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Analysis Report EDITORIALIST.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	EDITORIALIST.exe
Analysis ID:	357302
MD5:	ea23d3d88f6e6084d4f52d02d261323c
SHA1:	27e0de4101e73e0df337c6dc0311d959dbf52416
SHA256:	9ac2741f888eefffdc8085798f5e381536f67dcebfbf5dac2e9e5bf580c03f9a
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	88
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected GuLoader

Contains functionality to hide a thread from the debugger

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after reading information in the PEB, e.g. number of processors)

Hides threads from debuggers

Tries to detect Any.run

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Writes to foreign memory regions

Checks if the current process is being debugged

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected potential crypto function

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Tries to load missing DLLs

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

EDITORIALIST.exe (PID: 6844 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe' MD5: EA23D3D88F6E6084D4F52D02D261323C)

RegAsm.exe (PID: 3480 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe' MD5: 6FD7592411112729BF6B1F2F6C34899F)

conhost.exe (PID: 6632 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000003.00000002.901451594.00000000013C0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: RegAsm.exe PID: 3480	JoeSecurity_GuLoader	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: EDITORIALIST.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 64%	Perma Link
Source: EDITORIALIST.exe	Metadefender: Detection: 18%	Perma Link
Source: EDITORIALIST.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 53%

Compliance:

Uses 32bit PE files

Show sources

Source: EDITORIALIST.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Networking:

Source: RegAsm.exe, 00000003.00000002.901440850.000000000138A000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=12mRKdfuIjRgrBa6
Source: RegAsm.exe, 00000003.00000002.901451594.00000000013C0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=12mRKdfuIjRgrBa6hq_a5ZmYgCYE2UePZ
Source: RegAsm.exe, 00000003.00000002.901451594.00000000013C0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=12mRKdfuIjRgrBa6hq_a5ZmYgCYE2UePZVRQ

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

Source: EDITORIALIST.exe, 00000000.00000002.832810382.000000000073A000.00000004.00000020.sdmp

Binary or memory string: <HOOK MODULE="DDRAW.DLL" FUNCTION="DirectDrawCreateEx"/>

System Summary:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A8066D NtSetInformationThread,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C4F19 NtSetInformationThread,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C5398 NtProtectVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C57D9 NtQueryInformationProcess,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C04F2 EnumWindows,NtSetInformationThread,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C5736 NtProtectVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C595C NtQueryInformationProcess,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C05B2 NtSetInformationThread,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C05A5 NtSetInformationThread,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C59A3 NtQueryInformationProcess,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C57F5 NtQueryInformationProcess,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C59D3 NtQueryInformationProcess,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C0616 NtSetInformationThread,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C1275 NtSetInformationThread,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C5843 NtQueryInformationProcess,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C58A2 NtQueryInformationProcess,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C58F8 NtQueryInformationProcess,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_00401869
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040181C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040162D
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A844EC
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A8503C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A82834
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A84BF6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A83B28
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A83938
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A84568

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

Section loaded: sfc.dll

Source: EDITORIALIST.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal88.troj.evad.winEXE@4/0@0/1

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6632:120:WilError_01

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\~DF540D32BF41CC60EC.TMP

Jump to behavior

Source: EDITORIALIST.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: EDITORIALIST.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 64%
Source: EDITORIALIST.exe	Metadefender: Detection: 18%
Source: EDITORIALIST.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 53%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe'

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.901451594.00000000013C0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: RegAsm.exe PID: 3480, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_00404A09 push FFFFFFF6h; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_00407088 push ds; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_004070B3 push ds; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_00404744 push ds; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_004029FF push ss; retn 00EAh
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A854EF push ecx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A82016 push AA40AF08h; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A82B9A push edi; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A817F2 push cs; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A8552C push ecx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A85520 push ecx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A80D08 push ds; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C3900 push ebp; iretd

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe

RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002A82737 second address: 0000000002A82737 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor eax, eax 0x00000004 inc eax 0x00000005 cpuid 0x00000007 popad 0x00000008 call 00007FBB34455758h 0x0000000d lfence 0x00000010 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000016 lfence 0x00000019 ret 0x0000001a sub edx, esi 0x0000001c ret 0x0000001d nop 0x0000001e cmp dx, dx 0x00000021 pop ecx 0x00000022 add edi, edx 0x00000024 dec ecx 0x00000025 cmp ecx, 00000000h 0x00000028 jne 00007FBB3445573Bh 0x0000002a test ebx, edx 0x0000002c cmp dh, bh 0x0000002e push ecx 0x0000002f call 00007FBB3445576Bh 0x00000034 call 00007FBB34455768h 0x00000039 lfence 0x0000003c mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000042 lfence 0x00000045 ret 0x00000046 mov esi, edx 0x00000048 pushad 0x00000049 rdtsc

Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after reading information in the PEB, e.g. number of processors)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

Evasive API call chain: GetPEB, DecisionNodes, Sleep

Tries to detect Any.run

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	File opened: C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	File opened: C:\Program Files\qga\qga.exe
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	File opened: C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exe
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	File opened: C:\Program Files\qga\qga.exe

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: EDITORIALIST.exe, 00000000.00000002.832822433.0000000000751000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VC:\PROGRAM FILES\QEMU-GA\QEMU-GA.EXEAH
Source: EDITORIALIST.exe, 00000000.00000002.832822433.0000000000751000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: U-GA\QEMU-GA.EXE-
Source: RegAsm.exe	Binary or memory string: C:\PROGRAM FILES\QEMU-GA\QEMU-GA.EXE

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002A82737 second address: 0000000002A82737 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor eax, eax 0x00000004 inc eax 0x00000005 cpuid 0x00000007 popad 0x00000008 call 00007FBB34455758h 0x0000000d lfence 0x00000010 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000016 lfence 0x00000019 ret 0x0000001a sub edx, esi 0x0000001c ret 0x0000001d nop 0x0000001e cmp dx, dx 0x00000021 pop ecx 0x00000022 add edi, edx 0x00000024 dec ecx 0x00000025 cmp ecx, 00000000h 0x00000028 jne 00007FBB3445573Bh 0x0000002a test ebx, edx 0x0000002c cmp dh, bh 0x0000002e push ecx 0x0000002f call 00007FBB3445576Bh 0x00000034 call 00007FBB34455768h 0x00000039 lfence 0x0000003c mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000042 lfence 0x00000045 ret 0x00000046 mov esi, edx 0x00000048 pushad 0x00000049 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002A828D0 second address: 0000000002A828D0 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a ret 0x0000000b mov esi, edx 0x0000000d pushad 0x0000000e xor eax, eax 0x00000010 inc eax 0x00000011 cpuid 0x00000013 bt ecx, 1Fh 0x00000017 jc 00007FBB34B4F258h 0x0000001d popad 0x0000001e call 00007FBB34B4CFCBh 0x00000023 lfence 0x00000026 rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000013C28D0 second address: 00000000013C28D0 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a ret 0x0000000b mov esi, edx 0x0000000d pushad 0x0000000e xor eax, eax 0x00000010 inc eax 0x00000011 cpuid 0x00000013 bt ecx, 1Fh 0x00000017 jc 00007FBB34457A68h 0x0000001d popad 0x0000001e call 00007FBB344557DBh 0x00000023 lfence 0x00000026 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe

Code function: 0_2_02A857D9 rdtsc

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe TID: 6304

Thread sleep time: -2330000s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed

Source: EDITORIALIST.exe, 00000000.00000002.832822433.0000000000751000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vC:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exeAh
Source: RegAsm.exe	Binary or memory string: C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exe
Source: EDITORIALIST.exe, 00000000.00000002.832822433.0000000000751000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: u-ga\qemu-ga.exe-

Anti Debugging:

Contains functionality to hide a thread from the debugger

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

Code function: 3_2_013C4F19 NtSetInformationThread 000000FE,00000011,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,?,00000000,00000000,00000020,00000040,013C064E,00000000,00000000,00000000

Hides threads from debuggers

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Thread information set: HideFromDebugger
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Thread information set: HideFromDebugger

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe	Process queried: DebugPort
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process queried: DebugPort

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe

Code function: 0_2_02A857D9 rdtsc

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

Code function: 3_2_013C2C7B LdrInitializeThunk,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C4F19 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C490B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C13A2 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C41C4 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C1A3F mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C1A39 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 3_2_013C260C mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Writes to foreign memory regions

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe

Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe base: 13C0000

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe'

Source: RegAsm.exe, 00000003.00000002.904217090.0000000001D00000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: RegAsm.exe, 00000003.00000002.904217090.0000000001D00000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: RegAsm.exe, 00000003.00000002.904217090.0000000001D00000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: RegAsm.exe, 00000003.00000002.904217090.0000000001D00000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Native API1	DLL Side-Loading1	Process Injection112	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion22	Input Capture1	Security Software Discovery621	Remote Services	Input Capture1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	DLL Side-Loading1	Process Injection112	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion22	Remote Desktop Protocol	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Junk Data	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	DLL Side-Loading1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	NTDS	System Information Discovery21	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Software Packing	LSA Secrets	Remote System Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
EDITORIALIST.exe	64%	Virustotal		Browse
EDITORIALIST.exe	22%	Metadefender		Browse
EDITORIALIST.exe	54%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Vebzenpak

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious

Private

IP
192.168.2.1

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	357302
Start date:	24.02.2021
Start time:	12:31:12
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 5m 3s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	EDITORIALIST.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	15
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal88.troj.evad.winEXE@4/0@0/1
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 25.9% (good quality ratio 8.6%) Quality average: 21% Quality standard deviation: 28.4%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 72% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 13.88.21.125, 168.61.161.212, 52.255.188.83, 104.43.193.48, 51.11.168.160, 52.155.217.156, 142.250.74.206, 20.54.26.129, 93.184.221.240, 92.122.213.194, 92.122.213.247 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): arc.msn.com.nsatc.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, arc.msn.com, wu.azureedge.net, db5eap.displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, audownload.windowsupdate.nsatc.net, cs11.wpc.v0cdn.net, hlb.apr-52dd2-0.edgecastdns.net, drive.google.com, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, watson.telemetry.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, wu.wpc.apr-52dd2.edgecastdns.net, au-bg-shim.trafficmanager.net, displaycatalog-europeeap.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, displaycatalog-rp-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, wu.ec.azureedge.net, displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, skypedataprdcolcus17.cloudapp.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, skypedataprdcolcus15.cloudapp.net, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, skypedataprdcoleus17.cloudapp.net, blobcollector.events.data.trafficmanager.net, skypedataprdcolwus15.cloudapp.net, displaycatalog-rp.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
12:32:39	API Interceptor	234x Sleep call for process: RegAsm.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.491215363505321
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	EDITORIALIST.exe
File size:	73728
MD5:	ea23d3d88f6e6084d4f52d02d261323c
SHA1:	27e0de4101e73e0df337c6dc0311d959dbf52416
SHA256:	9ac2741f888eefffdc8085798f5e381536f67dcebfbf5dac2e9e5bf580c03f9a
SHA512:	4e1093446b70e90ad996f670dcdfc1c290a4918ce0078018f43a54ae7d758b52256d74b79afcc3e4350758fb9d37ef34bdf95acbc9d9c43fa8c7b79e6a8cac10
SSDEEP:	1536:LlDDBbvO0nX3NKan/Pn+wB/7sUZ6nYxVSJwD:LlRbvP4a/Pn+wB/7sE6n0ww
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......O.......................D.......=.......Rich............PE..L......I.....................0....................@................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	1e74f2ea62e4a082

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x401494
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x49F80296 [Wed Apr 29 07:32:38 2009 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	b84199caadebcbcd5f63d7b7de7ff518

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 0040A02Ch
call 00007FBB34A59F43h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
dec eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ebx+eax*8-49h], dh
jnle 00007FBB34A59EFEh
jnc 00007FBB34A59F12h
dec edx
sahf
aaa
mov eax, dword ptr [2AE23EC9h]
aaa
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add dword ptr [eax], eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc ecx
add byte ptr [esi], al
push eax
xchg eax, ebx
add dl, byte ptr [edx+61h]
imul ebp, dword ptr fs:[edi+61h], 7669746Bh
imul esi, dword ptr [ebp+74h], 00003973h
add byte ptr [eax], al
mov byte ptr [ecx+000002F5h], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
dec esp
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
or dword ptr [edi], esi
aaa
mov bl, 8Fh
xlatb
bound esp, dword ptr [ebx+5FD6B04Dh]

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0xf0a4	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x12000	0xc14	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x228	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x150	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0xe644	0xf000	False	0.395735677083	data	6.0319053756	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x10000	0x1218	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x12000	0xc14	0x1000	False	0.265625	data	2.90807398724	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_ICON	0x1236c	0x8a8	data
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x12358	0x14	data
RT_VERSION	0x120f0	0x268	MS Windows COFF Motorola 68000 object file	English	United States

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaVarMove, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaLenBstr, __vbaFreeVarList, _adj_fdiv_m64, __vbaFreeObjList, _adj_fprem1, __vbaStrCat, __vbaSetSystemError, __vbaHresultCheckObj, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaAryDestruct, __vbaVarForInit, __vbaObjSet, _adj_fdiv_m16i, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaFpR8, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaGenerateBoundsError, __vbaStrCmp, __vbaAryConstruct2, __vbaVarTstEq, DllFunctionCall, _adj_fpatan, __vbaLateIdCallLd, EVENT_SINK_Release, __vbaUI1I2, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, __vbaStrToUnicode, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaFPException, __vbaStrVarVal, _CIlog, __vbaErrorOverflow, __vbaNew2, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, __vbaStrCopy, __vbaFreeStrList, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaVarTstNe, __vbaI4Var, __vbaVarAdd, __vbaLateMemCall, __vbaStrToAnsi, __vbaVarDup, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, _allmul, _CItan, __vbaVarForNext, _CIexp, __vbaFreeStr, __vbaFreeObj

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0409 0x04b0
InternalName	EDITORIALIST
FileVersion	1.00
CompanyName	Log
ProductName	Log Inverter
ProductVersion	1.00
FileDescription	Log Inverter
OriginalFilename	EDITORIALIST.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Feb 24, 2021 12:31:47.708350897 CET	54531	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:31:47.760413885 CET	53	54531	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:31:52.282634974 CET	49714	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:31:52.331716061 CET	53	49714	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:31:53.790827036 CET	58028	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:31:53.840087891 CET	53	58028	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:31:55.388139963 CET	53097	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:31:55.440083027 CET	53	53097	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:31:56.313851118 CET	49257	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:31:56.362849951 CET	53	49257	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:31:57.085041046 CET	62389	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:31:57.136831045 CET	53	62389	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:31:58.418967962 CET	49910	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:31:58.469599009 CET	53	49910	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:00.122687101 CET	55854	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:00.174709082 CET	53	55854	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:01.283230066 CET	64549	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:01.335375071 CET	53	64549	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:05.093066931 CET	63153	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:05.142034054 CET	53	63153	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:06.300709009 CET	52991	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:06.349524975 CET	53	52991	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:07.340379953 CET	53700	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:07.392235994 CET	53	53700	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:08.281455994 CET	51726	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:08.346898079 CET	53	51726	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:12.288232088 CET	56794	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:12.350832939 CET	53	56794	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:14.024910927 CET	56534	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:14.073790073 CET	53	56534	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:15.024653912 CET	56627	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:15.076423883 CET	53	56627	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:15.885713100 CET	56621	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:15.934597969 CET	53	56621	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:17.145350933 CET	63116	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:17.194421053 CET	53	63116	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:20.857116938 CET	64078	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:20.909058094 CET	53	64078	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:37.891499996 CET	64801	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:37.949184895 CET	53	64801	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:38.987286091 CET	61721	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:39.051724911 CET	53	61721	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:39.538017988 CET	51255	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:39.608546972 CET	53	51255	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:39.668736935 CET	61522	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:39.730603933 CET	53	61522	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:40.193236113 CET	52337	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:40.258877039 CET	53	52337	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:40.748047113 CET	55046	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:40.810791969 CET	53	55046	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:40.888029099 CET	49612	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:40.967439890 CET	53	49612	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:41.350810051 CET	49285	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:41.413418055 CET	53	49285	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:42.080142021 CET	50601	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:42.129075050 CET	53	50601	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:42.844948053 CET	60875	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:42.852648973 CET	56448	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:42.893976927 CET	53	60875	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:42.901678085 CET	53	56448	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:43.832237005 CET	59172	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:43.881315947 CET	53	59172	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:44.319447041 CET	62420	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:44.369136095 CET	53	62420	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:56.550116062 CET	60579	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:56.599226952 CET	53	60579	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:56.608593941 CET	50183	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:32:56.680665016 CET	53	50183	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:33:01.436084986 CET	61531	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:33:01.494746923 CET	53	61531	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:33:31.898732901 CET	49228	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:33:31.948085070 CET	53	49228	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Feb 24, 2021 12:33:33.869833946 CET	59794	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:33:33.936659098 CET	53	59794	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: EDITORIALIST.exe PID: 6844 Parent PID: 5996

General

Start time:	12:31:54
Start date:	24/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	73728 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA23D3D88F6E6084D4F52D02D261323C
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: RegAsm.exe PID: 3480 Parent PID: 6844

General

Start time:	12:32:21
Start date:	24/02/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\EDITORIALIST.exe'
Imagebase:	0xfe0000
File size:	64616 bytes
MD5 hash:	6FD7592411112729BF6B1F2F6C34899F
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 00000003.00000002.901451594.00000000013C0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 6632 Parent PID: 3480

General

Start time:	12:32:21
Start date:	24/02/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff724c50000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Adversaries may take advantage of vague references in the library manifest of a program by replacing a legitimate library with a malicious one, causing the operating system to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Analysis Report EDITORIALIST.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

Public

Private

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: EDITORIALIST.exe PID: 6844 Parent PID: 5996

General

Analysis Process: RegAsm.exe PID: 3480 Parent PID: 6844

General

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 6632 Parent PID: 3480

General

Disassembly