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Analysis Report payment.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	payment.exe
Analysis ID:	357249
MD5:	0780e01f6ac683c0529fb1d40aaca8b4
SHA1:	d2c1ef0cab63992d4bea95fdf7838047997c46a7
SHA256:	0fc71d13ed4108b3afb81d9347063f9ef6ed9c3528a9c6e67a892c8a8db5fada
Tags:	exe
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

AgentTesla GuLoader

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected AgentTesla

Yara detected GuLoader

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Executable has a suspicious name (potential lure to open the executable)

Hides threads from debuggers

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)

Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)

Tries to detect Any.run

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Writes to foreign memory regions

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Checks if the current process is being debugged

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected potential crypto function

Enables debug privileges

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

PE file contains strange resources

Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Tries to load missing DLLs

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara detected Credential Stealer

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

payment.exe (PID: 6976 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe' MD5: 0780E01F6AC683C0529FB1D40AACA8B4)

RegAsm.exe (PID: 4660 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe' MD5: 6FD7592411112729BF6B1F2F6C34899F)

conhost.exe (PID: 4688 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author
0000000F.00000002.597115330.000000001D081000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0000000F.00000002.597115330.000000001D081000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
0000000F.00000002.592476347.0000000000564000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: RegAsm.exe PID: 4660	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: RegAsm.exe PID: 4660	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: RegAsm.exe PID: 4660	JoeSecurity_GuLoader	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security
Click to see the 1 entries

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: payment.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 56%			Perma Link
Source: payment.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 46%

Compliance:

Uses 32bit PE files

Show sources

Source: payment.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Networking:

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: onedrive.live.com

Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.597115330.000000001D081000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.597115330.000000001D081000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://DynDns.comDynDNS
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.597115330.000000001D081000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://kBTuTq.com
Source: RegAsm.exe	String found in binary or memory: https://onedrive.live.com/download?cid=876616565B0E44B1&resid=876616565B0E44B1%213215&authkey=AC2zGE
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.597115330.000000001D081000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha

System Summary:

Executable has a suspicious name (potential lure to open the executable)

Show sources

Source: payment.exe

Static file information: Suspicious name

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: Filename: payment.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056E697 NtProtectVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056EC97 NtSetInformationThread,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_00411464
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_00410C71
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_00411817
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_00411016
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_004114E6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_00410CF8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_0041108A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_004110AC
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_0041156A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040411C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_0041191C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_00411133
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_004115F5
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_0041199B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_00410E05
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_00411237
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_004112D0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_00410E88
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_0041134F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_00410B5E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_00410F06
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_0041170E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_004113D2
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_00410BF4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_00410F8F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Code function: 0_2_00411796
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056D7F2
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_1CF247B2
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_1CF2D6D0
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_1CF24827

Source: payment.exe

Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: payment.exe, 00000000.00000000.328356879.0000000000436000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameAncistrocladaceous5.exe vs payment.exe
Source: payment.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameAncistrocladaceous5.exe vs payment.exe

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

Section loaded: sfc.dll

Source: payment.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@4/0@2/0

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:4688:120:WilError_01

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\~DFDAD0523DB1C225BD.TMP

Jump to behavior

Source: payment.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_Processor

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior

Source: payment.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 56%
Source: payment.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 46%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe'

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{CF4CC405-E2C5-4DDD-B3CE-5E7582D8C9FA}\InprocServer32

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe

Window detected: Number of UI elements: 15

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000F.00000002.592476347.0000000000564000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: RegAsm.exe PID: 4660, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00567050 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056B050 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056705C push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056B05C push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00568058 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00565058 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00566058 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056B044 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00566040 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056A040 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056804C push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056504C push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056604C push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056A04C push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00567049 push di; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00567074 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056B074 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00568070 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00565070 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00566070 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056807C push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056607C push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056507C push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056A078 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056A066 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00568064 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00565064 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00566064 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056A06C push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00567068 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056A016 push edi; ret

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 6.80293275288

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000004468FB second address: 00000000004468FB instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor eax, eax 0x00000004 inc eax 0x00000005 cpuid 0x00000007 popad 0x00000008 call 00007FF4A85B8858h 0x0000000d lfence 0x00000010 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000016 lfence 0x00000019 ret 0x0000001a sub edx, esi 0x0000001c ret 0x0000001d pop ecx 0x0000001e add edi, edx 0x00000020 dec ecx 0x00000021 jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x00000023 test dx, bx 0x00000026 cmp ecx, 00000000h 0x00000029 jne 00007FF4A85B87ADh 0x0000002f jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x00000031 cmp al, bl 0x00000033 push ecx 0x00000034 test ebx, eax 0x00000036 test cx, ax 0x00000039 call 00007FF4A85B891Ah 0x0000003e call 00007FF4A85B8868h 0x00000043 lfence 0x00000046 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x0000004c lfence 0x0000004f ret 0x00000050 mov esi, edx 0x00000052 pushad 0x00000053 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000004414CD second address: 0000000000441549 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 00000001h 0x00000007 cpuid 0x00000009 popad 0x0000000a pushad 0x0000000b mov ah, D8h 0x0000000d cmp ah, FFFFFFD8h 0x00000010 jne 00007FF4A85BC575h 0x00000016 popad 0x00000017 jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x00000019 test al, cl 0x0000001b mov esi, 1A100000h 0x00000020 sub esi, 00001000h 0x00000026 push 00000004h 0x00000028 push 00003000h 0x0000002d mov dword ptr [ebp+64h], esi 0x00000030 mov ebx, ebp 0x00000032 pushad 0x00000033 mov ecx, 000000B2h 0x00000038 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000441CC9 second address: 0000000000441CDC instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 00000001h 0x00000007 cpuid 0x00000009 popad 0x0000000a push 0003E800h 0x0000000f pushad 0x00000010 lfence 0x00000013 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000044215A second address: 000000000044215A instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000004452BD second address: 00000000004452BD instructions:
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000565193 second address: 0000000000565193 instructions:

Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_BaseBoard

Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration

Tries to detect Any.run

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	File opened: C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	File opened: C:\Program Files\qga\qga.exe
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	File opened: C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exe
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	File opened: C:\Program Files\qga\qga.exe

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: RegAsm.exe

Binary or memory string: C:\PROGRAM FILES\QEMU-GA\QEMU-GA.EXE

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000044C4E9 second address: 000000000044C664 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 popad 0x00000003 jmp 00007FF4A886B5AAh 0x00000005 test dl, al 0x00000007 jmp 00007FF4A886B5A6h 0x00000009 test bl, al 0x0000000b jmp 00007FF4A886B5AAh 0x0000000d cmp ecx, edx 0x0000000f jmp 00007FF4A886B5A6h 0x00000011 cmp cl, dl 0x00000013 jmp 00007FF4A886B5AAh 0x00000015 pushad 0x00000016 mov ebx, 00000057h 0x0000001b rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000044C664 second address: 000000000044C119 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 popad 0x00000003 mov eax, 00000539h 0x00000008 jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x0000000a test ax, ax 0x0000000d mov ecx, dword ptr [ebp+1Ch] 0x00000010 jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x00000012 cld 0x00000013 mov edx, 8802EDACh 0x00000018 call 00007FF4A85B6F2Eh 0x0000001d push esi 0x0000001e jmp 00007FF4A85B889Ah 0x00000020 test bl, bl 0x00000022 push edx 0x00000023 push ecx 0x00000024 jmp 00007FF4A85B889Ah 0x00000026 cmp dh, ah 0x00000028 cmp eax, 00000539h 0x0000002d jne 00007FF4A85B8A8Fh 0x00000033 jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x00000035 test dh, 0000007Eh 0x00000038 push 6DDB9555h 0x0000003d call 00007FF4A85B98FFh 0x00000042 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h] 0x00000048 jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x0000004a test bl, al 0x0000004c mov eax, dword ptr [eax+0Ch] 0x0000004f mov eax, dword ptr [eax+14h] 0x00000052 mov ecx, dword ptr [eax] 0x00000054 mov eax, ecx 0x00000056 jmp 00007FF4A85B889Ah 0x00000058 cmp ecx, edx 0x0000005a jmp 00007FF4A85B88F4h 0x0000005f jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x00000061 pushad 0x00000062 mov ecx, 00000016h 0x00000067 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000044C119 second address: 000000000044C304 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 popad 0x00000003 mov ebx, dword ptr [eax+28h] 0x00000006 jmp 00007FF4A886B5AAh 0x00000008 test dl, al 0x0000000a cmp ebx, 00000000h 0x0000000d je 00007FF4A886B610h 0x00000013 push ebx 0x00000014 call 00007FF4A886B6A3h 0x00000019 jmp 00007FF4A886B5A6h 0x0000001b pushad 0x0000001c mov ecx, 00000025h 0x00000021 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000004468FB second address: 00000000004468FB instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor eax, eax 0x00000004 inc eax 0x00000005 cpuid 0x00000007 popad 0x00000008 call 00007FF4A85B8858h 0x0000000d lfence 0x00000010 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000016 lfence 0x00000019 ret 0x0000001a sub edx, esi 0x0000001c ret 0x0000001d pop ecx 0x0000001e add edi, edx 0x00000020 dec ecx 0x00000021 jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x00000023 test dx, bx 0x00000026 cmp ecx, 00000000h 0x00000029 jne 00007FF4A85B87ADh 0x0000002f jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x00000031 cmp al, bl 0x00000033 push ecx 0x00000034 test ebx, eax 0x00000036 test cx, ax 0x00000039 call 00007FF4A85B891Ah 0x0000003e call 00007FF4A85B8868h 0x00000043 lfence 0x00000046 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x0000004c lfence 0x0000004f ret 0x00000050 mov esi, edx 0x00000052 pushad 0x00000053 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000446DCA second address: 0000000000446DCA instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a ret 0x0000000b mov esi, edx 0x0000000d pushad 0x0000000e xor eax, eax 0x00000010 inc eax 0x00000011 cpuid 0x00000013 bt ecx, 1Fh 0x00000017 jc 00007FF4A8871918h 0x0000001d popad 0x0000001e call 00007FF4A886B655h 0x00000023 lfence 0x00000026 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000004414CD second address: 0000000000441549 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 00000001h 0x00000007 cpuid 0x00000009 popad 0x0000000a pushad 0x0000000b mov ah, D8h 0x0000000d cmp ah, FFFFFFD8h 0x00000010 jne 00007FF4A85BC575h 0x00000016 popad 0x00000017 jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x00000019 test al, cl 0x0000001b mov esi, 1A100000h 0x00000020 sub esi, 00001000h 0x00000026 push 00000004h 0x00000028 push 00003000h 0x0000002d mov dword ptr [ebp+64h], esi 0x00000030 mov ebx, ebp 0x00000032 pushad 0x00000033 mov ecx, 000000B2h 0x00000038 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000044F427 second address: 000000000044F530 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a popad 0x0000000b cmp dword ptr [eax+10h], 00000000h 0x0000000f jne 00007FF4A886B98Dh 0x00000015 jmp 00007FF4A886B5A6h 0x00000017 test ax, 0000F517h 0x0000001b cmp dword ptr [eax+14h], 00000000h 0x0000001f jne 00007FF4A886B939h 0x00000025 cmp dword ptr [eax+18h], 00000000h 0x00000029 jne 00007FF4A886B92Fh 0x0000002f jmp 00007FF4A886B5A6h 0x00000031 cmp bx, dx 0x00000034 pop eax 0x00000035 jmp 00007FF4A886B5A6h 0x00000037 pushad 0x00000038 mov eax, 00000020h 0x0000003d rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000441CC9 second address: 0000000000441CDC instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 00000001h 0x00000007 cpuid 0x00000009 popad 0x0000000a push 0003E800h 0x0000000f pushad 0x00000010 lfence 0x00000013 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000044215A second address: 000000000044215A instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000004452BD second address: 00000000004452BD instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000044608B second address: 0000000000446102 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a popad 0x0000000b test bx, ax 0x0000000e cmp dword ptr [esp+08h], 0Ah 0x00000013 jg 00007FF4A886B5E2h 0x00000019 test ebx, edx 0x0000001b cmp ecx, 70DD50C1h 0x00000021 jmp 00007FF4A886E112h 0x00000026 call 00007FF4A88689FFh 0x0000002b pop eax 0x0000002c pushad 0x0000002d lfence 0x00000030 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000446102 second address: 00000000004497C4 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a popad 0x0000000b push edi 0x0000000c cmp bh, FFFFFF83h 0x0000000f push eax 0x00000010 test ax, ax 0x00000013 call 00007FF4A85BBE67h 0x00000018 jmp 00007FF4A85B889Ah 0x0000001a test bh, bh 0x0000001c jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x0000001e pushad 0x0000001f mov ecx, 00000026h 0x00000024 rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000056C4E9 second address: 000000000056C664 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 popad 0x00000003 jmp 00007FF4A886B5AAh 0x00000005 test dl, al 0x00000007 jmp 00007FF4A886B5A6h 0x00000009 test bl, al 0x0000000b jmp 00007FF4A886B5AAh 0x0000000d cmp ecx, edx 0x0000000f jmp 00007FF4A886B5A6h 0x00000011 cmp cl, dl 0x00000013 jmp 00007FF4A886B5AAh 0x00000015 pushad 0x00000016 mov ebx, 00000057h 0x0000001b rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000056C664 second address: 000000000056C119 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 popad 0x00000003 mov eax, 00000539h 0x00000008 jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x0000000a test ax, ax 0x0000000d mov ecx, dword ptr [ebp+1Ch] 0x00000010 jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x00000012 cld 0x00000013 mov edx, 8802EDACh 0x00000018 call 00007FF4A85B6F2Eh 0x0000001d push esi 0x0000001e jmp 00007FF4A85B889Ah 0x00000020 test bl, bl 0x00000022 push edx 0x00000023 push ecx 0x00000024 jmp 00007FF4A85B889Ah 0x00000026 cmp dh, ah 0x00000028 cmp eax, 00000539h 0x0000002d jne 00007FF4A85B8A8Fh 0x00000033 jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x00000035 test dh, 0000007Eh 0x00000038 push 6DDB9555h 0x0000003d call 00007FF4A85B98FFh 0x00000042 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h] 0x00000048 jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x0000004a test bl, al 0x0000004c mov eax, dword ptr [eax+0Ch] 0x0000004f mov eax, dword ptr [eax+14h] 0x00000052 mov ecx, dword ptr [eax] 0x00000054 mov eax, ecx 0x00000056 jmp 00007FF4A85B889Ah 0x00000058 cmp ecx, edx 0x0000005a jmp 00007FF4A85B88F4h 0x0000005f jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x00000061 pushad 0x00000062 mov ecx, 00000016h 0x00000067 rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000056C119 second address: 000000000056C304 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 popad 0x00000003 mov ebx, dword ptr [eax+28h] 0x00000006 jmp 00007FF4A886B5AAh 0x00000008 test dl, al 0x0000000a cmp ebx, 00000000h 0x0000000d je 00007FF4A886B610h 0x00000013 push ebx 0x00000014 call 00007FF4A886B6A3h 0x00000019 jmp 00007FF4A886B5A6h 0x0000001b pushad 0x0000001c mov ecx, 00000025h 0x00000021 rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000566DCA second address: 0000000000566DCA instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a ret 0x0000000b mov esi, edx 0x0000000d pushad 0x0000000e xor eax, eax 0x00000010 inc eax 0x00000011 cpuid 0x00000013 bt ecx, 1Fh 0x00000017 jc 00007FF4A85BEC08h 0x0000001d popad 0x0000001e call 00007FF4A85B8945h 0x00000023 lfence 0x00000026 rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000561549 second address: 000000000056BD6F instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 popad 0x00000003 add ebx, 64h 0x00000006 push ebx 0x00000007 jmp 00007FF4A886B5AAh 0x00000009 push si 0x0000000b mov si, 323Dh 0x0000000f pop si 0x00000011 push 00000000h 0x00000013 mov dword ptr [ebp+68h], 00000000h 0x0000001a add ebx, 04h 0x0000001d push ebx 0x0000001e cmp bx, ax 0x00000021 push FFFFFFFFh 0x00000023 test cl, bl 0x00000025 call 00007FF4A8875976h 0x0000002a jmp 00007FF4A8868408h 0x0000002f call 00007FF4A886E6BDh 0x00000034 pop ebx 0x00000035 cmp dword ptr [ebx], 00000000h 0x00000038 jne 00007FF4A886B819h 0x0000003e jmp 00007FF4A886B5A6h 0x00000040 cmp cl, dl 0x00000042 jmp 00007FF4A886B5AAh 0x00000044 test cx, cx 0x00000047 jmp 00007FF4A886B5A6h 0x00000049 pushad 0x0000004a mov ecx, 00000077h 0x0000004f rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000056F427 second address: 000000000056F530 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a popad 0x0000000b cmp dword ptr [eax+10h], 00000000h 0x0000000f jne 00007FF4A85B8C7Dh 0x00000015 jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x00000017 test ax, 0000F517h 0x0000001b cmp dword ptr [eax+14h], 00000000h 0x0000001f jne 00007FF4A85B8C29h 0x00000025 cmp dword ptr [eax+18h], 00000000h 0x00000029 jne 00007FF4A85B8C1Fh 0x0000002f jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x00000031 cmp bx, dx 0x00000034 pop eax 0x00000035 jmp 00007FF4A85B8896h 0x00000037 pushad 0x00000038 mov eax, 00000020h 0x0000003d rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000565193 second address: 0000000000565193 instructions:

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

Code function: 15_2_0056EC97 rdtsc

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 717
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 9102

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe TID: 5560

Thread sleep time: -24903104499507879s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_Processor

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.597861206.000000001FC20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: A Virtual Machine could not be started because Hyper-V is not installed.
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.597861206.000000001FC20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: A communication protocol error has occurred between the Hyper-V Host and Guest Compute Service.
Source: RegAsm.exe	Binary or memory string: C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exe
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.597861206.000000001FC20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: The communication protocol version between the Hyper-V Host and Guest Compute Services is not supported.
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.597861206.000000001FC20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: An unknown internal message was received by the Hyper-V Compute Service.

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Anti Debugging:

Hides threads from debuggers

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Thread information set: HideFromDebugger
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Thread information set: HideFromDebugger
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Thread information set: HideFromDebugger

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Process queried: DebugPort
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process queried: DebugPort

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

Code function: 15_2_0056EC97 rdtsc

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_005664EC mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00566534 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056DC0F mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056AC3D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_0056BF85 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Writes to foreign memory regions

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe

Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe base: 560000

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe'

Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.593288205.0000000000F10000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.593288205.0000000000F10000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.593288205.0000000000F10000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: &Program Manager
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.593288205.0000000000F10000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

Code function: 15_2_00565184 cpuid

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Queries volume information: C:\ VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe	Queries volume information: C:\ VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Management.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected AgentTesla

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000F.00000002.597115330.000000001D081000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: RegAsm.exe PID: 4660, type: MEMORY

Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000F.00000002.597115330.000000001D081000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: RegAsm.exe PID: 4660, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality:

Yara detected AgentTesla

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000F.00000002.597115330.000000001D081000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: RegAsm.exe PID: 4660, type: MEMORY

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation211	DLL Side-Loading1	Process Injection112	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion34	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery631	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	DLL Side-Loading1	Disable or Modify Tools1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion34	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Non-Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Process Injection112	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery2	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Obfuscated Files or Information2	NTDS	Application Window Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Software Packing1	LSA Secrets	Remote System Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	DLL Side-Loading1	Cached Domain Credentials	System Information Discovery323	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
payment.exe	57%	Virustotal		Browse
payment.exe	46%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Backdoor.Remcos

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://kBTuTq.com	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
onedrive.live.com	unknown	unknown	false		high
c3ixha.bl.files.1drv.com	unknown	unknown	false		high

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1	RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.597115330.000000001D081000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	low
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.597115330.000000001D081000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.597115330.000000001D081000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://kBTuTq.com	RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.597115330.000000001D081000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://onedrive.live.com/download?cid=876616565B0E44B1&resid=876616565B0E44B1%213215&authkey=AC2zGE	RegAsm.exe	false		high

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	357249
Start date:	24.02.2021
Start time:	10:43:28
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 6m 49s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	payment.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	24
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@4/0@2/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 22.5% (good quality ratio 21.9%) Quality average: 54.7% Quality standard deviation: 11.1%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 69% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, conhost.exe, WmiPrvSE.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 40.88.32.150, 104.43.193.48, 92.122.145.220, 104.42.151.234, 51.11.168.160, 2.20.142.209, 2.20.142.210, 51.103.5.159, 92.122.213.247, 92.122.213.194, 52.155.217.156, 20.54.26.129, 13.107.42.13, 13.107.42.12, 184.30.24.56 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): au.download.windowsupdate.com.edgesuite.net, odc-web-brs.onedrive.akadns.net, arc.msn.com.nsatc.net, store-images.s-microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, arc.msn.com, vip1-par02p.wns.notify.trafficmanager.net, db5eap.displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, l-0004.l-msedge.net, skypedataprdcoleus15.cloudapp.net, e12564.dspb.akamaiedge.net, wns.notify.trafficmanager.net, odwebpl.trafficmanager.net.l-0004.dc-msedge.net.l-0004.l-msedge.net, l-0003.l-msedge.net, audownload.windowsupdate.nsatc.net, odc-bl-files-brs.onedrive.akadns.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, watson.telemetry.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, odc-bl-files-geo.onedrive.akadns.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net, au-bg-shim.trafficmanager.net, displaycatalog-europeeap.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, client.wns.windows.com, fs.microsoft.com, odc-web-geo.onedrive.akadns.net, displaycatalog-rp-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, bl-files.ha.1drv.com.l-0003.dc-msedge.net.l-0003.l-msedge.net, displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, a767.dscg3.akamai.net, skypedataprdcolcus15.cloudapp.net, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com, blobcollector.events.data.trafficmanager.net, skypedataprdcolwus16.cloudapp.net, displaycatalog-rp.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net Report size exceeded maximum capacity and may have missing disassembly code. Report size getting too big, too many NtAllocateVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
10:44:19	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: payment.exe modified
10:46:00	API Interceptor	191x Sleep call for process: RegAsm.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	6.584972265863127
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	payment.exe
File size:	225280
MD5:	0780e01f6ac683c0529fb1d40aaca8b4
SHA1:	d2c1ef0cab63992d4bea95fdf7838047997c46a7
SHA256:	0fc71d13ed4108b3afb81d9347063f9ef6ed9c3528a9c6e67a892c8a8db5fada
SHA512:	d7c0ede50d907e9374d3dc6ccaf18dedb1984b0d54a8bd50ba9fac9405c9f4acb7994e182b7a9e49d7d9c95f1135015e1d5cb61d8838536cc7edbfa12724bd8d
SSDEEP:	1536:ai24BsvhHpVmqBu755CxBa/t3UWoF6Jp6GeSlm3WdtHV1BsjlwoEffyW053iYk:SxZTGb9F3UWoFWpNgZUfh
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......O.......................D.......=.......Rich............PE..L...M..H.................0...@......0........@....@................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	0634b8d4c8c4c0ce

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x401630
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x48A5FC4D [Fri Aug 15 21:59:41 2008 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	c495ca9196b04f3a1871ecbfcbd50911

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 00402BD8h
call 00007FF4A8EA6DC5h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], dl
pop edx
out dx, eax
or eax, 4E4BFD93h
xchg eax, edx
or dh, ah
das
push ebx
clc
jnc 00007FF4A8EA6DD2h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax+72h], dl
outsd
push 00000065h
arpl word ptr [ecx+esi+00h], si
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add bh, bh
int3
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
sub byte ptr [edx], ch
call far 42B0h : F9A52BC6h
mov edi, DA7EB6B7h
lds eax, fword ptr [edx+edi*2+3Fh]
dec edi
faddp st(6), st(0)
aaa
leave
cdq
inc esp
mov bh, byte ptr [ecx]
xor ebp, ebp
xchg dword ptr [eax], edi
adc byte ptr [eax+3Ah], bl
dec edi
lodsd
xor ebx, dword ptr [ecx-48EE309Ah]
or al, 00h
stosb
add byte ptr [eax-2Dh], ah
xchg eax, ebx
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
mov esp, B4000014h
push cs
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ebx], dl
add byte ptr [ecx+eax*2+54h], al
inc ecx
push esp
push edx
inc ecx
dec esi
push ebx
dec ebp
dec ecx
push ebx
push ebx
dec ecx
dec edi
dec esi
inc ebp
push edx
push ebx

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x33364	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x36000	0x1252	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x228	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x124	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x32870	0x33000	False	0.263604856005	data	6.80293275288	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x34000	0x1280	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x36000	0x1252	0x2000	False	0.168090820312	data	2.29185489566	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_ICON	0x369aa	0x8a8	data
RT_ICON	0x36442	0x568	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x36420	0x22	data
RT_VERSION	0x36120	0x300	data	Chinese	Taiwan

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaVarMove, __vbaHresultCheck, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaFreeVarList, _adj_fdiv_m64, __vbaFreeObjList, _adj_fprem1, __vbaHresultCheckObj, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaLateMemSt, __vbaObjSet, __vbaCyAdd, _adj_fdiv_m16i, __vbaObjSetAddref, _adj_fdivr_m16i, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaCyI2, __vbaStrCmp, __vbaVarTstEq, __vbaObjVar, __vbaI2I4, _adj_fpatan, __vbaLateIdCallLd, EVENT_SINK_Release, __vbaUI1I2, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaFpCmpCy, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaFPException, __vbaI2Var, _CIlog, __vbaNew2, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, __vbaStrCopy, __vbaI4Str, __vbaFreeStrList, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaVarTstNe, __vbaI4Var, __vbaLateMemCall, __vbaVarDup, __vbaLateMemCallLd, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, _allmul, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeObj, __vbaFreeStr

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0404 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Coldest
InternalName	Ancistrocladaceous5
FileVersion	1.00
CompanyName	SummerDream Company
LegalTrademarks	Coldest
Comments	SummerDream Company
ProductName	Project1
ProductVersion	1.00
OriginalFilename	Ancistrocladaceous5.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
Chinese	Taiwan

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:10.911381006 CET	55074	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:10.960200071 CET	53	55074	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:11.780896902 CET	54513	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:11.834822893 CET	53	54513	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:12.757447004 CET	62044	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:12.806353092 CET	53	62044	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:13.411082983 CET	63791	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:13.477824926 CET	53	63791	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:13.569865942 CET	64267	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:13.618797064 CET	53	64267	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:14.516139984 CET	49448	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:14.568125010 CET	53	49448	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:15.470302105 CET	60342	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:15.522371054 CET	53	60342	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:16.690913916 CET	61346	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:16.740000963 CET	53	61346	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:18.376986980 CET	51774	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:18.428474903 CET	53	51774	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:19.211590052 CET	56023	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:19.264411926 CET	53	56023	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:20.427401066 CET	58384	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:20.480751991 CET	53	58384	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:23.716433048 CET	60261	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:23.768256903 CET	53	60261	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:25.128577948 CET	56061	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:25.177556038 CET	53	56061	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:29.631326914 CET	58336	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:29.683278084 CET	53	58336	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:31.132128954 CET	53781	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:31.183218002 CET	53	53781	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:32.073699951 CET	54064	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:32.127625942 CET	53	54064	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:32.960329056 CET	52811	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:33.009255886 CET	53	52811	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:37.799596071 CET	55299	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:37.851288080 CET	53	55299	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:38.644771099 CET	63745	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:38.693814993 CET	53	63745	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:44.368793964 CET	50055	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:44.420629025 CET	53	50055	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:49.696610928 CET	61374	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:44:49.748292923 CET	53	61374	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:05.888565063 CET	50339	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:05.954570055 CET	53	50339	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:07.742175102 CET	63307	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:07.792047024 CET	53	63307	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:22.955830097 CET	49694	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:23.017445087 CET	53	49694	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:29.490305901 CET	54982	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:29.541260958 CET	53	54982	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:30.131491899 CET	50010	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:30.181240082 CET	53	50010	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:30.849584103 CET	63718	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:30.950206041 CET	53	63718	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:31.368204117 CET	62116	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:31.433454990 CET	53	62116	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:31.986391068 CET	63816	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:32.055495024 CET	53	63816	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:32.674719095 CET	55014	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:32.732131958 CET	53	55014	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:33.386050940 CET	62208	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:33.443485022 CET	53	62208	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:34.287131071 CET	57574	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:34.347367048 CET	53	57574	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:35.530936956 CET	51818	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:35.588417053 CET	53	51818	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:36.095642090 CET	56628	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:36.156138897 CET	53	56628	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:36.366750956 CET	60778	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:36.416053057 CET	53	60778	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:49.429064035 CET	53799	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:49.478157043 CET	53	53799	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:50.202363014 CET	54683	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:50.230230093 CET	59329	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:50.281210899 CET	53	54683	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:50.289444923 CET	53	59329	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 10:46:11.232192039 CET	64021	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 10:46:11.283066988 CET	53	64021	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:49.429064035 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0xd2a9	Standard query (0)	onedrive.live.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:50.202363014 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0x8cbf	Standard query (0)	c3ixha.bl.files.1drv.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Type	Class
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:49.478157043 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0xd2a9	No error (0)	onedrive.live.com	odc-web-geo.onedrive.akadns.net	CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:50.281210899 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x8cbf	No error (0)	c3ixha.bl.files.1drv.com	bl-files.fe.1drv.com	CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 10:45:50.281210899 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x8cbf	No error (0)	bl-files.fe.1drv.com	odc-bl-files-geo.onedrive.akadns.net	CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: payment.exe PID: 6976 Parent PID: 5912

General

Start time:	10:44:18
Start date:	24/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	225280 bytes
MD5 hash:	0780E01F6AC683C0529FB1D40AACA8B4
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: RegAsm.exe PID: 4660 Parent PID: 6976

General

Start time:	10:45:35
Start date:	24/02/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\payment.exe'
Imagebase:	0x10000
File size:	64616 bytes
MD5 hash:	6FD7592411112729BF6B1F2F6C34899F
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 0000000F.00000002.597115330.000000001D081000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer, Description: Yara detected Credential Stealer, Source: 0000000F.00000002.597115330.000000001D081000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 0000000F.00000002.592476347.0000000000564000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 4688 Parent PID: 4660

General

Start time:	10:45:36
Start date:	24/02/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff61de10000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Disassembly

Code Analysis

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Description:	Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Adversaries may take advantage of vague references in the library manifest of a program by replacing a legitimate library with a malicious one, causing the operating system to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

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Warning!

Analysis Report payment.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: payment.exe PID: 6976 Parent PID: 5912

General

Analysis Process: RegAsm.exe PID: 4660 Parent PID: 6976

General