000003519000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameLegacyPathHandling.dllN vs OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.260673740.0000000000142000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameRSAOAEPKeyExchangeDeformatter.exe4 vs OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.271456934.0000000006A80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameuser32j% vs OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000003.00000000.256936849.0000000000192000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameRSAOAEPKeyExchangeDeformatter.exe4 vs OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000004.00000000.258007584.0000000000012000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameRSAOAEPKeyExchangeDeformatter.exe4 vs OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000000.258916672.00000000005F2000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameRSAOAEPKeyExchangeDeformatter.exe4 vs OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.503516040.0000000000EC0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamewshom.ocx vs OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.500064293.0000000000AF8000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameUNKNOWN_FILET vs OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.498958297.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameRGPorLNwUYdycrXetcefyHvNETDMsxfMMCuNPPo.exe4 vs OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.503278642.0000000000E10000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemscorrc.dllT vs OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameRSAOAEPKeyExchangeDeformatter.exe4 vs OC 136584.PDF.exe

Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: 6.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, A/b2.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock', 'CreateDecryptor'
Source: 6.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, A/b2.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock', 'CreateDecryptor'

Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, frmlogin.cs	Base64 encoded string: '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
Source: 0.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.140000.0.unpack, frmlogin.cs	Base64 encoded string: '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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.262677197.0000000002511000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: INSERT INTO Itens_Aluguel VALUES(@aluguelID, @aviaoID, @validade);
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.262677197.0000000002511000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Insert into Clientes values (@nome, @cpf, @rg, @cidade, @endereco, @uf, @telefone);

Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 20%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{172BDDF8-CEEA-11D1-8B05-00600806D9B6}\InProcServer32

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676

Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Data Obfuscation:

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Show sources

Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, BoundHandle.cs	.Net Code: .ctor System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 0.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.140000.0.unpack, BoundHandle.cs	.Net Code: .ctor System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 0.0.OC 136584.PDF.exe.140000.0.unpack, BoundHandle.cs	.Net Code: .ctor System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 3.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.190000.0.unpack, BoundHandle.cs	.Net Code: .ctor System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 3.0.OC 136584.PDF.exe.190000.0.unpack, BoundHandle.cs	.Net Code: .ctor System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 4.0.OC 136584.PDF.exe.10000.0.unpack, BoundHandle.cs	.Net Code: .ctor System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 4.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.10000.0.unpack, BoundHandle.cs	.Net Code: .ctor System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 6.0.OC 136584.PDF.exe.5f0000.0.unpack, BoundHandle.cs	.Net Code: .ctor System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 6.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.5f0000.1.unpack, BoundHandle.cs	.Net Code: .ctor System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_06AA87C1 push es; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_06AA8771 push es; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_06AA835B push es; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_06AA7D3C pushfd ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_06AA2B40 push es; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_007E31EC push FFFFFF8Bh; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_007E324B push FFFFFF8Bh; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_007E32C3 push FFFFFF8Bh; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00BBCF91 push esp; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Code function: 6_2_00E0B53F push edi; retn 0000h

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.52188684985

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Moves itself to temp directory

Show sources

Source: c:\users\user\desktop\oc 136584.pdf.exe

File moved: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpG819.tmp

Jump to behavior

Uses an obfuscated file name to hide its real file extension (double extension)

Show sources

Source: Possible double extension: pdf.exe

Static PE information: OC 136584.PDF.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe

Registry key monitored for changes: HKEY_CURRENT_USER_Classes

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Yara detected AntiVM_3

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.262677197.0000000002511000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.262887194.000000000254D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: OC 136584.PDF.exe PID: 6736, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.2539e90.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_BaseBoard

Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.262677197.0000000002511000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SBIEDLL.DLL
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.262677197.0000000002511000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: KERNEL32.DLL.WINE_GET_UNIX_FILE_NAME

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 3285
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 6518

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe TID: 6740	Thread sleep time: -99304s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe TID: 6740	Thread sleep time: -30000s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe TID: 6756	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe TID: 6824	Thread sleep time: -25825441703193356s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe TID: 6804	Thread sleep count: 3285 > 30
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe TID: 6804	Thread sleep count: 6518 > 30

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor

Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.262677197.0000000002511000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: InstallPathJC:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.262677197.0000000002511000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmware
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.262677197.0000000002511000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA II
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.262677197.0000000002511000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWAREDSOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Anti Debugging:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe

Code function: 6_2_007E20C0 LdrInitializeThunk,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe

Memory written: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe

Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.504657997.00000000014E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: uProgram Manager
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.504657997.00000000014E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.504657997.00000000014E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.504657997.00000000014E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arial.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariali.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariblk.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\bahnschrift.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibril.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrii.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrili.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrib.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibriz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambria.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candara.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candaraz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comic.ttf VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCMI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCB_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCBI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCM____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCRIPTBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCCB___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAGE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTILI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTIBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PER_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PALSCRI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OCRAEXT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAIAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEBO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\IMPRISHA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HATTEN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDYSTO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIL_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLSNECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIGI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABKIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FORTE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FELIXTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASMD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASLGHT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASDEMI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ENGR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCEDSCR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CURLZ___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENSCBK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CASTELAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIST.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_R.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_I.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_B.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCBLKAD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARLRDBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BSSYM7.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSPCL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTEXTRA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\marlett.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Management.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected AgentTesla

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000002.498958297.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.266834340.0000000003519000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: OC 136584.PDF.exe PID: 7124, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: OC 136584.PDF.exe PID: 6736, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 6.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.37e4050.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.36e3da0.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.37e4050.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.3686180.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Martin Prikryl\WinSCP 2\Sessions

Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\profiles.ini

Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\SmartFTP\Client 2.0\Favorites\Quick Connect\
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\FileZilla\recentservers.xml

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\profiles.ini
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\profiles.ini
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Messaging Subsystem\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\IncrediMail\Identities

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000002.505611814.0000000002BF1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: OC 136584.PDF.exe PID: 7124, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality:

Yara detected AgentTesla

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000002.498958297.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.266834340.0000000003519000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: OC 136584.PDF.exe PID: 7124, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: OC 136584.PDF.exe PID: 6736, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 6.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.37e4050.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.36e3da0.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.37e4050.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.3686180.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation211	Path Interception	Process Injection112	Masquerading21	OS Credential Dumping2	Query Registry1	Remote Services	Email Collection1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Web Service1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion13	Input Capture11	Security Software Discovery211	Remote Desktop Protocol	Input Capture11	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Encrypted Channel12	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Disable or Modify Tools1	Credentials in Registry1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion13	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Archive Collected Data11	Automated Exfiltration	Non-Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Process Injection112	NTDS	Process Discovery2	Distributed Component Object Model	Data from Local System2	Scheduled Transfer	Application Layer Protocol2	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information1	LSA Secrets	Application Window Discovery1	SSH	Clipboard Data1	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Obfuscated Files or Information131	Cached Domain Credentials	Remote System Discovery1	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Software Packing13	DCSync	System Information Discovery114	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
OC 136584.PDF.exe	14%	Metadefender		Browse
OC 136584.PDF.exe	21%	ReversingLabs	ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.Androm
OC 136584.PDF.exe	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1138558
OC 136584.PDF.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Download
3.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.190000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1138558	Download File
4.0.OC 136584.PDF.exe.10000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1138558	Download File
3.0.OC 136584.PDF.exe.190000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1138558	Download File
6.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Spy.Gen8	Download File
6.0.OC 136584.PDF.exe.5f0000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1138558	Download File
0.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.140000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1138558	Download File
6.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.5f0000.1.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1138558	Download File
0.0.OC 136584.PDF.exe.140000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1138558	Download File
4.2.OC 136584.PDF.exe.10000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1138558	Download File

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://api.telegram.org4Zk	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://mIjlctNEsyMKGExgO3.org	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
api.telegram.org	149.154.167.220	true	false		high

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.505611814.0000000002BF1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	low
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.505611814.0000000002BF1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://api.telegram.org	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510324365.0000000002EBA000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
https://api.telegram.org4Zk	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510324365.0000000002EBA000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.505611814.0000000002BF1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/0	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510407923.0000000002ECD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://certs.godaddy.com/repository/1301	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510407923.0000000002ECD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
https://api.telegram.org/bot1683948232:AAHc7uMmgJY5DzV0V0BhJXUizPMr1l1dubE/	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.266834340.0000000003519000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.498958297.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.tiro.com	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://crl.godaddy.com/gdig2s1-1823.crl0	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510407923.0000000002ECD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
https://certs.godaddy.com/repository/0	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510407923.0000000002ECD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://stackpath.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.5.0/css/bootstrap.min.css	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.262677197.0000000002511000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.carterandcone.coml	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.typography.netD	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://crl.godaddy.com/gdroot-g2.crl0F	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510407923.0000000002ECD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://fontfabrik.com	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://mIjlctNEsyMKGExgO3.org	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.505611814.0000000002BF1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://crl.godaddy.com/gdroot.crl0F	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510407923.0000000002ECD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fonts.com	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://api.telegram.org	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510407923.0000000002ECD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/gdig2.crt0	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510407923.0000000002ECD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
https://api.telegram.org/bot1683948232:AAHc7uMmgJY5DzV0V0BhJXUizPMr1l1dubE/sendDocument	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510324365.0000000002EBA000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.510324365.0000000002EBA000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sakkal.com	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.270062469.00000000066A2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.266834340.0000000003519000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.498958297.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://api.telegram.org/bot1683948232:AAHc7uMmgJY5DzV0V0BhJXUizPMr1l1dubE/sendDocumentdocument-----	OC 136584.PDF.exe, 00000006.00000002.505611814.0000000002BF1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
149.154.167.220	unknown	United Kingdom		62041	TELEGRAMRU	false

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	356562
Start date:	23.02.2021
Start time:	10:13:25
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 9m 57s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	OC 136584.PDF.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	26
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.spyw.evad.winEXE@7/1@1/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 2.9% (good quality ratio 0%) Quality average: 0% Quality standard deviation: 0%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 99% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): taskhostw.exe, MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 104.43.139.144, 52.255.188.83, 104.43.193.48, 168.61.161.212, 40.88.32.150, 184.30.20.56, 51.11.168.160, 8.253.207.120, 67.27.157.254, 8.248.131.254, 8.253.204.121, 67.26.83.254, 51.103.5.186, 52.155.217.156, 20.54.26.129, 92.122.213.194, 92.122.213.247, 51.104.139.180 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): arc.msn.com.nsatc.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, arc.msn.com, db5eap.displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, skypedataprdcoleus15.cloudapp.net, wns.notify.trafficmanager.net, audownload.windowsupdate.nsatc.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, watson.telemetry.microsoft.com, auto.au.download.windowsupdate.com.c.footprint.net, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net, au-bg-shim.trafficmanager.net, displaycatalog-europeeap.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, client.wns.windows.com, fs.microsoft.com, displaycatalog-rp-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, skypedataprdcolcus17.cloudapp.net, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, skypedataprdcolcus16.cloudapp.net, skypedataprdcolcus15.cloudapp.net, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, skypedataprdcoleus17.cloudapp.net, blobcollector.events.data.trafficmanager.net, vip2-par02p.wns.notify.trafficmanager.net, displaycatalog-rp.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net Report size getting too big, too many NtAllocateVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found. VT rate limit hit for: /opt/package/joesandbox/database/analysis/356562/sample/OC 136584.PDF.exe

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
10:14:25	API Interceptor	643x Sleep call for process: OC 136584.PDF.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link
149.154.167.220	Quote_13940007.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	SKBM 0222.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	crypted.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	PO-735643-SALES.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	muOvK6dngg.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	SKBM 0222..exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	PO 86540.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Unterlagen PDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	JFAaEh5hB6.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	BMfiIGROO2.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Inv_874520.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Inv_95736.scr.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	purchase_order.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	RFQ_2345.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Rechnung.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Shipping_Doc.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Purchase_Order16-122020.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	DHL_Shipment_74683783_Details_Pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Pnzyltwcdn1.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	PO20-001602-1.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse

Domains

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
api.telegram.org	Quote_13940007.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	SKBM 0222.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	crypted.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	PO-735643-SALES.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	muOvK6dngg.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	SKBM 0222..exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	PO 86540.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Unterlagen PDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	JFAaEh5hB6.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	BMfiIGROO2.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Inv_874520.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Inv_95736.scr.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	REVISED_INVOICE_Company_BankDetails_fle_doc.xlsx.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	purchase_order.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	RFQ_2345.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Rechnung.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Shipping_Doc.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Purchase_Order16-122020.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	DHL_Shipment_74683783_Details_Pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Pnzyltwcdn1.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220

ASN

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
TELEGRAMRU	Quote_13940007.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	SKBM 0222.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	crypted.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	PO-735643-SALES.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	muOvK6dngg.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	SKBM 0222..exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	PO 86540.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Unterlagen PDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	JFAaEh5hB6.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	BMfiIGROO2.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Inv_874520.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Inv_95736.scr.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	purchase_order.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	RFQ_2345.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Rechnung.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Shipping_Doc.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Purchase_Order16-122020.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	DHL_Shipment_74683783_Details_Pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Pnzyltwcdn1.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	PO20-001602-1.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220

JA3 Fingerprints

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
3b5074b1b5d032e5620f69f9f700ff0e	Quote_13940007.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	SecuriteInfo.com.Variant.Zusy.368685.25618.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	SKBM 0222.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	8WjU4jrBIr.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	crypted.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	PO-735643-SALES.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	SecuriteInfo.com.Mal.Generic-S.15142.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	LIQUIDACION INTERBANCARIA 02_22_2021.xls	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	muOvK6dngg.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	SKBM 0222..exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Vessel Line Up 7105082938.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	ProtonVPN.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	PO 86540.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	RTM DIAS - CTM.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	uTorrent.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	hreheh.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	JFAaEh5hB6.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Dmjsru7tdt.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Documents_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	BANK SWIFT- USD 98,712.00.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\OC 136584.PDF.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1216
Entropy (8bit):	5.355304211458859
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:MLUE4K5E4Ks2E1qE4x84qXKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhPKIE4oKFKHKoZAE4Kzr7FE4j:MIHK5HKXE1qHxviYHKhQnoPtHoxHhAHY
MD5:	69206D3AF7D6EFD08F4B4726998856D3
SHA1:	E778D4BF781F7712163CF5E2F5E7C15953E484CF
SHA-256:	A937AD22F9C3E667A062BA0E116672960CD93522F6997C77C00370755929BA87
SHA-512:	CD270C3DF75E548C9B0727F13F44F45262BD474336E89AAEBE56FABFE8076CD4638F88D3C0837B67C2EB3C54055679B07E4212FB3FEDBF88C015EB5DBBCD7FF8
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..2,"System.Windows.Forms, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089",0..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..2,"System.Drawing, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..2,"Microsoft.VisualBasic, Version=10.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Configuration\8d67d92724ba494b6c7fd089d6f25b48\System.Configuration.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Xml, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.505996390400658
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.80% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.75% Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73296/58) 0.36% Windows Screen Saver (13104/52) 0.07% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01%
File name:	OC 136584.PDF.exe
File size:	534528
MD5:	cd02744201573e3ac3c7dfde851005f3
SHA1:	3d39dd04c23ba52ed6f660e51e7510fef647186b
SHA256:	559bf7a1059928bb51ba72f92ff7c8348b219c0bcc92e59376a4d0f553ae3ee7
SHA512:	ff7f72c4847228a217a38a822217de735641476ab6a9430de49c9de2b71d816b5387abc9b290d79e39c2524686db4542688c5b80db39d19d8467f34b3295d1e5
SSDEEP:	12288:mfWysvBqTZ2MUWv4rzPdwFLhFH1rrQBPyBL9wht:mfWyoqTNSvlYzuRyBL
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L.....4`..............P..............:... ...@....@.. ....................................@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x483a16
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x6034067F [Mon Feb 22 19:31:11 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v4.0.30319
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [00402000h]
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x839c4	0x4f	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x84000	0x620	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x86000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0x81a1c	0x81c00	False	0.784209793473	data	7.52188684985	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x84000	0x620	0x800	False	0.33349609375	data	3.46671523025	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x86000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.101910425663	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_VERSION	0x84090	0x390	data
RT_MANIFEST	0x84430	0x1ea	XML 1.0 document, UTF-8 Unicode (with BOM) text, with CRLF line terminators

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Copyright Microsoft 2014
Assembly Version	1.0.0.0
InternalName	RSAOAEPKeyExchangeDeformatter.exe
FileVersion	1.0.0.0
CompanyName	Microsoft
LegalTrademarks
Comments
ProductName	WinClient
ProductVersion	1.0.0.0
FileDescription	WinClient
OriginalFilename	RSAOAEPKeyExchangeDeformatter.exe

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.067445993 CET	49750	443	192.168.2.7	149.154.167.220
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.117803097 CET	443	49750	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.119429111 CET	49750	443	192.168.2.7	149.154.167.220
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.171078920 CET	49750	443	192.168.2.7	149.154.167.220
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.221415043 CET	443	49750	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.221463919 CET	443	49750	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.221487045 CET	443	49750	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.221509933 CET	443	49750	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.221529007 CET	443	49750	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.221612930 CET	49750	443	192.168.2.7	149.154.167.220
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.222774982 CET	443	49750	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.222812891 CET	443	49750	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.223772049 CET	49750	443	192.168.2.7	149.154.167.220
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.231332064 CET	49750	443	192.168.2.7	149.154.167.220
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.281833887 CET	443	49750	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.330393076 CET	49750	443	192.168.2.7	149.154.167.220
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.366359949 CET	49750	443	192.168.2.7	149.154.167.220
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.417613983 CET	443	49750	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.422624111 CET	49750	443	192.168.2.7	149.154.167.220
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.514781952 CET	443	49750	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.548568010 CET	443	49750	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.596049070 CET	49750	443	192.168.2.7	149.154.167.220

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:08.204071999 CET	56590	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:08.263199091 CET	53	56590	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:09.277232885 CET	60501	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:09.326216936 CET	53	60501	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:12.617805004 CET	53775	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:12.669291019 CET	53	53775	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:14.051386118 CET	51837	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:14.100642920 CET	53	51837	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:14.987487078 CET	55411	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:15.036165953 CET	53	55411	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:16.252763033 CET	63668	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:16.310053110 CET	53	63668	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:17.974282026 CET	54640	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:18.023017883 CET	53	54640	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:18.775087118 CET	58739	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:18.823709011 CET	53	58739	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:19.741203070 CET	60338	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:19.790915012 CET	53	60338	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:20.575700045 CET	58717	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:20.624413013 CET	53	58717	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:23.150199890 CET	59762	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:23.208918095 CET	53	59762	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:24.310127974 CET	54329	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:24.359009981 CET	53	54329	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:25.192791939 CET	58052	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:25.241801977 CET	53	58052	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:26.194890022 CET	54008	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:26.243719101 CET	53	54008	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:30.639187098 CET	59451	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:30.690882921 CET	53	59451	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:33.303613901 CET	52914	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:33.365236998 CET	53	52914	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:33.474751949 CET	64569	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:33.523542881 CET	53	64569	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:34.684807062 CET	52816	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:34.736526966 CET	53	52816	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:35.984615088 CET	50781	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:36.036494970 CET	53	50781	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:36.930886030 CET	54230	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:36.982584000 CET	53	54230	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:37.800461054 CET	54911	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:37.849299908 CET	53	54911	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:38.692162037 CET	49958	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:38.740888119 CET	53	49958	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:47.218127966 CET	50860	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:14:47.269622087 CET	53	50860	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:03.083425045 CET	50452	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:03.140851974 CET	53	50452	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:04.790332079 CET	59730	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:04.839184999 CET	53	59730	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:12.987952948 CET	59310	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:13.051109076 CET	53	59310	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:13.742677927 CET	51919	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:13.791402102 CET	53	51919	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:14.403383970 CET	64296	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:14.463449955 CET	53	64296	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:14.943226099 CET	56680	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:15.000531912 CET	53	56680	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:15.466594934 CET	58820	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:15.530623913 CET	53	58820	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:16.061304092 CET	60983	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:16.130430937 CET	53	60983	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:16.318660975 CET	49247	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:16.375713110 CET	53	49247	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:17.313102961 CET	52286	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:17.370675087 CET	53	52286	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:18.210941076 CET	56064	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:18.271023989 CET	53	56064	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:18.293623924 CET	63744	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:18.357074976 CET	53	63744	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:19.578265905 CET	61457	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:19.638094902 CET	53	61457	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:20.239558935 CET	58367	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:20.301743031 CET	53	58367	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:50.199729919 CET	60599	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:50.264888048 CET	53	60599	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:53.303788900 CET	59571	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:15:53.352643967 CET	53	59571	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:08.229257107 CET	52689	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:08.279499054 CET	53	52689	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:13.988753080 CET	50290	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.040211916 CET	53	50290	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:13.988753080 CET	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8	0x5fdc	Standard query (0)	api.telegram.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.040211916 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7	0x5fdc	No error (0)	api.telegram.org		149.154.167.220	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

HTTPS Packets

Timestamp	Source IP	Source Port	Dest IP	Dest Port	Subject	Issuer	Not Before	Not After	JA3 SSL Client Fingerprint	JA3 SSL Client Digest
Feb 23, 2021 10:16:14.222774982 CET	149.154.167.220	443	192.168.2.7	49750	CN=api.telegram.org, OU=Domain Control Validated CN=Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2, OU=http://certs.godaddy.com/repository/, O="GoDaddy.com, Inc.", L=Scottsdale, ST=Arizona, C=US CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2, O="GoDaddy.com, Inc.", L=Scottsdale, ST=Arizona, C=US OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority, O="The Go Daddy Group, Inc.", C=US	CN=Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2, OU=http://certs.godaddy.com/repository/, O="GoDaddy.com, Inc.", L=Scottsdale, ST=Arizona, C=US CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2, O="GoDaddy.com, Inc.", L=Scottsdale, ST=Arizona, C=US OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority, O="The Go Daddy Group, Inc.", C=US OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority, O="The Go Daddy Group, Inc.", C=US	Tue Mar 24 14:48:17 CET 2020 Tue May 03 09:00:00 CEST 2011 Wed Jan 01 08:00:00 CET 2014 Tue Jun 29 19:06:20 CEST 2004	Mon May 23 18:17:38 CEST 2022 Sat May 03 09:00:00 CEST 2031 Fri May 30 09:00:00 CEST 2031 Thu Jun 29 19:06:20 CEST 2034	771,49196-49195-49200-49199-159-158-49188-49187-49192-49191-49162-49161-49172-49171-157-156-61-60-53-47-10,0-10-11-13-35-23-65281,29-23-24,0	3b5074b1b5d032e5620f69f9f700ff0e
					CN=Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2, OU=http://certs.godaddy.com/repository/, O="GoDaddy.com, Inc.", L=Scottsdale, ST=Arizona, C=US	CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2, O="GoDaddy.com, Inc.", L=Scottsdale, ST=Arizona, C=US	Tue May 03 09:00:00 CEST 2011	Sat May 03 09:00:00 CEST 2031
					CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2, O="GoDaddy.com, Inc.", L=Scottsdale, ST=Arizona, C=US	OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority, O="The Go Daddy Group, Inc.", C=US	Wed Jan 01 08:00:00 CET 2014	Fri May 30 09:00:00 CEST 2031
					OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority, O="The Go Daddy Group, Inc.", C=US	OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority, O="The Go Daddy Group, Inc.", C=US	Tue Jun 29 19:06:20 CEST 2004	Thu Jun 29 19:06:20 CEST 2034

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: OC 136584.PDF.exe PID: 6736 Parent PID: 5784

General

Start time:	10:14:15
Start date:	23/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe'
Imagebase:	0x140000
File size:	534528 bytes
MD5 hash:	CD02744201573E3AC3C7DFDE851005F3
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000000.00000002.262677197.0000000002511000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000000.00000002.266834340.0000000003519000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000000.00000002.262887194.000000000254D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: OC 136584.PDF.exe PID: 6988 Parent PID: 6736

General

Start time:	10:14:28
Start date:	23/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe
Imagebase:	0x190000
File size:	534528 bytes
MD5 hash:	CD02744201573E3AC3C7DFDE851005F3
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: OC 136584.PDF.exe PID: 6996 Parent PID: 6736

General

Start time:	10:14:29
Start date:	23/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe
Imagebase:	0x10000
File size:	534528 bytes
MD5 hash:	CD02744201573E3AC3C7DFDE851005F3
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: OC 136584.PDF.exe PID: 7124 Parent PID: 6736

General

Start time:	10:14:29
Start date:	23/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\OC 136584.PDF.exe
Imagebase:	0x5f0000
File size:	534528 bytes
MD5 hash:	CD02744201573E3AC3C7DFDE851005F3
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000006.00000002.498958297.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer, Description: Yara detected Credential Stealer, Source: 00000006.00000002.505611814.0000000002BF1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Email gateway, File monitoring, Mail server, Office 365 trace logs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	API monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Analysis Report OC 136584.PDF.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Software Vulnerabilities:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

Public

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

HTTPS Packets

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre