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Analysis Report FAKTURA I UWAGI.bat

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	FAKTURA I UWAGI.bat (renamed file extension from bat to exe)
Analysis ID:	357266
MD5:	2c3b4c255d8d786535c4832f5b7f7c0e
SHA1:	3cc1d799b6f92a338cffa35d74d52b1c4f19a91e
SHA256:	46c474c38fd679025142a453fc46243a91e0820d4ab0449aab0bd92c29d0ee30
Tags:	GuLoader
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	88
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Potential malicious icon found

Yara detected GuLoader

Contains functionality to detect hardware virtualization (CPUID execution measurement)

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Yara detected VB6 Downloader Generic

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Detected potential crypto function

PE file contains strange resources

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe (PID: 6492 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe' MD5: 2C3B4C255D8D786535C4832F5B7F7C0E)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
Process Memory Space: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe PID: 6492	JoeSecurity_VB6DownloaderGeneric	Yara detected VB6 Downloader Generic	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe PID: 6492	JoeSecurity_GuLoader	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 42%			Perma Link
Source: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 36%

Compliance:

Uses 32bit PE files

Show sources

Source: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

System Summary:

Potential malicious icon found

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Icon embedded in PE file: bad icon match: 20047c7c70f0e004

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe

Code function: 1_2_0040673C

Source: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe

Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe, 00000001.00000000.200222774.000000000040F000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamedosissspiro.exe vs FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe
Source: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe, 00000001.00000002.725896004.0000000002090000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameuser32j% vs FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe
Source: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamedosissspiro.exe vs FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe

Source: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal88.rans.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Source: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 42%
Source: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 36%

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: Process Memory Space: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe PID: 6492, type: MEMORY

Yara detected VB6 Downloader Generic

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: Process Memory Space: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe PID: 6492, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_00406B41 push FFFFFFFFh; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_004065F7 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E6893 push esi; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E44CB pushad ; ret

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe

Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Contains functionality to detect hardware virtualization (CPUID execution measurement)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E1A30
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E1AA6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E56CF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E56D2
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E1AE3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E1B49
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E176F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E179A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E17C9
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E17F6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E184D
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E1C63
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E18B2
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E1D2D
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E1D2B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E1925
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E1958
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E1D52
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E1D81
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E1993
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E19D9

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020E596A second address: 00000000020E5829 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 00000001h 0x00000007 cpuid 0x00000009 popad 0x0000000a cmp cl, al 0x0000000c mov eax, 00000539h 0x00000011 mov ecx, dword ptr [ebp+1Ch] 0x00000014 mov edx, 8802EDACh 0x00000019 cmp edx, FBBA1D1Eh 0x0000001f call 00007F030CBE3678h 0x00000024 jmp 00007F030CBE3C1Ah 0x00000026 test dh, ah 0x00000028 push esi 0x00000029 push edx 0x0000002a jmp 00007F030CBE3C1Eh 0x0000002c test bh, 00000007h 0x0000002f push ecx 0x00000030 jmp 00007F030CBE3C1Ah 0x00000032 cmp dh, ch 0x00000034 cmp eax, 00000539h 0x00000039 jne 00007F030CBE3C92h 0x0000003f jmp 00007F030CBE3C1Eh 0x00000041 cmp edi, 8CD470F3h 0x00000047 test dx, ax 0x0000004a test bh, dh 0x0000004c push 6DDB9555h 0x00000051 call 00007F030CBE3F42h 0x00000056 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h] 0x0000005c cmp cl, al 0x0000005e mov eax, dword ptr [eax+0Ch] 0x00000061 mov eax, dword ptr [eax+14h] 0x00000064 mov ecx, dword ptr [eax] 0x00000066 mov eax, ecx 0x00000068 cmp edx, 332BDEA8h 0x0000006e jmp 00007F030CBE3C2Bh 0x00000070 mov ebx, dword ptr [eax+28h] 0x00000073 cmp ebx, 00000000h 0x00000076 je 00007F030CBE3C29h 0x00000078 pushad 0x00000079 mov eax, 000000CAh 0x0000007e rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020E59D0 second address: 00000000020E59D0 instructions:

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe

Binary or memory string: C:\PROGRAM FILES\QEMU-GA\QEMU-GA.EXE

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020E5914 second address: 00000000020E596A instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 popad 0x00000003 cmp bx, ax 0x00000006 test ecx, ecx 0x00000008 test ax, dx 0x0000000b test bl, bl 0x0000000d jmp 00007F030C871BA2h 0x0000000f cmp cx, bx 0x00000012 push ss 0x00000013 pop ss 0x00000014 jmp 00007F030C871BA1h 0x00000016 pushad 0x00000017 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020E596A second address: 00000000020E5829 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 00000001h 0x00000007 cpuid 0x00000009 popad 0x0000000a cmp cl, al 0x0000000c mov eax, 00000539h 0x00000011 mov ecx, dword ptr [ebp+1Ch] 0x00000014 mov edx, 8802EDACh 0x00000019 cmp edx, FBBA1D1Eh 0x0000001f call 00007F030CBE3678h 0x00000024 jmp 00007F030CBE3C1Ah 0x00000026 test dh, ah 0x00000028 push esi 0x00000029 push edx 0x0000002a jmp 00007F030CBE3C1Eh 0x0000002c test bh, 00000007h 0x0000002f push ecx 0x00000030 jmp 00007F030CBE3C1Ah 0x00000032 cmp dh, ch 0x00000034 cmp eax, 00000539h 0x00000039 jne 00007F030CBE3C92h 0x0000003f jmp 00007F030CBE3C1Eh 0x00000041 cmp edi, 8CD470F3h 0x00000047 test dx, ax 0x0000004a test bh, dh 0x0000004c push 6DDB9555h 0x00000051 call 00007F030CBE3F42h 0x00000056 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h] 0x0000005c cmp cl, al 0x0000005e mov eax, dword ptr [eax+0Ch] 0x00000061 mov eax, dword ptr [eax+14h] 0x00000064 mov ecx, dword ptr [eax] 0x00000066 mov eax, ecx 0x00000068 cmp edx, 332BDEA8h 0x0000006e jmp 00007F030CBE3C2Bh 0x00000070 mov ebx, dword ptr [eax+28h] 0x00000073 cmp ebx, 00000000h 0x00000076 je 00007F030CBE3C29h 0x00000078 pushad 0x00000079 mov eax, 000000CAh 0x0000007e rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020E59D0 second address: 00000000020E59D0 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020E5EC3 second address: 00000000020E2FED instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a popad 0x0000000b test dx, ax 0x0000000e test edx, edx 0x00000010 ret 0x00000011 cmp si, 7336h 0x00000016 test bl, cl 0x00000018 call 00007F030CBE66FFh 0x0000001d cmp dx, ax 0x00000020 call 00007F030CBE3AF1h 0x00000025 cmp ebx, ecx 0x00000027 jmp 00007F030CBE3C22h 0x00000029 test ecx, 4D23117Ah 0x0000002f cmp dh, ch 0x00000031 xor edi, edi 0x00000033 test dx, dx 0x00000036 mov ecx, 00A95F60h 0x0000003b cmp ecx, 7DEA00C7h 0x00000041 test dl, al 0x00000043 cmp cl, cl 0x00000045 push ecx 0x00000046 cmp cx, 8097h 0x0000004b call 00007F030CBE3C3Dh 0x00000050 call 00007F030CBE3C39h 0x00000055 lfence 0x00000058 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x0000005e lfence 0x00000061 ret 0x00000062 mov esi, edx 0x00000064 pushad 0x00000065 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020E2FED second address: 00000000020E2FED instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor eax, eax 0x00000004 inc eax 0x00000005 cpuid 0x00000007 popad 0x00000008 call 00007F030C871BA9h 0x0000000d lfence 0x00000010 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000016 lfence 0x00000019 ret 0x0000001a sub edx, esi 0x0000001c ret 0x0000001d pop ecx 0x0000001e cmp eax, edx 0x00000020 add edi, edx 0x00000022 test cx, bx 0x00000025 dec ecx 0x00000026 cmp ecx, 00000000h 0x00000029 jne 00007F030C871B67h 0x0000002b cmp cl, cl 0x0000002d push ecx 0x0000002e cmp cx, 8097h 0x00000033 call 00007F030C871BBDh 0x00000038 call 00007F030C871BB9h 0x0000003d lfence 0x00000040 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000046 lfence 0x00000049 ret 0x0000004a mov esi, edx 0x0000004c pushad 0x0000004d rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe

Code function: 1_2_020E1616 rdtsc

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe

Binary or memory string: C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exe

Anti Debugging:

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 90% for more than 60s

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe

Code function: 1_2_020E1616 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E2E36 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E530A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E176F mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E1FCA mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E57D8 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E1FE0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E600D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E600B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	Code function: 1_2_020E1D52 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Source: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe, 00000001.00000002.725714003.0000000000C30000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe, 00000001.00000002.725714003.0000000000C30000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe, 00000001.00000002.725714003.0000000000C30000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe, 00000001.00000002.725714003.0000000000C30000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe

Code function: 1_2_020E56A5 cpuid

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Process Injection1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery511	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Process Injection1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Junk Data	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Binary Padding	NTDS	System Information Discovery311	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	42%	Virustotal		Browse
FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe	36%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.VBObfuse

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	357266
Start date:	24.02.2021
Start time:	11:03:49
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 6m 41s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	FAKTURA I UWAGI.bat (renamed file extension from bat to exe)
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	29
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal88.rans.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 23.1% (good quality ratio 14.5%) Quality average: 34.6% Quality standard deviation: 33.2%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): taskhostw.exe, MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, RuntimeBroker.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	4.798232487088525
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe
File size:	61440
MD5:	2c3b4c255d8d786535c4832f5b7f7c0e
SHA1:	3cc1d799b6f92a338cffa35d74d52b1c4f19a91e
SHA256:	46c474c38fd679025142a453fc46243a91e0820d4ab0449aab0bd92c29d0ee30
SHA512:	847d322ab76b98b24cc12c0591b2e4a8cf78afe8411e18aefc10eb1bc9824eb6251000a043403fc4ff6cebef523fbe3fd09554a2f442f1eea28ee25329a064e3
SSDEEP:	768:AZI4oR9Y0oIF+ik9FQGDMcZ7/R9hxIB6oRiU:lZR9FoIFo9FQgD1iVl
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........#...B...B...B..L^...B...`...B...d...B..Rich.B..........PE..L....[.P.....................0....................@................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	20047c7c70f0e004

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4012c4
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x509C5BCE [Fri Nov 9 01:26:38 2012 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f8fb5be8a6ea86fb9d04da61d8bfeb3a

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 004014F4h
call 00007F030C7AC163h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edx], ch
test dh, al

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0xc234	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0xf000	0x9ac	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x228	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0xd0	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0xb608	0xc000	False	0.456787109375	data	5.50676985986	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0xd000	0x118c	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0xf000	0x9ac	0x1000	False	0.180419921875	data	2.10150879762	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_ICON	0xf87c	0x130	data
RT_ICON	0xf594	0x2e8	data
RT_ICON	0xf46c	0x128	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0xf43c	0x30	data
RT_VERSION	0xf150	0x2ec	data	Hungarian	Hungary

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaVarMove, __vbaAryMove, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaFreeVarList, _adj_fdiv_m64, __vbaFreeObjList, _adj_fprem1, __vbaHresultCheckObj, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaAryDestruct, __vbaObjSet, _adj_fdiv_m16i, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaFpR8, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, _adj_fpatan, EVENT_SINK_Release, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaFPException, _CIlog, __vbaErrorOverflow, __vbaNew2, __vbaVar2Vec, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, __vbaStrCopy, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaVarTstNe, __vbaVarDup, _CIatan, __vbaCastObj, _allmul, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeObj, __vbaFreeStr

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x040e 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Copyright (C) AC
InternalName	dosissspiro
FileVersion	1.00
CompanyName	AC
LegalTrademarks	Copyright (C) AC
Comments	AC
ProductName	AC
ProductVersion	1.00
FileDescription	AC
OriginalFilename	dosissspiro.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
Hungarian	Hungary

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe PID: 6492 Parent PID: 5660

General

Start time:	11:04:36
Start date:	24/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	61440 bytes
MD5 hash:	2C3B4C255D8D786535C4832F5B7F7C0E
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Analysis Report FAKTURA I UWAGI.bat

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: FAKTURA I UWAGI.exe PID: 6492 Parent PID: 5660

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis