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Analysis Report Copyofreceipt.scr

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	Copyofreceipt.scr (renamed file extension from scr to exe)
Analysis ID:	356658
MD5:	6f9340718bf2defbdb4b438d80857fb3
SHA1:	ddfe78ec1db2fbec98ee87235938223360bae49d
SHA256:	26b8405b53da2fa69471859793721f24e5c407bb4d2af8537e21e244c4363f55
Tags:	AgentTeslascr
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

AgentTesla

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Antivirus detection for dropped file

Found malware configuration

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location

Snort IDS alert for network traffic (e.g. based on Emerging Threat rules)

Yara detected AgentTesla

Yara detected AntiVM_3

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

.NET source code contains very large array initializations

.NET source code contains very large strings

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

Machine Learning detection for sample

Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)

Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)

Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)

Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access)

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines

Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

Detected potential crypto function

Drops PE files

Enables debug privileges

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)

Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses SMTP (mail sending)

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara detected Credential Stealer

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

Copyofreceipt.exe (PID: 6436 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe' MD5: 6F9340718BF2DEFBDB4B438D80857FB3)

schtasks.exe (PID: 6568 cmdline: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ZnTVKjXRZvpJV' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpEC38.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)

conhost.exe (PID: 6576 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

Copyofreceipt.exe (PID: 6612 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe MD5: 6F9340718BF2DEFBDB4B438D80857FB3)

Copyofreceipt.exe (PID: 6620 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe MD5: 6F9340718BF2DEFBDB4B438D80857FB3)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Agenttesla

{"Username: ": "3ZVFxxx2W", "URL: ": "https://0SOrICva3tdSq4g.net", "To: ": "zenovia@ccglass.co.za", "ByHost: ": "mail.ccglass.co.za:587", "Password: ": "BKDXwAbUo", "From: ": "zenovia@ccglass.co.za"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author
00000000.00000002.217766303.00000000029AD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.218072836.0000000003979000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000005.00000002.463450155.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.217719267.0000000002971000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
00000005.00000002.468914912.00000000030F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000005.00000002.468914912.00000000030F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: Copyofreceipt.exe PID: 6620	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: Copyofreceipt.exe PID: 6620	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: Copyofreceipt.exe PID: 6436	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: Copyofreceipt.exe PID: 6436	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Click to see the 5 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author
5.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.2999eac.1.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.3c3c800.5.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.3c3c800.5.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.3aded30.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.3b3c750.4.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.29d317c.2.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Click to see the 2 entries

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Joe Security: Data: Command: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ZnTVKjXRZvpJV' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpEC38.tmp', CommandLine: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ZnTVKjXRZvpJV' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpEC38.tmp', CommandLine|base64offset|contains: *j, Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, ParentCommandLine: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe' , ParentImage: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe, ParentProcessId: 6436, ProcessCommandLine: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ZnTVKjXRZvpJV' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpEC38.tmp', ProcessId: 6568

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Show sources

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe

Avira: detected

Antivirus detection for dropped file

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ZnTVKjXRZvpJV.exe

Avira: detection malicious, Label: HEUR/AGEN.1138558

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe.6620.5.memstr

Malware Configuration Extractor: Agenttesla {"Username: ": "3ZVFxxx2W", "URL: ": "https://0SOrICva3tdSq4g.net", "To: ": "zenovia@ccglass.co.za", "ByHost: ": "mail.ccglass.co.za:587", "Password: ": "BKDXwAbUo", "From: ": "zenovia@ccglass.co.za"}

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ZnTVKjXRZvpJV.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 10%

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 10%

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ZnTVKjXRZvpJV.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 5.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.400000.0.unpack

Avira: Label: TR/Spy.Gen8

Compliance:

Uses 32bit PE files

Show sources

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Contains modern PE file flags such as dynamic base (ASLR) or NX

Show sources

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Software Vulnerabilities:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov dword ptr [ebp-18h], 00000000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov dword ptr [ebp-18h], 00000000h

Networking:

Snort IDS alert for network traffic (e.g. based on Emerging Threat rules)

Show sources

Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2030171 ET TROJAN AgentTesla Exfil Via SMTP 192.168.2.3:49740 -> 102.130.118.207:587
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2030171 ET TROJAN AgentTesla Exfil Via SMTP 192.168.2.3:49741 -> 102.130.118.207:587

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: https://0SOrICva3tdSq4g.net

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.3:49740 -> 102.130.118.207:587

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.3:49740 -> 102.130.118.207:587

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: mail.ccglass.co.za

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.468914912.00000000030F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.468914912.00000000030F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://DynDns.comDynDNS
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.470932330.00000000033A6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://ccglass.co.za
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://fontfabrik.com
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.470932330.00000000033A6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://mail.ccglass.co.za
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.217766303.00000000029AD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.coml
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fonts.com
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.goodfont.co.kr
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sajatypeworks.com
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sakkal.com
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.kr
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.com
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.typography.netD
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.urwpp.deDPlease
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.468914912.00000000030F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://zJtUrL.com
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.468914912.00000000030F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://0SOrICva3tdSq4g.net
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.217766303.00000000029AD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://stackpath.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.5.0/css/bootstrap.min.css
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.218072836.0000000003979000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.463450155.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.468914912.00000000030F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha

System Summary:

.NET source code contains very large array initializations

Show sources

Source: 5.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.400000.0.unpack, u003cPrivateImplementationDetailsu003eu007bA127015Au002dD413u002d43E5u002dBE45u002dE3525638B3FDu007d/u0034417B756u002d20ACu002d480Bu002d9C23u002dF4A6397749FA.cs

Large array initialization: .cctor: array initializer size 11933

.NET source code contains very large strings

Show sources

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, frmlogin.cs	Long String: Length: 13656
Source: ZnTVKjXRZvpJV.exe.0.dr, frmlogin.cs	Long String: Length: 13656
Source: 0.0.Copyofreceipt.exe.650000.0.unpack, frmlogin.cs	Long String: Length: 13656
Source: 0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.650000.0.unpack, frmlogin.cs	Long String: Length: 13656
Source: 4.0.Copyofreceipt.exe.350000.0.unpack, frmlogin.cs	Long String: Length: 13656
Source: 4.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.350000.0.unpack, frmlogin.cs	Long String: Length: 13656
Source: 5.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.d50000.1.unpack, frmlogin.cs	Long String: Length: 13656
Source: 5.0.Copyofreceipt.exe.d50000.0.unpack, frmlogin.cs	Long String: Length: 13656

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 0_2_00659526
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 0_2_0106C0D4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 0_2_0106E5A0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 0_2_04F247F8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 0_2_04F247F2
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 0_2_0714C1B0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 0_2_07140040
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 0_2_07142E58
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 0_2_07142E68
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 0_2_07140D80
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 0_2_07142C18
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 0_2_07142C07
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 0_2_0714D273
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 0_2_0714617A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 4_2_00359526
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_00D59526
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_01222D50
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_0122DF60
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_01222768
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_01221FE0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_0122BAA8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_014520E0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_01457EB8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_014595F8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_0145EA28
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_014596A8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_01540040
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_01549418
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_01545CDC
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_0154C340
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_01541780
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_01544C10
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_01540006
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_0154F27A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_017446A0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_01745372
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_017435C4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_017445B0

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000000.197376752.00000000006D2000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamePEFileKinds.exe4 vs Copyofreceipt.exe
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222618081.0000000006ED0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemscorrc.dllT vs Copyofreceipt.exe
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.223262000.0000000007A90000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: originalfilename vs Copyofreceipt.exe
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.223262000.0000000007A90000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamepropsys.dll.mui@ vs Copyofreceipt.exe
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.217766303.00000000029AD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameAsyncState.dllF vs Copyofreceipt.exe
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.218072836.0000000003979000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameLegacyPathHandling.dllN vs Copyofreceipt.exe
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.218072836.0000000003979000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameTXcrTtQyrOyUCSetTraHqGQSCLsAHRDhA.exe4 vs Copyofreceipt.exe
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.223124965.00000000079A0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: System.OriginalFileName vs Copyofreceipt.exe
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000004.00000000.215163381.00000000003D2000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamePEFileKinds.exe4 vs Copyofreceipt.exe
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.464492892.0000000001168000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameUNKNOWN_FILET vs Copyofreceipt.exe
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.464792709.0000000001230000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamewshom.ocx.mui vs Copyofreceipt.exe
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.463450155.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameTXcrTtQyrOyUCSetTraHqGQSCLsAHRDhA.exe4 vs Copyofreceipt.exe
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.464365715.0000000000DD2000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamePEFileKinds.exe4 vs Copyofreceipt.exe
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.467174113.0000000001460000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemscorrc.dllT vs Copyofreceipt.exe
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamePEFileKinds.exe4 vs Copyofreceipt.exe

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe	Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
Source: ZnTVKjXRZvpJV.exe.0.dr	Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: 5.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.400000.0.unpack, A/b2.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock', 'CreateDecryptor'
Source: 5.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.400000.0.unpack, A/b2.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock', 'CreateDecryptor'

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, frmlogin.cs	Base64 encoded string: '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
Source: ZnTVKjXRZvpJV.exe.0.dr, frmlogin.cs	Base64 encoded string: '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
Source: 0.0.Copyofreceipt.exe.650000.0.unpack, frmlogin.cs	Base64 encoded string: 'GIdDNNZNNNNRNNNN//8NNYtNNNNNNNNNDNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNtNNNNN4sht4NgNaAVotOGZ0uITucplOjpz9apzSgVTAuoz5iqPOvMFOlqJ4tnJ4tER9GVT1iMTHhQD0XWNNNNNNNNNODEDNNGNRQNViu868NNNNNNNNNNBNNNvRYNINNNPNNNNNTNNNNNNNNlw8NNNNtNNNNDNNNNNNNRDNtNNNNNtNNONNNNNNNNNNRNNNNNNNNNNPNNNNNNtNNNNNNNNZNDVHNNONNNONNNNNNRNNNRNNNNNNNNONNNNNNNNNNNNNNNUt/NNOCNNNNNRNNNBDQNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNTNNNNjNNNOpCjNNUNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNVNNNPNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNPPNNNRtNNNNNNNNNNNNNNP50MKu0NNNN0O8NNNNtNNNNVNNNNNVNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNPNNNTNhpaAlLjNNNBDQNNNNDNNNNNDNNNNvNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNONNNONYaWyoT9wNNNZNNNNNTNNNNNPNNNNWtNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNDNNNDtNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNPfCjNNNNNNNRtNNNNPNNHNhPHNNBjLNNNQNNNNNNNNNXD+NNP4NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNO4PXOLNNNbdWtNPXOpNNNbNXdMmTNNNPbNONNNRpkxNNNdNNtNNOUZnNNNXtNZNNNEmTjNNPbNRNNNRXuZjNDNDNNNNNDNNRDO+NDNNOT8pNNNXPvfNOvbGZNRNRNNNNNVNNORNstVNNNEiUDNNPtbeNNLdRmNONONNNNNQNNNENU4QNNNRok4NNNbXXjNTXuZjNDNDNNNNONNNRDO+ONNNOT8sNNNXPvfNOvbGZNVNCNNNNNHNNORNstHNNNDHXPNNNNbYOljuptRNNUQDODNNNvtuNNNXolVNNNcmVjNNPtjVtNHNNNDNNU4SNNNRPvfNOvbGZNRNPjNNNNLNNORNstLNNNDXXjNTXvVNNbNTNNNRXyMmQNNNOvtxNNNXqNLNNNXNOjNNOPbrNvtyNNNXXtNNRmNONNfNNNNUNNNENU4UNNNRPvfNOvbNRmNONNfNNNNUNNNENPtANNNTPvfNOvc+pwfNNUPNPNNNOUV7NNOjtNxNNNElBjNNpVNXNNNRXxbNNvtzNNNXNNZROFtENNNTNPbNNOZjONO0NNNNPNNNRDOmWjNNPtbTVYvPNDNtXWbONT8bNNNXXPxNNNbNNvtINNNTOPtHNNNTPjpbRjNNOtZbSDNNOvtFNNNTQNtbXtNNPt0WolfNNNbqzuZRRDEiYNNNPuhnRjHEOKV9NNOjTOvAStNNNFtgNNNXWuLbYtNNPtNdRmNSNWpNNNNWNNNENPtiNNNXN28jNNNXPjVPwzxK2cRspTRZNb5cS9LK2usJwF8NNNRANb5cS9bGOORRRjHJRjLeBtxEOtVEOcRVLDpEO5SugWjEOjAiZDNNPusn/tRGPORVRjxEPFjTSuZUNPfVNORUS9LGOjNEOusJRjLEOuRSZpNWNb5cTAbK1usnS9nAYjNNNFtlNNNXqNHNNOfXXjNTXtNGZNHNctNNNNbNNORNStfPomZNNNbGOkVUXQDNNNbZPNwLTgtAPEsnS9nAYjNNNEZRPOsnRjtJRjxeDjtK2uZXSuZYXl0PRDxEP281NNNXRjjFQPt2NNNXXQpNNNbJRDDUTvt4NNNXNNpn1tfEPksJRjfEPkRXZp0EPEsJRjxEPERVZopEOOLbBDNNPuZSRDHK2usJwF8NNNRGOuRRTuRTSuRTwzxbBNNNPtNEOtbeNNLdNNNGZNVNXNNNNNfNNORNN3WYNNOjXQbNNNbbBjNNPaZwNNNXPjpPomjNNNc0VtNNNDbeNNLdRmNRNRbNNNNZNNNENNWiZDNNPuuopm0NNNbYNz8kNNNXTAbZSt0eUjpPPEuiCtNNPu8DXQ8NNNbbDNNNPz9ONNNXWtxL1t0WPQUqO29PNNNXPvfNOvbNNOZjNDNUNNNNQDNNRDNHPvfNOvcTNNVJztVKztVLzvtENNNTNPbNNNNGZNZNVNNNNN4NNORNsttNNNE+PDNNOU4XNNNRXORNNNLNpwfNNUNXXjNTXuZjNtNFNNNNQjNNRDNPNluQNNNXXRDNNNbXXjNTXtNNRmNONNjNNNNDNNNENNVbEDNNPtbeNNLdRmNONONNNNNENNNENANWNNNPXPRNNNbXXjNTXuZjNDNZNNNNQtNNRDNPXRLNNNbXXjNTXuZjNtNqNNNNRtNNRDNPwNLNNOfH/tRYOljVXNRNNPfXXjHNNtbeNNLdWtNQ/uHTNNNoXvLNNvtzNNNXNPbNNNNGZNVNADNNNOZNNORNNagVNNNXo0xNNNbYO4jWNNNoSC4OQNtfSPtPNNNePjW7FNNNPtqiFtNNPtNNNNpXXjNTXyVNNvtzNNNXNNWmFjNNPa1VNNNXXv4bTNNNObNZNNNRXu4PXPLNNNbdNNOPH0cPNDNONNNNNNNZNNNNqwVhZP41ZQplAjNNNNNSNTjNNNPbPDNNV34NNODXNNOjPDNNV1A0pzyhM3ZNNNNNuOZNNTDNNNNwIIZN6OZNNONNNNNwE1IWENNNNCtGNNQ0ONNNV0Wfo2VNNNNNNNNNNtNNNIpIbtxWQjNNNCbOZjNJNNNONNNNBDNNNNfNNNNZNNNNVjNNNORNNNOYNNNNCjNNNOZNNNNTNNNNPtNNNNjNNNNWNNNNNDNNNNDNNNNONNNNNjNNNNZNNNNPNNNNNNNZODRNNNNNNNLNdtBJOjLNSjFJOjLNztYZOt8NQttNNNLN2jXzODLNwDBzODLN/tBzODLNltBzODLN4jBzODL
Source: 0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.650000.0.unpack, frmlogin.cs	Base64 encoded string: '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Classification label: mal100.troj.spyw.evad.winEXE@8/5@4/1

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Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6576:120:WilError_01

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

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Source: Copyofreceipt.exe

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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.217766303.00000000029AD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: INSERT INTO Itens_Aluguel VALUES(@aluguelID, @aviaoID, @validade);
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.217766303.00000000029AD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Insert into Clientes values (@nome, @cpf, @rg, @cidade, @endereco, @uf, @telefone);

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 10%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ZnTVKjXRZvpJV' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpEC38.tmp'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ZnTVKjXRZvpJV' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpEC38.tmp'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{95E15D0A-66E6-93D9-C53C-76E6219D3341}\InProcServer32

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Data Obfuscation:

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Show sources

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, BoundHandle.cs	.Net Code: .ctor System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: ZnTVKjXRZvpJV.exe.0.dr, BoundHandle.cs	.Net Code: .ctor System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 0.0.Copyofreceipt.exe.650000.0.unpack, BoundHandle.cs	.Net Code: .ctor System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.650000.0.unpack, BoundHandle.cs	.Net Code: .ctor System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 4.0.Copyofreceipt.exe.350000.0.unpack, BoundHandle.cs	.Net Code: .ctor System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 4.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.350000.0.unpack, BoundHandle.cs	.Net Code: .ctor System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 5.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.d50000.1.unpack, BoundHandle.cs	.Net Code: .ctor System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 5.0.Copyofreceipt.exe.d50000.0.unpack, BoundHandle.cs	.Net Code: .ctor System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 0_2_0714CF4A push ebx; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 0_2_0714CF82 push ebx; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 0_2_0714784B push esi; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_01227A37 push edi; retn 0000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_0145D3C0 pushad ; retn 011Dh
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Code function: 5_2_0145D938 pushad ; ret

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.50002099302
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.50002099302

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ZnTVKjXRZvpJV.exe

Jump to dropped file

Boot Survival:

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Show sources

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ZnTVKjXRZvpJV' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpEC38.tmp'

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

Registry key monitored for changes: HKEY_CURRENT_USER_Classes

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Yara detected AntiVM_3

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.217766303.00000000029AD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.217719267.0000000002971000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Copyofreceipt.exe PID: 6436, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.2999eac.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.29d317c.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_BaseBoard

Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.217766303.00000000029AD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SBIEDLL.DLL
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.217766303.00000000029AD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: KERNEL32.DLL.WINE_GET_UNIX_FILE_NAME

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

File opened / queried: SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 3398
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 6457

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe TID: 6440	Thread sleep time: -101937s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe TID: 6460	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe TID: 6960	Thread sleep time: -17524406870024063s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe TID: 6964	Thread sleep count: 3398 > 30
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe TID: 6964	Thread sleep count: 6457 > 30

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.217766303.00000000029AD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: InstallPathJC:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.217766303.00000000029AD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmware
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.217766303.00000000029AD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA II
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.217766303.00000000029AD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWAREDSOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Anti Debugging:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

Code function: 5_2_01451840 LdrInitializeThunk,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

Memory written: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ZnTVKjXRZvpJV' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpEC38.tmp'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.467940149.0000000001B70000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.467940149.0000000001B70000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.467940149.0000000001B70000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.467940149.0000000001B70000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arial.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariali.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariblk.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\bahnschrift.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibril.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrii.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrili.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrib.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibriz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambria.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candara.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candaraz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comic.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comici.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consola.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolai.ttf VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constan.ttf VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\gadugi.ttf VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelawUI.ttf VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanai.ttf VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothR.ttc VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothB.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\holomdl2.ttf VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BKANT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUAI.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUABI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARA.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARABD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTCORSVA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHIC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ALGER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BASKVILL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BAUHS93.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELLI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELLB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSDB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BERNHC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_PSTC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRITANIC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BROADW.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRUSHSCI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENTAUR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CHILLER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COLONNA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COOPBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FTLTLT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HARLOWSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HARNGTON.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HTOWERT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HTOWERTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\JOKERMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\KUNSTLER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITED.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITEI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITEDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LCALLIG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAGNETOB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MATURASC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MOD20.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGENG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGSOL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OLDENGL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ONYX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PARCHM.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PLAYBILL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\POORICH.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAVIE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\INFROMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SHOWG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SNAP____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\STENCIL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VINERITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VIVALDII.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VLADIMIR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LATINWD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCM_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCMI____.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCRIPTBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCCB___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAGE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTILI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTIBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PER_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PALSCRI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OCRAEXT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAIAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEBO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\IMPRISHA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HATTEN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDYSTO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIL_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLSNECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIGI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABKIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FORTE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FELIXTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASMD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASLGHT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASDEMI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ENGR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCEDSCR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CURLZ___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENSCBK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CASTELAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIST.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_R.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_I.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_B.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCBLKAD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARLRDBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BSSYM7.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSPCL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTEXTRA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\marlett.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Management.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected AgentTesla

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.218072836.0000000003979000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.463450155.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.468914912.00000000030F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Copyofreceipt.exe PID: 6620, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Copyofreceipt.exe PID: 6436, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.3c3c800.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.3c3c800.5.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.3aded30.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.3b3c750.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Martin Prikryl\WinSCP 2\Sessions

Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\profiles.ini
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cookies
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data

Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\SmartFTP\Client 2.0\Favorites\Quick Connect\
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\FileZilla\recentservers.xml

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\profiles.ini
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\profiles.ini
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\IncrediMail\Identities
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Messaging Subsystem\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.468914912.00000000030F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Copyofreceipt.exe PID: 6620, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality:

Yara detected AgentTesla

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.218072836.0000000003979000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.463450155.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.468914912.00000000030F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Copyofreceipt.exe PID: 6620, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Copyofreceipt.exe PID: 6436, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.3c3c800.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.3c3c800.5.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.3aded30.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.3b3c750.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation211	Scheduled Task/Job1	Process Injection112	Disable or Modify Tools1	OS Credential Dumping2	File and Directory Discovery1	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data11	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job1	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Scheduled Task/Job1	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information1	Credentials in Registry1	System Information Discovery114	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Local System2	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Non-Standard Port1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information31	Security Account Manager	Query Registry1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Email Collection1	Automated Exfiltration	Non-Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Software Packing13	NTDS	Security Software Discovery321	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Application Layer Protocol111	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Masquerading1	LSA Secrets	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion14	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion14	Cached Domain Credentials	Process Discovery2	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Process Injection112	DCSync	Application Window Discovery1	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	Indicator Removal from Tools	Proc Filesystem	Remote System Discovery1	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
Copyofreceipt.exe	14%	Metadefender		Browse
Copyofreceipt.exe	11%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Generic
Copyofreceipt.exe	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1138558
Copyofreceipt.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ZnTVKjXRZvpJV.exe	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1138558
C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ZnTVKjXRZvpJV.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML
C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ZnTVKjXRZvpJV.exe	14%	Metadefender		Browse
C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ZnTVKjXRZvpJV.exe	11%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Generic

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Download
4.0.Copyofreceipt.exe.350000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1138558	Download File
0.0.Copyofreceipt.exe.650000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1138558	Download File
4.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.350000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1138558	Download File
5.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.d50000.1.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1138558	Download File
5.0.Copyofreceipt.exe.d50000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1138558	Download File
5.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Spy.Gen8	Download File
0.2.Copyofreceipt.exe.650000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1138558	Download File

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://zJtUrL.com	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://0SOrICva3tdSq4g.net	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
ccglass.co.za	102.130.118.207	true	false		high
mail.ccglass.co.za	unknown	unknown	false		high

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
https://0SOrICva3tdSq4g.net	true	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://mail.ccglass.co.za	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.470932330.00000000033A6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.468914912.00000000030F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	low
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.468914912.00000000030F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.468914912.00000000030F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.tiro.com	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://zJtUrL.com	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.468914912.00000000030F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://stackpath.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.5.0/css/bootstrap.min.css	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.217766303.00000000029AD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.carterandcone.coml	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.typography.netD	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://fontfabrik.com	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fonts.com	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://ccglass.co.za	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.470932330.00000000033A6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.217766303.00000000029AD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sakkal.com	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.222383017.0000000006AE2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000000.00000002.218072836.0000000003979000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Copyofreceipt.exe, 00000005.00000002.463450155.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
102.130.118.207	unknown	South Africa		37153	xneeloZA	false

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	356658
Start date:	23.02.2021
Start time:	14:23:13
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 8m 44s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	Copyofreceipt.scr (renamed file extension from scr to exe)
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	27
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.spyw.evad.winEXE@8/5@4/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 2.9% (good quality ratio 0%) Quality average: 0% Quality standard deviation: 0%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): taskhostw.exe, MpCmdRun.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, UsoClient.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 13.64.90.137, 104.43.193.48, 104.43.139.144, 104.42.151.234, 51.104.144.132, 184.30.20.56, 20.54.26.129, 2.20.142.209, 2.20.142.210, 92.122.213.247, 92.122.213.194, 52.147.198.201 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): au.download.windowsupdate.com.edgesuite.net, skypedataprdcolwus17.cloudapp.net, arc.msn.com.nsatc.net, fs.microsoft.com, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, skypedataprdcolcus16.cloudapp.net, a767.dscg3.akamai.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, arc.msn.com, skypedataprdcolcus15.cloudapp.net, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, skypedataprdcoleus16.cloudapp.net, blobcollector.events.data.trafficmanager.net, audownload.windowsupdate.nsatc.net, watson.telemetry.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net, skypedataprdcolwus16.cloudapp.net, au-bg-shim.trafficmanager.net Report size getting too big, too many NtAllocateVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found. VT rate limit hit for: /opt/package/joesandbox/database/analysis/356658/sample/Copyofreceipt.exe

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
14:24:03	API Interceptor	768x Sleep call for process: Copyofreceipt.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
xneeloZA	qIViYQyb0a.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	196.22.132.140
	aJ5e4OJb0Q.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	102.130.119.215
	roboforex4multisetup.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	156.38.206.18
	fortrade4setup.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	156.38.206.18
	Bank details.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	129.232.138.144
	iUUJykFNh2.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	156.38.221.244
	iUUJykFNh2.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	156.38.221.244
	iUUJykFNh2.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	156.38.221.244
	Copy__VLWEHK9R.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	156.38.221.244
	Copy_HJ1TCUG.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	156.38.221.244
	Copy_HJ1TCUG.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	156.38.221.244
	Copy_HJ1TCUG.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	156.38.221.244
	Copy_HJ1TCUG.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	156.38.221.244
	Scan BUYX.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	156.38.221.244
	Scan BUYX.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	156.38.221.244
	1 Total New Invoices-Monday December 14 2020.xlsm	Get hash	malicious	Browse	129.232.220.74
	eYXiYB6U8N.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	156.38.221.244
	dT361Rrrys.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	156.38.221.244
	dT361Rrrys.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	156.38.221.244
	eYXiYB6U8N.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	156.38.221.244

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\Copyofreceipt.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	modified
Size (bytes):	1216
Entropy (8bit):	5.355304211458859
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:MLUE4K5E4Ks2E1qE4x84qXKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhPKIE4oKFKHKoZAE4Kzr7FE4j:MIHK5HKXE1qHxviYHKhQnoPtHoxHhAHY
MD5:	69206D3AF7D6EFD08F4B4726998856D3
SHA1:	E778D4BF781F7712163CF5E2F5E7C15953E484CF
SHA-256:	A937AD22F9C3E667A062BA0E116672960CD93522F6997C77C00370755929BA87
SHA-512:	CD270C3DF75E548C9B0727F13F44F45262BD474336E89AAEBE56FABFE8076CD4638F88D3C0837B67C2EB3C54055679B07E4212FB3FEDBF88C015EB5DBBCD7FF8
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..2,"System.Windows.Forms, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089",0..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..2,"System.Drawing, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..2,"Microsoft.VisualBasic, Version=10.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Configuration\8d67d92724ba494b6c7fd089d6f25b48\System.Configuration.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Xml, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpEC38.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1646
Entropy (8bit):	5.210550125242434
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:2dH4+SEqC/Q7hxlNMFp1/rlMhEMjnGpwjpIgUYODOLD9RJh7h8gKB6tn:cbh47TlNQ//rydbz9I3YODOLNdq3a
MD5:	74E5178641256500F0E9F4BA27DA611F
SHA1:	B593E71E67185FB3D8D193D54DB4B420607F8ED0
SHA-256:	BF10430D5E9B5395B43B8D368C7E6D65E7EBA962F70DB8EFA14C8A7D95C4DE07
SHA-512:	B8FBC809F5FF30590BDDEC3CC49D71EC7F26FA15400CD0609F9A46BC0E10C7778D046790669F87C1645C5C86B941A433E7E58629F3212B61D16906CF18B7AAF0
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	low
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>..<Task version="1.2" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">.. <RegistrationInfo>.. <Date>2014-10-25T14:27:44.8929027</Date>.. <Author>computer\user</Author>.. </RegistrationInfo>.. <Triggers>.. <LogonTrigger>.. <Enabled>true</Enabled>.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. </LogonTrigger>.. <RegistrationTrigger>.. <Enabled>false</Enabled>.. </RegistrationTrigger>.. </Triggers>.. <Principals>.. <Principal id="Author">.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>.. <RunLevel>LeastPrivilege</RunLevel>.. </Principal>.. </Principals>.. <Settings>.. <MultipleInstancesPolicy>StopExisting</MultipleInstancesPolicy>.. <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>.. <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>.. <AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate>.. <StartWhenAvailable>true

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ZnTVKjXRZvpJV.exe Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	519168
Entropy (8bit):	7.487602713055043
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12288:NLY7TvkxZKBvCEVUGcRjH162O4KmWcZKU:NLY0KBvRUVRjygn
MD5:	6F9340718BF2DEFBDB4B438D80857FB3
SHA1:	DDFE78EC1DB2FBEC98EE87235938223360BAE49D
SHA-256:	26B8405B53DA2FA69471859793721F24E5C407BB4D2AF8537E21E244C4363F55
SHA-512:	D971042A10A141CB876D2AE3A69EBC7B9CFB740238B83FC59424344B15C2D9BAA09C624A925878C6A5E9E9DE8F36CEF34D49A6AA65B5A729D4AA56DA4A112B82
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Avira, Detection: 100% Antivirus: Joe Sandbox ML, Detection: 100% Antivirus: Metadefender, Detection: 14%, Browse Antivirus: ReversingLabs, Detection: 11%
Reputation:	low
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L.....3`..............P.................. ... ....@.. .......................`............@.................................T...O.... .......................@....................................................... ............... ..H............text........ ...................... ..`.rsrc........ ......................@..@.reloc.......@......................@..B........................H.......8Y...T..............@R............................................( ...&..(!.....s"........s#........s$........s%........s&...........0...........~....o'....+...0...........~....o(....+...0...........~....o)....+...0...........~....o....+...0...........~....o+....+...0..<........~.....(,.....,!r...p.....(-...o....s/............~.....+...0...........~.....+.."........0..&........(....r)..p~....o0...(1.....t$....+..Vs....(2...t...........(3...*.0..........

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ZnTVKjXRZvpJV.exe:Zone.Identifier Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	26
Entropy (8bit):	3.95006375643621
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:ggPYV:rPYV
MD5:	187F488E27DB4AF347237FE461A079AD
SHA1:	6693BA299EC1881249D59262276A0D2CB21F8E64
SHA-256:	255A65D30841AB4082BD9D0EEA79D49C5EE88F56136157D8D6156AEF11C12309
SHA-512:	89879F237C0C051EBE784D0690657A6827A312A82735DA42DAD5F744D734FC545BEC9642C19D14C05B2F01FF53BC731530C92F7327BB7DC9CDE1B60FB21CD64E
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	[ZoneTransfer]....ZoneId=0

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\nnze0rrb.c0s\Chrome\Default\Cookies Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe
File Type:	SQLite 3.x database, last written using SQLite version 3032001
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	20480
Entropy (8bit):	0.6970840431455908
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:TLbJLbXaFpEO5bNmISHn06UwcQPx5fBocLgAZOZD/0:T5LLOpEO5J/Kn7U1uBo8NOZ0
MD5:	00681D89EDDB6AD25E6F4BD2E66C61C6
SHA1:	14B2FBFB460816155190377BBC66AB5D2A15F7AB
SHA-256:	8BF06FD5FAE8199D261EB879E771146AE49600DBDED7FDC4EAC83A8C6A7A5D85
SHA-512:	159A9DE664091A3986042B2BE594E989FD514163094AC606DC3A6A7661A66A78C0D365B8CA2C94B8BC86D552E59D50407B4680EDADB894320125F0E9F48872D3
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	SQLite format 3......@ ..........................................................................C....... ..g... .8....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.487602713055043
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.80% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.75% Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73296/58) 0.36% Windows Screen Saver (13104/52) 0.07% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01%
File name:	Copyofreceipt.exe
File size:	519168
MD5:	6f9340718bf2defbdb4b438d80857fb3
SHA1:	ddfe78ec1db2fbec98ee87235938223360bae49d
SHA256:	26b8405b53da2fa69471859793721f24e5c407bb4d2af8537e21e244c4363f55
SHA512:	d971042a10a141cb876d2ae3a69ebc7b9cfb740238b83fc59424344b15c2d9baa09c624a925878c6a5e9e9de8f36cef34d49a6aa65b5a729d4aa56da4a112b82
SSDEEP:	12288:NLY7TvkxZKBvCEVUGcRjH162O4KmWcZKU:NLY0KBvRUVRjygn
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L.....3`..............P.................. ... ....@.. .......................`............@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4800a6
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x6033EEFF [Mon Feb 22 17:50:55 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v4.0.30319
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x80054	0x4f	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x82000	0x5d8	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x84000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0x7e0ac	0x7e200	False	0.7782941805	data	7.50002099302	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x82000	0x5d8	0x600	False	0.430338541667	data	4.15623906597	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x84000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.0815394123432	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_VERSION	0x82090	0x348	data
RT_MANIFEST	0x823e8	0x1ea	XML 1.0 document, UTF-8 Unicode (with BOM) text, with CRLF line terminators

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Copyright Microsoft 2014
Assembly Version	1.0.0.0
InternalName	PEFileKinds.exe
FileVersion	1.0.0.0
CompanyName	Microsoft
LegalTrademarks
Comments
ProductName	WinClient
ProductVersion	1.0.0.0
FileDescription	WinClient
OriginalFilename	PEFileKinds.exe

Network Behavior

Snort IDS Alerts

Timestamp	Protocol	SID	Message	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
02/23/21-14:25:51.269518	TCP	2030171	ET TROJAN AgentTesla Exfil Via SMTP	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
02/23/21-14:25:56.000105	TCP	2030171	ET TROJAN AgentTesla Exfil Via SMTP	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:47.920284986 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:48.148248911 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:48.148458958 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:49.477054119 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:49.477432966 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:49.707827091 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:49.710621119 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:49.940865993 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:49.942033052 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:50.211505890 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:50.563543081 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:50.564824104 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:50.800438881 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:50.801060915 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:51.031137943 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:51.031786919 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:51.264789104 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:51.265007973 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:51.269517899 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:51.270486116 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:51.270754099 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:51.271147013 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:51.503815889 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:51.503869057 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:51.566407919 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:51.613913059 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:52.692764044 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:52.924814939 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:52.924942970 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:52.926065922 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:53.157072067 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:53.214193106 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:53.440908909 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:53.442802906 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:54.212846041 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:54.213403940 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:54.440181971 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:54.440823078 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:54.682852983 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:54.683886051 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:54.945940018 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:54.946572065 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:55.203639030 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:55.203978062 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:55.593511105 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:55.653441906 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:55.653920889 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:55.996579885 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:55.997186899 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:55.999504089 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:56.000104904 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:56.000286102 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:56.000529051 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:56.000926018 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:56.001089096 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:56.001279116 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:56.001478910 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:56.345427036 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:56.346282959 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:56.346780062 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:56.347376108 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:56.389697075 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:57.340683937 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:57.396975040 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:06.293469906 CET	49199	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:06.353530884 CET	53	49199	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:07.905133009 CET	50620	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:07.953888893 CET	53	50620	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:08.865890980 CET	64938	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:08.917666912 CET	53	64938	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:09.805881023 CET	60152	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:09.858961105 CET	53	60152	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:10.826489925 CET	57544	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:10.876769066 CET	53	57544	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:11.773478985 CET	55984	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:11.826736927 CET	53	55984	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:13.191037893 CET	64185	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:13.239675999 CET	53	64185	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:15.075582027 CET	65110	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:15.127912998 CET	53	65110	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:16.280759096 CET	58361	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:16.329624891 CET	53	58361	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:17.238226891 CET	63492	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:17.297549963 CET	53	63492	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:23.219616890 CET	60831	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:23.284632921 CET	53	60831	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:24.249520063 CET	60100	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:24.298491001 CET	53	60100	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:24.907696009 CET	53195	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:24.958107948 CET	53	53195	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:29.836438894 CET	50141	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:29.898005962 CET	53	50141	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:40.570148945 CET	53023	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:40.618855000 CET	53	53023	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:42.166326046 CET	49563	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:42.226610899 CET	53	49563	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:43.522676945 CET	51352	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:43.574994087 CET	53	51352	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:44.397749901 CET	59349	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:44.472640991 CET	53	59349	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:46.855901957 CET	57084	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:46.904716015 CET	53	57084	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:47.163440943 CET	58823	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:47.228372097 CET	53	58823	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:47.901654005 CET	57568	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:47.950432062 CET	53	57568	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:49.088057995 CET	50540	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:24:49.137070894 CET	53	50540	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:01.407572985 CET	54366	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:01.456485033 CET	53	54366	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:07.370172977 CET	53034	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:07.431126118 CET	53	53034	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:12.358786106 CET	57762	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:12.412118912 CET	53	57762	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:36.036636114 CET	55435	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:36.085448980 CET	53	55435	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:38.032072067 CET	50713	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:38.103945017 CET	53	50713	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:47.658164978 CET	56132	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:47.726969957 CET	53	56132	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:47.741564989 CET	58987	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:47.805444956 CET	53	58987	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:52.978311062 CET	56579	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:53.050185919 CET	53	56579	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:53.095804930 CET	60633	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:53.211267948 CET	53	60633	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:47.658164978 CET	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0x1aee	Standard query (0)	mail.ccglass.co.za	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:47.741564989 CET	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0x4a49	Standard query (0)	mail.ccglass.co.za	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:52.978311062 CET	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0x8a79	Standard query (0)	mail.ccglass.co.za	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:53.095804930 CET	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0xb063	Standard query (0)	mail.ccglass.co.za	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:47.726969957 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x1aee	No error (0)	mail.ccglass.co.za	ccglass.co.za		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:47.726969957 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x1aee	No error (0)	ccglass.co.za		102.130.118.207	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:47.805444956 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x4a49	No error (0)	mail.ccglass.co.za	ccglass.co.za		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:47.805444956 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x4a49	No error (0)	ccglass.co.za		102.130.118.207	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:53.050185919 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x8a79	No error (0)	mail.ccglass.co.za	ccglass.co.za		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:53.050185919 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x8a79	No error (0)	ccglass.co.za		102.130.118.207	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:53.211267948 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0xb063	No error (0)	mail.ccglass.co.za	ccglass.co.za		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:53.211267948 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0xb063	No error (0)	ccglass.co.za		102.130.118.207	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

SMTP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP	Commands
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:49.477054119 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3	220-cp25-za1.host-ww.net ESMTP Exim 4.93 #2 Tue, 23 Feb 2021 15:25:48 +0200 220-We do not authorize the use of this system to transport unsolicited, 220 and/or bulk e-mail.
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:49.477432966 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207	EHLO 609290
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:49.707827091 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3	250-cp25-za1.host-ww.net Hello 609290 [84.17.52.38] 250-SIZE 52428800 250-8BITMIME 250-PIPELINING 250-AUTH PLAIN LOGIN 250-STARTTLS 250 HELP
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:49.710621119 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207	AUTH login emVub3ZpYUBjY2dsYXNzLmNvLnph
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:49.940865993 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3	334 UGFzc3dvcmQ6
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:50.563543081 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3	235 Authentication succeeded
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:50.564824104 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207	MAIL FROM:<zenovia@ccglass.co.za>
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:50.800438881 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3	250 OK
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:50.801060915 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207	RCPT TO:<zenovia@ccglass.co.za>
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:51.031137943 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3	250 Accepted
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:51.031786919 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207	DATA
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:51.265007973 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3	354 Enter message, ending with "." on a line by itself
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:51.271147013 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207	.
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:51.566407919 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3	250 OK id=1lEXhG-00Fa50-EY
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:52.692764044 CET	49740	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207	QUIT
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:52.924814939 CET	587	49740	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3	221 cp25-za1.host-ww.net closing connection
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:54.212846041 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3	220-cp25-za1.host-ww.net ESMTP Exim 4.93 #2 Tue, 23 Feb 2021 15:25:53 +0200 220-We do not authorize the use of this system to transport unsolicited, 220 and/or bulk e-mail.
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:54.213403940 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207	EHLO 609290
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:54.440181971 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3	250-cp25-za1.host-ww.net Hello 609290 [84.17.52.38] 250-SIZE 52428800 250-8BITMIME 250-PIPELINING 250-AUTH PLAIN LOGIN 250-STARTTLS 250 HELP
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:54.440823078 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207	AUTH login emVub3ZpYUBjY2dsYXNzLmNvLnph
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:54.682852983 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3	334 UGFzc3dvcmQ6
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:54.945940018 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3	235 Authentication succeeded
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:54.946572065 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207	MAIL FROM:<zenovia@ccglass.co.za>
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:55.203639030 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3	250 OK
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:55.203978062 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207	RCPT TO:<zenovia@ccglass.co.za>
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:55.653441906 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3	250 Accepted
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:55.653920889 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207	DATA
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:55.997186899 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3	354 Enter message, ending with "." on a line by itself
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:56.001478910 CET	49741	587	192.168.2.3	102.130.118.207	.
Feb 23, 2021 14:25:57.340683937 CET	587	49741	102.130.118.207	192.168.2.3	250 OK id=1lEXhL-00Fa6F-5t

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: Copyofreceipt.exe PID: 6436 Parent PID: 5652

General

Start time:	14:23:57
Start date:	23/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe'
Imagebase:	0x650000
File size:	519168 bytes
MD5 hash:	6F9340718BF2DEFBDB4B438D80857FB3
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000000.00000002.217766303.00000000029AD000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000000.00000002.218072836.0000000003979000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000000.00000002.217719267.0000000002971000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: schtasks.exe PID: 6568 Parent PID: 6436

General

Start time:	14:24:05
Start date:	23/02/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ZnTVKjXRZvpJV' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpEC38.tmp'
Imagebase:	0xe00000
File size:	185856 bytes
MD5 hash:	15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 6576 Parent PID: 6568

General

Start time:	14:24:05
Start date:	23/02/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff6b2800000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: Copyofreceipt.exe PID: 6612 Parent PID: 6436

General

Start time:	14:24:06
Start date:	23/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe
Imagebase:	0x350000
File size:	519168 bytes
MD5 hash:	6F9340718BF2DEFBDB4B438D80857FB3
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: Copyofreceipt.exe PID: 6620 Parent PID: 6436

General

Start time:	14:24:06
Start date:	23/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copyofreceipt.exe
Imagebase:	0xd50000
File size:	519168 bytes
MD5 hash:	6F9340718BF2DEFBDB4B438D80857FB3
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000005.00000002.463450155.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000005.00000002.468914912.00000000030F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer, Description: Yara detected Credential Stealer, Source: 00000005.00000002.468914912.00000000030F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.
Tactics:	Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Email gateway, File monitoring, Mail server, Office 365 trace logs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Analysis Report Copyofreceipt.scr

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Agenttesla

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Software Vulnerabilities:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Boot Survival:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

Public

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Network Behavior

Snort IDS Alerts

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port paring that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088or port 587as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre